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ABSTRACT 
 
 In Singapore the state defines the parameters of ‘ethnic’ identity on the basis 
of the ideology of multiracialism, in which any particular ‘ethnic’ identity is 
subsumed under national identity and permitted expression in cultural and economic, 
but not political, terms.  Multiracialism’s appeal for the state as well as for its citizens 
lies in its objective: social cohesion between and equality for the four officially 
recognized ‘racial’ groups.  Nevertheless, from the viewpoint of the ‘Indian’ 
community, this thesis demonstrates how the multiple layers of meaning given to the 
doctrine and practice of multiracialism by various social actors and their interactions 
create tensions and contestations in reconciling ‘ethnic’ and national identity.  Public 
expression of ‘ethnic’ politics is considered by the state as subversive towards the 
nation, although the state itself implements its ideology through a stringent regime of 
‘racial’ management directed at every aspect of a Singaporean’s social, cultural, 
economic and political life. 
  The thesis addresses important issues involving ‘racial’ and ‘ethnic’ identity, 
modes of ‘ethnic’ interaction and nation building in the multiethnic and globalised 
context of Singapore in general and in ‘Little India’ in particular.  This area, though 
theoretically democratic in nature, is embedded in state-civil society power relations, 
with the state setting the agenda for ‘ethnic’ maintenance and identity.  My research 
interviews demonstrate the dominating and hegemonic power of the state, its 
paternalistic governance, and its wide network of social control mechanisms 
organizing ‘ethnicity’ in Singapore.  The historical decision, made firstly by the 
British colonial administration and thereafter perpetuated by the nation state, to make 
‘race’ the basis of all social classification has had far-reaching consequences.  With 
the postcolonial state wishing to be the sole authority over ‘ethnic’ practices and 
discourse, Singaporeans’ lives have been heavily conditioned by its impact, which I 
argue resembles to some extent the ‘divide and rule’ policy of the colonial regime.   
 ‘Race’ as the structuring principle and accepted reality of Singapore society 
since colonial days is so entrenched that it has been essentialised and institutionalised 
by the state as well as by the people in contemporary Singapore.  The terms ‘race’ and 
‘ethnicity’ are used interchangeably and synonymously in daily usage, though “race” 
is preferred by political leaders, academics and the population at large.  I will argue 
that with ‘race’ as the reference point ethnic communities that migrated from China, 
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India and other places became socially, culturally and economically segregated and 
polarised from colonial days to such an extent that extensive stereotypes and 
prejudices have fed on their lives.  Such perspectives have led to differing 
constructions of national identity discourses presented by the nation state based on its 
objectives of ‘racial’ integration, economic development and national identity.  By 
way of interview and survey material I demonstrate that ‘race’, ethnicity and national 
identity as defined and managed by the state have not only been inextricably linked in 
the everyday lives of Singaporeans but more importantly they have resulted in a 
resurgence of ethnic consciousness in the last three decades or so, thereby 
undermining the state’s attempts at national identity.  My findings are based on 
responses by Singaporean Indians to various social engineering policies employed by 
the state as strategies for integrating the diverse ethnic groups and anchored on the 
ideologies of multiracialism, multiculturalism, multilingualism, multireligiosity and 
meritocracy.  My respondents perceive that these policies are not proactive in 
fostering ‘racial’ integration because of growing social and economic inequalities 
brought about by the collision of ethnic and national identities with ‘race’.  They feel 
that the government has strayed from its declared goal of ‘multiracialism’, 
emphasized all along as critical to the strength, stability and growth of the nation.  
Such a situation, they argue, does not augur well for a common national identity that 
remains elusive in the eyes and minds of Singaporeans.   
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FROM COLONIAL SEGREGATION TO POSTCOLONIAL ‘INTEGRATION’ 
– CONSTRUCTING ETHNIC DIFFERENCE THROUGH SINGAPORE’S 
LITTLE INDIA AND THE SINGAPORE ‘INDIAN’ 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Thesis Argument 
        Singapore’s “Little India”, appears to take one back in history, to another time 
and, it would seem, another place.  At first glance, “Little India” is everything its 
name suggests: a miniscule fragment of the vast Indian sub-continent in the globalised 
city-state of Singapore.  The pattern of living here resembles that constructed in 
modern India.  Yet ‘Little India’ today is significantly different from the squalid 
Indian ‘ethnic’ kampung (or village in Malay) of the colonial days because of the 
explosion of global forces and the evolution of the nation state which has ordered its 
historical and commercial transformation after independence in 1965, and particularly 
since the 1980s when it became designated as a heritage zone deserving conservation 
status and the popular name of ‘Little India’.  A diminutive term designed both to 
preserve and contain its Indian ‘ethnic’ past, ‘Little India’ has been treated by the 
state as a public space catering to the gaze of tourists and Singaporeans alike in its 
management of ethnic consciousness juxtaposed with the creation of a common 
national identity through the ideology of multiculturalism.  While this Indian ethnic  
environment has been fostered  by the British in colonial terms, the Singapore nation 
state endeavours to supervise, and perhaps more importantly, to instill in its residents 
a sense of ‘multiracial’ and national identity, cultural values, the mutual help system, 
the protection of Indian sub-groups and the distinction of the whole Indian community 
from other ‘racial’ groups.  However, what is not obvious is that Little India could, as 
my research shows, be considered a façade that masks the prevalence of ‘racial’ 
politics in Singapore as a whole.  
 This thesis interrogates the construction of ethnic difference in Singapore from 
the colonial era to the present, with special emphasis on the Singapore ‘Indian’ in the 
context of Little India.  I will argue that the calling of the Indian area of Singapore 
‘Little India’ in the postcolonial period is a mode of retelling the British colonial 
narrative.  At the same time it articulates the ideological agenda of an independent 
nation state of Singapore.  I will argue that the relationship between these two 
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narratives is marked by a continuum of ‘racial’ politics directed towards achieving 
hegemony, which has been the basic intent of both the colonial and postcolonial state.  
The ‘racial’ politics begun by the British in the colonial period has continued in the 
form of a dominant postcolonial discourse that attempts to reconcile the ideals of 
national integration and a state-controlled Singaporean identity via the construction, 
maintenance and celebration of ethnic difference. However the perceived domination 
of one racial group – the Chinese – creates among the remaining racial minorities a 
sometimes explicit, sometimes implicit knowledge (both intellectual and emotional) 
of the contradictions and discriminations attending multiracialism and its constant 
reiteration by the Singapore government.  This knowledge will be explored with 
particular reference to Little India and the Singapore ‘Indian’.     
 I assume in this study that there are multiple layers of meaning attaching to the 
social production and construction of space in the world of the Singapore ‘Indian’.  
Different social actors like the state, Singaporeans, tourists, Indian migrants and other 
ethnic groups have combined to shape present-day ‘Little India’.  These actors have 
invested it with meanings, feelings and emotions interwoven with the passage of 
history associated with the place, its community and identity.  The built environment 
of postcolonial ‘Little India’ has therefore become a terrain of contestation and 
negotiation between various groups that access or occupy it.  Their different 
constructions give us a better understanding of how, in the words of Setha Low, 
“public space in urban society becomes semiotically encoded and interpreted 
reality”.1  They also demonstrate that linkages between place, history, community and 
identities have always been and continue to be ideologically charged in the spatial 
organization of the Singaporean city-state.  Because spatial experiences differ 
according to one’s perspective, this thesis also attempts to uncover the intricacies of 
these interactions by exploring the problematic and complicated nature of identities in 
the context of diaspora conflicts among Indians in the ‘multiracial’ and globalised 
nation state of Singapore.   
 In exploration of my arguments, I probe, by way of historical research, 
interviews and survey fieldwork, the way Singapore Indians relate to and articulate 
their sense of ethnic identity and belonging in relation to the process of national 
integration and national identity pursued in the various policy initiatives of the state, 
                                        
1  Setha M Low, “Spatialising Culture: The Social Production and Social Construction of Public Space 
in Costa Rica,” American Ethnologist 23, 4 (1996): 861-879. 
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bearing in mind the conflicts, contestations and tensions that confront Indians as they 
go about their daily co-existence with members of other ethnic groups in a multiracial, 
multicultural, multireligious and multilingual setting.  In focusing on the sensitive 
theme of ‘race’ politics that began with the colonial administration and has been since 
perpetuated by the nation state, I aim to offer a perspective on Singapore’s ‘racial’ 
politics from the point of view of the minority Indian community in Singapore.2   Far 
from any desire to articulate a critique of the nation state’s social engineering policies 
for the mere sake of doing so, my thesis grows out of the candid views of the Indians 
about these policies and highlights the continuing and ongoing discourse of ‘race’ and 
ethnicity that has pervaded the ideologies governing the various strategies and policy 
initiatives of the state as well as the everyday lives of the Indian community.  Any 
criticism arising from the responses of interviewees is therefore offered in a 
constructive spirit and not meant to cast aspersions of any sort on the state, its 
agencies or any of the communities residing on the island, much less detract from the 
nation’s phenomenal economic achievements. 
 In pursuing my research, I have been encouraged and indeed inspired by 
repeated calls from senior government leaders in the last fifteen years that the state 
welcomes greater public consultation, dialogue and openness.  Acknowledging that it 
had “no monopoly of knowledge and ideas”, and that there was a compelling 
necessity to heed people’s emotions and sincere feedback on government policies, the 
state is beginning to reinvent itself by agreeing that society needs to open up further 
so as to ensure greater stability and economic dynamism in the years to come.3  It is 
conceded by many in Singapore that the perceived ‘fear factor’ had hitherto prevented 
ordinary Singaporeans from expressing themselves freely in civic engagement.  The 
state’s paternalistic approach in fostering an effective and efficient management of 
society had resulted in apparent political apathy as Singaporeans rely on the 
government to solve most of their problems.  Weaned on a diet of material rewards, 
                                        
2    Here it is pertinent for me to emphasise that when one considers the position of Singapore Indians 
and the problems they face, one inevitably thinks chiefly of the Tamils (and to a lesser extent the 
better-educated and more affluent Malayalees) who constitute the major Indian group. In fact the 
Tamils themselves believe that they alone constitute and represent Singapore’s Indian community, 
especially with Tamil being one of Singapore’s official languages. Tamil is therefore supposed to 
represent the Indian population in Singapore. While most of my interviewees are Tamils, I have 
ensured that ‘expatriate’ Indians and other local sub-ethnic groups are also suitably represented. 
  
3  From a speech by former Deputy Prime Minister and now Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong at the 
Harvard Club’s 35th anniversary dinner on 6 January 2004, as reported in The Straits Times of 7 
January 2004.  
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many people find it easy to blame the government instead of coming forward with 
constructive ideas.  Motivated by the state’s new positive approach to topical issues, I 
have therefore embarked on the task of identifying the Indian response to ‘racial’ 
politics simply because no comprehensive literature exists on this sensitive topic.  
            What is important in the context of my thesis is how the various social 
engineering policies affect Singaporeans as they experience, perceive and negotiate 
the state’s construction of their ethnic identity in relation to the nationalist imperative.  
Their views and responses can help us better understand how their lives are shaped by 
these issues.  Though there has been growing open and public discourses on ‘race’ 
and ethnicity in the past two decades or so, such discourses have been dominated by 
political and community leaders.  Moreover, one could detect a distinct reluctance, 
and even refusal, of mainstream studies to engage with issues of ‘race’ and ethnicity.  
The Indian presence has been researched in specific areas, but the ways in which 
Singapore Indians negotiate their ethnic identity in relation to national identity has 
never been documented.  Moreover, while the ‘desire’ or ‘will’ of the ethnic groups 
has been repeatedly rationalized and articulated by the state to justify the 
implementation of official policies, little has been known or written about the feelings 
of Singapore Indians about these policies.  My thesis aims to redress this gap and 
generate a scholarly discourse in this minefield of ‘racial’ politics. 
 
Research Methodology and Fieldwork Experiences 
Competing discourses on race and ethnicity shaped my research strategies.  In 
seeking to achieve the objectives of my thesis I adopted a variety of approaches.  My 
research methodology incorporated a range of ethnographic research techniques, 
including the traditional historical research, questionnaire surveys (to provide broad-
based quantitative data for analysis), participant observation, qualitative research in 
the form of both structured and unstructured interviews, and focus group interviews 
with a representative sample of groups and individuals interacting in the specific site 
of ‘Little India’ – a site that reveals varying landscapes, among which are Housing 
Board estates, shops, markets, hawker stalls, restaurants, parks, a community centre, 
places of worship (including a church, several Hindu temples and a mosque), 
prostitution, gambling (areas in back lanes), schools and modes of transport.  Most of 
my interviews took place in this area though there were occasions when I conducted 
my fieldwork interviews outside the ‘comfort zone’.  My respondents included 
 6
Indians amongst whom were government officials, employees of state agencies and 
NGOs, professionals, journalists, tourists, retail merchants, expatriates, imported 
labourers, artists, politicians and other interest groups.  Although this thesis is mainly 
an exploration of the Indian presence in Singapore in relation to the ‘racial’ politics of 
the colonial and postcolonial governments, I have also considered it appropriate to 
seek some responses from members of the other ethnic minority communities residing 
in Singapore as well as from the dominant community for the purpose of fullness and 
balance.   
Let me now introduce my own orientation and positionality into the thesis and 
enumerate some interesting fieldwork experiences.  An ethnic Indian, with parents 
migrating from India before the Second World War, I was born in what was then 
colonial Malaya and partly educated there in my early years.  Subsequently I moved 
to British Singapore with my parents to continue my education and spent most of my 
life in post-colonial Singapore, working for the state there.  My background is 
therefore that of an ‘insider’ as well as ‘outsider’, as I now live and study in New 
Zealand.  Such a background also gives special meaning and significance to my 
research as I grew up in both the colonial and post-colonial periods of Singapore’s 
history.  My personal experiences have been the single most influential factor that 
inspired me to embark on this research, which has therefore opened up space for me 
to explore my own identity and ethnicity.   Growing up and living amongst people of 
different ethnic backgrounds, I had always tried to reconcile my own ethnicity with 
the issue of ‘race’, though during my school days I was not made aware that I 
belonged to a particular ‘race’ and that I looked different from my peers.  For this 
reason I have also decided to use myself as a source of information.  But I hope my 
own voice adds to the mix and does not dominate the analysis, although I recognize of 
course that the thesis is mine and that other voices are mediated by my own.   
What strikes me as significant is the fact that there is a serious dearth of 
documented literature about people’s responses, experiences and perceptions on the 
theme of ‘race’ and ethnicity in Singapore.  But, as I shall demonstrate in my thesis, 
this is hardly surprising given the ‘regulated’ atmosphere of the colonial regime as 
well as the independent nation, and the censorship directed to the talking about issues 
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of ‘race’ and ethnicity in public.4  There is therefore a need to reconcile the 
documented and official political discourse on the one hand, and people’s social and 
cultural experiences on the other.  The importance of such reconciliation cannot be 
overemphasized and I have therefore striven to relate peoples’ candid responses and 
views to the state’s ‘race’-based social engineering initiatives in as comprehensive a 
manner as possible.  It will become clear that my interviewees’ responses reflect the 
conflicts of an official rhetoric that seeks to reconcile the ideal of a common national 
identity and national integration with the celebration of ethnic difference and ethnic 
identity founded on the localized connotations attached to the colonial concept of 
‘race’.   
 Capturing these silent but powerful experiences of ordinary Singaporeans 
enables the production of rich cultural and historical insights not otherwise obtainable 
from documented sources in the context of Singapore’s official image.  Alvin Tan 
reiterates that “the existence of multiple histories can only strengthen Singapore 
historiography as a whole”, while Thomson in The Voice of the Past: Oral History 
argues that a more realistic understanding and reconstruction of history results from 
recording the experiences of ordinary people who are normally ignored in published 
accounts.  In his words, “oral history offers a challenge to the accepted myths of 
history, to the authoritarian judgement inherent in its traditions…”5  Passerini 
analyses oral history in similar vein:  
The raw material of oral history consists not just in factual statements, but is 
pre-eminently an expression and representation of culture, and therefore 
includes not only literal narratives, but also the dimensions of memory, 
ideology and subconscious desires.6
                                        
4  The government frequently warns the public not to stir up distrust and enmity between the ‘races’ by 
uttering racist remarks. With the emphasis that race, language and religion remain sensitive issues in 
Singapore, the government is concerned that racist remarks send a “very wrong signal to all minorities 
in Singapore”. (Speech by Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong on 17 September 2005, as reported in The 
Straits Times of 18 September 2005). 
 
5  Alvin Tan Peng Hong, “‘Allowing Dissonance’ in Rethinking History – New Approaches and Tools 
in Understanding the Past,” The Historical Journal (1998) (NUS Historical Society); Paul Richard 
Thomson, The Voice of the Past: Oral History (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 
8, 21. 
 
6  Luisa Passerini, “Work Ideology and Consensus under Italian Fascism,” 8 History Workshop Journal 
(Autumn 1979): 82-108. 
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My fieldwork in Singapore therefore proceeded from an anthropological 
angle, seeking to listen to, observe and understand people in their relevant social and 
cultural contexts.  In this scenario, I was perfectly aware of my ‘insider’ and 
‘outsider’ status and the ethnic identity to which I belong.  This ‘insider’/ ‘outsider’ 
boundary was constantly reinforced and contested during my fieldwork as it involved 
the sensitive question of power relationships.  This was prompted by the assumption 
that being an ‘insider’ I would have the ‘appropriate’ cultural knowledge and thus a 
more correct understanding of the experiences of the participants as opposed to an 
‘outsider’ who may lack the inner access to specific cultural knowledge.7  Yet I also 
realized I was not just an “insider”, but someone with a complex set of multiple 
identities.  Both my participants and I were reflections of the varied fragmentations 
that thrive within the ‘Indian’ community.  However, participants had different 
historical experiences from mine, which allowed them scope to make distinctions.  
“But you are different from me”, or “My background is different from yours”, or 
“You were not born in India like me”, only made my ‘outsider’ position more evident.  
With this awkwardly unique position of being an ethnic insider-outsider as well as 
local-foreign (living and working in Singapore though born and partly educated in 
Malaysia, but now living and studying in New Zealand), I proceeded to negotiate and 
manipulate my multi-faceted situation so as to ensure a meaningful outcome of my 
research.  Of course my personal and professional background as well as gender also 
impacted upon my fieldwork as I interviewed people from the varied strata of 
Singapore society.  In short, I had to build a social relationship with my informants so 
as to elicit their cooperation and trust.   
Although oral sources of information about issues of the day circulate in 
Singapore through private conversations between family members and friends, it is 
quite a different story when people are asked to air their views ‘in public’.  While 
researching primary documentary resources and historical material at the National 
University of Singapore (NUS), I realized that many senior faculty, while extending 
their cooperation, preferred not to get involved in contemporary ‘racial’ politics.  
Officials of government organizations were also not keen to discuss my project in a 
proactive way.  Several e-mails and letters written to these organizations remained 
                                        
7  G Valentine, “People Like Us: Negotiating Sameness and Difference in Research Process”, in 
Feminist Geography in Practice, Research and Methods, ed. P Moss (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 
2002), 116-126. 
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unanswered.  I consider this unusual because government organisations in Singapore, 
of which I was a part during my service days in Singapore, have an enviable 
reputation for efficiency and promptness in dealing with the public.  In the end, I had 
to literally knock on their doors, only to be referred to junior officers who were not 
much help.  On the other hand, some government agencies, like the Urban Renewal 
Authority, Singapore Tourism Board, National University of Singapore Central 
Library, National Library Board and National Archives were more cooperative and 
helpful.  Senior broadcast, TV and print media personnel were also not prepared to 
speak to me.  Prominent citizens, Members of Parliament, people in senior 
Government positions, and those in the elite list of the Who’s Who in Singapore were 
reluctant to be interviewed and have their comments recorded on audiotape.  Citing 
reasons like work pressure and lack of time, the few who did agree preferred to record 
their views by electronic means like e-mail, but only on the condition of anonymity 
and confidentiality.  Such behaviour on the part of the Singapore public stems from a 
generally perceived climate of fear that prevails in attitudes towards speaking out on 
controversial or ‘sensitive’ topics.  This in part explains why inhabitants’ social 
construction of Singapore has not been sufficiently researched.    Interestingly, those 
who were most forthcoming with their views and perceptions were men/women-in-
the-street Singaporeans who had a story to tell, but again who did so only on the 
guarantee of confidentiality and anonymity.  I have respected this by changing the 
names of the respondents and interviewees for the purpose of this thesis.   
In pursuing fieldwork, I encountered many interesting episodes, such as in the 
case of a local Indian shopper who strolled up to me and asked if I was an Indian 
tourist as he saw me taking photographs in ‘Little India’s Serangoon Road with its 
refurbished and quaint shophouses situated in narrow alleys.  In another instance I 
was gazing at the awesome skyline of Singapore from the 18th floor of a HDB block 
of flats in Serangoon Road, when another Indian resident rushed up to me to ask if he 
could be of any assistance.  Only when I assured him that all was fine with me was he 
relieved as he had feared that I was contemplating suicide.  I used such encounters to 
strike up fruitful conversations and their resulting contributions to my fieldwork have 
been frank and constructive.  In the highly structured and regimented nature of 
Singapore society suspicions about people and their motives abound.  I was aware that 
sensitivity to power discrepancies could put the potential rapport between the 
interviewer and the interviewee in jeopardy, resulting in only cursory, defensive, 
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bland and politically correct answers from people who felt threatened and worried that 
a researcher, with institutional authority, would publish what they said.  Therefore, 
sometimes I had to downplay my researcher role by adopting a passer-by anonymous 
role.  Responding to this role, my interviewees were more forthcoming.  This inherent 
facet of Singapore society sometimes became an inhibiting factor in my fieldwork 
there.  Being an Indian, I found relatively easy access to Indians and this was a 
positive factor in my fieldwork as most of my respondents in the ‘Little India’ area 
were of Indian ethnicity.  I also interviewed Malays, Chinese and other minority 
groups like Eurasians in Singapore.  Interviewing Malays also presented no major 
difficulties because I read, write and speak in their native tongue.  This factor 
guaranteed me some acceptance and legitimacy among Malay interviewees.   
By contrast however, with the Chinese, who are the dominant group in 
Singapore, my ethnic background and my ignorance of Mandarin and other Chinese 
dialects became an obstacle to winning their confidence.  Some Chinese residents 
gave me the cold shoulder when I sought to interview them.  They felt uneasy about 
being interviewed by a stranger, particularly from a different ethnic background, even 
though I assured them of the confidentiality of the interview.  This difficulty of my 
gaining access and acceptance to Chinese informants is, in my experience of living 
and working in Singapore, the result of a combination of structural, political, social, 
cultural, economic and historical factors.  The reluctance to voice their views on 
topical or controversial issues to me, despite my attempted friendly demeanour and 
manners, was markedly pronounced.  For instance, one middle-aged English-educated 
Chinese man, shopping at Mustafa Centre in ‘Little India’, suggested that I should not 
waste my time or his by discussing perceptions about Government policies.  He told 
me to steer clear on such matters as the Government had “eyes and ears everywhere”, 
possibly insinuating that I was an undercover Government agent sent out to ferret his 
views on issues of the day.  Another Chinese, a businessman, told me to return to 
New Zealand and continue enjoying its pristine beauty and picturesque vistas of 
nature instead of dabbling in matters best left to the powers that be.  There was also 
the interesting instance of a Chinese shopper who urged me to take up politics but to 
avoid becoming an opposition politician!   Other researchers pursuing their fieldwork 
in the Singapore context have faced similar situations because of feelings of suspicion 
and mistrust towards those enquiring about peoples’ perceptions of government 
policies.  Even when convinced about my bona fides, there was a general reluctance 
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on the part of people, Chinese in particular, to discuss matters pertaining to state 
policies.  Notwithstanding this tendency, there were some Chinese willing to share 
their candid perceptions of the Singapore urbanscape.  Perhaps they saw this as a rare 
opportunity to express alternative views from an uninhibited perspective once they 
found me more as a friend than an inquisitive researcher.  It is their voices that will 
lend credence to my thesis as well as helping to provide a much better understanding 
of how peoples’ lives are shaped by state policies. 
 Ethnographic fieldwork was undertaken in Singapore, mostly in ‘Little India’, 
over a period of four years from 2001-2005 with about three months being devoted in 
each year for this purpose.  For practical reasons, my methodology varied with the 
type of respondents interviewed.  The Singaporean group of interviewees is divided 
into two main categories, one group who live and work within the confines of my 
study area and the other who do not.  Respondents living and working in ‘Little India’ 
were mostly residents and shopkeepers.  Interviewees who did not live and work in 
‘Little India’ were selected so as to reflect a mix of people along gender, ethnic, 
educational and demographic divides.  Coming from different social backgrounds 
they were chosen to minimize bias in eliciting information on questions of nationality, 
identity, heritage and sense of place.  For the former group, there were several 
avenues of securing interviews.  They ranged from street surveys and door-to-door 
surveys to personal contacts.  Hawker centres (located in ‘Little India’s central market 
complex called Zhujiao Centre and now renamed Tekka Centre) and temples spread 
throughout ‘Little India’ also provided pathways of insight and formed a conducive 
counter-point to the world of image consumption accruing everywhere else in the 
glitzy shopping plazas spread throughout Singapore.   
 Open-ended questions were put to residents living and working in ‘Little 
India’, as they did not expect to be engaged in conversation when stopped on the 
streets or when they were in the midst of their meals in hawker centres or during 
prayer in the temples.  They therefore gave brief answers to set questions enabling 
meaning-making and best capturing the spontaneity of the vernacular and everyday 
hustle and bustle of the area.  In brief, there were more conversations than interviews.  
Respondents who were aware of my role as a researcher gradually became sufficiently 
comfortable with my presence to admit me into their worlds.  I realized the 
importance of social interaction with my respondents, so my ‘interviews’ were not 
quite that in the traditional sense, but often took the form of informal conversations, 
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these conversations trammeling through pent-up frustrations and feelings about the 
‘racialised’ environment as well as areas of work and politics.  Sometimes my 
conclusions were not taken from what my respondents expressed to me verbally, but 
were gleaned from the manner in which they expressed their views.  Furthermore, 
questions were never directed only at them.  I too had to succumb to questions they 
may have cared to ask.  In a sense, by speaking of my own personal experiences, I 
gained a better understanding of their lives than if I had maintained a professional 
distance.  In sum, a good rapport was established with the interviewees, especially the 
shop owners and workers who were already familiar with me because of my frequent 
visits to ‘Little India’ during the fieldwork process.  Interviews with people who lived 
or worked in ‘Little India’ revealed their strong sense of sentiment and attachment to 
the place and their opinions with regard to heritage conservation and ethnic 
interaction resulting from government policies.  For interviewees who did not live and 
work in the field area, more structured interviews were possible because they were 
referred to by personal contacts.  They understood the nature of my work and were 
more willing to sit down and talk with me in an informal setting.   
 Another set of open-ended in-depth narrative interviews was done with 
manual labourers and professional expatriates from the Indian sub-continent, as they 
were hesitant to divulge information through questionnaire surveys.  Manual 
labourers were targeted to establish reasons for their crowding of ‘Little India’ on 
Sundays, while expatriates were asked to focus on their perceptions of the place.  
Many expatriates, for example, were afraid that their application for Permanent 
Residence status would be affected by participating through questionnaires.  Similarly 
some foreign workers were not willing to answer questionnaires because they were 
illegal overstayers in Singapore and knew the harsh punishment (that is, mandatory 
caning) they could get from the courts if they were found out.  Even when they were 
legally working in Singapore, they were not likely to talk to people with structured 
survey questions because of feelings of suspicion against strangers.  They were 
usually afraid, suspecting that the researchers were from government agencies sent to 
check on them.  It was therefore often necessary to engage in small talk and social 
pleasantries that looked seemingly out of context but which led to the opportunity for 
relevant questions and equally relevant viewpoints on pertinent issues.  Open-ended 
in-depth narrative interview methods also allowed me to encourage the interviewees 
to talk at length in a ‘dialogical’ manner so that richer and more coherent information 
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could be elicited.  Hence, while structured interviews and questionnaires appeared too 
sanitized a method to capture such sentiments comprehensively both for Singaporeans 
and for foreigners, a non-structured research technique that best draws upon the 
complexities present in the contact zone was relied upon in such cases.  Sometimes I 
needed to use a contact person to break initial barriers and facilitate the flow of 
conversation, as with Bangladeshi and Indian workers.  Though it was not intentional, 
most of my respondents were Tamil-speaking Indians who came from Chennai in 
Tamil Nadu, South India.  My appearance as a ‘typical’ Indian from India and the fact 
that I had close relatives in India was an advantage in conducting interviews with 
these respondents.  Sometimes I dressed in Indian garb (dhoti and kurta) when I went 
for interviews especially in temples along Serangoon Road.8  Such a location and my 
Indian attire proved especially fruitful as the informants respected the sanctity of a 
religious site.  I also made it a point to stress that my close relatives were in India.  
Often this point resulted in a discussion of native areas and made the interview 
atmosphere less intimidating.  This made my respondents feel at ease and they treated 
me as one of them.  As a result they were more forthcoming in their views.  My age 
and educational level was neither an advantage nor a disadvantage in the case of the 
Indian professionals, as most of them were equally, if not more, educated.   
 Tourists were informally interviewed through street surveys.  This group of 
respondents was interviewed so as to shed light on their interpretation of ‘Little India’ 
as a tourist site.  Other sources of data are newspaper articles, guidebooks and 
speeches of key leaders, past and present, in Singapore.  Newspapers are one way 
through which opinions of the public are expressed and constructed, and a key 
medium through which the elaboration of stereotypes and issues is pursued.  Official 
guidebooks provide information relating to the sights, sounds and smells of the area as 
well as its history and heritage value, including the meaning of street names, even 
alluding to their date of naming.9  More importantly, they project the ideological 
perspective of the government.  Speeches of leaders often provide an indication of the 
official stand on issues such as heritage conservation, identity, ‘racial’ politics and 
foreign talent.   
                                        
8  Dhoti refers to the white loincloth tied around the waist by Indian men; kurta refers to the long top 
worn over the trousers or dhoti. 
 
9  The most recent is Peter Dunlop’s Street Names of Singapore (Singapore: Who’s Who Publishing, 
2000). 
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 All interviews were recorded, predominantly in Tamil and to a lesser extent in 
English, on audiocassette tapes, and later transcribed.  The interviews were held on a 
one-to-one basis except for focus group interviews and participant observation.  Focus 
group interviews consisting of five to ten people were mainly with foreign workers.  
Most of these interviews were carried out in a public park in ‘Little India’ where 
many gathered every Sunday, the one day of the week foreign workers were not 
required to work, while a few interviews took place in their homes.  The settings in 
which the interviews were held were carefully chosen to ensure that my interviewees 
were comfortable and familiar with their surroundings.  Topics ranged from their 
lifestyles to job-related problems to their experiences with local Singaporeans.  This 
type of interview was advantageous as it offered different insights into ‘Little India’ 
compared to the qualitative interviews.  The sheer number of these workers at an 
interview encouraged spontaneous exchange of information because they could relate 
to or counteract one another’s experiences.  At the end of the interview, which usually 
took about one to two hours, diverse but coherent accounts were given. 
 Participant observation, adopted as an approach in conjunction with other 
research procedures, was also useful in providing valuable information to my study.  
As Schutt says,  
Participating, observing, listening, talking and thinking, without special 
questionnaires give the field research its naturalness and unique and enduring 
appeal, allow the researcher to learn about and experience the social world of 
the… participants.10  
Participant observation was carried out at different times.  Observation of shops, 
streets, lanes, food courts, verandah or five-foot way activities and places of worship 
was carried out.  The fieldwork was done on weekdays and weekends at different 
times of the day so as to allow for comparative analysis of the intensity of interactions 
between the various groups.  Moreover, participant observation that is time sensitive 
sheds light on important issues like the gradual colonization of space in ‘Little India’ 
by foreign workers on weekends and weekdays, and how ‘Little India’ takes on 
different personalities at different times of the day and week.  Information obtained 
was used to crosscheck and supplement data from the questionnaire surveys and in-
depth interviews.   
                                        
10  R K Schutt, Investigating the Social World: The Process and Practice of Research (California: 
Thousand Oaks, 1996), 312. 
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 Having laid down the methodologies adopted and the problems encountered, I 
will now delve into the core areas of the study.  But before embarking on this task, let 
me define some important concepts that inform my thesis. 
 
Theoretical Perspectives 
 Two theoretical concepts that provide valuable insights into the cultural and 
sociopolitical manifestations of urban life and everyday practices in colonial and 
postcolonial Singapore help structure my thesis.  They are firstly, the terms, “social 
production of space” and “social construction of space” (coined by Setha Low11), and 
secondly, the Gramscian concept of hegemony.  These concepts merit some 
elaboration here not only because they help us understand the cultural and 
sociopolitical forces prevailing from colonial to postcolonial times in Singapore, but 
also because they signify the relationship between space and power as well as 
between domination and resistance.  I draw together these theoretical insights and 
apply them to the Singapore context.   
 
Social production of space and social construction of space 
 Setha Low emphasizes an anthropological approach to the built environment, 
arguing for the necessity of two mutually complementary perspectives: the social 
production, and social construction of space as “tools for understanding how public 
space in urban society becomes semiotically encoded and interpreted reality”.12  She 
defines the social production of space as including “all those factors – social, 
economic, ideological and technological – the intended goal of which is the physical 
creation of the material setting”.  Her definition of the social construction of space is 
equally succinct - it is “the actual transformation of space – through people’s social 
exchanges, memories, images, and daily use of the material setting – into scenes and 
actions that convey social meaning”.  Low explores the cultural meaning of the urban 
environment by probing the relationship between the experience of individuals and 
the sociopolitical and economic processes generating spatial form and organization.  
Underpinning this analysis is the search for what she calls “the underlying social and 
                                        
 
11  Setha Low, Spatializing Culture.  861-879.   
 
12  Ibid. 
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cultural values and power politics that give form and meaning to… the built urban 
environment”.13  
 Other theorists describe the same distinction in different ways, all seeing the 
built environment as an integral part of social life.  According to Habraken, intimate 
and unceasing interaction between people and the forms they inhabit uniquely defines 
any built environment.14  Lefebvre sees the built environment as “permeated with 
social relations; it is not only supported by social relations but it is also producing and 
produced by social relations”15, while McDonogh and Rotenberg explore “the 
meaning of urban spaces through the knowledge of the people who live within 
them”.16  As sociologist Ian Welsh puts it, the environment is “a site of intersecting 
and competing social and cultural definitions and interests”.17  In more theoretical 
vein, sociologist Manuel Castells, for instance, focuses on the interpretation and 
perception of the present-day capitalist city by its inhabitants, who socially construct 
the city through their actions based on these concepts and interpretations.  Castells 
argues that the city “is the space of collective alienation … transformed … into a flow 
that never stops and never starts”.18   
While the built environment in Singapore, first as a colonial city and later as a 
rapidly developing planned city state, has been in one way created by its rulers, the 
social practices of its inhabitants have also influenced their own varying constructions 
of the environment.  The processes of the social production of space and social 
construction of space convey meanings and provide insights as different groups and 
sociopolitical forces attempt to control and define urban spaces in the negotiation and 
representation of their respective realities and values.   In the context of Singapore, 
both these processes are contested for economic and ideological reasons.  
                                        
13  Setha M Low, “Constructing Difference: Spatial Boundaries and Social Change in Two Costa Rican 
Plazas” in Setting Boundaries: The Anthropology of Spatial and Social Organization, ed. Deborah 
Pellow (Westport, Conn.: Bergin & Garvey, 1996), 161-178. 
 
14  N J Habraken, The Structure of the Ordinary (Mass: MIT Press, 2000). 
 
15  H Lefebvre, The Production of Space, trans. D Nicholson Smith (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991). 
 
16  Gary W McDonogh and Robert Louis Rotenberg, The Cultural Meaning of Urban Space (Westport, 
Conn.: Bergin & Garvey, 1993). 
 
17  Ian Welsh, Environment and Society in Eastern Europe (Harlow, Essex: Addison Wesley Longman, 
1998). 
 
18  Manuel Castells, The City and the Grassroots: A Cross-Cultural Theory of Urban Social Movements 
(London: Arnold, 1983), 314. 
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Understanding these reasons can help us better understand the forces at work in the 
organization and consumption of space in this small but complex island city-state.   
Consequently the social organization of space and the meanings of knowledge, group 
and power in Singapore are brought into focus in the search for the underlying social 
and cultural values and power politics that give form and meaning to the cityscape 
and the built urban environment.  Instead of one meaning of the city, diverse and 
contradictory meanings exist.     
In the context of this thesis, the social production of space will be represented 
by the social engineering policies of the state while public responses will constitute 
the social construction of space.  These two concepts underline one main thrust of my 
argument – that ‘race’ politics, as generated through the built environment, has 
characterized political governance in Singapore from the colonial past to the 
postcolonial nation-state of today.  Consequently, I will in each chapter revisit these 
two concepts so as to interrogate the relationship between the ‘contested realities’ in 
Singapore’s history.   
 
Hegemony  
 The Gramscian concept of hegemony has been defined, in the words of one 
author, as “the predominance obtained by consent rather than force of one class or 
group over other classes”, based on consent for the “values, norms, perceptions and 
beliefs… of [the] central authority” – a consent secured through ideological means.19  
It therefore refers to the condition in which power is not based merely on coercion 
(which Gramsci sees as mere “domination”) but on a certain level of voluntary 
acceptance and consent on the part of those ruled.  The idea of ‘hegemony’ deserves 
attention here because constructing hegemony was of vital importance for the British 
in Singapore, as it was in their other colonies, most notably in India.  As a tool of 
governance, it was pivotal to the very structure of colonialism which, as noted by 
Alatas, is also a “control of the mind of the conquered or subordinated”.20  In a 
strikingly similar fashion, the government of the new nation state has, since 1965, 
constructed a post-colonial society whereby it seeks to control all aspects of political, 
                                        
19  Joseph V Femia, Gramsci’s Political Thought: Hegemony, Consciousness and the Revolutionary 
Process (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), 24-39.   
 
20  Syed Hussein Alatas, The Myth of the Lazy Native (London: Frank Cass, 1977), 17. 
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economic and social behaviour in the country by what Lisa Lim calls “a successful 
practice of hegemony”.21  The people have been persuaded by the governing People’s 
Action Party (PAP) that it is working for the general and public good of the nation, 
and that the party’s values, ideas and methods for attaining this public good are the 
most ‘natural’ and ‘commonsensical’ – what is often called ‘ideological hegemony’ in 
which the social order fostered by the state is also endorsed and accepted by the 
majority.22  
 Both the colonial and postcolonial ideological projects in Singapore have been 
hegemonically produced.  British colonial officials made extensive use of ideas and 
beliefs of colonialism towards achieving their objectives of political and economic 
domination in Singapore.  These were ideologies based on class and race, expressed 
mainly through political power rather than force, and implemented by specific 
methods and tactics to manipulate and enforce social control among the diverse ethnic 
groups.  The colonial administration in Singapore constructed hegemony in several 
ways, perhaps most significantly by the act of segregating the races and naming 
streets in the Raffles 1822 Town Plan.  British hegemonic rule in Singapore was, as 
noted by several historians, exercised both through coercion and negotiation.  This 
process ensured that only selected ethnic leaders (comprising mainly a handful of the 
wealthy professional and business Chinese) were represented on the Municipal 
Committee that passed rules and regulations concerning ethnic interests.  It has been 
argued that their presence on the Municipal Committee – considered a 
“representative” body – gave the appearance of mass support for British policies.23  
Benefiting from the status and positions conferred on them by the colonial officials, 
this elite group of “local representation” did not advance the working classes’ or other 
                                        
21  Lisa Lim Bee Fong, “Hegemony, Dominance and Resistance in Singapore: Pulau Ubin as a Case 
Study,” Maintaining Political Dominance in Singapore: A Gramscian Analysis (Unpublished Honors 
Thesis, National University of Singapore, 2003): 6. She shows in the example of the drive to keep 
Avian influenza out of Singapore how a modern society such as Singapore is ruled on the basis of “a 
combination of coercion and consent”. 
 
22  Lily Kong and Brenda Yeoh, The Politics of Landscapes in Singapore: Construction of “Nation” 
(Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 2003).  
 
23  See Edwin Lee, The British as Rulers: Governing Multiracial Singapore 1867 – 1914 (Singapore: 
Singapore University Press, 1991); Brenda S. A. Yeoh, Contesting Space: Power Relations and the 
Urban Built Environment in Colonial Singapore (Singapore, Kuala Lumpur and New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1996). 
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ethnic groups’ interests or challenge the racialized aspects of colonial policies to any 
significant degree.   
The government of the Singapore nation state on the other hand goes about 
constructing hegemonic control and discipline of its citizens by an emphasis on 
diversity and ‘race’ politics via a deliberate policy of social engineering in various 
social, economic and education reforms.  Virtually ruling unopposed since 1959 
(when self-government was first achieved), the government of the PAP-controlled 
state has secured acceptance by its citizens using a top-down approach structuring all 
aspects of government policy.  In sum, it can be said that whereas the British saw it 
expedient that their narrative be accepted by the few that mattered, the independent 
nation state has imposed its narrative on the silent majority.  In both the colonial and 
postcolonial regimes, ideology has been used as the instrument of manipulation for 
hegemonic control of the population and exercised by a process of what Clammer 
calls “classifying” – The Raffles Town Plan by the colonial administration and a 
regulated system of social engineering by the nation state.24  It can therefore be 
argued in the Singapore context that both colonial and postcolonial regimes have 
operated not only through coercion but also through extracting the consent of the 
governed (a select group or the majority) to the broad ideological stance of those in 
power.   
 Hegemony is reflected not only in the way control is exercised by the rulers, 
but also how it is received by the ruled.  Narratives of colonial dominance have 
tended to downplay the responses of the colonized peoples in Singapore to colonial 
urban planning practices.25  Yeoh explains that the seeming silence of colonized 
locals is partly the result of a paucity of formal records documenting the strategies 
adopted by colonized groups to contest the actions of the colonial government.     
Only the colonialists’ action is visible, flowing through what Anthony Giddens calls, 
“the institutional mediation of power...running silently through the repetition of 
institutionalised practices” over the colonised peoples.26  As cultural and ideological 
projects, ‘institutionalised practices’ were carried out by various colonial institutions 
                                        
24  John  R Clammer, Singapore: Ideology, Society, Culture (Singapore: Chopmen, 1985), 165. 
 
25  Yeoh, Contesting Space. 
 
26  Anthony Giddens, The Nation-State and Violence, Volume Two of a Contemporary Critique of 
Historical Materialism (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987), 9. 
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that influenced the lives of colonised peoples and the shape of their built environment.  
Kay Anderson calls these strategies of control “cultural hegemony,” colonial 
strategies that manipulate and control various aspects of the built environment.27  
Similar strategies continue in the governance of present-day independent Singapore as 
this thesis will demonstrate.   
 Such dominance suppresses those who invest the landscape with meanings and 
representations different from that of the dominant power.  Smith and Tardanico have 
observed that what is suppressed has been the “impact of common people – their 
consciousness, intentionality, everyday practices, and collective action – on the 
planning and implementation of state and business policies as well as their 
consequences for the social production of cities”.28  This neglect of the presence of 
the colonised is apparent in many studies of the colonial city.  In colonial Singapore, 
daily management of the built environment was controlled by the municipal 
authorities who exercised a form of disciplinary power, what Foucault calls “pastoral 
power,” that was concerned with the organisation of space.29  The colonial power, by 
organising, distributing and partitioning communities, proposed how reality was to be 
perceived by the inhabitants in Singapore.  In particular the colonial administration 
claimed the right to construct social and racial categories by ascribing racial identities 
and apportioning space along racial lines.  By imposing such social and spatial 
restrictions that permeated both the public and private domains of the colonised 
communities in Singapore, they contributed to what Foucault calls, in a wider context, 
an “objectivizing of the subject” through “dividing practices”.30  To counteract such 
practices, he argues that “local arenas of action” exercise power through their own 
counter-strategies that challenge the actions of the dominant power and modify their 
effect.  He calls this “revolts to the gaze”, contending that resistance to power “is all 
the more real and effective because they [it is] formed right at the point where 
                                        
27  Kay J. Anderson, “Cultural Hegemony and the Race-Definition Process in Chinatown, Vancouver: 
1880-1990,” Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 6 (1988): 28. 
 
28  Michael Peter Smith and Richard Tardanico, “Urban Theory Reconsidered: Production, 
Reproduction and Collective Action” in The Capitalist City: Global Restructuring of Community 
Politics, eds. Michael Peter Smith and Joe R. Feagin (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987), 105. 
 
29  Michel Foucault, “The Subject and Power”, in Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and 
Hermeneutics, eds. Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1982), 213-215. 
 
30  Foucault, “The Subject and Power”, 208. 
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relations of power are exercised”.31  These arguments have also been echoed by 
Giddens who contends that colonised subjects “can bring to bear strategies of their 
own, and apply specific types of sanctions”, despite being branded as ignorant.32  
Gramsci, too, emphasizes that hegemony is never fully achieved because groups not 
in power will always challenge those in power.  Likewise, Jon Goss has argued that 
the meanings of the built environment cannot be fully captured by any single 
privileged discourse.  Instead it should be, according to him, viewed as a complex 
‘multicoded space’ that is continually reinterpreted in ‘everyday usage...by everyday 
people who may be “reading” or “writing” different languages in the built 
environment’.33  
 What we can draw out from these theories of power and resistance is that 
while power is exercised through the control and manipulation of the built 
environment, resistance and negotiation arise when interests collide.  In response, the 
governing elite will also oppose and contest ideas and developments that threaten or 
undermine its agenda.  As contested terrain, the colonial landscape in Singapore is 
appropriately summed up by Yeoh and Kong as not only articulating “the ideological 
intent of the powerful who plan and shape the landscape in particular ways” but also 
“reflects the everyday meanings implicit in the daily routines of ordinary people 
associated with the landscape”.34  In this urban landscape various elements of the 
colonial built environment were differentially perceived and interpreted by powerful 
colonial agents and by the various communities based on their own values, attitudes, 
priorities and resources.   
Yet it would be reductionist to describe the relationship between the coloniser 
and colonised as only characterized by oppression and conflict, as Yeoh appears to 
argue.  For example, she sees the urban built environment of colonial Singapore 
produced through “the dialectics of power” – what she calls, an encounter “between 
municipal attempts at imposing social and spatial control… and Asian agency in 
                                        
31  Foucault, “Power and Strategies” in Michel Foucault: Power/Knowledge, Selected Interviews and 
Other Writings, 1972-1977, ed. Colin Gordon (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1980), 142. 
 
32  Anthony Giddens, The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1984), 288; The Nation-State and Violence, 11. 
 
33  Jon Goss, “The Built Environment and Social Theory: Towards an Architectural Geography,” 
Professional Geographer 40 (1988): 398. 
 
34  Brenda S.A.Yeoh and Lily Kong, “Reading Landscape Meanings: State Constructions and Lived 
Experiences in Singapore’s Chinatown,” Habitat International 18, 4 (1994): 7. 
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wresting concessions and asserting its own view of urban life”.35  She views the 
period of colonial rule as one of sustained conflict and contestation between the 
colonial administration’s spatial strategies of social control and surveillance against 
the routine social and cultural practices of the various communities.  Overly 
privileging the locals’ oppositional stance, she obscures the lines of communication 
between the local communities and the British by focusing on the strategies adopted 
by some in the Chinese community to colonial laws.  The colonial power is therefore 
seen, in her perspective, as a structure of oppression and the colonised a field of 
opposition.  Such a narrative tends to downplay antagonisms and discriminations 
between the colonized themselves, especially in their varied dealings with the colonial 
power.  The ‘divide and rule’ policy of colonial segregation was, for example, 
sometimes supported by the dominant subaltern group against others.   
 Yeoh’s perspective is representative of the tendency common among post-
colonial writers in former colonies to adopt a rhetoric that seeks to put their once 
colonial masters in an overly negative position.  But it also serves to overly unify the 
colonized, obscuring the power of various dominant elites or racialized groups 
amongst them and their monopolization of (or even rationalising) the narrative of 
national liberation. The authoritarian policies initiated by the PAP Government, when 
it came into power in 1959, made it imperative that local writers fall in line with its 
post-colonial discourse.  Consequently, vernacular historians, anthropologists and 
cultural geographers in Singapore began to produce revisionist historical writings that 
routinely presented contestations and conflicts between, on the one hand, the 
dominated ethnic communities and on the other the colonial administration.  This is 
partly because the creation of new national subjects by the nation state produces an 
emotionally charged environment whereby the government of the day is determined 
to undo the colonial ‘legacy’ and project its own image of a potential and progressive 
developmental state.  In line with this scenario and the nationalist struggle that 
preceded it, the government strives to mobilize the masses with a nationalist ideology 
by destabilizing vestiges of colonial influence and setting ambitious plans and targets 
to promote national development in housing, industries, education, defence, social 
cohesion and various other facets of public life.  Vernacular writers nurtured in this 
setting therefore emulate a developmentalist discourse that justifies, in their eyes, the 
                                        
 
35  Yeoh and Kong, “Reading Landscape Meanings”, 8. 
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creation of a nation state by writing a colonial past that saw little improvement in the 
living conditions of the ethnic communities.  A negative view of colonial 
development is narrated, for instance, in the constant use of the word “slum” that 
occurs with regular consistency in contemporary government rhetoric as well as in 
academic and literary works in Singapore.  Usage of the word obscures the fact that 
these so-called “slums” were also sites of dense social relationships and connections 
for their inhabitants.  They were not necessarily ‘dysfunctional’ but also nurtured and 
promoted order, solidarity and cohesion within and between various ethnic 
communities in Singapore.  The single-minded zeal with which the so-called ‘slum 
clearance’ was carried out did dislocate and traumatize some families.  They were not 
just disadvantaged socially but also in terms of their livelihood.  But there were also 
positive aspects to slum clearance.  Many of the children of the dwellers from slums 
and coolie lines (Indians included) appear to be grateful to the postcolonial 
government for rescuing them from the wretchedness of their previous existence and 
installing them in new and immaculately presented HDB (Housing and Development 
Board) apartments and for the relatively higher standard of living in the new 
environment.  Independent Singapore now is outstanding testimony to cleanliness and 
social order, not only because of the state’s hegemonic controls, but also because, it 
can be argued, notions of civic duty, compliance with the law, orderliness, 
cleanliness, hygiene, and love of peace and stability are attributes ordinary 
Singaporeans of today started imbibing from colonial times.  In other words, the seeds 
of the present order and hegemonic stability in Singapore were planted by British 
administrators in their relations with local communities during the colonial period.   
 There is no doubt, as historical records show, that some of the colonial 
administration’s policies and regulations were opposed, mainly by the Chinese 
community.  Several contentious issues were settled by negotiation and coercion.  
Examples of such issues that unpack the meaning, reception and acceptance of the 
colonial power by the Asian communities can be seen in racial zoning and segregation 
of the various communities, in the economic policies of the administration, naming of 
streets and places, burial grounds, various built forms like dwelling houses and the 
five-foot way or verandah, sanitation, disease prevention and control, water supply, 
drainage, suppression of immoral activities, law and order, management of liquor 
licensing, in the appointment of the kapitan (or Chinese village headman) system, and 
in appointments to the Municipal Committee .   
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 There were of course more belligerent and radical nationalist voices that 
openly opposed and criticized colonial and postcolonial rule and in these instances the 
colonial administration and subsequently the nation state came down hard on such 
elements, thereby illustrating the fact that strong coercive and somewhat violent 
measures were administered by both regimes to suppress and contain reactionary 
elements in Singapore society. During the colonial period, for example, the verandah 
became a site of everyday conflict and resistance leading to the so-called verandah 
riots of 1888.  The British administration also waged a relentless battle against 
communist elements that operated underground and opposed colonial rule in what 
was then peninsula Malaya.  This was the Communist ‘Emergency’ that was mainly 
confined to Malaya.  In Singapore the postcolonial state has similarly crushed several 
class-based and other opposing factions.  Examples are rioting communist inspired 
left-wing Chinese high school students, the Hock Lee bus riots, chauvinistic activists 
from the leftist opposition Barisan Sosialist party, restless Trade Union activists who 
preached anti-government rhetoric and staged demonstrations, university lecturers and 
intellectuals who openly criticized government policies, extremist elements that tried 
to disturb multiracial peace and harmony between the various ethnic groups by using 
race and religion to propagate discontent, intimidation and arrest of opposition 
politicians and dissidents who advocated leftist ideologies and opposed PAP rule, and 
local newspapers and international magazines like Time and Newsweek that were 
critical of government policies.   
 How has the nation state been able to achieve this hegemonic state of affairs?  
The former Prime Minister tells us how he thinks it happened:  
I have often been accused of interfering with private lives.  I say without the 
slightest of remorse we would not have made economic progress if we did not 
intervene on very personal matters who your neighbour is, how you live, the 
noise you make, how you spit, or what language you use.  We decide what is 
right.  Never mind what the people think.  That’s another problem.   
       -   Lee Kuan Yew, PM of Singapore, National Day Rally, 1986. 
The nation state rules by hegemony – trading economic/material progress for 
freedom.  The PAP, Singapore’s one-party government, makes no apologies about its 
social engineering policies to ensure the survival and competitiveness of the national 
economy.  In fact, the Singaporean nation state can be considered to have achieved 
phenomenal success at engineering a system of values and practices by a subtle 
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process of hegemony secured through ideological means and enforced through an 
artful fusion of coercion, compulsion and consent.  The state commonly uses the term 
‘dialogue’ to denote these hegemonic processes.  As Tremewan has noted, 
The ordering of society is most effectively achieved by consent.  However, 
when consent is not forthcoming or the ordering process requires the rapid 
breakdown of existing social relations, then various degrees of coercion 
become necessary.36
 The post-colonial state has dominated all aspects of political, economic, social 
and cultural life in Singapore since taking over the reins of power from the colonial 
regime.  Adopting authoritarian and paternalistic ways as opposed to western-style 
values supposedly based on individual rights, the state has monopolized public 
discourse by a dynamic and successful process of hegemonic control that ensures its 
political dominance.  Such hegemony has been practised through an ideology built on 
ideas of pragmatism, elitism, meritocracy, collectivism, ethnic essentialism, state-
directed industrialization and integration with global capitalism.  The ruling party has 
achieved a hegemony so complete and a rule so successful – at least by its own 
reckoning – that it has become difficult to conceive of other alternatives, which could 
only be seen as options for failure, if not chaos and anarchy.  This fear of the 
alternative has remained a dominant feature of Singapore’s official political rhetoric 
to the present day, and is a central feature of the PAP’s legitimating technique.  Vasil 
comments that the PAP “views itself and is seen by many Singaporeans as the 
unchallenged national party”.37  The state controls all the intermediary institutions 
that articulate the interests of the people and to ensure its hegemonic dominance it has 
in force strict censorship and other rules that stifle dissent and free expression.  The 
continued dominance of the ruling party since independence can be attributed to the 
structures and systems of governance that provide for “draconian systems of political, 
social and economic control,” so much so that Trocki considers Singapore to be one 
of the most intensely controlled societies in the world.38  He exposes the paradox of a 
                                        
36  Christopher Tremewan, The Political Economy of Social Control in Singapore (London and New 
York: St Martin’s Press, 1994), 187. 
 
37  Raj Vasil, Governing Singapore: Democracy and National Development (Singapore: Allen & 
Unwin, 2000), 17. 
 
38  Mark T Berger, on Singapore’s Authoritarian Capitalism, Asian Values, Free Market Illusions and 
Political Dependency, by Christopher Lingle (Barcelona: Edicions Sirocco, S.L; Fairfax, Va.: The 
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free enterprise economy blending with a very rigorously policed and controlled social 
formation system.  The workings of PAP hegemony are based on what Lingle calls 
“paternalistic nationalism and authoritarian capitalism”.39  In short, the state by 
offering a hegemonic vision for Singapore’s future has become barely distinguishable 
from the personality of the one-party PAP political leadership.   
 The hegemony of the state dictates the practice of control, discipline and 
surveillance through the instruments of social engineering in realizing Foucault’s idea 
of disciplinary technology or what Castells describes as political intervention.40  It has 
also been termed “calibrated coercion” in the Singapore context, because even as the 
state “maintains and updates its arsenal of coercive powers”, it calibrates its coercion 
“to get the job done with as little force as necessary”, in the words of George 
Cherian.41  The ‘illiberal’ democratic system of the PAP Government coupled with its 
‘soft authoritarianism’ stance, as noted by Mutalib, has been responsible for instilling 
a culture of fear, obedience and caution in the minds of ordinary citizens.42  This has 
been achieved by various judicial processes and legal measures of coercion including 
detention without trial, criminal law43 and defamation law44, the stifling of creativity 
and intellectual endeavour, confining the notion of civil society within the boundaries 
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of the ruling party, and the cultivation of a “citizenry [that] is not proactive”.45  In the 
words of Mutalib, “The Government of Singapore, because of its elite unity and high 
degree of integration, exercises sovereign and supreme power over the entire state 
apparatus”.46  While there appears to be a reducing trend of authoritarianism and an 
opening up of the political system, political pundits do not anticipate any elimination 
of it because it has served the PAP Government well in maintaining hegemony.47
 The Singapore state has always been intensely interventionist in economic, 
social and cultural terms in its management of ethnicity and of national development.  
Realizing that hegemony of economic discourse based on the hegemony of the state’s 
survivalist logic was crucial for national identity construction, the PAP Government 
decided that it should control all instruments and centres of power, without allowing 
the growth of political pluralism.48  To this end various legislative measures were 
passed and various instrumentalities and government agencies created to implement 
its national–building policies.  As Chan observes, “right from the start the PAP 
government showed an understanding of the equation linking legitimacy to 
performance and performance to state building and political capability”.49  This 
legitimization process has been labeled in a variety of ways: administrative50, 
instrumentalist51, authoritarian52, corporatist53, developmentalist54, non-democratic55 
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and illiberal democracy.56  The PAP’s control of the state has effectively undermined 
any form of political opposition in Singapore – all political participation and policy 
debates are severely limited and made exclusive to the PAP regime.  The ideology of 
economic growth and prosperity based on ideologies of survival and of pragmatism 
are translated into providing material incentives, political stability and social security 
through various social engineering policies.  The PAP-controlled state has 
implemented these ideologies and strategies virtually unchallenged to the extent that 
the party has been overwhelmingly reelected to government ever since it came to 
power.  In yet another show of hegemonic strength at the run-up to the 2006 General 
Elections, the ruling party has relied on ideology as strategy to capture all 84 seats in 
Parliament.  As Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong said on 9 April 2006, “We have 
policies, we have directions.  We know what we will be doing for Singapore, for the 
people”.57
 My research shows that many hegemonic aspects of colonial administration 
have been inherited by the postcolonial nation state.  These include the practices of 
‘Asian’ values, urban planning, housing policy, education and multi-lingual policy, 
the creation of racial categories, the English educated/Chinese educated divide and 
self-help, all of which will be analysed and discussed in subsequent chapters.  With 
historical and empirical evidence, I will demonstrate how important these values and 
practices are in contributing to the understanding of present-day Singapore and the 
Singapore ‘Indian’.   
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Thesis Structure 
 The structure of this thesis uses a framework whereby the built environment in 
Singapore is examined and interrogated from a combination of social constructionist 
and social production perspectives.   
 To set the scene, I explore the Colonial city in Part I.  Titled Segregation, 
‘Race’ and the Colonial City, Part 1 comprises Chapters 1-3.  For these chapters I 
have relied on the historical research of several writers both colonial and local, 
including works by Brenda Yeoh, Lily Kong, Victor Savage, Wong Lin Ken, Ernest 
Chew, Edwin Lee, C B Buckley, B W Hodder, C M Turnbull, K S Sandhu, A Mani, 
Siddique and Purushotam.  Chapter 1 provides a brief historical backdrop of 
Singapore in colonial days.  It discusses how colonial Singapore provided the scenario 
for the creation of a new nation state in 1965.  In Chapter 2, I focus on the subject of 
migration from the Indian sub-continent, and how and why various classes of Indians, 
namely, the convict labourers, the traders and the professionals migrated to Singapore.  
This chapter then articulates the evolution of the area around Serangoon Road as the 
main concentration of Indians, and explores the ‘ethnic’ significance of this district.   
Chapter 3 analyses the construction of the colonial economy by the British authorities.  
By the process of hegemony, the colonialist ideology manifested in the creation of the 
1822 Raffles Town Plan, under whose aegis the ‘ethnic’ communities, including the 
Indians, were ‘racially’ segregated into various geographical zones according to their 
occupational interests.  This ‘divide and rule’ policy of the colonial project was 
extended via the system of street-naming and regulation of other urban built forms 
like the bungalow, the attap hut, the shophouse, and the five-foot way or verandah.  
 Part II, titled ‘Integration’, ‘Race’ and Ethnicity in the Nation State, comprises 
Chapters 4-8 and deals with the ‘social production of space’ and the ‘social 
construction of space’ in the pluralistic society of the Singapore nation state.  It looks 
at contemporary Singapore showing how the apartheid developments begun by the 
colonial administration have been euphemistically perpetuated by a paternalistic 
postcolonial government in its ideological creation of a new nation state.  Various 
social engineering initiatives were introduced by the state in line with its ideology.   
 In Chapter 4 I will explore the meaning of ‘Indian’ in the context of the state’s 
multiracial, multicultural ideology of ‘race’ politics.  A sizeable number of Singapore 
Indians are torn between an ethnic identification that has diasporic connotations and a 
national identification in which they feel hopelessly subsumed by the majority.  How 
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do they go about reconciling and negotiating their complex identities?  I will first 
examine the built environment of the ‘Indians’ in Singapore and then analyse its 
inherent contradictions to demonstrate how such contradictions pose a dilemma to the 
identity of Indians in a ‘multiracial’, multicultural Singapore.  The Singapore ‘Indian’ 
is often the subject of a diasporic consciousness brought about by the emphasis on 
‘race’ and other factors that complicate the construction of national ideology.  The 
built environment of the ‘Indians’ in Singapore is juxtaposed against a multiethnic 
connection in a space setting in which rapid social change, state policies and 
interethnic relations play a major part.  This chapter will then discuss how the ‘Indian’ 
community in Singapore manages the negotiation of identities within the framework 
of a ‘multiracial’/multicultural ideology of nation building.  I will in this process 
demonstrate how the subject of ‘racial’ politics has become a site of struggle between 
ethnic identity and national identity.   
 Chapter 5 will set the pace by exploring the concept of ‘race’ introduced by 
the British.  This was an ideology of race theory based on an Orientalist discourse of 
superiority over colonized subjects – a discourse that led to negative stereotyping of 
the ‘races’ and which became infused in the ideology and practices of the new nation 
state.  How and why has this concept become a social reality for Singaporeans in the 
new nation state in the context of ‘ethnicity’?  ‘Racial’ politics in independent 
Singapore is anchored in the project of ‘multiracialism’ along with multiculturalism, 
multilingualism and multireligiosity.  Designed to forge national identity and ‘racial’ 
harmony on the basis of separate but equal ‘races’, informants contend that this 
ideological project in fact reinforces and promotes ‘ethnic’ exclusivity.   
 With ‘race’ as the basis of all social classification in the pursuit of the 
ideology of multiracialism and national identity, Chapter 6 will explore some social 
engineering policies and programs introduced by the postcolonial state in line with its 
corporatist management of ethnicity.  Specifically I will argue how a discourse of 
scientific racism underlined the introduction of population and family policies, 
immigration and promotion of Chinese cultural values as the basis of economic 
growth and social stability.  Responses from my correspondents reveal the 
contestations and conflicts over such policies.   
 In Chapter 7 I will discuss more ‘race’-based policies introduced by the state 
to enable it to exercise political and social control and pursue its version of a nation 
building identity based on survival, economic growth and social stability.  An analysis 
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of policies in housing as well as language and education will demonstrate how they 
have become a site of conflict between ethnic identity and national identity as shown 
in the responses from my informants.   
 Chapter 8, the final chapter, examines the policies of self-help and heritage 
conservation and questions how and why the Indian community’s dilemma over 
conflicting identities is reinforced in these policies. 
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PART I 
 
SEGREGATION, ‘RACE’ AND THE COLONIAL CITY 
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CHAPTER 1 
COLONIAL ORIGINS TO NATION STATE – A PREVIEW 
 
1.1   Singapore – The Colonial City 
    In Part 1 of this thesis I present a brief historical background to Singapore’s 
development from colonial times as a prelude to my research on the ‘racial’ politics 
that has governed both the colonial administration and the postcolonial nation state.  
Chapter 1 offers a critical re-reading of Singapore’s historical and colonial legacy and 
its impact on postcolonial society.   
 
1.1.1 History and Politics 
             Singapore’s modern history according to the colonial perception began 
in 1819 when Raffles decided on the island as a settlement.  Fearing resurgence of 
expansionism by the Dutch – who had been the dominant European trading power in 
the region for nearly 200 years – Raffles argued for an increased British presence, 
which he was promptly given.  Popularly considered its founder, he obtained, in 1824, 
on behalf of the East India Company, full sovereignty of the island from Sultan 
Hussein and Temenggong Abdul Rahman of Johor.1  Raffles saw its immense 
potential as a trading port because of its strategic geo-economic location and natural 
sheltered harbour at the southern end of the Malay Peninsula, as well as its 
concomitant commercial and naval significance on the fabled spice route.  Indeed, 
Singapore became one of the strongest military bases of the British Empire because 
the defence of the island acquired “a strategic and symbolic significance out of all 
proportion to its geopolitical position”.2  Professor Wong Lin Ken attributes the 
colony’s early success to the “untrammelled private enterprise” of Asian and Western 
merchants and to its status as a free port “open to all races, without any religious, or 
                                        
1  This popular colonialist version that Singapore’s history began with Stamford Raffles has been 
contested by local historians and scholars.  Dr Derek Heng of the Department of History, National 
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systematically destroyed by the British within the first decade after their arrival on the island in 1819”.  
The National Heritage Board, Singapore History Museum and National Archives of Singapore also 
consistently assert that new archival materials and historical evidence show Singapore’s history dating 
back to the fourteenth century.  (The Straits Times, 21 November 2005). 
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linguistic qualifications”.3  Four chief factors have, according to him, promoted the 
phenomenal expansion and growth of Singapore during its colonial existence, viz its 
strategic location at the centre of the vital sea-lanes of South and East Asia; a free 
trade policy that imposed no taxes on trade or industry; a stable and predictable 
colonial administration; and a hardworking and enterprising migrant population.  
Significantly these factors have continued to remain the key assets and strengths of 
modern Singapore.  Wong says that so pre-eminently was Singapore situated at the 
crossroads between the Indian and Pacific oceans in the expansion of trade between 
Asia and the West, that it prompted Rudyard Kipling to sing its praises in “The Song 
of Cities”: 
East and West must seek my aid 
Ere the spent hull may dare the ports afar. 
The second doorway of the wide world’s trade 
Is mine to loose or bar.4
 During colonial rule, Singapore developed as an entrepot port, linking its 
immediate hinterland and large parts of Southeast and East Asia to Western Europe.  
Activities directly and indirectly linked to this entrepot function dominated the 
Singapore economy for much of the colonial period.  This economic structure 
therefore created the population dynamics of colonial society in Singapore.  As the 
small indigenous population in Singapore at the time of its founding, comprising 
mainly Malays, could not supply the labour necessary for its entrepot activities, the 
British attracted migrants from other parts of Asia, chiefly China, the Indian sub-
continent, and, to a lesser extent, the Malay Peninsula.  From China came large 
numbers of commercially motivated entrepreneurs who became highly enterprising 
and successful traders.  Most of them were absorbed in the entrepot economy and a 
range of other commercial activities.  Indian migrants worked in the colonial 
administration as general workers, as labourers in the construction sector, and as 
traders.  This combination of Chinese and Indians served to produce a business-
inclined demographic base - a private sector that played an important part throughout 
the colonial period (and subsequently in nation building) in helping the British define 
the nature, extent, and type of land use.  The key role played by the migrant 
                                        
3  Wong Lin Ken, 41, 47. 
 
4  Rudyard Kipling, Song of Cities, ed. Eileen Gillooly (New York: Sterling, 2000), 210.  
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communities indicates the tremendous amount of interaction that took place with the 
colonial administration, mostly through dialogue, negotiation and mutual interest but 
also through conflict and contestation. 
 With entrepot trade being the mainstay of the colonial economy, godowns and 
trading houses, wharves and quays proliferated on both sides of the Singapore River 
from the early years of Singapore’s development to the middle of the twentieth 
century.5  As a result, the town extended rapidly from the port area.  Raffles’ vision 
was that the new trading settlement would eventually become ‘the emporium and 
pride of the East’ and ‘a place of considerable magnitude and importance’.6  
Realizing the significance of this settlement and its cultural diversity, he sought to 
order the physical landscape as growth had become haphazard.  To this end Raffles 
established a Town Committee to draw up a land-use plan for urban development in 
which economic activities and allocation of land for the various peoples took centre-
stage.  This plan came to be known as the Raffles 1822 Town Plan (see Map 1) and 
formed the basis of development of the built environment of Singapore for over a 
century.  
Well documented historical resources demonstrate the manner in which the 
Town Plan took shape.7  According to these sources, Raffles divided the town into 
‘divisions’ or ‘kampungs’ for particular racial and occupational groups, particularly 
segregating the residential spaces of different racial groups away from the European 
area.  The Europeans were allotted the area to the east of the government reserved 
area, while the Chinese congregated in and around the present Chinatown district 
which was divided among the various dialect groups, the Indians in the Serangoon 
district, and the Malays in Kampung Glam.  Each division or kampung was placed 
under the immediate supervision of its own chiefs or kapitans (in Malay).  These 
chiefs were then made responsible to the British Resident for policing their respective 
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jurisdictions.8  In a sense, such a practice can be broadly considered a precursor to the 
self-help policies later instituted by the nation state to enable the ethnic groups to 
regulate themselves for the State.  The appropriation of territory by the different 
groups was reinforced by the official land-use zoning policy that recognised these 
enclaves.  From the outset, then, the British adopted this policy of residentially 
segregating the different peoples and allocating different sections of the city to each 
of them9 (see Chapter 3.2: Racial zoning and segregation).  The spatial pattern laid 
down by the British reflected the different roles of each of the groups in the colonial 
economy and it was perpetuated throughout the entire period of British rule by a 
compartmentalisation of the economy and the labour market along ‘race’ lines.10  It 
could be argued that the Raffles Town Plan segregating the physical landscape of 
Singapore into distinct racial divisions became more than anything else, a powerful 
symbol of planned social control, dominance and stratification of the various Asian 
groups - a stratification expressed by local historian Liew Kai Khuen in terms of 
status, class and ‘ethnicity’. Liew elaborates his argument by saying that the fear of 
contamination from and between the immigrant groups was primarily responsible for 
their segregation into various areas away from the European quarter and for the 
enforcement of public policies under the guise of “urban planning” and “sanitary 
control”.11  Strict regulations relating to hygiene were enforced to avoid the “harmful 
pestilence radiating from the native areas”.  It could be further argued that this spatial 
organization and segregation itself partially constituted these groups of people into 
‘races’.  The key word ‘race’, already denoting difference in this period, then came to 
be perpetuated throughout British rule and in independent Singapore.   
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1.1.2   Society 
 Although economic factors wielded an overriding influence over land use and 
spatial organization, British urban planning practices cannot be considered in isolation 
from social and cultural factors inherent in the unique nature of Singapore society.  A 
study of urban anthropology in Singapore, both in colonial as well as in post-colonial 
times, has therefore to consider the process of urban living in this island – whether 
and to what extent different cultural groups adapt to the city or whether the city adapts 
to these groups.  Irrespective of the direction of adaptation, this equation brings into 
focus interrelations between various interests, power and pressure groups.  
Consequently, concepts, images and memories of the city differ between different 
ethnic, cultural, occupational and status groups, because although social networks in 
Singapore are interdependent, people are largely separated from one another on the 
basis of their ethnic, religious, language, and class particularity.  Hence we find 
different groups adapting the urban space for their own particular ends, thereby 
bringing into focus the tensions and negotiations of urban living.  The important 
issues of ethnicity, language, class, religion, tradition, identity and ideology have, 
both in colonial and post-colonial times, always assumed great significance as 
Singaporeans have attempted to make sense of the large, complex and heterogeneous 
urban environment in which authoritarian colonial as well as post-colonial 
government policies and regulations have dictated the private and public space of 
Singaporeans at almost every level of urban life.   
 While hegemony, discipline and control governed the British administration’s 
power structure in the colony, resistance and negotiation became the order of the day 
for the local communities.  The British colonial masters, powerful migrant - mainly 
Chinese – groups as well as English-educated locals jointly negotiated their political 
space.  As I explore in this and subsequent chapters, conflicting discourses and 
competing strategies were, according to Yeoh, employed by the Asian communities 
and the municipal authorities in various spheres of the built environment, namely, in 
sanitation, disease prevention and control, housing, place and street names, pedestrian 
‘five-foot ways’ and sacred spaces such as burial grounds.12  The British also 
controlled the definition and management of liquor licensing, property tax, law, order 
and public safety, market and traffic, water supply and drainage and suppression of 
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immoral activities.  Such colonial management regulations and controls remain very 
much a characteristic of post-independent Singapore’s built environment.  In fact it 
can be argued that its rapid urban growth owes its origins to the regulatory tools of 
planning and control instituted by the British administration.   
Nevertheless, the extent to which the non-European population drew upon 
their own discourses and cultural practices to establish strategies and resist hegemonic 
colonial laws cannot be underestimated according to historical sources.  One of these 
was the tendency, particularly among the Chinese and to a lesser extent among 
Indians and Malays, to project and practice their own traditional ‘Asian’ values as 
opposed to western values - a discourse that resonates in Singapore to this day.13  The 
Chinese, for example, practised their own social, cultural, religious and recreational 
activities without seeking recourse to the colonial government.  With their 
institutional support of clan and dialect associations, trade guilds, temples and secret 
societies, they organised passive counter-strategies to resist control and dominance by 
the colonial administration.  However, it was in the practices of everyday life that the 
various communities participated in the production and consumption of social spaces 
in colonial Singapore.   
  
1.1.3  Urban Political Economy 
 Urban public policy and planning in Singapore has traditionally, in colonial as 
in post-colonial times, been associated with state intervention in the urban political 
economy in order to rationalise and develop capitalist industrial development in terms 
of the improvement of living conditions.  Castells calls this form of planning 
‘collective consumption’, defining it as consumption whose “economic and social 
treatment, while remaining capitalist, takes place not through the market but through 
the state apparatus”.14  In colonial times, the British administration, recognising the 
importance of Singapore as an entrepot trading centre, marshalled its urban planning 
decisions towards developing the country’s infrastructure and facilities.  Capitalist 
industrial and economic development in the independent city-state has largely come 
                                        
13  The rhetoric of ‘Asian’ values, a colonial construct, prescribes attitudes and ways of perceiving 
along with social practices which run counter to European attempts to impose colonialist notions of 
civilization and modernity. See 1.1.3, 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4 for examples of Asian counter-strategies. 
 
14  Manuel Castells, The Urban Question, trans. A. Sheridan (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1977), 460.   
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about because of the political alliance between the local capitalist class and foreign 
capital which has been central to Singapore’s political economy and global urbanism.  
While the colonial power supplied the global capital, the Asian immigrants provided 
the labour and this partnership, though effected through a system of labour 
exploitation, provided the catalyst for Singapore’s economic development through the 
decades.  Three distinct levels of economic development can be identified in 
Singapore’s history as the country moved from entrepot trading post (1819-67), to 
regional city (1867-1965), to global city-state (post-1965).  As an entrepot trading 
post with free port status, Singapore was controlled from India by the British East 
India Company and became, in 1827, part of the Straits Settlements that also included 
Malacca and Penang, two urban port towns on the west coast of Malaya.  The pattern 
of entrepot trade involved European traders receiving goods on consignment that they 
sold on commission relying on Chinese traders as middlemen.  This was the mutually 
beneficial relationship between British capital and Chinese traders that underpinned 
Singapore’s economic growth during the colonial period.  In addition to free port 
status, the other fundamental basis of its economic growth was free immigration, 
which allowed access to the cheap labour needed by British capital to extract raw 
materials like rubber and tin from the Malay hinterland later in the century.   
 In 1867 the island became a British Crown Colony, with the Colonial Office in 
London taking direct control of running Singapore. This situation continued (except 
for the period of Japanese occupation from 1942 to 1945) until 1965 when it became 
completely independent subsequent to attaining self-government status in 1959.  With 
direct rule, the British administration in Singapore introduced, through the 
Municipality, various forms of social regulation to influence the ‘moral and social 
habits’ of the people.15  Such regulations included the suppression of piracy, the 
upgrade of the judicial system, and suppression of Chinese secret societies.16  While 
the British exercised only such control over the local population as was necessary for 
the realisation of its commercial and strategic objectives, it introduced a professional 
British civil service and initiatives in such areas as the judicial system, health, 
education and welfare, all of which had many implications for social regulation of the 
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various communities.  Interestingly this situation has been carried through and 
perpetuated by independent Singapore to an astonishingly high degree.  As I will 
demonstrate in subsequent chapters, social regulation remained a central state concern 
not only in the process of decolonisation in the aftermath of the Second World War, 
but more significantly in subsequent nation-building strategies in independent 
Singapore. 
 Commercial success in the early decades enabled the colonial town of 
Singapore to grow both in demographic, economic and spatial terms.  However, 
according to Perry, Kong and Yeoh, social development for the growing population 
lagged far behind economic development.17  Problems of poverty, overcrowding, 
sanitary control, sewage and rubbish disposal, malnutrition, lack of clean water, 
infectious diseases, high mortality rates, opium addiction, prostitution and general 
lack of social order and discipline were all compounded by the domestic practices and 
habits of the immigrant groups leading to what Warren calls, “a crisis of 
habitability”.18  In particular, the acute housing shortage and the attendant problems 
of a poor sanitary environment resulted in squatter settlements springing up all over 
the central and city areas.  Archival records show that the British administration, 
because of its laissez-faire policy towards housing, did not consider housing an 
important aspect of its urban planning practices.  Official reports describe the severe 
shortage of housing for the masses and the overcrowded conditions of existing 
houses.  A Housing Committee appointed in 1947 described housing conditions in 
Singapore as ‘a disgrace to a civilized community’.19  Several years later, Kaye, who 
documented the living conditions of a typical street in Chinatown in 1954, described it 
as ‘among the most primitive in the urban areas of the world’.20   
 In the colonial mind, these problems were attributed, according to Yeoh, to the 
“basic nature of Asians as ‘incurably filthy’ and their intrinsic racial peculiarities.21  
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19  Report of the Housing Committee of Singapore, 1948, 16 (Government of Singapore). 
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The Chinese residents – termed “the most insanitary of mortals” were singled out for 
their “filthy habits…a hereditary Chinese instinct”.22  Such attitudes towards the 
immigrant communities emanated from a colonial discourse of power and superiority 
whereby Asian practices in managing health, disease and the environment were 
condemned by the colonial administration – a scenario Jyoti similarly paints in the 
colonial disparagement of Old Delhi (see Chapter 3.1).   There was also the serious 
problem of law and order, and the colonial government realized the need for urban 
development that was essential for policing and surveillance functions.  Consequently, 
the Asian communities were subject to the rigors of colonial notions of inspection, 
regulation, enforcement, disciplinary action and increased surveillance by government 
measures that included various issues like naming and signifying places, controlling 
urban traffic and segregating different types of land use.  Yeoh says that several 
campaigns were mounted to prevent shopkeepers from obstructing pedestrian 
walkways.  Legislation was also passed to close or control burial grounds that 
proliferated in the municipal area.  Such methods were also effected so as to facilitate 
classification of information on racial categories.23  Notwithstanding these measures, 
Singapore’s urban dilemmas continued to worsen, especially with the onset of the war 
and the Japanese Occupation (1942-1945). 
 The colonial administration had also left industrial, commercial, residential 
and community developments in the hands of the local communities with a minimum 
of state involvement.  The administration encouraged communal initiatives that 
catered to the separate needs of the migrant groups and ensured the maintenance of 
the separate identities of all communities.  Each group was therefore largely left to 
regulate itself, which the Chinese community did through guilds and secret societies 
that encouraged the Chinese-educated section of the community to be politically 
apathetic to colonial rule.24  Similarly in the field of education, the colonial 
government adopted a largely hands-off attitude, paying attention only to English-
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medium primary schools and ignoring vernacular education.25  Separatism was 
practised in British education policy, allowing vernacular schools to exist in separate 
linguistic and communal compartments and creating a separate English-educated class 
as opposed to the vernacular-educated masses, hence widening the gap and feelings of 
separateness between and within the different ‘communities’ with racial, cultural and 
linguistic differences.  For example, the colonial administration consciously and 
painstakingly promoted the development of an English-educated Chinese elite, 
thereby antagonizing the Chinese-educated elite, a difference that has had ethnic 
repercussions in the politics of postcolonial Singapore. State intervention in medical 
and health services was also limited, the official view being that the population was 
largely transitory and ‘people who drifted in and out did so at their own risk.26  
Overall, the laissez-faire style adopted by the colonial government facilitated a free 
trading system but contributed little to the planned socio-economic development of 
the city.  Says Edwin Lee, “The British understood the need to invest in infrastructure 
and Singapore was their show-piece, an artefact of colonial design and engineering 
skill” but in contrast “schools, hospitals, and homes for the people were either not 
enough or not up to standard”.27
 As in all colonial societies, indigenous, immigrant and colonialist groups in 
Singapore were not only characterized by racial, cultural, social and religious 
pluralism but also by a social stratification system that constructed and privileged 
‘race’ as the reference marker.  The planning of separate quarters, the ranking and 
stereotyping of different communities on the basis of supposedly inherent racial 
attributes, and the general subordination of the local communities to white superiority 
in political and social spheres was the feature of life in urban Singapore.  This was 
accentuated by the dualistic structure of the colonial urban landscape, symbolized by 
segregated European and indigenous quarters with their own distinct type of 
economic activities, land use patterns and architectural styles.  On the eve of 
independence the colonial legacy was evident in the structured plural nature of 
society, comprising different factions, each with its own trades, traditions and 
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institutionalized practices.  In the words of one commentator, “in spite of its wealth 
and strategic importance” Singapore was “in many respects a sociologically immature 
city where racial, tribal and economic divisions are still quite sharp”.28  
 
1.2    Singapore – The Nation State 
One People One Nation One Singapore 
Singapore – Quality Class 
A City of Excellence 
The City that Never Sleeps 
Instant Asia 
New Asia – Singapore  
Small is Beautiful 
Clean & Green 
Garden City 
Where the World comes to Feast 
Live it up! Singapore  
Singapore – So Easy to Enjoy 
Shared Values 
Intelligent Island 
 Today slogans, devised by the State, dot the highways, building foyers and 
urban spaces of Singapore.  In one way they epitomize the metamorphosis 
characterizing Singapore urbanization since Sir Stamford Raffles first set foot on 
Singapura, the Lion City, in 1819. 
 The building of contemporary Singapore has resulted from early British 
innovations in urban development and planning.  Anthony King notes that 
communication systems, financial, banking, insurance and warehouse facilities all 
proliferated to incorporate the colonial city into the capitalist world system.29  
Accordingly, the spatial organization of the city and the local society became, in his 
view, articulated to the demands of capital, a situation that is valid from colonial times 
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to the present day in Singapore.  The colony therefore was from its inception a 
planned and progressive city, with urban planning practices put in place by the British 
- this was the legacy the new nation state inherited when it obtained independence in 
1965, a scenario that is in line with King’s argument that colonial urban development 
has had a profound influence with urban planning for national development.   
 Colonialism and capitalism have both been the catalysts for the development 
of Singapore into a highly state-controlled and globalised free market economy in the 
years since the nation became fully independent.  The unusual circumstances 
surrounding the sudden independence of Singapore – an isolated Chinese city in a 
Malay-dominant region; a small island without any natural resources; a declining 
trade economy; the need to provide jobs for the largely unskilled but rapidly growing 
population - enabled the new state to adapt the human resources, facilities and 
institutions that emanated from colonial rule to immediately institute vast economic 
development and industrialization programmes that have been instrumental in 
creating the post-colonial nation state. This transformation was effected by an 
ideology of ‘survivalism’ that enabled the nation state to set in motion a bewildering 
array of tightly-regulated and enforced rules and social policies  supporting its various 
development plans aimed at stimulating economic growth, a disciplined and obedient 
workforce, and multiracial solidarity.30  The state envisioned, in the words of former 
Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, that “every Singaporean citizen must learn how to be 
a good citizen; how to be fit; how to be honest, effective, and deserving of belonging 
to a community with the highest social and living standards in South-East Asia”.  He 
should be the “rugged” product of “a systematic programme for the inculcation of 
self-discipline”.31  A deliberate policy of redesigning and redefining Singapore’s 
physical, urban and cultural landscapes by means of urban planning and renewal has 
been the predominant focus of nationalism and economic growth, to such an extent 
that the main government agency in Singapore responsible for controlling and 
renewing the built environment is called the Urban Renewal Authority.  Since 
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independence the Master Plan continues to provide the blueprint for the overall land-
use pattern in Singapore.32  The Singapore urbanscape is a masterpiece in social 
engineering, as can be seen in various policies implemented by the state.  Social 
engineering has been a vital component of the social, cultural and economic changes 
undertaken by the state since independence and will be explored in depth in Chapters 
6-8 in the context of a discussion of ‘racial’ politics and identities in the city-state. 
  Singapore has also become a global financial, trading, industrial, and 
technological hub, so much so that it has earned the epithet of “economic miracle” 
and is sometimes referred to as ‘Singapore Inc.’.  Dynamic leadership has, in the last 
four decades, integrated the nation into the global world economy with the result that 
Singapore is now considered one of the best-run economies in the world.  Embracing 
globalisation to maximum advantage, the city-state has in the past decade opened its 
doors wide to foreign investment and talent, slashed corporate taxes, offered 
incentives to nurture strategic industries (such as biotech, pharmaceuticals and 
financial services) and cut free-trade deals with a host of other countries.  Singapore’s 
spectacular growth can be seen by the fact that over the past three years, its economy 
has averaged 7.6 per cent growth – a staggering pace for an industrialized state – and 
created new jobs at a rate any government would envy. 
 Chief sponsor of “Singapore Inc.”, the post-colonial Government is generally 
seen as dominating all aspects of political, economic, cultural and social life.  It has, 
for reasons of necessity and survival, striven to construct a national identity primarily 
on economic grounds because of the absence of any prevailing ideology at the time of 
its unceremonial exit from the Malaysian Federation in 1965.33  The Government 
frequently reiterates that economic growth is required for, what it calls, “sustainable 
urban development”, a slogan that conveys different meanings to different people.  
Contained in this term is a raft of Government perceptions and policies that project 
economic growth as synonymous with national identity – these policies are explored 
in Chapters 6-8.  For this purpose, the Government has declared capitalist values like 
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physical development by both the public and private sectors have to be scrutinized in the light of the 
prevailing Master Plan.   
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materialism, enterprise and competition as integral to Singapore’s national culture, 
while simultaneously creating an official ‘cultural’ ethos based on “Asian 
communitarian values”.  Government leaders defend a discourse that emphasizes 
order, discipline, pragmatism, elitism, collectivism, Confucian ethics and 
authoritarian ways as opposed to Western-style values supposedly based on individual 
rights.  The content of this distinctive and “hybrid” Singaporean identity and the 
“proper” balance between cosmopolitan and traditional values are issues that continue 
to shape contemporary society in Singapore.  As a means of integrating the 
fragmented fractions of society and forging a single identity out of a population riven 
by racial, religious, language and cultural lines, the PAP Government has also 
espoused the ideology of multiracialism ‘without discrimination for any particular 
community’.34  
 
1.3  Conclusion 
 This chapter has shown that the planned spatial and built environment of 
Singapore from its colonial origins to the global city has been the outcome of 
historical, sociopolitical and economic forces, spatial practices and social control.  Of 
particular significance has been the high impact of colonial urban planning practices, 
the role of capitalism, the psychological mobilization of society, and the political 
attempt at self-legitimation through rapid and spectacular economic development and 
social change, all of which have enabled the nation state to achieve control through its 
enormous power structure, both literally and symbolically.   
 The politics of space in Singapore has also an intensive ideological 
dimension, because its citizens invest places with meanings related to state-enforced 
rules and regulations that they have imbibed through their own social and cultural 
backgrounds.  In subsequent chapters, I will interrogate how the contemporary ethnic 
quarter of Singapore now known as ‘Little India’ came into being, and how meanings 
vested in this ethnic district of Singapore are closely woven with the passage of 
history associated with the place.  While historical continuity has made Little India a 
distinctive community place and space for Indians in Singapore, its significance must 
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inevitably be related to the nation state’s social, political, ideological and economic 
fabric in which identity and ‘racial’ politics play a significant part. 
The early Indian migrants to Singapore grouped themselves in different areas, 
ultimately congregating in the Little India area around Serangoon Road, an area that 
has enormous significance for the Indian community and for the state as well.  This 
significance will be explored in the next chapter in which I will examine the arrival 
and settlement of Indians in several parts of Singapore, and finally their concentration 
in Little India. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
INDIAN MIGRATION 
 
2.1     Indian migration to the British colonies, including Southeast Asia 
 
 Large-scale movement and settlement of people from the Indian sub-continent 
into various British colonies began with the expansion of Western colonialism and 
capitalism during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.  With the political 
independence of former British colonies, most Indians have become domiciled in their 
respective countries.  The descendants of these Indian indentured migrants today have 
taken their place in the socio-cultural and political milieu of their adopted nation 
states.  
 British colonial dominance of the Indian sub-continent facilitated the 
movement of Indians to Myanmar, Malaya (which then included Singapore), Fiji, 
Mauritius, West Indies, British Guyana, Kenya, Uganda, South Africa and a few other 
British trading posts spread throughout the British Empire.  Indian immigration 
appears to have begun in 1833, when slavery was abolished throughout the British 
Empire and cheap and subservient labour was sought to work the plantations in the 
colonies.1  With an impoverished India becoming the perfect source of cheap labour 
recruitment, the colonial administration and European planters in these colonies 
developed a system of quasi-slavery termed ‘Indentured Labour Contract’ to bring 
migrant labourers from the Indian sub-continent.  There were also other forms of 
labour migration, but the most common form was the indentured system, used 
specifically for sugarcane cultivation.  For about 80 years between 1833 and until the 
abolition of indentures in 1917, the plantation economies in various British colonies 
thrived by the hard labour of these Indian labourers or “coolies”.   The processes of 
recruitment and settlement into Malaya (including Singapore) can be divided into two 
historical phases, the first phase from about 1840 to 1910 when indentured labourers 
were imported from Madras in South India under a regressive and exploitative 
system, and the second phase from about 1910 to 1938, the period of the more 
progressive ‘kangany’ (meaning foreman in Tamil) system of immigration.  Both 
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were forms of assisted labour migration.  There also existed so-called “free” or 
“independent” migrant labourers.  In addition, there was the movement of 
professional and commercial people as well as clerks, technicians and people working 
in other service-related sectors of the economy.2
Prior to the influx of these people into Malaya during the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries, Hindu traders had already been arriving from the Indian 
Coromandel Coast from the second century AD onwards.  Through cultural 
assimilation and intermarriage, the continued presence and influence of these Indian 
merchants had resulted in the Indianization of several city-states in Southeast Asia 
and a flourishing civilization.  The ‘Malay Annals’ in Sejarah Melayu (Malayan 
history) and scholars on the subject of Indian origins in Malaya and Singapore have  
documented the conquest of Singapore (then called Temasek) and other parts of 
Malaya by the Tamil king Rajendra Chola (1012-1044).3     
The indelible Indian legacy that was left behind in Malaya and Singapore is 
still evident today in the Malay language and literature, its customs, its arts and crafts, 
and perhaps most significantly in the Sanskrit name given to Singapura (or Lion City), 
now known as Singapore.4  Professor K S Sandhu, quoting famed historian R O 
Windsdedt, describes this legacy thus:  
With little exaggeration, it has been said of Europe that it owes its theology, its 
literature, its science and its arts to Greece: with no greater exaggeration it 
may be said of the Malayan races that till the nineteenth century, they owed 
everything to India: religions, a political system, medieval astrology and 
medicine, literature, arts and crafts… .5
             The outstanding feature of the legacy of Indian influence brought about by 
early Indian traders and contract labourers has therefore been the historical evolution 
and growth of Singapore.  Set against this background of history and tradition, Indian 
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labour migration to Malaya (and hence Singapore) in the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries can be considered an extension of Indian influence accelerated by 
European imperialist expansion and British colonial rule.  The migration of Indians 
into Singapore must therefore be situated in the larger political and economic contexts 
of Malayan colonial history. 
 
2.2  Indian Migration to Singapore 
 While there were trickles of Indian migrants into Singapore in the pre-colonial 
era, flows of Indian migration started after the founding of Singapore by Sir Stamford 
Raffles in 1819 and the subsequent formation of the Straits Settlements (comprising 
Singapore, Penang, and Malacca) in 1827.  Consequently the types of migrants 
entering the Malay Peninsula were sharply different in the case of Singapore.  While 
the indenture and ‘kangany’ systems of labour migration operated in Singapore to a 
small extent, with agriculture and rubber estates becoming relatively insignificant, the 
types of Indian migrants into the British colony varied considerably when compared 
to the Malayan mainland and with migrant settlements in other British colonies.  
Sandhu describes the migrant thus: 
A new genre of Indian migrant – Ramasamy, the labourer, Tulsi Ram, the 
convict, Bhai Singh, the policeman, Maniam, the technical assistant and Pillai, 
the clerk – arrived in the country… .  They were the principal labourers and 
security guards and, together with the Tamils from Ceylon, the main 
administrative and technical assistants.6
 The changing Indian migration patterns were a testimony to the fact that the 
British saw Singapore as an excellent trading hub and colonial settlement and 
therefore labour was badly needed to fill jobs as labourers and construction workers.  
This need tied in neatly with their economic policy to exploit both Singapore as well 
as India with its large population, unemployment, poverty, epidemics and slow 
economic growth.  Hence, controlled immigration (labourers), convicts and voluntary 
immigration (traders and professionals) formed the bulk of the settlement and 
evolution of the Indian community in Singapore.  The other great push factor that 
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propelled the migrants, predominantly male, to leave India was that of caste.7  
Emigration for poor, unemployed, landless and lower-caste labourers thus not only 
provided economic survival but the hope of social emancipation in terms of removing 
them from the clutches and exploitation of the caste system.  Crossing the seas was 
not taboo to lower-castes, unlike the upper-castes, hence the demographic 
preponderance of lower castes in comparison to the upper castes in Singapore.  
According to Arasaratnam, in the early nineteenth century a third of the emigrants 
belonged to the untouchable castes of pariyan, chakliyan and pallan.  A smaller 
number of higher caste groups also chose to migrate like the vellalan, koundan and 
vaniyan.8  Caste differences had repercussions along with related sub-ethnic, religious 
and linguistic differences in the evolution of the Indian community and its built 
environment in Singapore, particularly in the context of Singapore’s Little India.  For 
example, once in Singapore:  
Labourers of the untouchable castes … were housed in separate lines … from 
those of the “clean castes”.  Provision for drinking water was also separate.  
The untouchables had separate shrines … not allowed into the temples of the 
upper caste.9  
Since the early Indians were very much affiliated with the native country, caste taboos 
were strictly followed by individuals who intended to return to India to resume their 
place in the village communal system and caste structure. 
 I will, in the reminder of this chapter, explore how these different players 
helped to shape the urban landscapes of the Indian quarters in particular, and of 
Singapore as a whole, during the colonial period.  This was a process that involved a 
measure of resistance and negotiation on the part of the Indian community to the 
hegemonic urban planning decisions of the colonial administration, although 
historical sources agree that the Indian migrants were generally obedient and law-
abiding.   
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The Indians migrated to Singapore in waves. The first migrants were sepoys 
(soldiers) in the employ of the East India Company and accompanied Raffles on his 
first visit in January 1819.  They remained to guard British interests on the island 
when the Lieutenant-Governor sailed for the British settlement of Penang on the 
Malaysian mainland.  During the early years, then, the majority of Singapore’s Indian 
population comprised military men and camp followers who belonged to the lower 
castes.10  However, some civilians soon joined them.  When, at the end of May 1819, 
Raffles arrived for a second visit to Singapore, he brought along with him a number of 
Indian immigrants from Penang that had already been colonized since 1786.  Among 
them was an enterprising merchant, Naraina Pillai, who quickly set about building a 
brick-kiln to supply bricks to the builders and establishing religious and educational 
organizations for the benefit of the Hindus.  Says Pearson of Pillai: “it was a 
beginning from which great things have come”.11   Within five years of Pillai’s arrival 
in Singapore, there were 756 Indians living on the island, accounting for about 7% of 
its then population of 10,683, which also comprised 4,580 Malays, 3,317 Chinese, 
1,925 Bugis, 74 Europeans, 16 Armenians and 15 Arabs.12  Virtually to this day the 
Indian population in Singapore remains at about 7% by virtue of the new nation 
state’s planned policies of multiracialism and demographical balance.  The following 
table and graph show the growth of the Indian population in Singapore over the years.   
                                        
10  C M Turnbull, A History of Singapore, 1819-1988 (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1997), 15. 
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Table 1 
The Indian Population of Singapore, 1819-2000 
 
 
Year 
 
Number of Indians in Singapore 
(000) 
 
Number of Indians as a 
percentage of 
Total Population of Singapore 
(%) 
 
1819 
1871 
1891 
1911 
1931 
1947 
1957 
1970 
1980 
1990 
2000 
 
n.a. 
11.5 
16.0 
28.4 
50.9 
69.0 
124.0 
145.2 
154.6 
194.0 
257.8 
 
n.a. 
11.8 
8.7 
9.2 
9.4 
7.7 
9.0 
7.0 
6.4 
7.1 
7.9 
 
 
Source: Department of Statistics, Singapore  
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A steady stream of Indians continued to arrive in Singapore over the years, according 
to Jackson.13       
                                       
While the majority of these early Indians were mainly from South India, 
subsequently North Indians like the Sikhs, Bengalis and Pathans came to Singapore.  
These Indian migrants regarded Singapore as an economic treasure trove, and their 
purpose was to acquire as much wealth as possible to better their financial position 
back in India.  They saw themselves as temporary residents who had every intention 
of returning back home to India.14  Thus, very few brought their families.  Historical 
records show that most of these Indian migrants were single men.15   Most of these 
men lived in sleeping quarters above the shops, cattle sheds and stables provided by 
the employers who also provided daily meals.  Some of them were employed in the 
plantation sector, initially under the indentured system and later the ‘kangany’ system, 
but the majority worked on public projects, transport, harbour and other service 
sectors of the economy, like doormen, watchmen, domestic servants, gardeners, 
cattle-herders and laundrymen (hence the area near Orchard Road is still known as 
Dhoby Ghaut).16  
 Another important factor that contributed to the increased presence of Indians 
in Singapore was the British preference for the cheap and docile Indian labourers 
compared to the Chinese who were engaged in secret society activities and demanded 
higher wages.17  The Indians, as British subjects unlike the Chinese, were perceived 
as better accustomed to British authority.18  The British also felt threatened by the 
 
13  R N Jackson, Immigrant Labour and the Development of Malaya, 1786-1920 (Kuala Lumpur, 
Government Press, 1961), 57. 
 
14  Mani, “Changing Caste-Structure amongst Singapore Indians”; S Arasaratnam, Indians in Malaysia 
and Singapore; Sandhu, Indians in Malaya; Turnbull, A History of Singapore; Charles Wilkes, The 
Singapore Chapter of the Narrative of the United States Exploring Expedition During the Years 1838, 
1839, 1840, 1841, 1842 (Philadelphia: Lea & Blanchard, 1845; reprint: Antiques of the Orient Pte. 
Ltd., 1984).   
 
15  Jackson, Immigrant Labour and the Development of Malaya, 59. 
 
16  Turnbull, A History of Singapore.  99. 
 
17  Ironically and interestingly it was the Indians that spearheaded the trade union movement in 
independent Singapore. Many Indians also took to the legal profession and became vocal in their stance 
on politics, nationalism, and other issues of the day. 
 
18  Saw Swee Hock, “Population Trends in Singapore, 1819-1867,” Journal of South East Asian 
History X, 1, 1971: 47. 
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increasing numbers of Chinese and their enterprising spirit.19  In 1887, the Straits 
Settlements Governor, Sir Frederick Weld, wrote to the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies in London, saying: 
I am also anxious for political reasons that the great preponderance of the 
Chinese over any other race in these Settlements… should be counter-
balanced as much as possible by the influx of Indian and other nationalities.20
The Indians of pre-war Singapore can be divided into three main occupational 
groups.  The labouring class was the main group, while the commercial class 
comprised divergent groups of Indians, namely, Bengalis, Gujaratis, Sindhis, Sikhs, 
Parsies and Tamils, and included proprietors, managers of wholesale and retail 
businesses, salesmen, shop assistants, mercantile accountants, street vendors and 
peddlers.  The third group engaged in trading and in a variety of white-collar jobs 
such as clerks, interpreters, overseers, policemen, watchmen, moneylenders and 
professionals like teachers, doctors and lawyers.  They comprised Tamils (the 
majority), Malayalees, Telugus, Gujaratis, Sikhs, Punjabis, Ceylonese and others. 21  
Raffles’ liberal economic policies had resulted in the encouragement of the 
immigration of not only traders, “the lenial successors of the traders and sea captains 
of historical times”, but also those in the supporting services, thereby creating vast 
employment opportunities.22  However, Tamil labourers and the commercial class of 
persons dominated the occupational scene in pre-war Singapore, while Indian traders 
were (and still remain) more diverse in their ethnicities.23
 With Indian community numbers increasing in the second half of the 
nineteenth century and in the first half of the twentieth century, more of them stayed 
and fewer returned to India.  The result was a semi-permanent ethnic minority, but no 
effort was made by the British administration to integrate them into local life, 
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according to Mani.24  Consequently, the Indians looked on Singapore as a temporary 
residence for livelihood and maintained close ties with their homeland.  They could 
not maintain traditional Indian family values in Singapore, most of them being males.  
Further, caste, class, and religious differences precluded their fusion into the general 
community in Singapore.  Such differences were aggravated by cultural and linguistic 
differences between the Indians themselves, because the labourers and working 
classes originated from South India, while merchants came from the north.  All these 
differences created separate cultural traditions, these separate traditions preventing 
cohesion between the various groups of Indians, not only then but also now in the new 
nation state.   
 The other group of Indians to come here were Indian convict labourers, the 
result of the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1824, by which treaty the British surrendered 
Bencoolen, their outpost in Sumatra (Indonesia), to the Dutch in exchange for 
Malacca on the Malaysian mainland.  Since Bencoolen had been a penal colony for 
convicts transported from the Indian subcontinent, often for life, the British had now 
to find a place for them.25  For the next half century, Singapore remained an important 
penal settlement with about 1,200 resident Indian convicts in 1832, rising to 2,275 in 
1860 (17.5% of Singapore’s Indian population in this census year).26  
Overwhelmingly male, the convicts came from all over India and Ceylon and 
belonged to castes ranging from the Brahmins to the ‘untouchables’, and comprising 
Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs and Buddhists, a diversity that is reflective of Singapore’s 
Indian population mix to this very day.27  At that time, this heterogeneity was viewed 
as an advantage by the British authorities; McNair, for example, writes that “this 
admixture of caste and tribes was a very valuable corrective against possible 
insurrection”.28  
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 The overriding consequence of the convict presence for Singapore’s built 
environment was the deployment of the convicts for vital colonial infrastructural 
development, mainly reclamation, roading and public building projects.  With the 
civilian people concerned largely with trade (overwhelmingly Chinese, some Indians), 
agriculture (a Chinese monopoly) and fishing (mostly Malays), cheap labour was in 
extremely short supply in the early years of Singapore’s growth.  The colonial 
administration therefore found it expedient to provide the convicts training and skills 
for various construction trades and utilize them for infrastructural projects which now 
showcase Singapore’s colonial past and heritage to present day generation of 
Singaporeans living in the new nation state.29  Some of Singapore’s most treasured 
public buildings and projects that the convicts were responsible for are Raffles Place 
(previously called Commercial Square and located in the heart of the commercial and 
administrative centre of the city), the Collyer Quay reclamation, numerous arterial 
roads from the city centre, railways, waterways, bridges, hospitals, prison buildings, 
public housing, courthouse buildings, lighthouses, temples, churches including 
Singapore’s first church (St Andrew’s Cathedral), and probably what was to be their 
last great contribution to Singapore’s heritage, Government House.30  This 
outstanding piece of colonial architecture (now called Istana – meaning palace in 
Malay) has housed Singapore’s British Governors, Governor-General, and Presidents 
and Prime Ministers of the new nation state ever since.  Also among the prominent 
examples of colonial architecture built with Indian convict labour are the old 
Parliament House, City Hall, Singapore Cricket Club, Fullerton Building, Supreme 
Court, Victoria Theatre and Victoria Memorial Hall, and Dalhousie Memorial.  All 
these buildings are located in the heart of the colonial town centre. 
  Quarrying and brick making for the numerous projects was also the 
responsibility of the convicts.  Sandhu elaborates:  
The whole of the existing roads throughout the island … every bridge in both 
town and country, all the existing canals, sea walls, jetties, piers … have been 
constructed by convict labour … Singapore is indebted for [their] works… .31
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Their contribution to the built landscape of Singapore is described by various writers 
as having left an indelible mark on the development of Singapore’s infrastructure 
from colonial times to the nation state.32  This infrastructure continues to project 
Singapore’s rich colonial heritage and the colourful multicultural diversity of its 
peoples.  Netto aptly sums up their contribution: “the history of Indian convicts was 
the history of the Public Works Department of Singapore”.33  Their usefulness and 
versatility even extended to “any occasion when the presence of a body of men under 
discipline was required”, McNair & Bayliss tell us.   The convicts were therefore used 
to the maximum for the colony’s economic and political advantage.  Upon their 
release, many preferred not to return to India but to marry Indian (some ex-convicts 
themselves) or Malay women and so to merge into the small, but growing, local 
Indian community.  Sandhu records the fact that in 1838 only 60% returned to India 
and by the 1860s only very few returned.34 Community numbers were bolstered when 
many convicts were granted unconditional pardon on the transfer of administrative 
responsibility for the Straits Settlements from the Government of India to the Colonial 
Office in London in 1867.35  Historical records show that many of them decided to 
remain in Singapore as cattle-keepers, bullock-cart pullers, carriage pullers, milk 
vendors, shopkeepers, road contractors, barbers, money lenders and other small 
traders.36   
 
2.3 Gathering Grounds of Early Indian Migrants in Singapore 
 Although the Indian migrants were a minority, they were spread out over 
different parts of the town.  While Kampong Glam and Kampong China ultimately 
came to be identified with the respective Malay and Chinese ethnic groups, Kampong 
Chulia did not materialize as the only Indian ethnic enclave because of the racial 
zoning and segregation practices of the colonial administration as well as preference 
among Indian migrants to congregate within their own groups.  Though there were six 
main concentrations where they tended to congregate, none of these areas is today so 
                                        
32  Mani, “Indians in Singapore Society”; Sandhu, “Tamil and Other Indian Convicts”. 
 
33  George Netto, Indians in Malaya: Historical Facts and Figures (Singapore, 1961), 16. 
 
34  Sandhu, Indians in Malaya. 
 
35  McNair & Bayliss, Prisoners Their Own Warders. 
 
36  Netto, Indians in Malaya, 21; McNair & Bayliss, Prisoners Their Own Warders. 183. 
 59
completely identified with Singapore’s Indian community as is that along Serangoon 
Road, the area that is now affectionately called “Little India.” Little India is the heart 
and lifeline of Singapore’s Indians and was the final area of traditional Indian 
concentration.  Interestingly, however, this area was never designated as an ethnic 
enclave by the colonial administration, unlike Kampong China and Kampong Glam.   
 According to Siddique and Purushotam, the major influence in the early 
construction and settlement of Serangoon Road was cattle trading and related 
economic activities like milk, meat, production of sesame oil and wheat grinding.37  
These activities provided ample opportunities and therefore lured the early Indian 
migrants to the place thereby giving rise to the birth of an Indian enclave from the 
mid-nineteenth century.  Roads named after such activities like Buffalo Road, Kerbau 
Road and Lembu Road (kerbau and lembu meaning buffalo and cow respectively in 
Malay) are still at the heart of Serangoon Road.  Other economic activities introduced 
in Serangoon Road that helped to stimulate the cattle and related businesses there 
were of an agricultural nature.  Farming activities including vegetable growing, 
planting of gambier, sugarcane and coconut, and rich grass for the cattle, were 
facilitated by the presence of canals like the Rochor and Kallang Rivers and the low-
lying swampy nature of the land.   
           There were also other factors that provided the impetus for Indians to 
congregate in this area.  The Public Works Department’s labour lines sited there 
housed numerous Indian Tamils.38  In addition, as Siddique and Purushotam have 
noted, the establishment of a convict jail on Bras Basah Road near the Dhoby Ghaut 
junction led to prison employees settling in the vicinity and promoting activities like 
laundrying (hence the name Dhoby Ghaut), food supply and dairying among the 
Indian immigrants.39  Lack of space within the other areas of Indian groupings and 
particularly the Market Street/Chulia Street commercial centre and the predominantly 
North Indian enclave of the High Street area also led to South Indian commercial 
settlers establishing a ribbon development along Serangoon Road from the 1880s.  All 
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these factors led to a loss of predominance of the Indian presence in those areas.  
Serangoon Road was also one of the key arterial roads along which the settlement 
fanned out from the centre of the city during the nineteenth century.  It is still one of 
many main arterial roads that slice through Singapore, but when it was first built it 
stood as the only road that cut across the island.  It already appeared on an 1822 map 
as a dotted line labeled “proposed Road across the island”.  In a map prepared in 1828 
by Lt Jackson, Serangoon Road is shown as “a road leading across the island”, 
signifying its importance in transportation in those days and thereby attracting and 
encouraging Tamil labourers, shopkeepers and traders to settle in this area.40  Lime 
was also found here, giving rise to a brick-manufacturing industry.  The Indians who 
worked in the numerous brick kilns that used to line Serangoon Road called the area 
“Village of Lime” or Sunnambu Kambam in Tamil.  Over time, a thriving Indian 
community developed which engaged in an array of different occupations, including 
gold-trading, astrology, tattoo artistry, tailoring and money-lending.  Tamil 
shopkeepers and traders are still the main occupiers of Serangoon Road.  Places of 
worship, like the Sri Veeramakaliamman and Sri Srinivasa Perumal Temples, and the 
Angullia and Abdul Gafoor Mosques, were built.  With the passage of time, 
Serangoon Road became Singapore’s traditional Indian quarter, and it remains so 
today, commonly known as Little India. 
         While the cattle and related economic activities increased the flow of 
immigrants into the area, this meant that more space was needed for the population as 
well as for roads, buildings, shophouses, temples and other construction.  These 
developments gradually reduced the prominent role of the cattle trade and led to 
commercial and retail activities catering to the needs of the growing population in the 
area.  The final blow to the cattle trading activity came in 1936 with the passing of the 
Municipal Ordinance that completely prohibited cattle trading in Serangoon Road.41  
Consequently by the 1930s, the character of the place began to undergo a dynamic 
transformation from an area of cattle rearing and trading into a burgeoning residential-
commercial district that persists to the present day.  With the congregation of Indians 
along Serangoon Road from the middle of the nineteenth century, the area developed 
over time into an “Indian” space, providing comforts and an environment similar to 
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native India.  The growing population of Indians in the area enhanced their social, 
economic and religious organizations there, further attracting more Indians to the 
place.  The heavy concentration of Indians in the place also provided a sense of 
emotional and physical security to the new immigrants and a style of living similar to 
that of India.  This can be seen, for example, in the temples with ornate carvings that 
help to create a total atmosphere of little pockets of different parts of India.  The 
Indian flavour of the place continues to be maintained and strengthened for the social, 
economic, physical, emotional, cultural and religious needs of the Indians in 
Singapore.  Nothwithstanding urban dilemmas like poor and insanitary housing 
conditions caused by the neglect of the British administration, by the late nineteenth 
century most new migrant Indians were choosing to settle in this area.   
            During the first half of the twentieth century, a new wave of commercial 
Indian migrants that were different from the early waves of Indian migrants in terms 
of demographic and occupational structure began to settle in the area.  The rapid 
commercial evolution of Singapore during this period brought many North Indian 
businessmen from established business communities such as the Parsees, Sindhis, 
Marwaris and Gujaratis, as well as South Indian retail traders and Chettiar money 
lenders.  After 1920, migration of Indians strengthened when the British developed 
military bases in various outlying parts of Singapore for strategic purposes.  Civilian 
workers were needed for the construction and maintenance of such bases and this led 
to an inflow of migrants from South India.  Commercial traders and activities like the 
doothwallas (milk vendors), goldsmiths, paanwallas (seller of betel nut leaves 
wrapped around various condiments), curd sellers, mamak (South Indian Muslims) 
stalls, dhobis, barbers, flower garlanders, fortune tellers, tailors, money changers and 
money lenders, frame makers, Tamil record shops, sari shops, luggage shops, 
ayurvedic medical shops, textile shops, provision shops, eating establishments and 
other trading enterprises, some even flowing into the five-foot ways, have contributed 
to the growing commercial character and Indian ambience of the place.42  Unlike the 
single men who dominated the early migration scene, these traders brought their 
families with them from the 1950s and their stability contributed to the fact that most 
of these trades are still prevalent in Little India today.43  However the state’s 
                                        
42  Siddique and Purushotam, Singapore’s Little India. 
 
 62
hegemonic heritage conservation policy in the last two decades has affected 
traditional Indian activities as I will demonstrate in Chapter 8.3.  Since the mid-1980s, 
a new wave of Indian professionals (particularly software engineers, analysts and 
chartered accountants), construction labourers as well as domestic maids have been 
coming into Singapore for their livelihood and, in the case of professionals, taking up 
residency in Singapore.  These groups also patronize Little India for their varied 
needs.   
2.4  The Ethnic Signification of Little India  
 Despite the predominance of Indians living in the area, Little India was 
nevertheless a multicultural space.  One reason for this was the presence of two very 
important inland waterways – Rochor River and Kallang River – straddling 
Serangoon Road.  Hence the importance of gambier, pepper and coconut plantations, 
sugar, nutmeg and sireh (Malay for betel leaves) and other vegetable gardens which 
thrived on both sides of Serangoon Road and along Balestier and Lavender Streets at 
the northern end of the Little India area.  These agricultural activities were undertaken 
mainly by the Chinese though such activities were short-lived.44  Their activities were 
augmented by the construction of Rochor Canal.  Not surprisingly, the Chinese built 
their homes in such areas as Syed Alwi Road, Balestier Road and Lavender Street.    
Another important factor was the crucial role played by the Europeans in shaping the 
landscapes along Serangoon Road as they created leisure spaces in the midst of 
vernacular economic scenes.  The racecourse, a symbol of radically unequal and 
racially based power relations, was built to cater to the leisure needs of wealthy 
Europeans who dabbled in activities like horse riding and horse racing.  A main road 
was constructed for this purpose and named “Race Course Road”, a street name that 
still exists today.  The built environment of the Little India area also became 
increasingly significant with the provision of various amenities by the colonial 
administration.  These took the form of colonial buildings and landmarks serving the 
needs of the various communities. All these factors led not only to the development of 
various activities and the active involvement of the various communities in the 
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development but also contributed to the cultural richness of Serangoon Road and the 
vicinity (see Plate 6). 
            Little India was therefore not only home for the Indians but also housed 
Europeans, Eurasians, Chinese and Malays, reflecting the multi-ethnic character of 
Singapore.  As claimed by Siddique and Purushotam:  
…although one could argue that the Indian community provided definitive 
identity for the area, they certainly never held exclusive territorial claims to it, 
and in fact, settlement and working patterns seem to reflect particularly well 
the ethnic/community diversity which is so characteristic of Singapore’s 
population.45
According to Siddique and Purushotam, such ethnic diversity in the Little India area 
was also reflected in the building plans submitted by the various communities.  
Chinese, European, Eurasian and Indian communities all wanted to put up residential 
and commercial structures in the area.46  While the Indians built dwelling houses and 
shophouses facing Serangoon Road, the Europeans, Eurasians and rich Chinese 
businessmen built bungalows at the corner of Serangoon Road and Syed Alwi Road.  
Shophouses with characteristic Chinese architectural styles were also built by the 
Chinese in the area.  In particular, there was and still is Chinese dominance in Perak 
Road, Mayo Street, Madras Road and along the Jalan Besar perimeter of Little India, 
where there are mainly Chinese shops dealing with Chinese hardware, electrical 
goods and Chinese food outlets.   The segment of the Serangoon Road area between 
Syed Alwi Road and Lavender Street continues to be dominated by the Chinese rather 
than the Indians.  
        Malays and Indian-Muslims lived in the adjoining area of Kampong Kapor, 
which is bounded by Sungei Road, Syed Alwi Road, Serangoon Road and Jalan 
Besar.  The Malay residents there were mainly Boyanese (from the coast of Java in 
Indonesia) and were employed as syces, horse-trainers, carriage-drivers and bullock-
cart drivers.  The proliferation of such jobs in the area could be explained by their 
close proximity to the Race Course.   
The influence of the Chinese, Malay and other communities in the area is also 
evident in the many vernacular street names in that area, providing further evidence of 
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the ethnic heterogeneity of the place.  For instance, the word “Serangoon” may be 
derived from the Malay word ranggong, which was a small marsh bird that used to 
inhabit the muddy banks of the old Serangoon River.  The Malay villagers called it 
Rangong; the Europeans knew it as the Marabou Stork.  The spelling “Saranggong” 
(sa, meaning one in Malay) appears on some of the earliest maps of British Singapore.  
From this feathered creature, the river and, later, Serangoon Road, got their names.  
Another Malay interpretation is that the word Serangoon has its roots in the Malay 
phrase di-serang dengan gong, literally meaning the use of gongs to frighten off the 
wild animals then living in the area.47  Most Indians believe that Serangoon Road is 
derived from the name Sri Rengam, a temple town in South India where the early 
Indian emigrants to Singapore came from.48  There is also a claim that Serangoon 
Road originated from Rangoon, the old capital city of Myanmar.  Streets in Little 
India and in the vicinity therefore came to be known by vernacular Chinese, Malay 
and Indian names that stemmed from these communities living side by side and using 
the same space.  The locals labeled streets and places on the basis of the 
environmental character of the surroundings and their daily experiences, thereby 
resisting and negotiating official street names imposed hegemonically by the colonial 
administration.  The various meanings that different communities invested indicated 
the different systems of signifying the landscape.  The rich variety of street names to 
be found in the area also brings to mind the prominent individuals who spent their 
lives building the urban landscape of Singapore.  Streets in Little India are of several 
types: those associated with the cattle trade and cottage industries, streets named after 
British colonial officials and prominent European families, streets named after 
colonial bungalow dwellers and entrepreneurs, and finally streets named after 
prominent Indian personalities.   Little India’s streets are as shown in Map 2. 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
The story of Indian migration has therefore been one of physical       
movement, through history, of Indians to various British colonies, including 
Singapore.  People of different caste, class, religious and linguistic backgrounds 
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migrated to Singapore.  Occupationally and in numerical order of ascendance, these 
were Indian labourers, professionals and merchants.  Regardless of the circumstances 
under which they arrived, and in spite of their different regional origins from their 
motherland, they were able to find their respective niches in the Singapore economy 
and contribute significantly to the colony’s development.  Through the colonial 
processes of hegemony, racial zoning and segregation in its various manifestations 
they went about constructing their lives.   
Throughout the nineteenth century and particularly towards the latter part of 
the century, and all through the twentieth century, the Serangoon Road area became 
increasingly the most important concentration of Indian migrants, though this did not 
occur in isolation from other communities.  The social worlds of Indians, due to their 
location in an obviously multicultural context and their numerical minority, were not 
just constituted by contact and interaction with members of their own ethnic 
community.  Since their earliest days in Singapore, their daily existence has also been 
constructed existentially through intra-ethnic relations.  Mixing with other 
communities, namely the Chinese, Malay, Eurasian and European communities, the 
Indians have formed an important minority ‘community’, although this term is 
problematic in the context of the multiracial politics of Singapore.  Who and what is 
an ‘Indian’ in Singapore?  The Indian community is caught in a dilemma, struggling 
to find its way between the national objectives of ethnic and national identities in 
Singapore.  How does the community grapple with these conflicting identities in the 
conduct of its everyday strategies of existence and coexistence while responding to 
the various race-based policies in force? How do these policies impact them?  What 
sort of tensions do they negotiate in the ideology of official CMIO multiracialism?  
To what extent will Little India continue to be relevant, not only to the Indian 
community in Singapore but also to the flows and meanings inherent in a global city 
like Singapore? These issues will be explored in subsequent chapters.   
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CHAPTER 3 
 
THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE COLONIAL NARRATIVE IN SINGAPORE 
– AN IDEOLOGY OF RACIAL ZONING AND SEGREGATION 
 
 In this chapter, I explore the relationship between early settlement patterns and 
the construction of the colonial narrative in Singapore, teasing out the ways in which 
racial zoning and segregation retold a specific colonial narrative.   The construction of 
the narrative forms the ideology underlying colonial urbanism and is integral to the 
colonial project.   The colonial project, according to Bernard Cohn, depends largely 
on the creation and production of colonial knowledge that in turn manifests itself in 
the construction of unequal and racially based power relations with the colonized.1  
The colonial narrative is also the subject of how ‘space’ in colonial urban Singapore 
led to different representations of the landscape by the colonial administration and the 
various communities.   
 
3.1  The Construction of the Colonial Narrative in Singapore 
“I think that the capacity for governing is a characteristic of our race, and it is 
wonderful to see in a country like the Straits, a handful of Englishmen and 
Europeans, a large and rich Chinese community, tens of thousands of Chinese 
of the lower coolie class, Arab and Parsee merchants, Malays of all ranks, and 
a sprinkling of all nationalities, living together in wonderful peace and 
contentment.  It always seems to me that we – an eccentric race – were created 
to govern and look after them, as a groom looks after a horse, whilst they were 
created to get rich and enjoy the good things of the earth.” 
Frederick A Weld2
So declared Frederick Weld, Governor of the Straits Settlements, in a speech, 
delivered on 10 June 1884, clearly enunciating the innate right of the British to govern 
and hence manage the colonial power structure in Singapore.  Binary oppositions of 
                                        
1  Bernard S Cohn, Colonialism and its Forms of Knowledge: The British in India (Princeton, New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1996). 
 
2  Frederick A. Weld, “The Straits Settlements and British Malaya [speech delivered on 10 June 
1884]”, in Honourable Intentions: Talks on the British Empire in South-East Asia delivered at the 
Royal Colonial Institute 1874-1928, ed. Paul H.Kratoska (Singapore: Oxford University Press), 46-7. 
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Europeans/others, and dominance/dependence organize the speech, simultaneously 
establishing and justifying colonial power, dominance and control.  This discourse of 
the colonial power constructs natives as the “other” in order to facilitate 
subordination, says AlSayyad.3  Such constructions have been embedded in 
colonialist notions of “the Orient” as justifications for empire building.  Edward 
Said’s famous treatise also posits that the ‘Orient’ was a product of late-eighteenth 
century European colonialism and points to the plans and projects of colonial powers 
in justifying and maintaining cultural domination and control over indigenous 
populations.4
          Said’s argument has resonated with many writers, particularly in colonised 
countries.  Preeti Chopra interprets the colonial city as the site where the colonial 
power has the potential to “fundamentally transform the built environment to make it 
serve its interests - be they economic or ideological”.5   Shirine Hamadeh contends 
that the notion of the ‘traditional city’ was an ideological construct born out of French 
colonial discourse and used to legitimise French domination in North African 
colonies.6  This image, according to her, serves to “promote the idea of an exotic, 
static and disorderly people in contrast to advanced and normalised European 
society”, similar to Indian writer Hosagrahar Jyoti who, writing in the same vein as 
Said, claims that India was constructed as a disorderly ‘other’ in need of British 
authority, protection and redemption.7  Jyoti has interpreted British New Delhi as a 
‘theatre of colonial discourse’, the dramaturgical metaphor being used to examine the 
cultural domination and subordination of indigenous peoples through urban planning 
                                        
3  Nezar AlSayyad, “Urbanism and the Dominance Equation: Reflections on Colonialism and National 
Identity” in Forms of Dominance: On the Architecture and Urbanism of the Colonial Enterprise, ed. 
Nezar AlSayyad (Aldershot: Avebury, 1992), 8. 
 
4  Edward W Said, Orientalism (New York: Vintage, 1979).  
 
5  Preeti Chopra, “Pondicherry: A French Enclave in India” in Forms of Dominance: On the 
Architecture and Urbanism of the Colonial Enterprise, ed. Nezar AlSayyad (Aldershot: Avebury, 
1992), 107-37. 
 
6  Shirine Hamadeh, “Creating the Traditional City: A French Project” in Forms of Dominance: On the 
Architecture and Urbanism of the Colonial Enterprise, ed. Nezar AlSayyad (Aldershot: Avebury, 
1992), 41-59. 
 
7  Hosagrahar Jyoti, “City as Durbar: Theater and Power in Imperial Delhi”, in Forms of Dominance: 
On the Architecture and Urbanism of the Colonial Enterprise, ed. Nezar AlSayyad (Aldershot: 
Avebury, 1992), 102-103.  
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projects.8  Jyoti views the planning of New Delhi as symbolically expressing the 
authority of the British and subordination of the Indians. In arguing that urbanism was 
an integral part of the colonial project and that the British had particularly utilized the 
urban space of New Delhi to retell a specific narrative, Jyoti maintains that race was 
an essential criterion of colonial discourse that epitomized the notion of superiority in 
the “creation of difference between European and ‘native’, modern and traditional, 
health and disease”. Such an Orientalist mindset, Jyoti further argues, could be 
symbolized by the analogy of “dominance of men and masculinity over women and 
feminity” in the understanding of the colonial city – a perspective that has been 
advanced in the urban planning of postcolonial Singapore as well.9   
 Like the Town Planning Committee established by the British to create New 
Delhi “based on a rhetoric of modernization and progress”, the story of British urban 
development in Singapore started with the Raffles Town Plan that “served as the 
critical manifesto of colonial urbanization in Singapore”.10  For Raffles such a 
rhetoric of “modernization” seemed especially important for he “attempted to use the 
natives’ history to persuade them of the value of Western ideas”.11  In the words of 
the same author, Raffles’ main goal was “the transfer of Western civilization to 
Southeast Asia and its native inhabitants”.12  The basis of his “civilizing” mission was 
a hierarchy of grades of “civilized” people based on a certain ideology, in which the 
Europeans, relying on certain beliefs such as democracy, economic liberalism and 
justice, had placed themselves at the apex of the hierarchy.13  The point to be 
recognized here is that the colonizer always represents the colony, in the words of 
Spurr, “as a vast cultural and geographical blankness” for the “inscription” of the 
                                        
8  Jyoti, “City as Durbar”, 83. 
 
9  Ibid.; See Ashis Nandy, The Intimate Enemy: Loss and Recovery of Self under Colonialism (Delhi : 
Oxford University Press, 1983), 4, for a discussion of British cultural practices portraying India as 
feminine and Britain as masculine because of the latter’s political and socio-economic dominance as 
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10  Jyoti, “City as Durbar”, 94, 103; Rajpal Singh, Street Naming and the Construction of the Colonial 
Narrative in Singapore: 1819-1942 (Academic Exercise: National University of Singapore, 2002), 12. 
 
11  Ellen C. Cangi, “Civilizing the People of Southeast Asia: Sir Stamford Raffles’ Town Plan for 
Singapore, 1819-23,” Planning Perspectives 8 (1993): 166.  
 
12  Cangi, “Civilizing the People of Southeast Asia”, 167. 
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values that the colonizer held, such as the idea of “modernity”.14  If colonization is 
such a form of “inscription”, then it is natural that “naming and classifying” were vital 
strategies pursued in the colonial project.15  It is only through such “naming and 
classifying”, in effect giving the colonized space and people meaning, that such 
values can be “inscribed”.  Following Bach, therefore, “colonization depends not only 
on military power, technology, politics, and economics, but also on acts of naming”.16  
In fact, a reading of Singapore’s history shows that naming and classifying have been 
integral to the colonial project. 
 Most histories of Singapore written from a Western perspective still tend to 
glamorize the role of Sir Stamford Raffles.  An inscription on the statue of Raffles 
opposite the Victoria Memorial Concert Hall unveiled on the 100th anniversary of the 
foundation of the settlement reads: 
  …to the memory of  
  Sir Stamford Raffles to whose 
  Foresight and genius Singapore 
  Owes its existence and prosperity… 
A more probing analysis is available in Alatas’ book Thomas Stamford Raffles – 
Schemer or Reformer?  He quotes a letter dated 9 October 1820 from Raffles to 
Thomas Murdoch from Benkulu that reveals much about British values at that time, 
and the colonisers’ belief in the superiority of the European.17  Raffles wrote: “The 
most rapid advances have probably been made when great power has fallen into 
enlightened and able hands…it would be folly to conceive the careless independence 
of the savage as deserving equal respect”.18  Raffles went on, “Whether the power to 
which they [the natives] bow be the despotism of force, or the despotism of superior 
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16  Rebecca Ann Bach, Colonial Transformations: The Cultural Production of the New Atlantic World, 
1580-1640 (New York: Palgrave, 2000), 67. 
 
17  Syed Hussein Alatas, Thomas Stamford Raffles, 1781-1826: Schemer or Reformer? (Singapore: 
Angus and Robertson, 1971). 
 
18  Ibid., 2. 
 
 70
intellect, it is a step in their progress which cannot be passed”.19  Raffles believed 
totally in the superiority of the Anglo-Saxon; it was ingrained in him as it was in his 
contemporaries.  Raffles also suggested that Christianity should be spread “to 
cultivate the waste and barren soil of the native mind”.20  All in all, his vision was the 
colonial vision that was to pursue “the desire to emphasise racial and cultural 
difference as a means of establishing superiority”.21
 Asians were expected to accept a subordinate status to the colonial personnel 
and provide the labour force for British and Western capitalism.  Raffles said of his 
plan for the establishment of European colonies in Sumatra: “The Chinese and natives 
would be manual labourers, as the Negros are in the West Indies”.22  He wrote of the 
Chinese that they were ‘crafty’ and a ‘very dangerous people’.23  Arabs, he wrote, 
“were useless and idle consumers of the produce of the ground”.24  Ironically, 
Raffles’ philosophy of racial hierarchies, paternalism and autocracy appears to bear 
resonance to the post-independent nation’s governance of the state.   
 
3.2    Racial Zoning and Segregation 
Colonialist ideology was manifested as the Raffles’ Town Plan for the urban 
development of Singapore.  The Plan was conceived for the purposes of establishing, 
systematising and maintaining colonial rule, and for inscribing modernity as part of a 
scheme to create a certain civilisational hierarchy.  At the beginning of his most 
lengthy instructions to the Town Committee in 1822, Raffles pointed out to its 
European members that “timely attention should be paid…to the peculiar character 
and institutions of the several classes of inhabitants of which the society will be 
composed”, and that the town should be planned on the basis of the “nature and 
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occupation of the several classes of people” which occupy it.25  Raffles had imagined 
a hierarchy of classes for colonial Singapore in which some were more ‘civilised’ 
than others and instructed that the merchant community, “because they belonged to a 
higher and respectable class”, was to be at the “centre” of this new town, and the rest 
of the town was to be made up by the labouring class, with no space for the 
agricultural class.26  Raffles had therefore significantly stressed that the mercantile 
community should have the choice sites and, in the words of Buckley, “all the 
facilities which the natural advantages of the port afford[ed]”.27  Such a policy, says 
Wurtzburg, justified his objective of making trading and commerce the main rationale 
for Singapore’s existence and future.28  Interestingly, economic interests have 
continued to dictate government policy and spatial order ever since.   
Such considerations in the Town Plan ensured that the European settlement 
was focused at the heart of the town.  The health, safety, and fear of native 
“contamination” also suggested separation of the European community from the 
ethnic communities.  As Raffles instructed Farquhar on 25 June 1819: ‘it will be 
necessary to allot sufficient space in a convenient and proper situation for officers’ 
bungalows’.29  His plan also specified house sizes, street dimensions, and even the 
materials to be used.  This was prompted not only by practical matters such as the 
efficient movement of people and vehicles, the risk of fire, convenient surveillance, 
and considerations of climate, but also by the need for control and discipline.  
Ironically, however, what gave momentum to British planning practices was the 
number of town fires that resulted in accelerated urban renewal.  These fires have 
been well documented: interestingly, as Tremewan has noted, similar fires have also 
occurred at regular intervals in areas earmarked for large-scale housing development 
in early post-independence days.30  Unsubstantiated rumours have circulated that this 
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was a carefully planned and engineered covert strategy by the government as a quick-
fix solution to evict squatters from the land – without having to pay them 
compensation – which would then make way for housing development.  The Bukit Ho 
Swee fire tragedy of 25 May 1965 that paved the way for a massive government 
Housing Development Board apartment complex is a prime example. 
The European settlement boasted of a spacious administrative enclave (still 
called Empress Place to this day), a large padang (meaning field in Malay), a 
Europeans-only club called the Singapore Cricket Club at one end of the padang, and 
an imposing Anglican church (St Andrews Cathedral).  The creation of an impression 
of colonial grandeur was the main consideration in the design of the European part of 
the town.  The European Town had impressive architecture in bungalows with 
sprawling compounds, open spaces, wide boulevards, parks and promenades in front 
of the Esplanade to create “a front where wealth and power of the town were 
concentrated”.31  The European community, consisting of the administration and 
business elite, lived in the central city area north of the Singapore River in well-
defined residential areas like the Orchard-Tanglin-Holland Road belt.  Prominent 
British administrators and merchants settled in areas which are still identified, to this 
day, by street names like Scott, Guthrie, Kerr, Spottiswood, Bain, Oxley, Napier, 
Shenton, Montgomery, Crane, Elliot, Fullerton and many others.  Europeans, who 
separated work from residence, typically occupied bungalows with large verandahs 
standing in spacious gardens and compounds built in an architectural style imported 
by the British from India (see Chapter 3.4 and Plates 1 and 2).32
In sharp contrast to the European Town and bungalows were the congested 
spaces in the Asian kampungs where the maintenance of “orderliness” was the prime 
consideration.33  Overcrowding led to social and trading activities spilling into the 
streets, which fulfilled many of the functions that the home unit lacked.  Behind the 
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“vibrancy of the street life were the unhygienic and overcrowded conditions of 
living”.34  In colonial discourse, as Yeoh and Kong have described, “Chinatown was 
often depicted as filthy and pestilential, and an area of moral decay evidenced by the 
gambling houses, opium dens, dimly-lit brothels and higgledy-piggledy disorder of 
Chinese street-life.35  Under the colonizer’s gaze, the streets became places of 
“fantastic colouring from ugliness unspeakable”.36  According to some accounts, 
there were “violent and vivid contrasts” between the ugly seething squalor of the 
native town and the “paradise” of the European residential area.37  On the other hand, 
for the Europeans, there was no street culture as their social life was carried out in 
their grand bungalows and compounds.  Hence, it is not surprising that the European 
part of the town, which did not have a bazaar economy, was perceived as “dull and 
sleepy looking … where no life and movement prevailed around the shops”.38  
The Raffles Town Plan retold the colonial narrative through racial segregation.  
There were to be Chinese, Indian (then called Chuliah) and Malay (called Bugis) 
kampungs reflecting the major groups of inhabitants in Singapore as well as a 
European settlement located away from these areas.  Raffles laid down firm lines for 
the development of these kampungs and for the residential separation of the various 
communities according to ethnic origin and occupational interests (see Map 1).  The 
kampungs were to be created with work, residence, recreation and the bazaar 
contained within the same area and organized around rows of shophouses with a 
series of tightly bound cross-streets running around narrow rectangular grids so as to 
isolate and contain the existence of the natives within.39  Accordingly, the southern 
central core of the city (the zone of mercantile trade) was divided into various ‘racial’ 
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quarters for different groups of migrants.40.  This plan for ethnic separation was the 
centerpiece of the Raffles Town Plan and a physical manifestation of the ‘divide and 
rule’ policy for which British were renowned.  
  Raffles had directed his Town Committee that “in the allotment of the Native 
divisions of the town … the first in importance of these is beyond doubt the 
Chinese”.41  They were, according to Raffles, “peculiar attractions” that Singapore 
had for this “industrious race”42 which had contributed immensely to Singapore’s 
commercial success.  The Chinese immigrants were the most numerous and because 
of their strong trading inclinations were allotted land second only in location and 
importance to the European Town, despite Raffles’ personal dislike of these migrants.  
An important characteristic of early town planning was therefore the virtual 
monopolisation by the Chinese of the trading and entrepot sectors of the economy 
because the British considered these functions as pivotal to the success of the new 
colony.  This economic strategy resulted in the spatial organisation of the Chinese in a 
congested central location in the vicinity of the commercial core (presently called 
Boat Quay and Clarke Quay).  Merely a handful in 1819, they grew to about 50,000 in 
1860 (63% of the total population) and 164,000 by 1901 making up 71% of the total 
population.43  Most of the Chinese ‘coolies’ were immigrants belonging to the artisan 
and peasant classes that vastly outnumbered the merchants and traders.  They were 
extremely hardworking and laboured to make as much money as possible before 
returning to retire in China44.  Most of them came from different provinces in China 
and, because their social organization, both for legal and illegal (especially secret 
societies, gambling, gangster fights) purposes, was strong, Raffles ensured that they 
maintained their territorial distinctions (based on province, clan and dialect) when 
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establishing Kampong China or Chinatown.  In this way, he felt less threatened by 
their presence. The Chinese characteristically erected two-storey terrace 
“shophouses”, as noted by many writers (see Chapter 3.4 and Plate 3).  The Chinese 
quarter reflected the privileged position that the group had in the British plan for the 
colony, when compared with the Malay and Indian quarters of the town.   
 Malays often had little access to relatively lucrative jobs in the commerce and 
banking sectors of the colonial economy, occupying a peripheral position as has been 
characterised by a number of authors.45  This was also translated into marginalisation 
in geographical terms, with Malays virtually absent from the central parts of the city.  
The Malays lived in Malay-style kampung houses built of plank and attap or on stilts 
located in the tidal swamps near the river mouth. (see Chapter 3.4 and Plates 4 and 5) 
An important spatial requirement for the Malays was the mosque in the centre of their 
kampung.   The marginal position of the Malays was reflected in the town plan that 
Raffles drew up.  The assumption was that the Malays did not need a separate urban, 
ordered space as they were not expected to contribute to the new, modern capitalism 
of Singapore.  The place of the Malay within the British colonial narrative is best 
illustrated in these words:  
The Malays were a very peaceful and somewhat indolent people.  They were 
clever craftsmen, fishermen and agriculturalists but were not fond of laborious 
undertakings…  The Malays viewed without resentment the incoming of the 
more powerful and industrious Chinese and Europeans.  As a result, they did 
not contribute much to the development of the island in the early day.46  
The Malays (consisting of local Malays, Javanese, Arabs and Bugis) were therefore 
consigned to Kampong Glam, an area beyond the town limits between the coast and 
the Rochor River because of their strong religious affiliation with the Malay Sultan.47              
Street names further reinforced their position in the peripheries of colonial society.   
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Sandhu says that social status determined the physical distance of the various 
groups from the European-dominated centre of the town, although there was no 
official policy on these lines.  Consequently, the Indian communities were “in the 
eyes of some of the colonial elite forever doomed, irrespective of their economic or 
social position, to be the coolies and ‘blackmen’ of Singapore…”.48  Whether or not 
Sandhu’s claim is true, it is a fact that the Indian concentrations within the town 
usually tended to be further away from the centre of town and the European 
settlement, unlike the Chinese or Eurasians who were well placed above the Indians in 
the colonial social hierarchy.  In catering for the living space for the Indians, Raffles 
wrote to the Town Committee in 1822 about the: 
“advantage of allotting a separate division for the town class of Chuliahs49 up 
to the Singapore River, and this will of course be done with  due consideration 
of their expected numbers, and the necessity of their residence being in the 
vicinity of the place where their services are most likely to be called for”.50
Accordingly, Kampong Chulia was set aside for the Indians.  Like the Chinese, Indian 
immigrants arrived in Singapore mainly as traders and labourers, although some came 
as garrison troops and convicts.51   The Indian population was mainly clustered on the 
edge of the central town in and around the Serangoon Road-Kampung Kapur area, 
now known as Little India, although smaller pockets could also be found in various 
parts of the city such as concentrations of South Indian chettiars (moneylenders), 
Tamil-Muslim traders, moneychangers, petty shopkeepers, boatmen and quayside 
workers on the fringe of the central business area.  Indian traders and merchants built 
houses that served as workplace and residence, mainly in the Little India area and 
Arab Street precincts. 
The colonial urban project therefore meant that the British demarcated land 
based on race and vocation and compartmentalized the economy, resulting in the 
creation of racial enclaves like Kampong China, Kampong Glam as well as Kampong 
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Chulia.  Consequently, urban planning practices, shaped by almost 150 years of 
colonial rule, were reflected in the partitioned city that the local leadership inherited 
when it took office in 1965.   
The Raffles Plan was hugely significant to the development of the colonial 
city as it inscribed public order in space, mapped out the spatial configuration of the 
town’s built environment on both sides of the Singapore River, and spatially defined 
the distribution of the ‘Asian’ population.  The design of the built environment 
became in the hands of the British administration an instrument for producing power 
relations, constituting what Brenda Yeoh calls, “a strategy of surveillance”.52  The 
main focus was the remodeling of the town to facilitate public administration and 
order, maximise business activity and instill discipline among the diverse groups 
through a culture of control – a feature of governance that the post-independent 
leadership has pursued with greater intensity.   
The colonial practice of naming and classifying by means of racial zoning and 
segregation in Singapore was reinforced by street naming and built forms based on 
ethnic affiliation. 53    Street names and various built forms in each area further served 
to reinforce the colonial narrative.  Anthony King draws a parallel in the colonial 
planning of New Delhi, arguing that for various economic, social, political and racial 
reasons, the indigenous and colonial parts of Delhi were kept apart and urban 
planning practices followed suit.  King argues that “norms and forms” which 
informed the built environment of the colonial society served not only to reflect 
colonial aspirations but were also used “both consciously and unconsciously, as social 
technologies, as strategies of power to incorporate, categorise, discipline, control and 
reform ‘the inhabitants of the city ”.54    
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 3.3  Street Naming 
 The British policy of racial segregation and zoning left an indelible mark on 
the system of street naming in colonial Singapore – a further manifestation of the 
construction of power and hegemony so integral to the project of colonialism.  The 
provision of roads was an essential part of Raffles’ plan for urban development – in 
fact, by 1821, only two years after the colonial founding of Singapore, the colony is 
said to have possessed 15 miles of road, then already considered extensive.55  More 
importantly than the mere provision and naming of streets for the colony was the fact 
that the Town Committee regulated the construction of all streets.  The streets were 
given a standard width and were made to intersect at right angles, resembling a grid 
pattern that is the most common design of cities that have been planned through 
history.56  Kostof says that this design has two main purposes.  First, it is meant to 
make possible “orderly settlement, colonization in its broad sense” and, second, it is 
used “as an instrument of modernization, and of contrast to what existed that was not 
as orderly”.57  Given the fact that there were no roads or streets in pre-colonial 
Singapore, it would appear that the introduction of the grid pattern in Singapore 
fulfilled both the above stated functions.58  As such, the laying of streets in Singapore 
was more than just a roading project; it was in fact, an inscribing of power and 
modernity, a representation to the effect that the British were the ones to bring a 
modern, rational way of structuring space and society, as opposed to the 
‘disorderliness’ or nothingness of what then existed in Singapore.59  
 The Town Committee also decreed that “each street should receive some 
                                        
55  Lim Siu Hong, “History of Land Use Pattern in Singapore: 1819-1867” (Academic Exercise: 
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56  Cangi, “Civilizing the People”, 177; Cheng Hui Cheng, Singapore: Early Town Development, 1819-
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appropriate name”.60  The need for “appropriate” names would therefore reflect the 
ideological framework that Raffles aimed to realise in his plan for the town, namely, 
the promotion of the construction of the colonial project.61  Such naming practices, it 
has been argued by historians, are integral to the theme of “discovery” that the 
colonizer often employs.  By representing this new space according to the names they 
accorded them, the British were telling the story of their arrival, leaving an indelible 
mark on the landscape that reflected the perception that it was they who had built 
these spaces and named them accordingly.  The very fact that all new streets in the 
centre of the town were to have English names further reinforces the narrative of the 
British “founding” of Singapore.  Busy CBD streets like Stamford Road, Coleman 
Street, Victoria Street, Queen Street, Albert Street, Shenton Way, Robinson Road, 
Cecil Street, Connaught Drive, St Andrew’s Road, Fort Canning, Waterloo Street, 
Nicoll Highway, Farquhar Street and Fullerton Road are still significant thoroughfares 
in Singapore’s urban landscape today. 
  Street names were assigned by the Town Committee appointed in 1822 to 
“appropriate and mark out the quarters or departments of the several classes of the 
native population” so as to “prevent confusion and disputes”.62  As I have explained 
in 3.2, the committee designated separate divisions by racial groups: the European 
settlement was dignified by the term town, but the Asian communities were relegated 
to separate kampungs.  Accordingly, street names in each division were identified 
with the intended inhabitants, thereby creating a system of street names that 
associated racial and cultural identity with specific places in the colonial 
consciousness.  Most municipal street names honoured power-holding Europeans 
rather than those of the residents of specific areas.  Such perceptions were based on a 
street-naming system that was centered on colonial ideas of landscape ordering and 
urban functioning and what a colonial city should be.  Street nomenclature therefore 
became, in the words of Yeoh, “a means by which the authorities were able to project 
on to the urban landscape their perceptions of what different areas within the city 
represented”, though official street names constituted but one layer of the complex 
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built environment.63  These perceptions of the authorities typified one form of ‘text’, 
but unfortunately the consumption of its meaning, according to Gresswell, left behind 
no visible ‘text’.64   
 Side by side with official street names assigned and approved by the 
Municipal Commissioners (as evidenced by the minutes of the meetings of the 
Municipal Commissioners available in the National Archives), there existed 
alternative systems of street names that originated among the various communities 
who lived in or used the streets.  Hence, although official street names were given by 
the colonial administration and road signboards were placed at the corner of every 
street, on which was inscribed “the name by which the street shall be known”, the 
Asian occupants saw little relevance in them and devised their own naming practices, 
languages and cultural as well as spatial orientations for these streets.   
 Their alternative systems of designations had localised representations of 
meaning and interpretation derived informally from community-defined conventions 
and parameters.  There was a close association between the identification of places 
and the everyday life of the local groups denoting specific trading, artisan and 
agricultural activities.  Each group had its own spatial cosmology and street signs 
which were valueless and meaningless to those who possessed different spatial 
orientations.  For example, if a British subject asked a Cantonese what the street name 
or place was, and then asked a Hokkien person next, and then a Tamil person before 
finally seeing the official sign on the street corner, he or she would have been served 
four different conceptions of the same street.  What is revealing here is the nature of 
cultural interaction and the fusion of one language into another when one language 
fails to provide adequate tools for comprehending an institution such as the police.  In 
brief, there was little correlation between municipally imposed and ethnically derived 
street names.  Whereas municipal street names primarily sought to identify the urban 
landscape with civic notions of order, ethnic resistance linked streets to local features, 
symbols, legends, trades and activities that formed a significant role in daily 
experience and social practice. The two systems represented different and competing 
ways of signifying the landscape and therefore frequently clashed.   
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 This dual system of identification, namely, the official network of street names 
and the names attached by indigenous and non-European immigrants, provides an 
understanding of contrasting representations and uses of the colonial landscape.  The 
capacity of the local communities to develop and use their own names and signifiers 
to denote and differentiate parts of the landscape implies the diversity of socio-
cultural influences that each community brought to bear on the urban landscape as 
well as it reveals their ability to subvert the power relations that colonialism operates 
on.  If according to Michel de Certeau a city could be narrated through language, then 
in colonial Singapore it could be said that there were multiple spatial narratives in the 
interpretation of streets.  Despite the official use of street names on the maps, it did 
not mean that the formal names erased cultural realities and material practices of the 
various communities.  In fact, I would argue that the various groups continued with 
their own naming practices, which while having little relationship with the official 
street names became interwoven into the intricate fabric that was cosmopolitan 
Singapore.  Street names therefore represented discursive realities that provided a 
striking contrast between colonial landscapes that were shaped, systematised and 
rationalized by the colonial authorities, then resisted and negotiated by the Asian 
communities.   
   The ideological project of street naming supports the Gramscian theory that 
hegemony is reflected not only in the way power and control is exercised by the 
colonial administration but also how it is challenged and resisted by the local 
communities.  The Municipal Commissioners, a select group consisting mainly of 
Europeans and one or two members representing the Asian communities, were able to 
obtain implied consent in Gramscian terms, for the “values, norms, perceptions and 
beliefs… of [the] central authority”, thereby proving that colonial hegemony does not 
operate on mere coercion alone but with the active and voluntary consent of a select 
group as described above.65  Colonial officials thus ensured that hegemony was being 
constructed in the project of street naming on the basis of acceptance for the basic 
themes of the colonial project.  Rather than creating confrontation or opposition with 
the colonized, they sought domination by what Spurr calls “inclusion and 
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domestication”.66  Yet as I have described in preceding paragraphs, the public at large 
subverted street names created by the municipal committee and resorted to their own 
interpretations and meanings.   
Colonial and municipal authorities lamented at what they saw as the 
“haphazard and imprecise manner in which Asians identified places and furnished 
addresses” as Yeoh has described.67  She says that the Malays took “little notice of 
streets, and as a rule, only describe[d] places by kampongs” or geographical features, 
while Firmstone says that to the Chinese, “accuracy is the last thing that strikes them 
as essential”.68  Asian disregard for municipal street names had practical significance 
for the authorities who were involved in governing and policing the city.  Often 
addresses could not be ascertained accurately for instituting arrests, serving court 
summons, or tracing the spread of infectious diseases with the result that “the non-
comprehension and non-acceptance of municipally assigned street names and the use 
of alternative systems by the ethnic communities rendered these communities less 
open to the surveillance strategies of the colonial authorities”.69
 The history of British rule and urban transformation in Singapore from the 
early colonial period to integration with the Federation of Malaysia in 1963 and 
finally to independence in 1965 is manifested in street names, especially in the nature 
of the names and the lingua adopted in the naming of the streets.  Most of the streets 
named during the colonial period bore the hegemonic imprint of British rule.  After 
independence in 1965, street names, apart from being named after persons, places, 
topographical features and serial numbering, tend to emphasise local identity, success, 
prosperity, harmony and the spirit of the new modern multi-cultural and multi-racial 
nation state.  Sometimes the new nation state has found it necessary to rename certain 
streets in line with its principle of hegemonic ideology in economic, political, 
administrative and social considerations.  This necessity accords with its street-
naming policy of giving equal treatment to the four official languages (i.e. English, 
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Malay, Chinese and Tamil) in order to reflect the multi-ethnic nature of Singapore 
society.   
 
3.4  Urban built forms 
The British policy of racial zoning and segregation in colonial Singapore was 
extended by another specific colonial narrative – that of urban built forms.  As early 
as 1869, Alfred Russel Wallace, the famous naturalist commented that “the town 
comprises handsome buildings and churches, Mohamedan mosques, Hindoo temples, 
Chinese joss-houses, good European houses, massive warehouses, queer old Kling 
and China bazaars and long suburbs of Chinese and Malay cottages”.70  The 
ambiguity and variety of these urban forms in Singapore is testimony to the fact that 
representations of the urban built environment generate open-ended questions about 
power, difference and identity, leading to, in the words of Sharon Zukin, a “struggle 
for interpretation”.71  While communal interests and occupational necessity meant 
that the local communities had little say in the areas that were allocated to them under 
the Raffles Town Plan, it is possible to read in Singapore’s colonial built forms the 
struggle for interpretation and meaning by the various groups.  These communities 
displayed competing meanings and perceptions in the general practices of daily living 
and more specifically in various built forms like dwelling houses and the five-foot 
way or verandah.   
 The colonial bungalow, for example, became the coloniser’s vehicle for 
political control, social ideals, and cultural values (Plates 1 and 2).  The attap 
(thatched roof) hut remained the structurally simple dwelling of the indigenous Malay 
who lived in the vernacular tradition of kampung life (Plates 4 and 5).  By and large, 
the shophouse, in which two and three storey row houses are connected at the street 
by a continuous covered walkway or verandah, came to be associated with the 
Chinese (Plate 3).  It has been argued by many writers that the shophouse could have 
arisen out of the Raffles Town Plan’s stipulations for the buildings and their 
continuous verandah, with rooms separated by airwells.  A shophouse 
characteristically features a five-foot way or verandahed walkway fronting the house.  
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This covered five-foot way, typically an arched opening, joins one house with the rest 
on the street front, thus creating a continuous walkway on the front facade of the 
shophouse block (Plate 3).  In his instructions to the Town Committee, Raffles had 
instructed that “each house should have a verandah of a certain depth open at all times 
as a continued and covered passage on each side of the street”.72  The verandah was, 
and still is, in some urban areas of Singapore, including Little India, a focus of life 
and trade.  The five-foot way provides a background for some of the tensions that 
developed over the definition and use of public space in the local historical context.  
Tensions arose because the Municipal authorities sought to clear the verandah of 
obstruction and congestion, while the migrant communities associated this space with 
different meanings, uses and values.  Given contrasting municipal and local 
conceptions, the verandah soon became a site of conflict and resistance in an everyday 
sense as well as during flashpoints, such as the so-called 'verandah riots' of 1888.  By 
drawing on Henri Lefebvre's concepts of 'representation of spaces' and 'spaces of 
representation', the verandah, in the Singapore context, is therefore a fine illustration 
of how space can contain multiple definitions and, as a result, is often 'contested' in 
ideological and material terms.73  
 
3.5  Conclusion 
Interrogating the colonial narrative therefore gives us a unique understanding 
of the built environment in colonial urbanism and of the dominance-dependence 
equation and the corresponding counter strategies that marked colonial rule.  Urban 
planning projects and practices, such as racial zoning and segregation of the various 
communities, street-naming and various built forms like dwelling houses and the five-
foot way or verandah, became symbols of colonial domination and the subordination 
of the ethnic communities economically, intellectually, physically, symbolically and 
emotionally.  Because the dominant colonial administration had the power to 
fundamentally create and transform the built environment of the colonized society to 
promote its own social, cultural, economic, ideological and political interests, colonial 
urban planning projects and practices have perpetuated unequal social relations 
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between the colonial power and the colonized society resulting in resistance, conflict, 
negotiation and compromise in the daily lives and practices of the ethnic population.  
In other words, says Abidin Kusno, they generate a relationship between space and 
power – a relationship that is particularly contestational between the colonizers and 
the colonized because it produces complex social and symbolic meanings.74  These 
meanings have particular relevance in the context of my thesis as I interrogate the 
built environment of the Indians in Singapore in the next and subsequent chapters 
with reference to the social engineering policies enforced by the state.  
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Plates 1 and 2   Bungalow 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Plate 3    Shophouse in Little India’s Serangoon Road 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Plates 4 and 5   Attap hut 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Plate 6    Serangoon Road on a festive day 
 
 
 
 
  
Plates 7 and 8  Parrot ‘fortune-teller’ in five-foot way along Serangoon Road 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Plates 9 and 10  Indian foreign workers congregating in Little India 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Plate 11   “Thaipusam” religious/cultural festival in Little India 
 
 
 
 
Plate 12  Trishaws in procession through the streets of Little India 
 
 
 
Plate 13      Sri Veeramakaliamman Temple 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Plate 14   Sri Srinivasa Perumal Temple 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Plate 15   A typical spice shop in Little India 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Plate 16   Mustafa Centre 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Plate 17   Plaiting flower garlands on five-foot way in Little India 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Plates 18 and 19  Dosai meal at vegetarian restaurant in Serangoon Road 
 
 
 
 
Plate 20   A spicy banana leaf meal 
 
 
 
 
Plates 21 and 22  Goldsmith shop in Little India 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Map 1 
 
Raffles Town plan of 1822 for the segregation of the races in Singapore, derived from 
Lt. Jackson’s Plan of 1822.  The European Town and Chinese kampung are on either 
side of the central business and government area, while the other groups (Arabs, 
Bugis, Indians and natives, which is, Malays) are in  smaller kampungs around the 
periphery. 
Source:  Eng, 1992. 
Map 2 
 
Map of Little India 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Map 3 
 
 
 
 
Guided walking/ trishaw tour map of Little India  
Source: Singapore Tourism Board 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
RACIAL POLITICS AND THE BUILT ENVIRONMENT OF THE INDIANS 
IN SINGAPORE – WHO AND WHAT IS AN ‘INDIAN’? 
 
What does it mean to be ‘Indian’ outside India?  
      - Salman Rushdie1
 
…beneath the surface of a superficial likeness, behind the impressions that he 
gives to make him less distinguishable and beyond the stereotype that others 
see in him, he will be holding on and clinging to his Indian heritage while 
incorporating what is good in the larger world.    
     - Chandrashekhar Sastry2
 
4.1  Introduction  
 While the dynamics of the origins of Indian settlement in Singapore have 
been explored in the preceding chapters, the complex question of who and what is an 
Indian in the context of the state’s corporatist management of ethnicity has yet to be 
discussed.  This is because, as previous researchers have discovered, the Indians in 
Singapore as elsewhere in Southeast Asia “are the most understudied of all the ethnic 
minorities”.3  This situation needs to be interrogated, as I will demonstrate in this 
chapter, because several issues and contradictions complicate the state’s multiracial, 
multicultural articulation of racial politics with one of its component ‘races’.  
Although non-Indian Singaporeans and visitors to Singapore make sense of all 
Indians in a particular way by virtue of the latter’s common geographical origins in 
the Indian subcontinent, different community groups within the all-encompassing 
state-engineered ‘Indian race’ react differently to the intersection of ethnic and 
national production of identity and hence this needs some elaboration.   How are the 
                                        
1  Salman Rushdie, Imaginary Homelands: Essays and Criticisms, 1981-1991 (London: Granta Books, 
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3  Lian Kwen Fee and Tong Chee Kiong, “Constructing and Deconstructing Singapore Society” in The 
Making of Singapore Sociology, eds. Tong Chee Kiong and Lian Kwen Fee (Singapore: Times 
Academia Press, 2002), 14. 
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politics of ‘sameness’ and ‘difference’ manifested in the Singapore Indians?4  As I 
will show in this and subsequent chapters, Indians in Singapore face a dilemma 
reconciling racial politics, ethnic identity and national identity, a relationship that will 
be analysed with reference to the dominant state discourse and to the various social 
engineering instruments of the state.  While the other ethnic groups in Singapore have 
also to grapple with these identities in the course of complying with the state ideology 
of CMIO multiracialism (defined in Chapter 5.6), the Indian negotiation of identities 
is made manifoldly more difficult and complex by structural and attitudinal problems 
within the community.  The Malay ethnic group looks to refuge in Islam as a unifying 
factor, the Chinese in the Mandarin language, but the ‘Indian’ category in the CMIO 
classification has arguably no unifying factor except perhaps the notion of origins in 
the Indian sub-continent, a factor that is also debatable because Indians nowadays “do 
not automatically have India as their homeland.”5  Unlike the Chinese and Malays, 
the Indians also possess a strong diasporic consciousness, which has particular 
relevance to their construction of national identification.  Such a construction is made 
more difficult by the fact that there are serious internal contradictions within the 
‘Indian’ community itself, leading to the question: “Who and what is an Indian?”  An 
identity politics is initiated that complicates the relationship between racial politics, 
ethnic identity and national identity.   
 The chapter addresses several inter-related themes, the most important being 
the tracing of how the historical process of migration explored in the previous 
chapters is related to the emergence of an ethnic identity in the Singapore context.  
Resulting from this enquiry I will demonstrate that the state’s attempt to construct a 
homogenous Indian ethnic identity exposes the problems and tensions encountered in 
Singapore Indians’ struggle to identify with the nation-state’s ideology of 
multiracialism and national identity.  In exploring the above themes, the chapter has 
two points of focus.  First, it will in 4.2, address elements that define the individual’s 
identity as a member of an ethnic group and, second, in 4.3 it will look at ways in 
which the Indian community relates to multi-ethnic relations and the mechanism for 
defining group identity induced by the state’s race-based policies of social control.  I 
                                        
 
4  Arjun Appadurai, “Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural Economy,” Public Culture 2, 2 
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will explore in this chapter the various facets of the ‘Indian’ identity by examining the 
responses of the minority Indians to the state’s articulation of racial politics in a bid to 
demonstrate how the construction of national identity affects their day to day 
experiences as members of a minority ethnic group saddled between the Chinese and 
Malay communities.   
 
4.2  What is an ‘Indian’ in Singapore? 
 As defined by the Singapore Department of Statistics, the Indian community 
in Singapore is referred to as: “persons of Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi and Sri 
Lankan origin”, comprising various ethno-linguistic groups and sub-ethnic groups 
such as the Tamils, Telugus, Malayalees, Sikhs, Punjabis, Bengalis, Gujaratis and 
Sinhalese.6  These groups can be further divided along religious communities such as 
the Tamil Hindus, Christians and Muslims, and the Malayalee Hindus, Christians and 
Muslims.  Collectively, they are referred to as ‘Indians’, a social category that refers 
to peoples and their cultural practices from the Indian sub-continent.  K S Sandhu 
highlights that almost all major ethno-linguistic groups of the Indian sub-continent are 
represented in Singapore.7  Despite considerable diversity within the Indian 
community, in both administrative usage and in the everyday life of non-Indian 
Singaporeans and tourists, ‘Indian’ is a catch-all term for all ethnic and sub-ethnic 
groups supposedly of South Asian origin.  I will explore in this chapter how this 
simplistic definition of Indian identity and ethnicity is subverted by the community’s 
own articulations.  
 Most Indians initially came from India and some from Malaysia in the 
nineteenth century, and settled in Singapore during British rule.  Their social and 
economic lives were based on racial lines drawn by the British administration, and 
this situation continued till the onset of post-independence when urban renewal and 
resettlement schemes were introduced by the new nation state in the 1960s.  With the 
introduction of these schemes, the racial enclaves carved out by the British 
administrators had to make way for integrated housing which changed the conditions 
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of ethnic interaction.8  Since more than 90% of the population now live in 
government subsidized Housing Board apartments9, the state employs a quota system 
which amalgamates a cross-cultural mix of all the races, regardless of religious or 
sub-ethnic associations (see Chapter 7.2: Housing Policy).  Despite this changed 
urban living context, many Singapore Indians still identify with their village origins in 
the Indian subcontinent.  Sub-ethnic differences and diversities are also evident in the 
Indian concentrations on the island.  In colonial days Indians from different parts of 
the Indian sub-continent had concentrated mainly in five areas of the island (see 
Chapter 2) but, even within these Indian groupings, one type of Indian group was 
numerically dominant.10  Even today, for example, the Little India area around 
Serangoon Road has more South Indian Tamil merchants, and High Street more Sikh 
and other North Indian traders.  Indians themselves therefore were, and still are, 
conscious of sub-ethnic differences within what may have seemed to others a 
homogeneously Indian area.  In fact, as compared to the other major ethnic groups in 
Singapore, Indians have by far the greatest variety of sub-ethnic groups. 
 Although most Indian migrants in the pre-independence period were citizens 
of India, many, my own parents for example, chose to become Singapore citizens 
because dual citizenship was not offered by India.  The Indian government made it 
clear in 1953 that Indians outside India had to choose between India and their country 
of residence.11   Indians form the smallest minority in multicultural Singapore but are 
given ‘equal’ rights with other racial groups through the state ideology of CMIO 
meritocracy.  At present, Indians form 8% of the total population of Singapore and the 
majority of them are Singapore-born.  Unlike early Indian migrants, direct economic 
and political contact with India has been diminishing and fewer Indians now return to 
India to settle there.12  The Indian population in Singapore is therefore clearly 
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becoming more stabilized and less transient than it once was.  A comparison of the 
percentage of locally born Singaporean Indians with those born elsewhere (the vast 
majority in India and Pakistan) is illuminating, as shown in Table 2 below. 
Table 2.   
Locally-born Singapore Indians by comparison to Indians born elsewhere. 
(Numbers and percentage) 
  
1970 
 
 
 
Per 
cent 
 
1980 
 
Per 
cent 
 
1990 
 
Per 
cent 
 
2000 
 
Per 
cent 
 
Locally-born  
Singapore Indians 
 
 
Indians born  
Elsewhere 
 
 
81,126 
 
 
 
 
64,043 
 
55.9 
 
 
 
 
44.1 
 
96,665 
 
 
 
 
57,967 
 
62.5 
 
 
 
 
37.5 
 
142,678 
 
 
 
 
48,229 
 
74.7 
 
 
 
 
25.3 
 
165,833 
 
 
 
 
74,270 
 
69.1 
 
 
 
 
30.9 
 
Total Resident  
Indian Population 
 
 
145,169 
 
 
100 
 
 
154,632 
 
 
100 
 
 
190,907 
 
 
100 
 
 
240,103 
 
 
100 
 
 
 
Note: The resident population comprises Singapore citizens and non-citizens.     
Source: Department of Statistics, Singapore.  
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As for the increase in the general population of Singapore from 1990 to 2000, the 
Census of Population 2000 reports that “the growth of population during 1990-2000 
was the fastest in the post-independence era.  This was mainly due to the inflows of 
permanent residents and foreign workers… the population in 2000 had grown by an 
average annual rate of 2.8% [whereas] the rate of growth in the 1970s and the 1980s 
was 1.5% and 2.4% per annum, respectively”.  The census also reports that the 
number of Indians who were non-citizens in 1970 was 32,486 whereas it dropped to 
25,663 in 1980 and increased to 53,800 in 1990.  These figures indicate that most of 
the non-citizen Indians comprised foreign workers who by the terms of their contract 
were not eligible for Singapore citizenship anyway.  On the other hand, most of the 
permanent residents decided to avail of the opportunity of Singapore citizenship.  The 
above figures bear out the point that the Indians in Singapore are beginning to identify 
more closely with the Republic and less with their natal homelands in South Asia.  
These figures are augmented by data showing that the Indian citizen population has 
increased substantially over the decades, as Table 2A below shows.  
Table 2A  
Indian citizen and non-citizen population in Singapore. 
  
1970 
 
1980 
 
1990 
 
Citizens 
 
Non-citizens 
 
112,683 
 
32,486 
 
128,969 
 
25,663 
 
175,700 
 
53,800 
 
Source: Department of Statistics, Singapore. 
The department was not able to provide data for 2000, but extrapolating the above 
figures it can be surmised that there has been a sizeable increase in the numbers of 
Singapore Indian citizens since 1990.  While, of course, possession of Singapore 
citizenship does not necessarily signify a commitment to the nation, it does clearly 
indicate a much greater physical, economic and emotional attachment to Singapore 
than in times past.   
Another contributory factor was that after gaining independence in 1965, 
Singapore officially recognized the Indians as one of the three official racial groups, 
along with the Chinese and Malays.  Accordingly, since the vast majority of the 
Indian population in Singapore comprised Tamils from South India, Tamil was 
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declared one of the island’s official languages, along with English, Malay and 
Mandarin.  Tamil appears on the Singapore currency, postage stamps, official 
documents, street signs in Little India and in many public notices throughout the                       
Republic.  Furthermore Tamil is officially designated the ‘mother-tongue’ of the 
Indian community, meaning that Tamil is supposed to represent the Indian population.  
At the 2000 census, 64% of all Indians in Singapore listed Tamil as their mother 
tongue and Tamil is the only Indian language offered for instruction in Singapore 
schools.13  South Indians in turn form 80% of the total Indian population in Singapore 
and are therefore the most prominent.  Among the North Indians, Punjabis form the 
majority and speak the Punjabi language.  Numerous regional languages are spoken 
by Indians coming from different parts of India.   
 Apart from linguistic diversity, the Indian community in Singapore is also 
heterogeneous in terms of religious and cultural practices, although in official 
discourse they are seen as a homogeneous group.  The religious categories for Indians 
are, at best, very broad ones and it is important to acknowledge that Indians 
themselves would in some contexts identify themselves as belonging to more specific 
sects or denominations of a particular grouping.  The broad category of Hinduism, on 
which much of the scholarship has been focused, encompasses a 56.5% majority of 
Singapore Indians.  While there is an underlying unity of ideas among the Hindus, 
there are numerous sub-groups who have a different emphasis when it comes to 
worship and social relations.  Examples of such sub-groups include Sai Baba 
devotees, Krishna devotees, members of the Shiva family, and some other modern 
Hindu movements.  Sometimes members belonging to different sects can be found 
within the same family - such is the diversity among the Indian community.   
 There are also different approaches to religious practice and interpretation of 
Hindu ideas.  Some of the different religious orientations among Singaporean Hindus 
correspond to regional and linguistic differences.  Interestingly, I found that there 
were indeed distinct differences in North and South Indian approaches to Hinduism 
both in everyday life and in formally articulated aspects of worship.  Most Tamil-
speaking Indians in Singapore are Hindu by religion; yet it must be remembered that 
there are also other Indian Hindus whose mother-tongue is one of many regional 
North and South Indian languages like Malayalam, Telugu, Hindi, Kannada, Marathi, 
                                        
13  Source: Department of Statistics, Singapore. 
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Sindhi, Kashmiri, Gujarati, Bengali and many other dialects like Bhojpuri and 
Rajasthani.  Although they are all Singaporean Hindus, there are significant religious 
differences among them, according to whether their own or ancestral background is in 
North or South India.  This North-South divide extends to the domain of domestic 
rituals, religious traditions and customs that are jealously cherished and observed, 
both privately in homes and publicly as in temple worship.  As American 
anthropologist Lawrence Babb notes: 
Of the thirty-odd important Hindu temples in Singapore, two are North Indian.  
They are constructed in the Northern style, are served by North Indian priests, 
and are supported and patronized exclusively by the North Indian community.  
The remaining temples are South Indian in design and iconographic style.  
They employ South Indian priests, and are supported and patronized by 
Southerners … In general, the two communities have maintained separate 
religious institutions, separate festival calendars, separate priesthoods, and 
separate traditions of ceremonial style.14
 Babb maintains that what divides North and South Indians is linguistic 
difference in religious matters, since the two communities generally cannot 
communicate with each other in any Indian language.  There is, however, some 
measure of religious interaction between Northerners and Southerners and this is in 
the region of mediums and neo-Hindu movements, both of which use the vehicle of 
English mainly to attract devotees.  While mediums or Swamijis, who normally come 
from India, attract both the rich and poor, educated and uneducated, North and South 
Indians, neo-Hindu movements attract English-educated Hindus and hence are more 
class-based.  Such reformist movements place greater emphasis on emotional 
attachment to a guru and are deritualised unlike traditional Hindu worship.  Examples 
of the prominent movements currently operating in Singapore are the Sathya Sai Baba 
Movement, Transcendental Meditation, Brahma Kumaris Raja Yoga Movement, 
International Society for Krsna Consciousness (ISKON), The Shiva Family, Sri 
Ramakrishna Mission, Sri Narayana Mission, and Krishna Our Guide.   
 Islam, Christianity, and Sikhism are the other religious traditions practised by 
Indians in Singapore.  Their significance in the Singapore ethnic context can be seen 
                                        
14  Lawrence Babb, “Patterns of Hinduism” in Singapore: Society in Transition, ed. Riaz Hassan (Kuala 
Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1976), 190-91. 
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by the fact that together they attract about 42% of the total Indian population in 
Singapore, and hence some understanding of their presence is important.  Originally 
coming from India as traders, Singapore’s Indian-Muslims, who constitute 21.8% and 
form the second largest religious group among Singapore Indians, are sub-divided 
into different dialect-regional groups and sects.  These include various Tamil and 
Malayalee groups, Dawoodi Bohras and Khojas.15  The Indian-Muslims are a 
fragmented community in a manner similar to the Hindus.  Fragmented by linguistic 
and various Islamic denominations, notably the Sunni and Shia, Singapore’s Indian-
Muslims pray at mosques associated with their respective congregations, many also 
identifying with the local Malay Muslim population.  The assumption of fixed and 
rigid boundaries in the essentialist categorisation of CMIO racial identities and the 
successful internalization of this classification in Singapore has resulted in the 
ambiguous identity of the sub-ethnic Singapore Indian-Muslim ‘community’.16     
Indian-Muslims form a population of 66,000, or 25.6% of the total Indian population 
of 257,800, according to the population census of 2000.   These statistics, however, do 
not differentiate between country of origin, linguistic affiliations and sub-ethnic 
affiliations.   
 The national ideology that assumes Muslims to be Malays and Hindus to be 
Indians becomes dominant in the minds of people and in images featuring 
multicultural Singapore.  Hence the Indian-Muslims are thrust uncomfortably into a 
position of contested identities.17  The hyphenated identity joining two processes of 
Indianness and Muslimness into a single racial entity becomes problematic and 
contested as it embodies multiple identities whose interaction creates new 
complexities.  Indian-Muslims in Singapore consequently embody a historically 
changing and contested set of multiple identities that contradict essentialist state 
notions of a homogeneous, unified and fixed racial identity.  In the first place, the 
                                        
15  Dawoodi Bohras and Khojas are Shi’a Muslims from North India.  The Dawoodi Bohras trace their 
spiritual leader to Yemen while the Khojas say they were converted to Islam by a Persian.  In 
Singapore there are about 500 Dawoodi Bohras and 80 Khojas (Heritage Society Workshop, 1988).   
 
16  Joel S Kahn, “Southeast Asian Identities: Introduction” in Southeast Asian Identities: Culture and 
Politics of Representation in Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand, ed. J Kahn (Singapore: 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1998), 1-27. 
 
17  Nooraisha binte Mohamed Ibrahim, The Contested Identities of Singapore’s Indian-Muslim 
‘Community’ (Academic Exercise: Department of Geography, National University of Singapore, 
2002/2003). 
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identity of the Indian-Muslim community in Singapore is strongly influenced by the 
domineering presence of the overwhelming 90% Malay-Muslim community who 
speak Malay. The second influential factor is the dominant presence of Hindu Indians, 
the majority of whom in Singapore speak Tamil and come from the Indian 
subcontinent, while there are also others who speak Hindi, Urdu, Malayalam and 
other Indian languages.  Between this equation, there are multiple affiliations and 
positions as both men and women tend to be either more Malay or more Indian as the 
situation demands.  Their similarities with the Malays with respect to religion and 
their ethnic similarities with the Indians allow them to be among both communities, 
making them insiders and ‘other’ simultaneously. These powerful influences impinge 
on the identity of the Indian-Muslims as they struggle to form an ethnic community in 
the national production of identity.  As a Muslim respondent says:  
Because we are a minority within a minority we can’t expect to be known very 
well.  The immediate image of the people in Singapore would be Chinese, 
Malay and Indian.  To them it doesn’t matter what type of Indian you are.  But 
for us it is important because that is who we are.18
The presence of the multiple sub-ethnic groups within the Indian-Muslim community 
makes the Indian-Muslims here a highly fragmented group.  While at one extreme one 
group of Malay-speaking Indian-Muslims are assimilated into the Malay-Muslim 
community, at the other end of the spectrum are the Tamil-speaking Indian-Muslims 
who are assimilated into the larger community of Tamil-speaking Indians.19  
 Indian Christianity in Singapore is even more diverse than Indian Islam: Some 
Indians are members of Protestant denominations where they either form minorities 
within the largely Chinese congregations, or in some cases they have separated 
themselves, usually in order to be able to use an Indian language or languages as the 
medium of communication and worship (eg. The Tamil Methodist Church).  Many are 
members of the Roman Catholic Church, which has a far higher percentage of Indian 
members than the Protestant denominations (with the exception of the Methodists), 
and others are members of the virtually exclusive Indian Syrian Orthodox and Mar 
                                        
18  As told to Nooraisha binte Mohamed Ibrahim in The Contested Identities of Singapore’s Indian-
Muslim ‘Community’, 22. 
 
19  Noorul Farha As’art, Crafting Selves: The Case of Indian-Muslims in Singapore (National 
University of Singapore, 2000). 
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Thoma Churches.20  Among the 12.4% Indian Christians there are Catholics, Syrian 
Christians, Anglicans, Methodists, Pentecostal and those belonging to other 
denominations.21  Sub-group differences among these denominations and groups also 
exist.  A case in point would be that Malayalee Syrian Catholics would, when it 
comes to the question of arranging a marriage, differentiate themselves from other 
Malayalees including Mar Thomite and Jacobite Syrian Christians, and from other 
Catholic Indians.   
 Singapore Sikhs, numbering about 12,000 according to the 2000 Census 
Report, share a common linguistic and historical heritage in the Punjab (now divided 
between India and Pakistan), yet have several internal divisions in Singapore.  The 
politics of identity equally applies to the Sikh community in Singapore.  According to 
Dusenbery, unlike the other Indian communities, the Sikhs in Singapore have in 
recent years come to be regarded as something of a model minority community, 
praised at the highest levels of government for contributing effectively to the “well 
being and stability of Singapore … more than in proportion to [its] numbers”, and 
therefore rewarded with promises of state support while still preserving its 
distinctiveness.22  That the Sikhs as a distinct community have gained official 
recognition and support has largely been because they successfully made out a case 
for recognition and reinforcement of their distinctive Punjabi/Sikh heritage by 
reconciling it with the nationalist agenda. Given institutional efforts since the 1970s to 
nurture an inclusive Singapore Indian identity (although largely Tamil and Hindu in 
content) this has been achieved by the Sikh’s explicit repudiation of politicized 
religion (including a crackdown on Singaporean Sikh supporters of an independent 
Sikh state of Khalistan in India in the mid-1980s).   
                                        
20  John Clammer, The Sociology of Singapore Religion: Studies in Christianity and Chinese Culture 
(Singapore: Chopmen Publishers, 1991), 102. 
 
21  Syrian Christians who came from Kerala in India claim to have been converted to Christianity by 
Thomas, one of Jesus’ 12 disciples in the first few years of the Christian era.  The Syrian Christians are 
divided into a few denominations like Catholics, Jacobites and Mar Thomites based on different 
ecclesiastical allegiance. 
 
22  Verne Dusenbery, “The Poetics and Politics of Recognition: Diasporan Sikhs in Pluralist Politics,” 
American Ethnologist 24, 4 (1997): 738-762; Comments made by then Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew, 
shortly before his retirement to the position of Senior Minister.  Similar comments were also made 
subsequently by then acting Minister of Information and the Arts, B G Yeo (The Straits Times, 1990) 
as well as by former Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong (The Straits Times, 1991). 
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 Unhappy with being forced to study Tamil (one of the designated second 
languages) in schools as it did not contribute to Sikh culture, Sikhs lobbied the 
government for a change in language policy.  Their main concern was to combat “the 
negative influences of Western culture” and “the erosion of traditional Asian (Sikh) 
values among the Sikh youth.23  The government, acknowledging the concerns of the 
Sikhs, consequently allowed Sikh studies to be incorporated in the school religious 
studies programme and the Punjabi language as an examination subject both at 
primary and secondary levels.  Such efforts to advance the interests of the community 
in tandem with the nationalist project and efforts to work in line with government 
welfare initiatives earned the praise of the government, leading the Prime Minister to 
laud their contributions to society as befitting a “distinctive group” who “had been a 
credit to Singapore because by and large, they were law-abiding, hardworking and 
successful in educating their children to enter the professions and business”.24  During 
a visit to the Central Sikh Temple in November 1990, then Prime Minister Lee Kuan 
Yew complimented the Sikhs for their “realistic appreciation of Singapore’s 
realities”.25  Accordingly, the Sikh has been recognized as a distinct social identity by 
the state – Sikh is now listed as a separate ‘race’ as well as a separate ‘religion’, a 
change also reflected in the latest census category.  Among all the subethnic divisions 
of Singapore’s Indian population and indeed of all the ethnic groups of Singapore, the 
Sikhs are probably the most visible, their men bearded and colourfully turbaned as 
well as sporting other symbols of their religion, and the womenfolk wearing salwar 
kameez (long tops, scarfs and pyjama pants).  Identifying Sikh values that will provide 
a cultural anchor and harmonise with the ideology of a Singaporean identity as 
articulated by the state, the Sikhs have successfully blended the politics of national 
ideology and multiculturalism for the benefit of themselves and the society at large.  
The state in turn has used its recognition of Sikh distinctiveness to successfully 
demonstrate its management of ethnicity and religion of the Sikh community and the 
                                        
23  These issues are drawn from a letter of 2 November 1990 (“Tribute from the Sikh Community”) 
from Bhajan Singh, Chairman of the Sikh Advisory Board, to Lee Kuan Yew, then Prime Minister of 
Singapore.   
 
24  The Straits Times, 1990. 
 
25  Ibid. 
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successful reconciliation of nationalist and multicultural discourses by this 
community.26   
 The Malayalees are another prominent sub-ethnic group in Singapore.  
Originally hailing from the Malabar Coast in the South Indian state of Kerala, they 
too, like the Tamils, lived in ethnic enclaves in colonial Singapore.  The largest was in 
Sembawang near the British Naval Base and in various British Royal Air Force bases 
at Changi, Seletar and Tengah, as most of the Malayalees worked for the former 
British administration.  Even though they lived in close proximity, they were not a 
homogeneous group, as they comprised Hindus, Muslims, Syrian Christians, Roman 
Catholics and other Christian denominations who were varied in their social, cultural 
and religious practices and organizations.  According to many Singaporean 
Malayalees I interviewed their biggest ‘problem’ is the inability of their respective 
organizations to effectively work together as a collective entity.  Because of the 
state’s language policy, Malayalee youths have little interest in such organizations or 
their activities as many are not competent in the language and therefore are unable to 
appreciate or participate in Malayalee cultural activities.  Unlike these local 
Malayalees, recent Malayalee migrants from India maintain their strong Malayalee 
cultural traditions and tend to perceive the local Malayalees as being culturally 
inferior because many either do not speak the language or observe Malayalee 
traditions.  Hence, language, religion and economic cleavages within the local 
Malayalee community are exacerbated by their relationship with new arrivals from 
India and complicate the problem of identities.   
 Most Malayalee children grow up competent in English, many choosing 
Malay or Tamil as their second language requirement in schools instead of Malayalam 
(not offered). The dearth of marriage partners, especially girls, from within the 
community, compels many modern Malayalee boys to marry out of the community.  
In such cross-cultural marriages, they find Malayalee social organizations less 
meaningful, preferring non-ethnic based social organizations instead.  Thirdly, a 
sizeable number of Malayalee boys are educated overseas.  Many also migrate abroad.  
Moreover, intra-ethnic contact is minimal with interaction mainly confined to 
youngsters in the community.  All in all, there is no motivation for younger 
Malayalees to preserve their culture in the form re-invented by their parents and 
                                        
26  Dusenbery, “The Poetics and Politics of Recognition”. 
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grandparents.  There is also, among the younger Malayalees, a conscious movement 
away from ethnic identification and towards a more liberal and neutral identification 
especially in Chinese-dominated Singapore in which racial stereotypes and prejudice 
towards minority communities by the dominant Chinese prevail. 
 Caste identification also plays a significant part in the social life of the Indian 
in Singapore.  Although their presence has been diluted in the urban cosmopolitan 
world of modern Singapore, caste divisions still exert strong pressure on the social life 
of Indians in Singapore, although it must be borne in mind that Indians in Singapore 
have to conform to a society in which full ritual observance and pollution practices 
cannot conveniently be observed.  The state for example has never allocated housing 
to Indians on the basis of caste or jati.  Yet caste as an institution has reinvented itself 
and caste identities continue in the Singapore setting in different forms and ways.  It is 
highly probable that it has been effectively and subtly supplemented by division 
according to social class – the ranking stratification tool of modern society which 
demarcates social status according to economic, employment, and educational status.        
 Caste was associated with migration from the very start.  Economic survival 
and social emancipation from the evils of the caste system propelled outward 
migration of the lower caste poor, unemployed, and landless Indian labourers, to 
whom crossing the dark seas, the kalapani, was not considered polluting.27  The 
system was rigidly maintained in the early migrant periods through occupational 
specialization, residential separation, restrictions on temple entry and participation in 
Hindu rituals.  According to A Mani, the distance between caste Hindus and 
untouchables (the class that was largely employed as coolies in the British 
administration) was maintained in the occupations they performed, and in the 
residences, roads and temples of ‘Little India’.28  Although this social-spatial 
separation has been moderated in modern Singapore, it is still visible to the discerning 
Indian eye, especially in the area of occupations, marriages and caste-based 
organizations.  For instance, it is unimaginable for a Brahmin to work as a road 
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sweeper in contemporary Singapore society just as it was during the colonial period.29  
Caste-based organisations take the form of voluntary associations and are normally 
prevalent among the upper-caste Hindus, particularly the Brahmins, decreasing with 
the level of the social hierarchy of the Hindus.   
 As a ‘reinvented’ tradition, caste manifestations are also present among 
Singapore’s Indian-Muslims, Christians and Sikhs, though to a lesser degree than with 
upper-caste Hindus.  While the Sikh caste, for example, extols identities and values, it 
is not an uncommon sight to see Sikhs marrying non-Sikhs.  Christians generally 
marry within their denominations, though this is not always the case.  Indian-
Muslims, on the other hand, appear more rigid when it comes to marriage, insisting on 
alliances within the community, as I observed when interviewing this community 
group.   
  Singapore Indians also use other criteria in defining themselves and 
differentiating themselves from other kinds of Indians, including physical appearance, 
dress, regionality, dialect, class, occupation and religion.  Non-Indian Singaporeans 
are generally vague when it comes to differentiating one type of ‘Indian’ from 
another.  Some differentiate North Indians from Tamils on the basis that the latter are 
generally “very dark”. For many Northerners, South Indians are all “Tamil” and/or 
“mamaks”.  The rest are “Sindhi”, “Bengali”, or “Gujarati”.  “Bengali” is commonly 
used as a generic term for all North Indians, the derogatory term “Bangali tongchet” 
more specifically referring to Sikhs with turbans.30  A Bengali from Bengal among 
my informants often has great difficulty explaining to non-Indian friends that he is not 
Sikh.  Indian sub-ethnic differences are thus both visible and blurred to non-Indian 
Singaporeans.  Some non-Indian Singaporeans, I observed during my interviews, are 
not even able to comprehend the complexity of sub-ethnic differences among the 
Indians.  There were several occasions when I was asked (mainly by Chinese 
respondents) whether I was Muslim, Hindu or Christian, even though my name is 
clearly that of a Tamil Hindu.  
 These examples illustrate how complicated the social identities of Singapore 
Indians are to deconstruct, though in many areas of everyday life these identities do 
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30  Siddique and Purushotam, Singapore’s Little India, 8.   
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not come into play, especially when interactions with the anonymity of urban modern 
spaces are involved. The social divisiveness of the Indians in Singapore has also 
extended to their public political life right from the earliest colonial times.  Historian 
Sandhu claims that unlike the Chinese, the Indians were not united enough to have 
any one Indian official appointed to take charge of all the Indians living there.31   His 
findings are echoed by another historian, Mary Turnbull, who argues that the Indian 
community made no impact on society and lacked leadership or strong local 
organizations.32  
 Consequently, the Indians were poorly represented in the colonial 
administration.  Until 1923, they did not have a single representative on the executive 
council and had only one on the legislative council.33  The Singapore Indian 
Association was founded in 1923 for social and recreational purposes and the Indian 
Chamber of Commerce in 1937 for trade purposes, but more extensive participation in 
the political affairs of Singapore came only in the wake of the Second World War and 
with the success of the nationalist movement and independence in India.  Close 
proximity to India and strong emotional, religious, linguistic and political ties to their 
respective regions of origin encouraged Indians to go their different ways.34  
Last but not least, to compound the situation even further, the Indian sub-
ethnic groups became torn apart over the issue of their respective mother-tongue 
languages.  From the 1950s, the Indian community became fragmented and 
diversified along linguistic leanings, with the Tamils, Malayalees, and Punjabis 
(comprising the main Indian communities in Singapore) politicized over the issue.  
This trend was accentuated by urban renewal, education policies, language policies, 
meritocracy, secularism and economic prosperity in independent Singapore, according 
to Sandhu.35
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 Although my research shows that the new generation of young Indians 
identify strongly with Singapore as compared to their country of ethnic origin, it also 
reveals that in certain contexts, such as marriage, relations with other ethnic groups 
and their reaction to the state-sponsored CMIO ideology of multiethnicity, they 
acutely feel that their ethnicity makes them a minority.  My field interviews suggest 
that this consciousness of being a minority group is intensified by the Republic’s 
policy of encouraging the preservation and strengthening of ethnic, cultural and 
linguistic roots, and by the knowledge that they are further fragmented by regionality, 
dialect, language, caste, class and religion.  They also differ greatly in their socio-
economic and educational levels as Tables 15 (Chapter 6.3) and 18-22 (Chapter 8.2) 
show. 
  Structural weaknesses and lack of cohesion within each of the Indian 
communities’ social organizations leave these communities divided and fragmented, 
thereby preventing them from progressing in terms of socio-economic development 
and responding positively to issues (for example, educational and occupational 
improvement) confronting Indians as a whole in the context of the wider multiethnic 
society of Singapore.  Despite several generations of Singapore-born Indians, the 
ethnic group still stands divided along ethnic, religious, linguistic and social class 
lines.  Consequently this plurality of interests and identities does not make it possible 
to speak of a distinct Singapore Indian community as such within the context of 
Singapore’s political, social and economic environment. In the words of Sandhu, “it is 
unlikely that the Indians will ever, at least not in the foreseeable future, again play a 
significant political role in the island as a community or a communal force”.36  
 
4.3  ‘Indian’ identity in Singapore  
Of particular relevance in the analysis of the Indian presence in the broader 
polyethnic and globalised Singaporean society is how the community manages the 
negotiation of identities.  This problem is accentuated by new arrivals of professional 
elites and manual labourers who have been increasingly occupying the social spaces 
of the local Indian community in the last two decades or so.  The recruitment of such 
foreign talent has a strong ‘racial’ dimension as I will demonstrate in this section, 
thereby giving emphasis to the argument that ‘race’ is a social/political construct in 
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Singapore.  Indian ethnic identity is further problematised by the reinforcement of 
racial identities by the nation state.  Additionally, the negotiation of identities has 
created a situation of diasporic consciousness among the Indians in Singapore, 
particularly since the 1980s when the promotion of ethnicity through the state’s 
‘Asian Values’ policy gained momentum and overshadowed the pursuit of a single 
national identity.37  More recent changes in state ideologies, policies, and practices of 
nation building and “ethnic management” in the corporatist globalised city-state over 
the years had brought into sharp focus the relevance of diasporic consciousness 
through the migration experience.  The problem has become complicated for the local 
Indians since the 1990s with the influx of new waves of professional and manual 
Indian migrant workers (see Table 2 in 4.2) whose particular identities add new 
dimensions to the construction of ethnic identity.  Such a negotiation of identities has 
long been an issue for Indian migrants as well as for local Indians in Singapore.   
 The experiences of migrants are always constructed within specific national 
spaces.  Consequently, the ideology of the nation has implications for how they 
experience their relocation and identities.  Similarly the migrants’ experience reflects 
on the ideology of the nation.  Various studies have been made about the connections 
between national ideology and migration with regard to Asians living in multicultural 
societies such as the USA, Canada and Australia.  Hage, for instance, argues that 
‘multiculturalists’ within Australia fantasize a ‘white nation’ governed by a dominant 
white majority (a view popularized by Pauline Hanson), with such a fantasy 
impacting upon migrants’ sense of belonging.38  Asian migrants, in this context, will 
always be seen as ‘outsiders’, as they will never fit into the national imagination of 
what constitutes an ‘Australian’.  These polarizations prevail in the national 
imagination of many countries even though those nations identify themselves as 
multicultural.     
 Singapore’s concept of multiculturalism, however, is different from most 
settler colonial societies because Singapore endorsed a policy of multiculturalism not 
only from the day it was conceived as a nation but also during the colonial era, 
although the approach to multiculturalism and the way it has been practised has been 
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differently emphasized during these two periods.  Uncovering how multiculturalism 
has shaped and still continues to shape transmigratory experience in Singapore is 
crucial to understanding the context of Indian diaspora in the globalised nation state 
of Singapore.  Most studies of the Indian diaspora in Singapore study migration as a 
phenomenon of the past, confining it to the migration of convict, construction and 
plantation labour of the colonial period.  These studies fail to recognize that many 
local Indians are emigrating, while many overseas Indians (not only from India but 
also from other countries) are immigrating.  Another failing of these studies is their 
emphasis on the homogeneity of race and ethnic identification, signifying a 
perspective of colonial management strategies.39  The Indian community during the 
colonial period was therefore assumed to be fixed and static.  Such an essentialised 
notion portrayed the Indians as temporary economic migrants who owed economic, 
emotional and physical attachment and true allegiance to India without making any 
attempt to integrate into the mainstream of Singaporean society.  Indians migrating 
after the Second World War, have been considered, in these writings, to have 
permanently settled and developed roots in Singapore.  These writings ignore 
contemporary themes of globalization, transnationalism, mobility of labour and the 
relevance of diasporic consciousness and social realities of Indians in Singapore.   
 Diaspora is a term whose definition has been expanded to designate virtually 
any population considered “deterritorialised” or “transnational” – any gathering of 
individuals currently residing in a country other than from which they (or their 
ancestors) originated.  The term was originally intended to describe and encapsulate 
the historical experiences and predicament of Jews forcibly displaced from their 
homes and yearning to return to their homeland to end their diasporic existence.  In 
recent times, however, the application of this term has been evoked and extended to 
represent other geographically dispersed groups all over the world.   
  Safran’s definition of diaspora relies heavily on the Jewish diaspora, while 
James Clifford conceptualizes diaspora as the “modern, transnational and intercultural 
experience”.40  Basch, one of the most influential writers in the study of international 
migration from a transnational perspective, defines transnationalism as “the processes 
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40  William Safran, “Diasporas in Modern Societies: Myths of Homeland and Return,” Diaspora 1, 1 
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by which immigrants forge and sustain multi-stranded social relations that link 
together their societies of origin and settlement”.41  Furthermore, transmigrants are 
understood as developing and maintaining multiple familial, economic, social, 
organizational, religious and political relationships within and across borders.  They 
do not sever ties with their homeland and assimilate into new ways of life in their new 
settlements.  Instead, transmigrants are seen as actively maintaining relations across 
national borders.  Diaspora or diasporic communities are described by Dwyer as 
dispersed communities who share multiple belongings to different places or ‘homes’ 
in different “national spaces”.42  Robin Cohen, on the other hand, advances a 
definition that encompasses trade, imperial, cultural and labour diasporas.43  Various 
other writers including Stuart Hall, Tololyan, Gilroy, Radhakrishnan, Ang and Mishra 
have described this term in various ways, while literary writers like V S Naipaul and 
Salman Rushdie have problematised it in their novels.44  In my opinion, only Mishra 
adequately encapsulates the predicament of the Indian diaspora in Singapore because 
of the unique nature of the Singapore ‘Indians’ who have to contend with the social 
production of racial and ethnic identities and the social realities of living in Singapore.  
They have also to grapple with the construction of national ideology and state 
management of ethnicity through the CMIO label, their relationships with other 
ethnicities, the heavy impact of global capitalism, transnational cultural flows, the 
migration experience and the historical baggage attached to it as well as the political 
history of Singapore both during colonial and postcolonial times.  More importantly, 
the new forms of class and caste distinction connected to the migration of recent 
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waves of guest migrant workers from the Indian sub-continent, particularly white-
collar skilled professionals and blue-collar unskilled construction workers/domestic 
servants in the last two decades or so, have thrust the Indian diaspora in Singapore 
into a very highly contested domain.  Mishra’s work appears to be able to encompass 
the contemporary diaspora of the Indian in Singapore where “the old diaspora of 
exclusivism” (meaning already localized Singapore Indians who no longer regard 
India as their home like V S Naipaul) is set against the “new diaspora of the border” 
(highly mobile ethnic Indian transnationals who include both the skilled, talented 
white-collar expatriates like Salman Rushdie and the comparatively unskilled blue-
collar foreign construction workers/domestic servants).45  The presence of these 
newer arrivals of various groups of Indians has generated new forms of racial politics.  
 The Singapore state has been actively encouraging the inflow of temporary 
‘foreign workers’ and ‘foreign talent’ from abroad since the late 1980s.  However, the 
flow of foreign nationals is a highly selective process.  Indian professional talent is 
readily desired by the state and given ‘red-carpet treatment’ (for example, encouraged 
to take up Permanent Residence) while construction workers and domestic maids are 
merely tolerated and subjected to a ‘use-and-discard’ policy.  What is significant in 
the selection of foreign nationals is the concentration on recruiting professional talent 
from Asia that is able to fit into CMIO ideology.  The state imagines foreign talent 
from Asia as adapting to Singaporean society easily because:     
Singapore offer[s] an Asian society with a higher standard of living and a 
quality of life than their own countries and they [can] easily assimilate into our 
society.46
The rationale was that Indian talent shared similar values with Singaporean Indians.  
The recruitment of Indian talent since the late 1980s has been so successful that the 
number of these migrants has increased substantially (see Table 2 in 4.2).  The CMIO 
ideology however both regulates the lives of Singapore citizens and the flow of 
foreign talent into the country on the basis of a class dimension.  It has implications 
for how the migrants experience their relocation in the new context of Singapore’s 
ethnic and national identities.   
                                        
45  Mishra, “The Diasporic Imaginary”. 
 
46  Lee Kuan Yew, From Third World to First, The Singapore Story: 1965-2000 (Singapore: Times 
Publishing Group, 2000), 166.   
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             A key question is whether these migrants, having themselves been subjected 
to nation state building of postcolonial Indian nationalism, can easily fit into 
Singapore and gain acceptance in the local community merely because they fit neatly 
into CMIO ideology.  Hage’s concept of ‘official’ citizenship and ‘practical’ national 
belonging is a useful distinction in considering this issue.47  He argues that official 
citizenship refers to an institutional-political acceptance by the state.  Practical 
national belonging, on the other hand, refers to acceptance or non-acceptance as a 
subject of belonging at a communal, everyday level.48  Indian professional talent has 
gained acceptance in Singapore society at an institutional-political level because they 
fit the ‘racial’ classification.  But what needs to be considered is whether they have 
gained a sense of ‘practical national belonging’ based on racial affinity alone, as the 
degree of acceptance they find in the general Singaporean community affects their 
experience of living and working in Singapore.  Occupying the same category as 
localized Singapore Indians under the CMIO classification has different implications 
that affect not only the new migrants, but more importantly the local Singapore 
Indians.  My fieldwork shows (see later this chapter) that many local Indians do not 
readily see them as assimilating into Singapore society – a factor that questions the 
logic of CMIO ideology by adding another layer of complexity to an already diverse 
‘Indian’ category.  This is because despite the different origins, historical experiences, 
and the time periods within which they arrived in Singapore, migrants from the Indian 
subcontinent have all been classified as ‘Indians’ under CMIO ideology and practice.  
In official discourse and in reports such as the population census since colonial days, 
Indians are portrayed as a homogenous group rather than as plural and differentiated.  
At the same time language, religious and cultural practices place them in common 
physical spaces such as temples and cultural events.  This further serves to ‘naturalise’ 
their Indian ethnic identity, but problematises the manner in which ethnicity is 
articulated in relation to national identity in Singapore.  
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 This dilemma of the ‘diasporic encounter’ has enormous implications for an 
understanding of the Indian diaspora.49   To understand the resultant racial politics 
arising from the state management of multiethnicity, I will now explore Indian foreign 
workers and Indian talent in more depth. 
   
4.4  Indian foreign workers 
 Indian foreign workers are one of the many groups of workers who have been 
recruited to fill the shortage of people required in the construction industry and in 
other manual jobs like domestic help.  The term ‘foreign worker’ is used for those 
who are employed in bluecollar jobs such as construction and domestic help.  This 
group is often paid comparatively lower wages and is seen as ‘unskilled’ or ‘semi-
skilled’ by the state and in popular discourse.  They are regarded by the state as a 
transient workforce within the Singapore economy.  Stringent legislation such as 
monthly levies is put in place to restrict their numbers and to ensure their short term 
migrant status.  Various other conditions ensure that they do not become a social 
liability to the state.  They are given work permits that last for two years, after which 
they are expected to return to their homeland.  In short, ‘foreign workers’ are tolerated 
as temporary labour because they work in jobs Singaporeans no longer find attractive 
or viable.   
 Foreign workers are subjected to a regime of strict legal controls and policies 
that make it impossible for them to acquire a degree of permanence in Singapore.  
They earn less than $1,500 per month under a work permit scheme that prohibits them 
from contributing to a state savings scheme called the Central Provident Fund (CPF).  
This way the government ensures that they will not be eligible for government 
housing, education or other welfare benefits that are lavished on Indian professional 
expatriates who come under the category of ‘Indian talent’.  Work permit holders are 
also prevented from bringing their families to Singapore or from marrying or even 
having relationships with Singaporeans.  They need to apply to the Ministry of Labour 
if they plan to marry a Singaporean – something not required of expatriate 
employment pass holders. Marrying without obtaining permission brings about 
immediate cancellation of the foreigner’s work permit, deportation and a permanent 
ban on re-entry to Singapore.  Overstaying in Singapore is an offence punishable by 
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caning and deportation.50  Government policing also extends beyond questions of 
marriage to the sex lives of the women foreign workers – the domestic maids who 
make up about 140,000 or 30% of the foreign labour force.  A female work permit 
holder is required by law to undergo a pregnancy test once every six months.  If she is 
found pregnant, she is summarily repatriated and the employer forfeits the monetary 
bond of $5,000 taken out on her.   
 The consensus among my respondents is that the labour and immigration 
policy relating to the foreign workforce is ‘racially’, class and gender biased, 
discriminating between foreign workers (comprising mainly construction workers and 
domestic maids) and other categories of skilled foreign talent.  The harsh treatment of 
foreign workers is brought out in the case of a Filipino maid who was found guilty 
and hanged in 1995 for the murder of another maid and the 3 year-old son of her 
employer.  There was also the case of a Thai construction worker, Somaid Kamjan, 
who was sentenced to a 3-month jail term and 3 lashes of the cane for overstaying.  
 There are also various levels of discriminatory treatment of these foreign 
workers.  For instance, there is a sizeable difference in the wages provided to 
domestic maids.  While Filipino maids are paid between $300-400 per month, 
Indonesian and Sri Lankan maids are paid an average of $230-250 per month and 
maids from India only about $200 or lesser per month.  Such a payment disparity has 
generated criticism that the wage is set according to race.  Added to this criticism is 
the culture of maid abuse that has come under severe public scrutiny, though the 
Government warns employers against the harsh treatment of these workers.  Physical 
and sexual abuse appears to be common among some Singapore employers, according 
to extensive media reports.  On an average, about 80 cases of severe maid abuse reach 
the courts each year in Singapore.   
              Abuse is one reason one of my respondents, a 45 year old Indian 
businessman, gives for the Government not wanting to recruit maids from China, 
ascribing such a policy to the state’s attitude towards race.  He says, “The Chinese 
cannot bear torturing their own kind.  It’s easier to do that to Indians, Indonesians, Sri 
Lankans or Filipinos”.  He continues pointing to a racial dimension in the state’s 
policy of not recruiting domestic maids from China:  
                                        
50  Whilst punitive measures like imprisonment, fines and deportation of overstayers is common in 
many countries, the brutality of canning such offenders as inflicted in Singapore seems unprecedented 
in this day and age.  
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Although Singapore declares that foreign talent and manpower is open to all 
nationalities, in reality what’s being practised smacks of apartheid.  If local 
Chinese wives worry that their husbands would be seduced by their China 
maids, what about Malays and Indians? 
Another interviewee agrees: “The truth is, domestic maid work is one of those dirty 
and degrading work not considered fit for a Chinese.  Besides, would the local 
Chinese employers mistreat their own kind the way others have been?”  Upset at the 
exploitation of these workers from some of the countries like India, Indonesia, 
Bangladesh, and Philippines, another incensed resident tells me: “It is nothing but a 
demographic game… While the Bangladeshis who can speak and write English sweep 
the void decks and clear dustbins in HDB apartments, the Chinese without a single 
word of English get the better jobs and within six months are able to become 
Permanent Residents while the Banglas go home.  Why compartmentalize jobs to 
race?”  Interviewing a maid agency, I was told that the Ministry of Manpower will not 
issue a work permit for domestic maids from China. 
 Large numbers of unskilled Indian construction workers began arriving in 
Singapore in the 1990s and their numbers continued to swell as the demand for 
manual workers increased.  Their presence was not contested by the local populace 
until their large numbers were felt in Little India where residents claimed disturbed 
their neighbourhood.  For many of these workers, Little India is a ‘home away from 
home’ and therefore their comfort zone.  It is a predominantly Indian landscape where 
Indian goods are sold by Indians for Indians.  In this way, it is reminiscent of the way 
things are back in India.  Over time Indian workers have also gained an emotional 
attachment to the landscape because their Sundays are spent there.  It is a day when 
they meet up with friends, receive mail, make calls, send remittances and shop for 
their essentials.  These routine activities in themselves do not pose a problem for 
residents.  However, the manner in which these activities have concentrated in Little 
India is seen as a problem.  Many of the workers often congregate in public access 
paths, open spaces, outside public housing flats and in almost every other common 
space available (see Plates 9 and 10).51  Little India is therefore avoided by most 
Singaporeans, particularly on Sundays, because of the overwhelming concentration of 
what my Chinese interviewees see as “dark-skinned” people.  Local residents respond 
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with mixed feelings at the sight of hundreds of foreign workers congregating in every 
inch of space in the Little India area.  While some Singaporeans are prepared to 
tolerate them, others are not so accommodating.  Says Kannappan, a 31-year old male 
Singapore Indian executive who deliberately avoids Little India on Sundays:  
They look so dirty and menacing, aimlessly walking in the middle of the road 
and posing a danger when I drive and to other motorists as well.  I also see 
some of them lying on the pavements… they are a sorry sight. 
Yet another local, 39-year old Sachdev has this to say about the construction workers: 
“I feel more like a foreigner whenever I go to Little India on Sundays”.  Forty two 
year old Krishnan, a merchant banker, is equally contemptuous of the foreign 
construction workers.  He says: 
They spoil the image of Indians by their behaviour, poor dress habits, and 
various mannerisms like holding hands with their fellow workers and talking 
loudly.  Singaporeans form stereotypes of local Indians from these workers. 
These views indicate that many local Indians judge these manual workers by 
prevailing norms of modernity and cosmopolitanism in Singapore.  
 Singapore women also say they prefer to avoid Little India on Sundays as they 
“hate” the “stares” of the foreign workers which they interpret as sexual harassment.  
Geeta, a 21-year old university student, says that she is being watched by these 
workers as she walks along Serangoon Road.  “I don’t like the way they gaze at me… 
It’s so disgusting… He may be having evil intentions”.  Says another Indian local 
housewife in her 30s, “They always stare at you as though they have never seen a 
woman in their lives… I feel so uncomfortable”.  Such views are common from 
women of all ethnicities who venture to stroll along Serangoon Road on Sundays. 
As I have shown above, my interviewees, even local Indians, portray foreign 
manual workers as being noisy, smelly and drunk, attitudes that contribute to racial 
stereotyping.  Residents also complain that they avoid these workers as their presence 
is a threat to their personal safety and that they were littering the place.52  Through 
media reports, Little India is also constructed as a landscape to be avoided because of 
the presence of these Indian workers.  Consequently the stereotypes of these Indians 
remain etched in the memory of the Singaporean who is familiar with the historical 
attitude attributed to Indians.  Their contributions to the economy are obscured by the 
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negative construction of their ‘polluting presence’.  Such negative portrayals – based 
on both race and class - also affect the other Singapore Indian communities and not 
just Indian workers alone, racial connotations playing a major part in these portrayals.  
These connotations are accentuated by onlookers classifying all these foreign workers 
as Indians when in fact about half of them are from Bangladesh, as my observation 
shows.  All in all, the stigma attached to the ‘Indian’ has affected racial politics since 
colonial days, thereby complicating the processes of ethnic and national identity.   
 On the other hand, by classifying Little India as a heritage zone for tourism 
and heritage purposes, the state promotes the area as a ‘front space’ that is projected 
for tourist consumption.  Such a projection however excludes the presence of the 
foreign workers from the Indian subcontinent.  Their presence is ignored from STB 
and URA tourist brochures of Little India implying that these “dark-skinned” people 
were not worthy of being included in the state’s heritage or touristic value of Little 
India because again by implication their presence pollutes, contaminates and threatens 
the image the state promotes of the place.  Such a situation exposes, in the opinion of 
people interviewed, a racially negative connotation in the state’s treatment of such 
individuals as well as all Indians, racial stereotyping being based on skin colour – a 
hangover from colonial days.  Says Indian construction worker Marimuthu who with 
his fellow workers from India congregates in the area every Sunday:  
We are treated like dirt.  The Government puts lots of restrictions and 
conditions during our stay here, our Chinese boss gives us a low wage, shabby 
and congested accommodation and the people think we are a nuisance when 
we gather in the open spaces in this area.  That is our fate… but we need the 
money to pay off the agents as well as help our families in India survive. 
He implies that the foreign worker treats his landscape as ‘back space’ or ‘front space’ 
as the situation demands.  His co-workers who had gathered around him also held 
similar views which were reinforced by sympathetic opinions from local Indians who 
had come to Little India to shop as well as the Indian shopkeepers in the area.  
Remarks Senthil Mohan, a 55-year old manager of an employment agency working 
from an office in Serangoon Plaza  recruiting foreign workers:  
Little India gives them a feeling of home and this is the only place in 
Singapore they feel safe and comfortable.  They have a deep sense of 
attachment to Little India as it reminds them of their home country.  They 
have come here for survival and yet they are being discriminated by 
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everybody.  Even many other Chinese friends I know don’t like their presence 
here – I think it must be because they perceive these workers to be noisy, 
smelly and dirty.  This is not really true.  It’s just a prejudice borne out of race 
I think, because if you are dark-skinned, people here assume you are Indian.53
His remarks about how the Chinese feel towards the presence of these Indian 
labourers bring to mind vivid memories of what a Chinese PAP backbencher in 
Parliament remarked during a Parliamentary sitting: Little India looked “pitch-black” 
because of the presence of these workers, a racist remark which provoked a storm of 
protest from the Indian community.  He was seen by Indians as expressing a 
perceived threat posed to the state by the presence of the foreign Indian workers – a 
racial slant for which they expressed their displeasure.  Interestingly, state treatment 
of these foreign workers in this contact zone is occasionally subverted by instances of 
workers dressing immaculately, complete with neatly pressed long-sleeved shirts and 
mobile phones to gain an air of respectability not only from fellow workers but also 
from the Singapore public.  The consensus among respondents is that the Chinese 
tend to be contemptuous of these Indian workers.  Interviewing a Chinese female 32-
year old computer operator in Serangoon Road one particular Sunday, I observe how 
angrily she reacts when I bring up the subject of the foreign workers.  Adopting a 
rather racist tone she says she would never again visit Little India on Sundays and 
expresses her opinion that it is of no surprise that Indians are subject to stereotyping, 
confirming a historical prejudice based on race.  As Letchumanan, a middle-aged 
manager of a large departmental store in Serangoon Plaza recounts,  
My Chinese friends do not like the presence of these workers.  They consider 
them an embarrassment to the image of Singapore as a highly modernized and 
sophisticated commercial hub.   
The Chinese contempt for the Indian foreign workers – they are often said to “reek of 
coconut oil or toddy”, “dress in mismatched and garishly coloured attire”, “talk loudly 
in a funny Indian accent” – is extrapolated in such a way that these popular 
perceptions of immigrant Indians envelop the local Indians as well.  The position of 
local Indians, already subject to stereotypes drawn from historical events, therefore 
becomes more problematic as they relate to other ethnic communities, rendering the 
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possibility of national integration and nation building on the basis of racialized 
identities even more complex.   
 
4.5 Indian talent  
 In contrast to Indian foreign workers, the term ‘Indian talent’ refers to those 
employed in white collar jobs in professional, managerial and entrepreneurial fields 
such as finance, banking, computer technology and business services.  They receive 
much higher salaries (not less than $1,500) compared to ‘foreign workers’ and are 
conversely seen as ‘highly skilled’.  Their employment pass allows them to contribute 
to the Central Provident Fund social security scheme, denied to the construction 
workers and domestic maids.  They are also provided with generous Government 
housing, education and other concessions which the foreign workers are prevented 
from participating in.  The government has put several incentives in place to attract 
such talent and to encourage them to settle in Singapore.  Subsidized housing, fast 
track employment pass applications and Permanent Residence status are some of the 
incentives currently in place.  Such favourable treatment contrasts sharply with the 
experiences of ‘foreign workers.’ In short, ‘Indian talent’ is strongly desired by the 
government and the professionals are actively encouraged to sink their roots in 
Singapore.   
  Indian “talent” began arriving in 1990 when the Singapore government 
decided to attract professional and managerial skills where such expertise was in short 
supply.  The search intensified in the mid-1990s as globalization and the new 
knowledge economy took off.54  Former Deputy Prime Minister and now Prime 
Minister Lee Hsien Loong has praised Indian expatriate professionals in Singapore 
and mentioned that their children have distinguished themselves in local schools.55  
The latest population census of 2000 has revealed that Indians were ahead of other 
racial groups in terms of academic qualifications, though it does not disclose that this 
increase was partly due to the entry of Indian graduate Permanent Residents.  Former 
Prime Minister and now Senior Minister Goh Chok Tong had also encouraged 
Singaporeans to welcome Indian talent because of their potential to enhance the 
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overall ‘talent pool.’56  Such an exhortation to locals was interpreted through the 
Prime Minister’s perceived failure to accord sufficient importance to the concerns of 
local Singaporean.57 His contention that “there was no special reason why I should 
address the so-called problems of the Indian community” also generated among them 
a sense of neglect.58 Local Indians felt that greater importance was being placed by 
the state on expatriate professionals from India.  A typical response is that of 
Pavithran, a 37-year old locally born Indian working as a supervisor in a company 
employing Indian professionals:   
We are not against the Government’s encouragement of Indian expatriate 
workers, but this should not be at our expense and usefulness. As locals, our 
stake is in this country whereas these foreigners leave once they get a better 
deal somewhere.  They have no loyalty to Singapore, even though the 
Government has welcomed them here. 
 This community of new “expatriate” Indian migrants also contributes to 
existing stereotypes or to the formation of new stereotypes that affect the lives of 
Singapore’s Indian communities and the construction of ‘Indian’ as a socially 
meaningful category.  Being well-educated many of them I spoke to appear to harbour 
some form of class consciousness and cultural superiority over local Indians.  Thirty-
four year- old software engineer Kumar and Sreedevi, another systems analyst, 
complain: “Singapore Indians lack cultural identity and behave as though only they 
are civilized.  They try to demean us and our ways.  They are just arrogant”.   30 year-
old chartered accountant Ghosh feels that Indians here have forgotten their roots.  He 
elaborates: “Many locals, not having travelled to India, have no idea that India and 
Indians there are well advanced and well educated.  They are too proud and arrogant 
as they only know and talk about the poverty and corruption prevalent in India”.  All 
these responses emphasize a reference to the Indian homeland as representative of 
Indian culture and “Indianness”.  Yet another professional from India, 42 year-old 
John Mathews sees Singapore Indians as being jealous of them because jobs had been 
given to professionals from India, thereby perceiving that the locals, in search of jobs, 
had lost out to the Indians from India.  Mathews argues that it was the Singapore 
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Government that had offered them the jobs at salaries well below the local rate.  Such 
perceptions underline the fact that Indian talent tries to subvert the marginal position 
assigned to them by local Indians.  I was not surprised therefore to observe from my 
interviews that local Singaporeans are equally contemptuous of the professional 
Indians from India.  Says a 47 year-old local-born Indian named Senthil, whose great 
grandparents migrated from India in the nineteenth century, “these expat Indians think 
the world about themselves… they are snobbish”.  Such views are echoed by another 
local Indian, a plumber by the name of Raj, who talks about being insulted by expat 
Indians.  He recalls one incident: “When I went to their house to do some plumbing 
work, they treated me like a servant and ordered me around as they do their servants 
in India.  They are very bossy”.  Some other local Tamils I spoke to mention that 
there is an obvious class divide between the local Indians - particularly the low 
income-earning Tamils - and the expatriate Indians. Remarks Ramasamy who is  
employed as an artisan, “ These expatriates, though they are Indians themselves, only 
want to improve themselves and have no interest in wanting to interact with or even 
offer any real help to us Tamils”.      
 Together with localized Indians, Indian professional talent and Indian 
construction workers/domestic servants can therefore be seen as part of a broader 
‘Indian diaspora’.  Their engagements with each other and with the broader 
Singaporean multicultural community have been shaped by stereotypes and racial 
ideology that they contest and resist.  In turn, they too contribute to stereotypes and 
racial ideology that affect the construction of ‘Indian’ ethnic identity in the context of 
the nation state’s social construction of CMIO ideology.         
 As I have demonstrated above, ‘Indians’ as units of analysis and objects of 
anthropological interest are inherently problematic, because clearly ‘Indians’ are not a 
monolithic and homogeneous entity.  While this can be said to be characteristic of all 
ethnic groups in the Singapore context, ‘Indians’ have access to fewer uniting factors 
than the other ethnic groups.59  Nonetheless, I have made a conscious decision to 
continue using the label, but within quotation marks to denote its problematic nature.  
In Singapore’s highly racialised climate, race names provided by historical factors and 
the dominant discourse of the CMIO model are the most obvious and logical ways in 
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which Singaporeans classify others and themselves.  Furthermore, in the discourse 
and imagination of the state and the citizens, ‘Indians’ and ‘Tamils’ are 
predominantly synonymous.  Given the numerical preponderance of Tamils, the 
state’s ideal ‘Indian’ is one who belongs to the Tamil dialect group as discussed 
earlier in this chapter.60  Furthermore, one central problematic in my thesis is what it 
means to be an ‘Indian’ in the Singapore context.  The definition of ‘Indians’ I have 
adopted would include Sri Lankans, Sikhs, Bangladeshis and Pakistanis – this is also 
the official position - all of whom, I gather from my interviews, are less than happy to 
have their homeland identified as India which, as we know today, is itself an artificial 
and political construct borne out of colonial rule and administration.  As Nelson 
pronounces, “the imposed geographical boundaries, for the most part, are marks of a 
violent dismemberment - scars that testify to the troubled history of the 
subcontinent.61  His perception is echoed by Salman Rushdie, who writes, “In all the 
thousands of years of Indian history, there never was a creature as a united India”.62  
Despite these claims to historical reality, many of my respondents share the logically 
defined political and physical space of India as a common place of origin, imagining 
it as a place imbued with emotional attachments.   
 The conceptualization of ‘Indian’ communities outside India as diasporas is 
still very much contested.  The blurring of the boundaries demarcating immigrant 
groups from diasporas further complicates the scenario.  The ‘Indian’ diaspora in 
Singapore detracts in important ways from established traditional classifications.  For 
one, a majority of the new generation of Singaporean ‘Indians’ are not amenable to 
eventual return to their homeland.  To speak of an ‘Indian’ diaspora is thus to assume 
and insist on an underlying and essential historical and/or psychological commonality 
that binds and unites the disparate scatterings of ‘Indian’ peoples.  Even though the 
younger ‘Indian’ population in Singapore may not be read and accepted as an 
example of a diaspora, it may be postulated that they are connected by a diasporic 
consciousness that extends beyond mere affinity to the place of origin that immigrants 
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for the most part experience.  Such a diasporic condition becomes only too obvious 
when Singaporean Indians’ self-defining ability is compared to other fellow 
Singaporean Chinese or Malays.  As an Indian respondent once remarked to me:  
Why is it that when Indians meet, they invariably talk about things Indian – 
about our sub-ethnic identities, or about our relatives in India?  Look at the 
Chinese, they seldom discuss their ethnic connections in China.   The Malays 
too have no such talking point. 
Such a consciousness is borne out of my own experience and observing ‘young’ 
Indians in Singapore over the years.  The lure of the Indian cinema, Indian music, 
Indian fashions, Indian culture and Indian way of life, pride in India’s spell of 
successes in the Miss World/Universe titles and the impact it has made on the Indian 
psyche combined with the Singapore nation state’s emphasis on ethnicity have all 
contributed to the diasporic attachment to India and things Indian, a situation very 
unlike that in countries like Fiji, West Indies, Kenya or South Africa where Indian 
migrants have less diasporic connection with India.   
 To proclaim that first generation migrants fervently preserve ties to their 
originating countries, second generation migrants are more than eager to shed the 
mantle of their origins and assimilate into the host society mainstream, and third 
generation migrants consciously attempt to excavate buried ethno-national traditions 
and sentiments would be a very idealistic and simplistic generalization.63  My 
fieldwork has shown that this is not the case.  Indeed, my own mother, a second 
generation migrant, feels proud to be an Indian, inheriting such a great historic 
civilization and even though a lot of the traditions have lost their significance in 
Singapore she still keeps up with Indian customs, culture and religion.  So do I as a 
third generation Indian in Singapore because I consider myself to be part of the 
‘Indian’ diaspora in complex ways, at times rather reluctantly and at other times 
almost religiously.  My family and I maintain close contact and connections with the 
original ‘homeland’ and this obsession with the supposed land of our origins has 
always fascinated me.  To me, the quintessential ‘Indian’ in Singapore does not exist.  
She is a myth!  On the other hand, two of my three sons (fourth generation 
descendants) who are also settled in New Zealand feel less proud to be an Indian as 
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their exposure to peer influence, western lifestyles and attitudes makes them less 
sentimental and nostalgic about India.  Thus I made the decision to include amongst 
my respondents, first generation immigrants as well as respondents from subsequent 
migrant generations.  I have also, consciously, included gender and caste, as 
according to Spivak, men and women share differential migratory experiences.64
 Shanthi, a 26-year old teacher says she always felt a close affinity to India and 
Indian cultural traditions: 
 partly because everyone sees that I’m Indian and partly because the 
Government tells us to be proud of our customs and traditions.  Moreover my 
grandparents come from India though my parents and I were born here.  My 
grandparents and parents maintain close contact with India.  I also hear that 
dual citizenship is going to be introduced and I’m looking forward to it.  To 
me identification as an Indian is very important – after all don’t I look Indian?   
But at the same time I’m proud to be a Singaporean too. 
It can therefore be argued that there is a dominance of ethnic perspectives over the 
‘racialised’ national identity.65  While Shanthi values a diasporic ethnic attachment to 
India she also celebrates her dual identity with the Singapore nation state.  Such an 
attitude is prevalent amongst the majority of local born Indians most of whom pride 
themselves with ethnic identification while also owing allegiance to the nation state’s 
ideologies, although ethnic identity is perceived to take precedence.  The state’s 
multiracial ideology has encouraged respect for dual ethnic and national identities, the 
state imploring Singaporean Indians to strike a balance between preserving ethnic 
identity and being “stoutly Singaporean”.66  However, ethnic identification, 
respondents explain, is heightened by the state’s racial categorizations that make 
people of different ethnicities aware of their differences in language, religion, culture 
and physical appearance, as well as by stereotypical attitudes of the various 
communities towards the Indian community.  Says Das, a 44-year old company clerk:  
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I face the problem of racial discrimination in buses and trains.  Sometimes 
when I board a bus or train, I observe that if the passenger sitting next to me 
happens to be Chinese, he quickly moves away and tries to find another seat 
next to a Chinese or prefers standing if no other seat is vacant.  Similarly when 
a Chinese boards the train or bus and finds the seat beside me vacant, he 
seldom takes the vacant seat. Even if he does, he sits awkwardly as if my 
presence next to him is repulsive.  If he’s given a choice to sit next to an 
Indian or Chinese, invariably he prefers sitting next to his own race.   
This occurrence, for instance, is an all-too common experience that Indians of all 
social strata, be they local Indians, Indian foreign workers or Indian professionals 
repeatedly love to recount.  They are all unanimous in saying that established 
stereotypes based on skin colour, dress or other negative perceptions of being an 
Indian engender discriminatory treatment – a discrimination they attribute to ‘race’.   
 Common complaints from respondents also arise from interactions with 
members of other communities in various situations, particularly in lifts and taxis.  
Describing such an incident, Parvathy, a 38-year old housewife, says: 
 I flagged down a taxi, initially he hesitated because I looked Indian but 
reluctantly accepted me as a passenger.  To add insult to injury, I observed the 
Chinese taxi driver covering his nose with one hand during the trip.  He also 
wound down his window although it was an air-conditioned taxi. 
This incident reveals two aspects of ‘racial’ discrimination as Parvathy described it.  
One is the fact that she belonged to the Indian ‘race’.  Secondly and as a consequence, 
the stereotypical perception popularly attributed to Indians – that Indians are smelly 
and dirty.  Obviously the taxi driver’s prejudice has blinded him into associating all 
Indians with the smell of coconut oil that traditional Indians use to groom their 
tresses.  Incidentally coconut oil exudes a characteristic smell that is now associated 
with some Indian foreign workers in Singapore.  A similar incident was recounted by 
37-year old Sripathy who resides in an HDB apartment block in Little India.  Residing 
on the ninth floor the father of two school going children explains that it was normal 
for him to use the lift daily in the mornings to take them to school before he left for 
work.  Members of the Chinese community in particular, he observed, stood away 
from him in the lift.  Their reaction towards his presence was most felt when the lift 
was crowded.  He observes as follows, “In such situations, some of them strain their 
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bodies to one side so as to avoid touching me.  They also turn their backs towards me.  
This happens quite often”.   Faced with such pressures, Indians consider ethnicity to 
be their defining characteristic beyond any national identity.  They are more likely to 
take comfort in their own community, as they feel isolated, alienated and under siege.  
Such feelings lead them to adopt their symbols of ethnic identity as a defence 
mechanism.  They therefore retreat into the comfort zone of their own ethnicity rather 
than in a national identity that, to them, has little direction. 
Indian foreign workers, it would appear, are the group most affected by these 
negative stereotypes.  The state recognizes ‘Indian’ at the national CMIO level, yet 
migrants who are Indian do not appear to fit easily into Singapore and gain 
acceptance.  At the same time Singaporean Indians by extension feel estranged from 
local Singaporean society although they are also Indians by state definition.  Another 
common concern of racism registered by local Indians as well as by professional 
workers from India occurs when they need to rent a house or apartment from a 
Chinese.  Very often they are turned away on some pretext.  One local Indian 
engineer Suresh talks of his encounter with a Chinese landlord who said that Indian 
curry cooking was too smelly because of overcooking and that the whole house 
reeked of the bad odour:  “He also complained that we Indians placed weird-looking 
idols for prayer and this was not good for his ‘feng shui’”.  Another common 
stereotype was the result of the state’s frequent educational, occupational and income 
profiling of various ethnic groups in Singapore (see Tables 15 in Chapter 6.3 and 18-
22 in Chapter 8.2), resulting in Chinese landlords questioning the affordability of the 
Indians.  A senior expatriate industrial engineer 58-year old Arun from the United 
States working on a consultancy project in Singapore was subject to what he 
considered “insulting and prejudiced treatment” when he was asked by the landlord 
whether he could afford the high rent.  Payment was never a problem in his case, yet 
his ability to pay was considered suspect because he was Indian – an attitude caused 
by racist tendencies.   
 Placing all these identifications in balance, it is no surprise that the state’s 
ideology of multiracialism, multiculturalism, multilingualism and multireligiosity 
with added emphasis on racial distinctions has engendered dual consciousness, the 
central idea within diasporic discourse.  In the practice of such a discourse, a member 
of a minority group becomes acutely aware of his or her ethnicity in relation to other 
ethnicities and with the major community group in the context of the multiethnic 
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setting of Singapore.  Says news editor Jayabalan, “We are reminded again and again 
by the Government and in state discourse that we are Indians.  We have to produce 
our identity card wherever we go in Singapore – it always shows that we are ‘Indian’ 
by race, although we really belong to various sub-ethnic categories”.   
‘Indian’ as a marker of both ethnic and national identity is therefore a very 
‘real’ category in the Singapore context.  Consequently minorities are conditioned to 
view themselves as subordinated and marginalized, an attitude that necessarily 
enforces self-identification in a ‘racialised’ dichotomy of majority-minority in which 
the minority react by religiously hoarding and institutionalizing their ‘otherness’ as 
their cultural heritage.  It is such an attitude that encourages Singapore Indians to seek 
refuge in diasporic identification thereby emphasizing ethnic identity over national 
identity.   
 Ethnic consciousness among these Indians has become pronounced as I 
discovered in their responses. Karthikeyan, a 29-year old locally born clerk working 
for a private firm has this to say: 
I am a proud Indian and I think most Indians in Singapore are like me.  We are 
committed to our Indianness because the Government leaders want us to 
cherish and value our culture and traditions… It’ll take many many years 
before all the races in Singapore can evolve and integrate with a common 
identity, because they too, like me, cling to their culture and traditions. 
In Singapore, I observed from my Indian respondents, the question now is not one of 
developing a new, integrated Singaporean identity but an ethnic cultural identity that 
abides by a state ideology emphasizing ethnic groups and ethnic affiliation.  The state 
has encouraged, in the pursuit of its multiracial and multicultural policies, the learning 
of one’s own language (in addition to English), the embracing of one’s religion, 
culture and traditions to counter the threat of “social and moral pollution”, these 
values having been given state recognition in an ‘Asian Values’ discourse and later 
enshrined since 1995 in a ‘Shared Values’ political ideology supposedly derived from 
the rich heritages of Asian civilizations.67  However, these measures have been 
widely perceived by ethnic minorities in Singapore as according undue importance to 
Chinese language and culture in a multiethnic society like Singapore.  Consequently, 
they feel marginalized and alienated from the national project, a situation that gives 
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rise to a collision between ethnic and national identities.  As described by one 
respondent, Murali, a 31-year old technician in an engineering company,  
There’s too much emphasis on Chineseness in Singapore.  Bilingualism 
actually means English and Mandarin.  I thought all the races should be treated 
equally because that’s what our Constitution says, but the Government gives 
importance only to the Chinese and their values.  As Indians we have no say 
because we are in the minority and our Indian leaders in Parliament do not 
really fight for our ethnic or national rights.  Most of the Indian MPs don’t 
even speak Tamil although they are Singaporean Tamils themselves.  The 
Government says the various races can speak freely about their rights but in 
practice it’s not that easy.   
 Identity is for the most part an intensely personal and unquestioned aspect of 
an individual’s being and existence.  This would seem to be all the more pronounced 
in a highly ‘racialised’ society like Singapore where one’s identity is not only 
determined and designated by the state, but one is reminded of one’s identity by the 
entry of ‘race’ on one’s identity card and in numerous daily encounters with other 
ethnic communities and in state discourse.  In the CMIO categorization of ethnicities 
by the state, ‘Indian’ as a classification is readily accepted by people of Indian 
ancestry, even though within the community they identify themselves by their sub-
ethnic categories such as Tamil, Telugu, Kannada, Gujarati, Bengali, Malayalee and 
so on.  Self-definition as an ‘Indian’ therefore appears to be of great significance to 
these individuals in their relations with other ethnicities in the multiethnic diversity of 
Singapore.  As software engineer Sanjay puts it,  
Other races would not be familiar with our sub-ethnic identities.  In any case 
Government and official records recognize us only as ‘Indian’ and not on the 
basis of these other identities.  So for all intents and purposes and even though 
the Government’s definition of our identity and ethnicity is too simplistic, it 
makes sense to be identified as Indian and we are proud of it. 
Such an attitude conforms to Appiah’s argument that we should recognize and 
acknowledge the relational constructedness of our identities.68  In a not dissimilar way 
it can be argued that the identification of ‘Indian’ was in the first place a racial 
construct imposed on the basis of biological and physical traits by British colonialism 
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in India centuries ago and perpetuated in Singapore.  Racial distinctiveness between 
the various ethnic communities has therefore become the ideological basis of colonial 
and postcolonial Singapore society. 
 From interviews with Singaporean Indians I observe that ethnic identity and 
ethnic consciousness have heightened diasporic attachments.  First generation 
migrants hark back to a supposed homeland, even though they left it several decades 
earlier.  To these individuals ethnic identity takes precedence over national identity as 
82-year old widower Retnam, a one-time resident of Little India and now living with 
his eldest son and their family in a flat in the vicinity testifies nostalgically, “There is 
no place like India for me.  As I still have ancestral property left by my parents as 
well as relatives there I would like to go back and die there but my children here don’t 
want me to leave them and return to India”.  His romanticized construction of India 
does not register with his locally born 49-year old son Damodharan though the latter 
still holds steadfastly to his Indian way of life and things Indian. 
While I may not want to return to India like my father does, I’m still a staunch 
Indian and will not let go my identity and culture.  I like to dress traditionally 
as well as watch Tamil movies and hear music from India, and I’ve made 
several visits to India but though these ties still bind me to my ethnic culture, 
my identity is predominantly with Singapore where I was born and bred.  Of 
course some of the Government’s policies here are very pro-Chinese and to 
some extent racist but so long as I’m able to keep my Indian way of life, I’m 
happy to be a Singaporean Indian.  The Government also encourages me to 
maintain my Indian culture. 
This category of Singaporeans grew up in a society where in the years immediately 
after independence, the state placed overriding importance on the development of a 
common national identity as a way to integrate the ethnically diverse peoples into a 
racially harmonious society.  Ethnic identity was then relegated to the background of 
racial politics and Damodharan’s response is reflective of this mood.  While he clings 
to his Indianness, he places a high profile to his sense of national identity as a 
Singaporean Indian.  He is typical of the majority of second-generation Singaporean 
Indians interviewed.  They hold strong connections to their Indian ethnicity but at the 
same time align themselves closely with the state ideology of nation building.  
Interestingly Damodharan’s son Vijay, a 22-year old first year humanities student at 
the National University of Singapore, though born and bred completely in the post-
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independent milieu of Singapore, holds very strong views about his identities.  To him 
being an Indian is “everything” he is proud of because this identity “signified his 
place in Singapore society” and although he values his Singapore citizenship and 
identification with national goals, his “loyalty to ethnicity ranked higher than national 
identity”.  Vijay’s attitude is typical of the present new generation of Singaporean 
Indians who grew up completely in the new multiracial, multicultural environment of 
postcolonial Singapore.  While his parents and others like them were coaxed into 
subscribing to the goals of national identity more than ethnic identity, people of his 
generation, that is those born since the late 1970s, had ethnic identity and ethnic 
consciousness (in line with specific Asian cultural values) disciplined into them, 
national identity then assuming a lower level of priority.  In such an atmosphere 
ethnic fervour flourished for all communities, Singaporean Indians showing 
particularly strong diasporic affiliations with pride in Indian cultural and educational 
attainments.  For instance, the demand for software professionals from India, its 
increasing importance for Singapore trade and investments, and success in 
international beauty pageants all held the imagination and awe of Singaporean Indians 
towards India - Vijay is one of them.   
 Their responses demonstrate that while first generation migrant grandfather 
Retnam clings to compelling and sentimental constructions of his diasporic homeland 
India which he would like to return to eventually, locally-born son Damodharan does 
not regard India as homeland in the conventional sense though he is still emotionally 
attached to his Indian identity and lifestyle.  Damodharan, unlike his father, is more 
aligned with national identity while he is comfortably maintaining his ethnic identity 
in the midst of the other communities in Singapore.  On the other hand Vijay, is very 
much a staunch Indian, but also feels proud to be a Singaporean.  Locally born 
Damodharan and son Vijay typify the high levels of ethnic and national identification 
prevalent among younger Singaporeans today.  Vijay continues:  
My family’s been here for generations.  I’ve never been to India but it’s still a 
big part of my life.  My culture and identity come from India and I like to 
identify with it as much as possible.  I also know where I stand among the 
other races in Singapore and although I’m a loyal citizen I also love my ethnic 
identity.   
Diaspora, an emotional affiliation to India as a cultural reference point, obviously 
continues to play a very vital role in the lives of young as well as older Singaporean 
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Indians, confirming the words of Skrbis: “Diasporas are the breeding places for the 
creation of idealistic beliefs, pertaining to the past, the present and a possible 
future”.69  Hence the hyphenated Singaporean-Indian implies a hybridized diasporic 
identity composed of both Singaporean and Indian hybrid elements.  Respondent 
Kamala summarizes the position of Indians in Singapore in a nutshell, “I’m a 
Singaporean when I’m in India, I’m Indian when I’m in Singapore”.   
 Apart from strong diasporic attachments to India affecting the identities of 
Indians in Singapore, the ethnic community is also buffeted by perceived attitudes and 
stereotypes from the other ethnic groups in the CMIO taxonomy.  As Shankar 
explains, 
In Singapore we are definitely made aware of our race by the way the Chinese 
look down on us.  They think they are far superior and at the same time tend to 
treat us contemptuously by harbouring age-old commonly held negative 
notions of us as dirty, smelly drunkards and as fit only for manual labour as 
coolies.  
Since race is a primary mode of classification in Singapore, socially 
constructed notions of race inform people’s everyday perceptions and imagination of 
both themselves and others.  Physical attributes such as the way an Indian dresses (use 
of the saree, pottu and viboodhi) and his/her skin colour (brown) are seen as markers 
of particular racial categories.70  Similarly, certain customs and practices are often 
associated with each ‘race’.  In addition, through educational and occupational 
profiling in the popular media, races are projected comparatively as performing better 
or worse.  Invariably, as far as the Indians are concerned, they are portrayed as 
lagging behind the Chinese in terms of socio-economic levels and occupying lower-
paying jobs across all industries, although their position is considered better than the 
Malays.  All the above contribute to social construction and stereotyping of each race 
in a particular way – a relic of British colonialism inherited by the nation state on 
independence.  Although new migrants from India may perceive themselves as 
different from Singaporean ‘Indians’ or vice versa, the dominant signifier of ‘Indian’ 
affects their everyday encounters in Singapore too.   
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Historical attitudes arising from local Indians originating as convicts, rubber 
tappers and construction labourers in colonial times tend to linger strongly in the 
minds of the other communities in Singapore, particularly the Chinese.  Shankar 
above attributes this factor as impacting upon the relationship between Indians and the 
other ethnicities in Singapore although he agrees that there was no open animosity as 
such.  In fact he believes that the Indians get along quite well with the other 
communities though such a relationship is based on the ethnic communities merely 
tolerating each other without “any effort to really appreciate or understand one 
another”.  Under these circumstances Shankar believes that for the Indians, 
integration (with other ethnic groups) and national identity “is some distance away”, 
as the Indians feel more secure within their community.  Suffice it to say, the 
persistence of ethnic boundaries encouraged in part by self-identification within the 
community, a dominating sense of diasporic consciousness, perceived attitudes from 
other ethnic communities and state discourse and policies, all combine to produce for 
the Singapore Indian community greater attachment to ethnic identification than to the 
cause of national identity.    
 ‘Indian’ in relation to the state’s incorporation of ‘race’ in the Singapore 
context bears specific meanings, the most important being that it is a marker of ethnic 
and national identity as imposed by the state.  Characterized by physical features and 
cultural forms like language, attire and food, these identity markers are doubly 
strengthened by the state’s exhortation to Indians, as well as the other ethnic 
communities, to hold fast to their cultural roots and heritage.  Consequently ethnic 
consciousness has become pronounced in the minds of Singaporeans, be they Indians, 
Chinese or Malays, though there is also a high level of national identification among 
them – this is particularly true of the younger generation of Indians in Singapore - as 
my interviews suggest.   
 
4.6  Conclusion 
          What is not obvious to the non-Singaporean is how the various Indian 
categories in Singapore perceive themselves, perceive other Indians in Singapore and 
perceive their relations with Singapore society as a whole.  As a member of the 
‘Indian’-Singaporean group, I recognize something of myself in the predicament of 
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other ‘Indians’ localized in Singapore who are in constant negotiation and 
renegotiation in the public sphere with same-race compatriots and others. 
 The responses from my interviewees demonstrate that the problematic nature 
of identities in the context of a globalised and multicultural Singapore has been 
complicated by serious internal contradictions within the so-called ‘Indian’ 
community itself, as well as passive resistance to the state’s hegemonic policies of 
discipline and control. I have therefore considered it important to acknowledge the 
constructedness and historical baggage attached to these factors in this chapter.   
Secondly, the political history of Singapore, both during colonial times and in the 
contemporary nation state, has played a critical role in initiating the shifting of 
identities and loyalties of the ‘Indians’ of Singapore.  The stabilization of the ‘Indian’ 
population, extension of citizenship, acceptance into the national mainstream, 
diminishing physical and emotional contact with their homeland India, and increasing 
numbers of Singapore-born ‘Indians’ have effected fundamental changes in the 
outlook of the Indians and their orientation towards nation building.71   
   However, the very label of ‘Indian’ in the state-driven CMIO multiracial 
ideology presupposes the individual’s presumed place of origin in the Indian 
subcontinent and thus exerts pressure on ‘Indians’ to become more ‘Indian.’ This is 
doubly reinforced by various government initiatives to promote ‘ethnic’ identification, 
thereby creating a diasporic attachment to the Indian homeland.  Singapore ‘Indians’ 
therefore now inevitably look back to their parent country with a telescopic view, 
limited and artificial, influenced by newly acquired sensibilities.  As noted by 
Benjamin, the state’s emphasis on meritocracy and multiracialism as a means of 
incorporating all the ‘races’ equally into the national project has resulted in the 
significance of ‘race’ as a signifier of differences and divisions between the various 
ethnic groups in Singapore society.72  Dual consciousness has created an identity 
crisis as the minority ‘Indians’ are disciplined to think of themselves as ‘ethnic’ 
subjects and therefore subordinated.  In such an environment, they react by clinging to 
their ‘ethnic’ cultural identity with its traditional manifestations as my interviews 
suggest.  Additionally, global capitalism, transnational labour mobility, worldwide 
consumption flows, transnational cultural dissemination and the lure of information 
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technology have all contributed to the racially and ethnically constructed Singapore 
‘Indians’ being caught in the crossfire between two opposing alternatives, the nation-
state and the diaspora.  
 I discovered from many of my respondents that they felt a greater attachment 
to their ethnic identity than the national identity, while some of them saw these 
identities as complementing each other thereby exhibiting both ethnic and national 
identification.  I will interrogate in the next and subsequent chapters how ethnic 
identity and national identity are presently centered on the state’s conception of ‘race’ 
in relation to the various social engineering policies impacting the Indian community.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
‘RACE’, ‘ETHNICITY’ AND THE SINGAPORE NATION STATE 
 
Any intellectual discourse on postcolonial ethnicities or formation of a nation 
state cannot be conducted without reference to its historical base, which is rooted in 
colonial history.  In Part I of this thesis I looked at how British Singapore’s 
construction of cultural difference, arising from a European ideology of ‘race’, led to 
racial segregation of the various communities and the evolution of the Indian 
settlements in Singapore.  Although the concept of ethnicity has gained almost 
universal currency since the 1920s, the colonial regime saw fit to continue imposing 
‘racial’ theories on those it considered to be “inferior” peoples by a system of racial 
segregation.  In a not too dissimilar fashion, the government of the new nation state 
also found it politically, socially and culturally expedient to adopt an ideology based 
on ‘race’, this time as a means of integrating various groups and communities.  This 
ideology has continued to evolve even though ethnic heritages, particularly after the 
1960s, have been revitalized and re-invented worldwide.  The seeds of ‘race’ 
discourse had been well and truly planted in the psyche of the colony when it became 
an independent nation in August 1965 so that the new state found it impractical to 
ignore this social reality.  In this chapter, I will explore its evolution in depth and 
argue that the racial politics introduced by the British have been perpetuated to an 
extraordinary extent by a paternalistic and hegemonic postcolonial government even 
though it denies this continuity.   
 
5.1  Introduction 
 There is a broad scholarly consensus that ‘race’ and ‘ethnicity’ are social and 
cultural constructs that are bound up with material and human social processes.1  
However, there are differences in the way these terms are defined and constructed in 
different contexts.  ‘Ethnicity’ as a concept is most difficult to define because of its 
elusive, fluid and malleable nature.  In certain societies, where the term ‘ethnic group’ 
refers to minorities, the dominant and majority groups do not see themselves as ethnic 
at all.  For instance, Guibernau and Rex highlight that the term ‘ethnic minorities’ is 
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used to refer to ‘non-white’ immigrants in Britain and to migrants in Australia.2  In 
Singapore, however, state ideology assigns a ‘race’ to each individual, and individuals 
identify themselves and others as members of a particular ‘race’ often by virtue of 
their skin colour and other physical and cultural features.  The social significance 
attached to such outward characteristics by both the state and individuals makes the 
society ‘multiracial’.  This discourse of racial politics has been the cornerstone of 
government policy and planning, both in colonial and postcolonial times in Singapore 
and ‘race’ has been treated as ‘natural’ and a taken-for-granted feature of everyday 
life.  The terms ‘ethnicity’ and ‘race’ are used interchangeably in official discourse: 
according to the Singapore Department of Statistics, ‘Ethnic group refers to a person’s 
race’.3  Ironically, discussion of race/ethnicity is confined mostly to the private sphere 
and best not conducted in public, because the state determines what is ethnicity and 
how it is to be interpreted and practised in daily life and not brook contestation.   In 
private, however, Singaporeans, including my respondents, use the word ‘race’ 
although they take it to mean ethnicity.   
 
5.2  The Evolution of Race as a Worldview 
 The changes in the way the word ‘race’ has been used since it entered the 
English language at the beginning of the sixteenth century reflect changes in the 
popular understanding of the causes of physical and cultural differences.  It can be 
argued that scholars and the general public the world over have been conditioned to 
viewing human races based on visible physical differences that have acquired socially 
significant meanings.4  The social meaning given to racial classifications activates 
beliefs and assumptions about individuals belonging to a particular racial category.  
‘Race’ then becomes socially significant when members of a society routinely divide 
people into groups based on their physical and biological genetic makeup, namely, a 
                                        
2  M Guibernau and J Rex, The Ethnicity Reader (USA: Polity Press, 1997).   
 
3  Source: Department of Statistics, Singapore, 2000, 16. As a result, the words ‘race’ and ‘ethnicity’ 
are used freely and synonymously by both the state and individuals, with preference for the word 
‘race’. Appendix A is a sample collection of random press cuttings and reports which are self-
explanatory. The fudging between these words is sometimes taken to extremes when used together – as 
in “ethnic races” – to form a sentence. 
 
4  Michael Banton, Racial and Ethnic Competition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); 
Michael Omi and Howard Winant, Racial Formation in the United States: From the 1960s to the 1990s 
(Routledge: New York, 1994); Glenn C Loury, The Anatomy of Racial Inequality (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2002). 
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person’s skin colour, size, facial features and speech.  According to Smedley, “the 
very existence of physical differences among populations is accepted as evidence of 
race”.5  Tracing the evolution of race in America for more than three centuries, she 
shows that ‘race’ is a social construct and a cultural invention that was developed and 
used opportunistically by English colonists since they began settlements in the 
seventeenth century.  Their objective was to maintain boundaries between the 
colonizer and colonized, ‘civilized’ and ‘savage’, ‘advanced’ and ‘backward’.   
Ultimately ‘race’ as an ideology portraying the “social reality of inequality” 
among human differences subsequently spread to other parts of the world; however 
the English in North America developed the interpretations of race to a “much higher 
degree” than the Spanish, Portuguese or French.6  In particular it became a strategy 
used by colonial powers everywhere for segregating, ranking and controlling 
colonized peoples.  ‘Race’ categories helped secure the basis for colonial expansion 
and were used to justify the supremacy of European colonizers over other ‘races’ in 
the colonies.  Once the notion of ‘race’ was created, the idea that there were inherent 
differences relating to physical appearance took root among the colonial officials.7  
The ideology of colonialism was therefore an ideology of ‘race’.8  Potential for 
progress was found to be present only in the white European races9 and differences 
between whites and others were seen in terms of differences in social, intellectual, 
physical and psychological abilities.   
 
5.3  Race and the Colonial Imagination in Singapore 
 British conceptions of ‘race’ were based on the increasing legitimacy of racial 
theory with the widespread acceptance of Social Darwinist thought in Europe and the 
United States and the unquestioned worldwide political, economic and technological 
                                        
5  Audrey Smedley, Race in North America: Origin and Evolution of a Worldview (Boulder: Westview 
Press, 1993), 1. 
 
6  Smedley, Race in North America, 16, 40.   
 
7  Such an attitude was extended to show how differences in brain size corresponded with the degree of 
civilization and capacity for rational thought of the colonized peoples. The European by comparison 
had brain development far in excess of these peoples.  
 
8  Of course the economic objectives of colonialism were significant for the domination of the ideology 
of race in Singapore as it was in the other British colonies. 
 
9  And even these were differentiated by race scientists in the late-nineteenth century with Anglo-
Saxons or Teutons being seen as superior to Mediterraneans. 
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dominance of white (especially British) societies.  Ideological movements like 
individualism, utilitarianism, Evangelicalism and Anglo-Saxonism all helped to 
reinforce British notions of race from the mid-nineteenth century, but it was Social 
Darwinism that stamped the British attitude of superiority in governing others based 
on their concept of ‘race’.10  ‘Race’ became inextricably linked to Western notions of 
civilization and inspired ‘civilizing missions’ that assumed the role of a moral 
crusade.  Such an attitude of superiority is summed up in the words of Frederick 
Weld, “I think that capacity for governing is a characteristic of our race [British] …  
Personal government is a necessity for Asiatics; it is the outcome of their religious 
systems, of their habits of thought, and of long centuries of custom”.11  That such an 
attitude prevailed in the British governing elite can be seen in similar pronouncements 
made by many others including Joseph Chamberlain (“I believe that the British race is 
the greatest of governing races the world has ever seen”) and Cecil Rhodes (“the 
British [are] the best race to rule the world”).12  On this basis of racial superiority 
British ‘race’ ideology towards the ‘Other’ on account of skin colour and differences 
in cultural and belief structures created a colonial vision of ‘race’ and the imposition 
and maintenance of colonial rule in Singapore from the mid-nineteenth century.13  
Once this notion of ‘race’ was systematised by European colonizers, it became 
grounded for social, political and economic development purposes.   
 Ironically, historical records show that the ideology of ‘race’ never existed in 
the precolonial period of Singapore’s history because prior to the nineteenth century 
there had already existed different migrant groups in Malaya (which then included 
Singapore) as in other Southeast Asian societies and that these groups had interacted 
                                        
10  Edwin Lee, The British as Rulers: Governing Multiracial Singapore 1867-1914 (Singapore: 
Singapore University Press, 1991). 
 
11  Sir Frederick Weld, “The Straits Settlements and British Malaya”, [speech delivered on 10 June 
1884] in Honorable Intentions: Talks on the British Empire in Southeast Asia delivered at the Royal 
Colonial Institute 1874-1928, ed. Paul H Kratoska, (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1983), 46. 
 
12  R A Huttenback, Racism and Empire: White Settlers and Colored Immigrants in the British Self-
Governing Colonies 1830-1910 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1976), 15-16. 
 
13  In the words of Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak: “Europe… consolidated itself as sovereign subject by 
defining its colonies as ‘Others’, even as it constituted them for purposes of administration and the 
expansion of markets”.  (“The Rani of Sirmur”, in Europe and Its Others, eds. Francis Barker et al., 
Colchester: University of Essex, 1985) 128. Raymond Kennedy writes: “The British colonial code… 
draws the most rigid color line of all” (“The Colonial Crisis and the Future” in The Science of Man in 
the World Crisis, ed. Ralph Linton, New York: Columbia University Press, 1945) 320. Skin colour 
was, according to historians, taken as the only acceptable criterion for advancement to the highest 
positions in the colonial administrative service and the European business world.   
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without any reference to western notions of biological differences that made one 
group superior to another.  For instance, Hirchman considers that ‘racial divisions’ 
between the three main groups were not present, while Abraham contends that they 
maintained a degree of harmony in the precolonial period which was disrupted by 
colonial rule leading to racial polarisation and tensions.14  Indians and Chinese over 
the centuries have, for example, demonstrated a high degree of acculturation through 
marriage.  Chinese traders had married Malay women and adopted aspects of Malay 
culture, becoming known as ‘Babas’ or Straits Chinese.  Similarly, Indians had 
assimilated into Malay society as a result of intermarriage and became known as Jawi 
Pekan.  According to Malaysian scholar and historian Wang Gungwu, an interactive 
society was already flourishing between the indigenous and migrant communities 
because of trade.  He says that what we know as cultural pluralism (or 
multiculturalism) today was already “an integral part of a local reality” which was 
adaptable in absorbing other layers of “pluralism” to come, even through 
colonialism.15   
 From the mid-nineteenth century, the British brought European racial theory 
to Singapore and constructed a social, political and economic order structured by 
‘race’ and racial stereotypes that led to elaborate social distinctions.  In particular, the 
colonial administration devised a system classifying and cataloguing people so as to 
justify the colonial creation of the orientalist “Other”.  According to research done by 
Nirmala Purushotam on census reports from 1871-1957, the word ‘race’ gradually 
evolved over the years – and still prevails in the nation state - as the most significant 
entry for the purpose of simplifying and classifying the major communities in terms 
of origin, language, economic value and other essential characteristics – features 
which continue to form the basis of the tenets of multiracialism, multiculturalism, 
multilingualism and multireligeosity that foreground the post-colonial Singaporean 
                                        
 
14  Charles Hirchman, “The Making of Race in Colonial Malaya: Political Economy and Racial 
Ideology,” Sociological Forum 1, 2 (Spring 1986): 338; Collin Abraham, The Naked Social Order: The 
Roots of Racial Polarisation in Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur: Pelanduk Publications (M) Sdn Bhd, 2004). 
 
15  Wang Gungwu, “Continuities in Island Southeast Asia” in Reinventing Malaysia: Reflections on its 
Past and Future, ed. K S Jomo (Bangi: Penerbit Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 2001), 24-25. 
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and the growth and prosperity of the nation state.16  The 1871 population census 
introduced the concept of ‘races’ and, by 1947, the British census had formally 
categorized the peoples as ‘Europeans’, ‘Malays’, ‘Chinese’, and ‘Indians’ on the 
basis of ‘race’ – ‘race’ names thus became an “apparatus of knowledge” and hence 
power.17  This distinction was a precursor to the ‘race’-defined CMIO categories 
presently in use.18  The CMIO quadrotomy can therefore be argued to be a carry-over 
of the British classification of the different categories of people living in Singapore 
based on ‘race’.  ‘Racial’ distinctiveness between the various communities therefore 
became the ideological basis of colonial society, which, as Wertheim characterizes, 
was “moulded on racial principles”.19  These racial classifications were also used for 
the division of labour and for the planning of residential areas I will discuss later in  
this chapter.20  By extension, it can be argued that the very concept of the nation state 
and the ideology of ‘multiracialism’ in the Singapore context had its genesis in the 
colonial era.   
            The sense of racial superiority and the natural gift for global domination 
among British colonizers developed in tandem with the categorization of lower racial 
groups according to physical and intellectual attributes – a result of the British 
Orientalist attitude, which used ‘race’ as a marker of the ‘inferiority’ of colonised 
peoples.  Such an attitude was based on a colonial ideology that used ‘race’ to justify 
the economic order of colonial capitalism through the notion of the superiority of 
white people over ‘races’ of coloured peoples.21    This underpinned the justification 
for British colonial administration in Singapore and elsewhere in Asia and its avowed 
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19  W F Wertheim, “Southeast Asia,” International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences 1(1968): 423-
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aim to civilize and modernize colonized peoples.  The positioning of native peoples as 
uncivilized went hand in hand with the construction of negative stereotypes of the 
Malays, Chinese and Indians – stereotypes that survive till today.  British colonial 
histories and accounts posited the Malay as the ‘lazy native’ and not as industrious as 
the Chinese and Indian ‘races’.  This strategy enabled the British to justify the 
immigration of the Chinese and Indians, which itself engendered a ‘self-fulfilling 
prophecy’ of inferiority among the Malays.22  The most prominent of British 
administrators in Singapore, Stamford Raffles, himself portrayed the Malay as “lazy” 
and “so indolent, that when he has rice, nothing will induce him to work”, suggesting 
the Malays’ dislike for hard manual and intellectual labour in contrast to the 
industrious Chinese and Indian ‘races’.23  Likewise, many other colonial officials, 
naturalists and historians (to name a few, Sir Frank Swettenham, A R Wallace, Sir 
Hugh Clifford and Rupert Emerson) contributed to attitudes that were perpetuated in 
the early twentieth century, although scholars of Malay society (like J S Furnivall, Sir 
Richard Winsdedt and Syed Hussein Alatas) have endeavoured to deconstruct the 
colonial image of the Malays.  The image of the ‘lazy’ and ‘inferior’ Malay still 
persists in the national imagination, exerting a pervading influence in Singapore not 
only among non-Malays but even among the Malays as well.24  Such negative 
stereotypes persist to the extent that they affect relations between the various ethnic 
communities and with the state in present-day Singapore, hindering state efforts 
towards national integration.  The nation state expresses the concern that racial and 
class divisions lead to racial antagonisms and conflict, though it is commonly 
accepted by my interviewees that class divisions are well entrenched in Singapore’s 
ideology – in elitism for instance.  
            As a result of the negative stereotypes generated by colonial ideology, the 
racial harmony that existed during the precolonial period gave way to antagonisms, 
ethnocentrism and racial polarization, according to Abraham.25  An unrestricted 
immigration policy that allowed the Chinese to dominate the urban political economy 
                                        
 
22  Abraham, The Naked Social Order, xxii.   
 
23  Thomas Stamford Raffles, Memoir, v. 1, ed. Sophia Raffles (London: James Duncan, 1835). 
 
24  Alatas, The Myth of the Lazy Native.   
 
25  Abraham, The Naked Social Order.   
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as well as segregation policies of ‘divide and rule’ whereby the Malay, Chinese and 
Indian populations were kept apart along residential, social and economic lines only 
served to create inequality, mistrust, friction and racial stereotypes between the 
communities and between British and Asians (see Part I).26  Such exploitative 
political, economic and social structures and policies along with European economic 
and segregationist policies thus promoted antagonisms among the various groups, 
leading to the perpetuation of the word ‘race’ as normal acceptable usage in 
contemporary Singapore society.   
 While Europeans did not concern themselves with getting Malay labour or 
cooperation and treated Malays with condescension and paternalism, their attitudes 
towards the work ethic of the Chinese and Indians in Singapore were vastly 
different.27  The Chinese had shown themselves to be extremely hard working and 
persevering, a quality made use of by the British who almost completely depended on 
Chinese entrepreneurial activity and manual labour for their economic base.  A 
Singapore colonial merchant describes them: “The Chinese are, as a race, capable of 
civilization of the highest kind.  They are at once labourers and statesmen.  They can 
work in any climate, hot or cold, and they have great mercantile capacity… we are 
pleased to see them flocking [to Malaya] as they do in thousands”.28  Yet this quality, 
while grudgingly admired and respected by the colonial administration, was at the 
same time viewed with a profound sense of ambivalence and resentment: “In short, 
whenever there is money to be made, you can be sure that the Chinaman is not far 
away” and “greedy Chinese”.29  In contrast to the Chinese, the Indians were looked 
upon as a source of cheap, expendable and docile labour for the plantation and 
construction sectors of the economy.  British attitude towards the Indians is 
encapsulated in the 1885 speech of a British official: “There are many who prefer the 
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Indian coolie, and consider [them relative to Chinese labor] better suited to the 
peculiar wants of the locality… .  They regard the Indian, moreover, as a creature far 
more amenable to discipline and management than the sturdy and independent 
Chinese”.30  Nevertheless, at times both groups were lumped together.   
 To the British, economic considerations, more than anything else, were the 
prime cause for this ideology of ‘race’ to dominate in colonial Singapore.  A system 
of migrant labour in which racial characteristics were made to coincide with particular 
occupations enhanced and maintained the salience of ideology in the consciousness of 
the dominant and dominated classes.31  British colonialism created a “cultural 
division of labour”, which was essentially an articulation between ‘ethnicity’ and the 
economic division of labour in the colonial order based on class and race.32  Under 
colonial rule, each group was recruited into particular occupations and this was 
justified on ideological and essentialist grounds.  The unflattering British attitude 
towards the ‘ethnic’ communities is captured by an early European resident:  
From a labour point of view, there are practically three races, the Malays 
(including Javanese), the Chinese, and the Tamils (who are generally known 
as Klings).  By nature the Malay is an idler, the Chinaman is a thief, and the 
Kling is a drunkard, yet each in his own class of work is both cheap and 
efficient, when properly supervised.33
 According to Furnivall economic inequalities appeared to be based on ‘racial’ 
differences of the different groups and were made visible and emphasized in the daily 
life of Singaporeans.34  As noted by Abraham, the mode of production of the Malays 
was pre-capitalist whereas that of the Chinese and, to a lesser extent, Indians was 
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essentially capitalist.35  The logical development of this historically evolved form of 
social relations between capital and labour meant that in the colonial economy, both 
in the peasant and capitalist sectors, labour became segmented along ‘racial’ lines and 
no substantial basis of unity could develop.  This equation of ‘race’ with economic 
function, Brown asserts, gave rise to the perception by the subordinated groups that it 
was their racial attributes that determined their economic and class position.36  By the 
same token, their ethnic characteristics were presented by the dominant ideology as 
racial traits.  The consequence of such perceptions was that the subordinate status of 
racialised communities was permanently entrenched.   
 The British policy of ‘divide and rule’ based on class and race also 
compounded the racial division of labour.  Indians and Chinese were employed in 
different jobs and at different wage rates, the consequence of which was to make it 
impossible for both these migrant groups to come together to engage in any form of 
collective bargaining.  This division of labour along ‘racial’ lines further reinforced 
socio-cultural differences between the different groups because of the lack of social 
interaction between them.  This factor, compounded by spatial segregation of both 
their residential and occupational locations, tended to accentuate differences leading 
to cleavages, according to Abraham.37  He notes that colonial immigration policy 
based on physical differences had served as “boundary mechanism… reinforced by 
economic and educational inequalities highly correlated with race”.38  The Malays 
were already confined to rural enclaves and therefore marginalized and insulated from 
mainstream economic development that was controlled by Chinese businessmen, 
traders, middlemen and shopkeepers.  In towns where there was potential for 
community contact, residential areas, market places, and recreational space were 
typically segregated along ‘racial’ lines.  British administration had encouraged the 
different communities to organize themselves within their own communities at the 
same time isolating them from one another culturally and politically.  As a result,  
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the centres of commerce, mining and planting were wholly dominated by 
Westerners, Chinese and Indians.  Everywhere there were self-contained 
cultural enclaves – Chinatowns, Indian estate labour lines, Chinese tin 
mines… and Malay villages.  Each group lived in its own watertight 
compartments; there was little economic competition and much social 
aloofness.39
Each group had therefore to fend for itself, creating an environment of racial 
polarization that endured throughout the colonial period and continues in the nation 
state today.  The structural inequalities imposed by the British on these three groups 
were therefore responsible for poor ‘race’ relations between the communities while 
they strengthened colonial power relationships.  As Murphree has noted, “race 
relations… are effectively power relations”.40  The stereotypes of the ‘lazy native’ 
and his inherent racial ‘inferiority’ and ‘incapability’ to compete economically with 
the Chinese and Indians (an ideology propagated by the colonial government in the 
first place) came to be believed by the immigrant groups and the indigenous Malay 
group itself.  On the other hand, the Chinese being left to self-government responded 
in ways which particularly emphasized their Chineseness – a trait that has had 
enormous implications in the contemporary society of the nation state, as my minority 
respondents have demonstrated (see Chapter 6.5).41  Perceiving their socio-economic 
distance from other communities, race consciousness between them and the other 
groups became conspicuously significant.  The Indians not being able to assert 
themselves politically or economically did not pose a threat to both the Chinese and 
the Malays and were content to maintain an isolated existence.42  As a result of the 
British superimposition of class distinctions on racial groups during the colonial 
period, race rather than ethnicity has come to be accepted as the meaningful basis for 
social interaction in contemporary Singapore.  Under these conditions, it can be 
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argued that ethnicity may be seen, in the words of Abraham, “as a manipulation of 
social reality transforming itself into perceptions of race”.43
Works by several historians reveal that colonial policies created limited 
opportunities for integration between these communities.  Except for a small number 
of children who attended English language schools in the urban areas, most children 
studied in vernacular schools that only promoted their cultural homogeneity.  In the 
eyes of the colonial administration education was a possible source of social 
discontent and therefore not given much support.  Consequently, very few Chinese 
(and to some extent Indians) were allowed to participate in administrative roles in the 
government.  Criticizing this policy, George Maxwell, a senior colonial civil servant, 
had this to say: “The policy of keeping non-Malayans out of the administration owes 
its inception to British officials.”44  Given the hostility expressed by many colonial 
officials especially towards the Chinese and the lack of physical and social 
integration, it is not surprising that Malays perceived the Chinese with increasing 
racial contempt, perceiving their own economic backwardness as related to socio-
cultural factors.  This has led Nagata to observe that “some Malays even go as far as 
to suggest that the aspiring Malay businessman should become more like the 
Chinese”.45  
Furnivall in his seminal work on colonial policy and its implementation in 
Singapore/Malaysia, describes the social and economic landscape in which each 
ethnic group was accorded a specific place in the following words:  
different sections of the community living side by side, but separately, within 
the same political unit.  Each group holds by its own religion, its own culture 
and language, its own ideas and ways.  As individuals they meet, but only in 
the market place, in buying and selling… .  Even in the economic sphere there 
is a division of labor along racial lines.  Natives, Chinese, Indians and 
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Europeans all have different functions, and within each major group, 
subsections have particular occupations.46
Taking Furnivall’s argument that this kind of plural society divided by racial 
cleavages is a creation of colonialism, it becomes clear that the attachment of ‘race’ to 
both occupation in the colonial economy and the plural character of a migrant society 
made it difficult to dislodge ‘race’ consciousness and cultural exclusiveness so deeply 
entrenched in the minds and bodies of such a population.  The effect of colonial rule 
was to increase the social and cultural distance between the various communities, 
presenting them with few opportunities for inter-ethnic integration and creating 
instead suspicion and antagonism, especially between the Malays and Chinese.  The 
Chinese and Indians also looked down on the Malays, and the Malays in turn resented 
the wealth of the Chinese and Indian migrants who had become prosperous through 
business and the professions.  The outbreak of war and subsequent Japanese 
occupation of Singapore from February 1942 to September 1945 was another factor 
contributing to racial divisiveness.47  Though the concept of ethnicity displaced the 
notion of ‘race’ as a descriptor of difference from the 1920s and has gained 
acceptance especially by the West in the 1960s, the British administration pursued 
their relentless ‘racial’ ideologies in Singapore until independence.48     
 By their actions and words then, the legacy of the colonial establishment has 
been to inscribe ‘racial’ groups as the main structuring principle of the organization of 
contemporary Singapore society.  This was achieved through the implementation of 
an ideology of ‘racial’ differences leading to race consciousness and racial 
polarization.  Colonial rule had therefore ensured that ‘race’ became the only 
“meaningful basis for social interaction” by compressing “two principles of social 
division, race and ethnicity… into one” such that ‘race’ superseded ethnicity in local 
terminology though these terms are both seen as synonymous.49  Consequently 
Singaporeans see it as normal to regard themselves and the other groups as ‘races’, a 
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phenomenon that is as pervasive and entrenched in the psyche of Singaporeans today 
as it was in the colonial times.  The roots of contemporary ethnic divisions and 
tensions have therefore been created by British economic and segregationist policies 
formed during the colonial era as I have demonstrated in this chapter.  What became 
the order of the day through subsequent political independence was the 
institutionalization of ‘race’ as an accepted facet of Singapore society, even though 
this word, because of its negative connotations, had been universally relegated in 
favour of ethnicity.   
 
5.4 Emergence of Ethnicity 
 Race as a biologically based category became increasingly questioned 
especially in the West and, in the 1920s, the notion of an ethnicity-based paradigm 
displacing ‘race’ emerged among social scientists to describe differences between 
people.50  This transition was the result of worldviews that saw ‘race’ as scientifically 
and biologically oriented and ethnic groups as socially, politically and culturally 
constructed based on behavioral patterns and on the establishment of differences or 
boundaries.  Eric Wolf says that the notion of ethnicity in the United States came into 
vogue by a gradual paradigm shift from ‘race’ to ‘culture’ then to ethnicity, a shift 
given prominence largely by writers like Fredrik Barth.51  Following Weber, Barth 
had ushered in the beginnings of ethnicity as a social constructionist model.  Barth 
proposes that ethnic groups are socially constructed and that the physical and 
ideological contents of a group’s cultural characteristics cannot be seen in isolation.52  
The significance of Barth’s theory is that it points to the basic foundation of identity, 
namely the establishment of group differences.   
  Ethnicity has been defined by several writers as referring to a self-conscious 
group of people united, or closely related, by shared experiences and considering 
themselves and being considered by others as different from other groups.  Different 
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languages, geographical origins, religious beliefs, customs and traditions become a 
self-perpetuating quality and are passed on by the group from one generation to the 
next.   Ethnicity is now regarded as something everyone has, not just ‘others’, and 
difference is seen as important to the creation of who we are.  Anthropologists have 
also widened the idea of ethnicity whereby ethnic groups are incorporated into states 
to form a ‘nation’.  Glazer and Moynihan have pointed out that the term ethnicity was 
not widely used until the 1960s, as evidenced by its appearance for the first time in 
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary in 1961 and other major dictionaries in 
subsequent years.  By 1973, it was included in the American Heritage Dictionary with 
the following definition: “1. The condition of belonging to a particular ethnic group; 
2. Ethnic pride”.53  This does not mean that ethnic groups have not existed in the past, 
but rather that they have taken on a new significance in the post-colonial period as the 
developing nations of the world like Singapore attempt to define their own identity 
and the peoples within them claim certain rights on the basis of their belonging to a 
separate group. 
 
5.5  The Relationship between Race and Ethnicity 
The relationship between race and ethnicity over the years has been difficult 
and contestational, with the biological concept of race being confused with the 
cultural concept of ethnicity.  British anthropologist Michael Banton who has 
consistently explored and theorized the two concepts and the relationship between 
them sums up the essential difference between an ethnic group and a ‘race’: “the 
former reflects the positive tendencies of identification and inclusion whereas the 
latter reflects the negative tendencies of dissociation and exclusion”.  He argues that 
‘race’ is a categorical identification denoting ‘them’ based on physical or 
phenotypical characteristics, and is often a label - usually having negative 
connotations - imposed on others by a more powerful group.  Ethnicity on the other 
hand is the cultural group identification of ‘us’ based on cultural differences or 
boundaries rather than innate biological traits.54   From this point of view ethnicity is 
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seen as dependent on group and cultural identification, while race is a matter of social 
categorization bound up with power relations whereby one group successfully 
imposes its categories of ascription upon another set of people.  Ethnicity is thus 
internally defined to mean inclusion, that is, it is voluntarily embraced by a group or 
groups of people who define their own identity not based on physical features but on 
certain geographical, cultural or religious characteristics, while ‘racial’ identifications 
are externally defined to mean exclusion, that is, imposed by those in a position of 
dominance on other people.  As Banton says, “membership in an ethnic group is 
usually voluntary, membership of a racial group is not”.55  Identifications of race are 
based on categorization as well as in ascription and imposition rather than group 
identification and subscription, as the situation in Singapore represents.   
However Banton’s theory has been increasingly questioned by scholars over 
the years on the basis that there is a family relationship between race and ethnicity.56 
Richard Jenkins argues that group identification and social categorization are already 
inextricably linked and implicated in each other, an argument finding resonance in the 
writings of many others.57  According to Handelman, race is a potent example of a 
hierarchically dominant ethnic category.58  Nathan Glazer maintains that race and 
ethnicity “form part of a single family of social identity”.59  Sandra Wallman 
dismisses the debate about the distinction between race and ethnicity as a “quibble”, 
in later years arguing that phenotype or physical appearance is also a potential ethnic 
boundary marker among many.60  Similarly Erikson takes the position that race may 
or may not form part of ethnic ideologies and that it does not appear to be a decisive 
factor in interethnic relations.61  Van den Berghe argues that race has become nothing 
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more than a “special marker of ethnicity”.62  A similar perspective is offered by Floya 
Anthias who says that “race categories belong to the more encompassing category of 
ethnic collectivity”, and suggests that race is simply one way in which ethnic 
boundaries are constructed.63  Smedley argues that race and ethnicity “can, and often 
do, accompany and complement each other” along with racist stereotypes.64
 The various arguments advanced recognize that the socially constructed 
concepts of race and ethnicity though qualitatively different, appear to have a 
relationship that results in a certain overlap.  This is particularly true of the Singapore 
situation where the term ‘race’ often used by post independent political leaders, and 
enshrined in the daily lives of Singaporeans, is used synonymously with ethnicity, 
suggesting that physical or phenotypical characteristics of peoples are linked to their 
cultural attributes and therefore group identification goes hand in hand with social 
categorization.  The ethnic group does not have to be a ‘race’ in the sense that it is 
seen by others as somehow inferior, though there is a very strong overlap and groups 
that organize themselves ethnically are often regarded by other groups and the state as 
a ‘race’, as the position is in Singapore society.  The nation state adopted the 
definition, concept and management of ‘race’ from the British and infused it into state 
ideology and in administrative practice by linking it to its own definition, concept and 
management of ethnicity in the enforcement of its vision of ‘multiracialism’ and 
‘multiculturalism’.  This project of nationalism is anchored on the acceptance, 
maintenance, and celebration of difference as a means to create a sense of national 
identity.   
 
5.6  ‘Race’, Ethnicity and the Nation State 
 As I have described above, present-day ‘racial’ categories in Singapore arose 
from British colonial ideology and practice which helped define the names and 
boundaries of groups.  How this insistence and application of the notion of ‘race’ (as 
opposed to ethnicity) by the post-colonial nation state came about will now be 
analysed. 
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The move towards independence, coming on the heels of World War II, was a 
time of great global upheaval.  Decolonization of other countries in Asia and Africa at 
this time, along with the emergence of new social movements in the West in the 
1960s led to an ethnic revival and celebration of cultural roots worldwide.  
Consequently, the negative connotations attached to the colonial usage of the word 
‘race’, denoting superiority of one group over another based on scientific and 
biological theory, made way for the widespread adoption of ethnicity in the West.  
‘Race’, as biologically determined, became no longer an appropriate or viable 
category.  Yet the government of the new nation state of Singapore chose to articulate 
its visions for a nation composed of ‘races’ from the very first day of independence 
and ever since.  How has ‘race’ functioned to preserve and develop these 
articulations, why has ‘race’ been so highly prized and politicized in Singapore, and 
what is the state’s attitude to ‘race’ and race relations? 
 At the end of the colonial period several extremely important factors were 
present in Singapore society and confronting the new government.  Firstly, the various 
communities, both immigrant and indigenous, were diasporic, diverse in content and 
character, and divided sharply by language, culture, religion, ethnicity and geography.  
They were ethnocentric, had little unity between them, had not gone through a shared 
nationalist struggle for independence and hence there existed little sense of a new 
national identity that would help create an ‘imagined’ community.65  Secondly, 
economic policies, necessitated by entrepot trade and the development of a port 
economy, had promoted growth through the colonial period and this scenario 
represented the mechanism for an independent Singapore that now had to contend 
with no trading hinterland or natural resources on attaining independence.  Thirdly, to 
justify its existence the government had to improve living conditions because the 
colonial administration had left behind massive socio-economic problems such as 
unemployment, poor housing and insufficient education.  Fourthly, the new 
government desired to secure political support and credibility, build ideological 
consensus, and transform the fragmented population into a disciplined and united 
workforce.  Finally and most significantly, the new state was convinced that a new 
nation had to be forged with a common consciousness and a sense of national identity 
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that extended beyond just meeting the immediate and more long-term material needs 
of the people.   
 These factors were compounded by two other inherent and hugely significant 
criteria derived from the colonial administration that deserves special mention here.  
As recounted earlier, importing labour migrants from China and India during the 
colonial period - as well as indigenous peoples from the peninsula states of Malaya 
and the surrounding Indonesian islands of Sumatra and Riau - had led to the creation 
of separate and segregated socio-economic communities.  Faced with the increasing 
legitimacy of ‘racial’ theory and a hitherto unknown mass of diverse peoples, colonial 
authorities sought to make sense of them and impose some sort of social order 
through a simplified ‘racial’ classification as described earlier in this chapter.  The 
British had also left each ‘race’ to handle its own problems and, in a similar way, the 
nation state has perpetuated this practice by promoting self-help groups for the 
various communities (see Chapter 8.2).  Such segregation and divisive strategies, it 
can be argued, have resulted in a plural society with clear-cut boundaries, a scenario 
that the nation state deals with through a discourse of ethnicity management linked to 
its ideology of ‘multiracialism’ and multiculturalism.66
The other major factor that contributed to shaping the state’s attitude towards 
‘race’ relations after independence in 1965 has been the ‘Chineseness’ of Singapore 
society since colonial days (see Chapter 6.5).  ‘Chineseness’ has continued to be a key 
factor in shaping the policies of the state.  Whether it is language, culture, national or 
political affiliations or economics, this factor has greatly affected the state’s attitude 
towards ‘race’ and national identity since independence.  Clammer, in particular, 
argues that “it is an especially Chinese characteristic to put great emphasis on ‘race’, 
although the idea is much weaker amongst the other groups in Singapore”.67  Hence 
the idea of ‘race’ is given such prominence in Singapore.  How did this situation come 
about?  
 British colonial expansion had provided excellent opportunities for the early 
Chinese traders, artisans and labourers to move to Singapore on a transient basis, but 
with increasing economic success more and more of them decided to settle 
permanently in Singapore.  Within ten years of the founding of Singapore, the 
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Chinese had become the largest group and by 1931 constituted 74.3% of the total 
Singapore population.68  In the eyes of the colonial administration they had acquired a 
position of some pre-eminence as they were looked upon as an economically forward 
community possessing “industry and economic genius”, in sharp contrast to the 
Indians’ ability to “labour”, and especially the Malays who were considered laid-
back, “lazy” and economically backward.69  Such stereotypes had led to ‘racial’ 
tensions and anti-Chinese resentment mainly from the Malays before the Second 
World War, increasing during and persisting after the war.  There were also racial 
cleavages between the various communities that led to racism and ‘racial’ stereotypes 
not only from the colonial administration but also between the various communities 
(see discussion of stereotypes earlier in this chapter).  These communities, particularly 
the Chinese, had also been harshly treated by the Japanese during the war partly 
because of the long-standing enmity between China and Japan.  Such discriminatory 
Japanese policies towards the different groups had intensified ‘racial’ tensions among 
the Malays, Chinese and Indians, especially between the Malays and Chinese.  For 
instance, the largely Chinese anti-Japanese resistance fighters took revenge against 
some Malays whom they accused of collaborating with the Japanese.  Such ‘racial’ 
tensions were later to become accentuated in the 1960s during the acrimonious debate 
over Chinese-Malay equality in the newly formed Malaysian Federation, leading to 
communal rioting in 1964 between these two groups, all of which increased political 
and ‘racial’ tensions and eventually led to Singapore’s separation from Malaysia and 
consequent independence in August 1965.  This traumatic severance of Singapore 
from Malaysia forever marked the political and social landscape of Singapore in terms 
of communal politics and ‘race’ relations.  ‘Racial’ (and ‘class’) tensions were also 
simmering between the indigenous Muslims and the Chinese minority in Indonesia.  
Given such regional sensitivities, the new government realized that a Chinese nation 
would not be readily accepted and that the ‘Chineseness’ of Singapore had to be 
deemphasized. 
Given this intensity of ‘racial’ pluralism in Singapore and in the region, 
multiracialism through meritocracy was therefore seen by the government of the new 
nation state as the most practical, pragmatic and feasible national ideology to adopt, 
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the urgent need being to construct a Singaporean identity out of disparate 
communities and to diffuse ethnic tension.70  The state therefore implemented a 
strategy to integrate the ‘nation’ so as to ensure racial harmony and the development 
of a modern, capitalistic economy.  The project of ‘multiracialism’, this term often 
being used interchangeably with ‘multiculturalism’ in state discourse in Singapore, is 
anchored in the belief that the different ‘ethnic’ groups had a right to remain distinct 
without having to shed their ‘ethnic’ heritage and identity.  ‘Multiracialism’, along 
with multiculturalism, multilingualism, multireligiosity and meritocracy, was 
therefore promulgated as a social formula to forge a single national identity out of a 
population divided along ‘racial’, religious, language and cultural lines and holding 
emotional ties to the countries they came from.71  In accordance with this ideology of 
the nation building project the nation state has imagined and officially recognized four 
separate but equal ‘races’ – Chinese, Malay, Indian and Others - to co-exist without 
discrimination.  The Chinese (C) make up 77% of the population, Malay (M) 14%, 
Indian (I) 8%, and Others (O) 1%.72  ‘Others’ is a residual category for those not 
belonging to the first three, and consists of small and diverse communities such as 
‘Eurasian’, Armenian, Arabic, Japanese, Jewish and other types of Europeans.  This 
quadrotomy attempts to capture the diverse population into four simple boxes and is 
presented by the state as the most commonsensical representation of the population.  
This simplified ‘racial’ classification has been popularized as the ‘CMIO’ ideology of 
multiracialism and has guided the government’s multiracial, multicultural, 
multilingual, multireligious and meritocracy policy in many areas of the nation 
building project, especially in various education, housing, defence, social and family 
policies (see Chapters 6-8).  Such policies are legitimized by claims of pragmatism, 
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economic survival and a nervous appreciation of lack of space that reinforce the 
quadrotomy.  Chua argues that state ideology has been couched within the terms of a 
discourse on ‘national survival’.73
   Singapore leaders spearheaded by its first Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew and 
ably supported by cohorts like S Rajaratnam, Goh Keng Swee, Toh Chin Chye, Lim 
Kim San and a few others explicitly rejected the ideology of assimilation or the 
‘melting pot’ based on the dissolution of group identity, which was the global trend 
prior to the sixties.  As a team they determined the nature of Singapore’s democracy 
and governance, and devised policies to promote rapid economic progress and 
prosperity.  Together they agreed to establish Singapore as a multi-cultural, multi-
lingual and multi-religious entity and treat it as constituting the core element of their 
strategy for nation building - the management of the new island state’s extreme ethnic 
diversity.  They offered the vision of a multiethnic society whose component ‘ethnic’ 
groups shared equal participation and acceptance within the ideological boundaries of 
the nation state, while at the same time guaranteeing autonomy and equality of status 
with regard to culture, language and religion to all ethnic segments so as to ensure that 
these segments could retain their distinct languages, religions and customs.74  “Rather 
than seeking harmony through the abolition of ethnicity”, the state decided to “set 
about not only enhancing ethnicity as a primary social identification”, but also to 
“extend this principle to making ethnicity the main form of socio-cultural 
classification”.75  It adopted an instrumentalist view of ‘ethnicity’ by enforcing the 
notion of what Manchester School’s Abner Cohen calls “political ethnicity”, that is, 
ethnicity as a strategy for corporate action.76  The rationale for “political ethnicity” as 
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perceived by my respondents goes beyond the means for corporate action – preserve 
and enhance the integrity of the dominant ethnic community which also happens to 
possess proven entrepreneurial skills.  “It is a goal-directed ethnicity, formed by 
internal organizations and stimulated by external pressures and held, not for its own 
sake, but to defend an economic and political interest”.77  The enunciated principles 
of a ‘multiracial’ policy also guaranteed the principle of meritocracy, ensuring equal 
rights to all individuals, as well as emphasizing economic success.  Says Lai Ah Leng, 
“As a state strategy, the interplay of meritocracy, consensus and CMIO multiracialism 
has been a powerful weapon in promoting economic growth and socio-political 
equilibrium”.78  Nation building therefore took a very ‘ethnic’ path during which 
various instrumentalist policies were executed by the Singapore state (see Chapters 6-
8).  As a result of this instrumentalist view, which has profound significance for this 
thesis, ‘ethnicity’ has been manipulated by the state so that it is subservient to the 
nation state.  Brown calls this restructuring of ethnicity   ‘corporatist’, while Clammer 
considers it as furthering the “authoritarian culture and social character” of the 
country.79
The new nation state also believed from the outset that the key to survival in a 
Muslim-dominated region lay in ‘racial’ cohesion through economic modernization.  
It realized quickly that national identity could only evolve in economic terms, both for 
national development as well as for improving the living conditions and material well 
being of its population.  Economic development and material progress required a 
disciplined workforce and this was achieved by what sociologist Chua Beng Huat 
calls “a culture of capitalism” - a set of cultural attitudes and values like competition, 
meritocracy, excellence, pragmatism and ‘Asian’ communitarian values aimed at 
reducing differences between the various ‘ethnic’ groups and forging a single national 
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identity for the separate but equal ‘races’, in other words, a set of national values over 
and above the values of ethnic groups.80  
Such a form of ‘multiracial’ society has been articulated and perpetuated by 
the nation state over the years.  Using different constructs the political leadership has 
always emphasized the word ‘race’ or ‘racial’ to underline its significance in the 
Singapore context.81  Former Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong, for example, in a 
speech titled “Building a multi-racial nation through integration”, spoke of his vision 
for building “a multiracial Singapore with four overlapping circles” (representing the 
various officially designated communities) to integrate “racial and religious harmony” 
and for the purpose of reconciling ethnicity with a national identity that supports and 
accommodates the diversity of ethnic identities and differences in their midst.82  He 
said the area of overlap of the four circles was where Singaporeans “live, play and 
work together” with “minimal consciousness of ethnicity”.  The presentation of group 
(or ethnic) identity was therefore uppermost in the minds of the nation state’s political 
leadership as it took office in 1965, despite its insistence of the concept of ‘race’ as 
the organizing principle of the plural society in Singapore.83   
 Chua Beng Huat argues that through the policy of multiracialism, “race is 
essentialized as an unchanging feature of the population so as to ground specific ways 
of disciplining the social body”, the racialised body becoming “part of the larger 
project of social control and state identity”.84  The state maintains that ‘race’ is a 
potent symbol and a primary source of a person’s identity that will not be erased.  
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While the British classified the communities according to the country they came from 
(for example, the Indians from India, and the Chinese from China), and the language 
they spoke, the Singapore nation state has used this classification to construct and 
emphasise the concept of ‘races’.  The ethnic categories are represented by the ‘race’ 
of each member of the community.  In this new milieu, ‘race’ has become a social 
concept that has served to construct Singaporeans as radically different from each 
other so successfully that most Singaporeans today have almost entirely internalized 
what was from the colonial days a highly arbitrary system of ‘racial’ and cultural 
hierarchies.  ‘Race’ has been conceptualized and used to such an extent in the 
construction of Singaporean society that it is now a ‘pervasive’ reality in the social, 
cultural, economic and political life of Singaporeans.85
Essentialist categorization of racial identities in Singapore assumes fixed and 
rigid boundaries.  Consequently each ethnic group is imagined by the state as 
homogeneous and unified.  ‘Race’ is essentialized and institutionalized in the 
following manner.  Each child is officially ‘racially’ classified at birth by being 
arbitrarily assigned the father’s ‘race’ which would be Chinese, Malay, Indian, or 
Other, a nomenclature deeply rooted in the colonial past and perceived to originate 
from inherent biological differences between peoples.86  The ‘race’ is inscribed on the 
birth certificate and subsequently on an identity card that all citizens must carry.  
Singaporeans are therefore not free to select the ‘race’ they belong to.  One is 
therefore officially a Singaporean Chinese, Singaporean Malay, or Singaporean 
Indian, the term ‘Singaporean’ not threatening any of the individual cultures.  
However says Benjamin, “The constant reiteration of the Chinese-Malay-Indian… 
categorization in national censuses, in the reports of Government departments 
concerned with social policy, and in the schools puts considerable pressure on people 
to see themselves as ethnically defined”.87  An individual thus bears an indelible 
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imprint as a member of an officially designated ‘race’ from the cradle to the grave.  
‘Race’ is therefore the basis of social and cultural classification of Singaporeans who 
are constantly reminded of their ‘race’ by being asked to classify themselves in 
various institutional forms and records.  Consequently, ‘race’ is associated with a raft 
of state policies and regulations (see Chapters 6-8) that govern the daily lives of all 
Singaporeans.  It is the way by which social difference in Singapore is reported and 
recognized for official purposes and is the process that seeks to privilege ‘race’ over 
all alternative forms of social identity. 
  Each ‘race’ is also identified with a language, a culture and a religion, the 
ideology of ‘race’ being articulated and manipulated as ethnicity by the state.  
Multiracialism, multilingualism, multiculturalism, multireligiosity and meritocracy 
are therefore the pillars of the national project.  The social fabric of Singapore is 
therefore inextricably tied up with ‘race’ that is manifested in all activities of daily life 
and highly visible in the public sphere and built environment.  This high visibility of 
‘ethnic’ cultures is used to contribute directly to the formation of the Singapore nation 
state.  Hence we have Chinese dances, Malay dances and Indian dances displaying the 
distinctive traditional cultures of the major ‘ethnic’ groups.88  Similarly, cultural 
forms like songs, costumes, languages, food, religious/cultural festivals, TV and radio 
programmes, newspapers, ‘race’-based self-help groups etc are all distinguished 
between and organized according to ‘race’ (see Plate 11).  
 ‘Racial’ discourse through state-managed ethnicity is also present in everyday 
communication – in relation to identity of self and others, in food, culture, language, 
habits, transport, education, TV, newspapers etc.  Similarly, festivals like Chinese 
New Year (for the Chinese), Hari Raya Puasa and Hari Raya Haji (for the Malays), 
Deepavali (for the Indians) and Vesak Day (for Chinese and Indian Buddhists) are 
declared public holidays in Singapore.  The cultures of Singapore are therefore neatly 
packaged and frozen by the state in three respective ‘race’ traditions - an effect of the 
official ‘multiculturalism’ that is promoted by the government. 
 Yet at the same time the state also successfully introduced the teaching and 
use of English as a language to provide Singaporeans access to the global market and 
transform the island-nation into an attractive location for foreign investment.  The 
introduction of English as the international language of technology and commerce 
                                        
88  Examples are the Chinese lion dance, Malay kompang, Indian bhangra and Eurasian folk dance. 
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also allowed a politically and ‘racially’ neutral language to become the lingua franca 
of Chinese, Indian, Malay and other minority communities.  The emphasis of English 
as a common language for national identity formation, concomitant with the 
government’s insistence on the capitalist orientation of its citizens towards the global 
economy also aimed at delimiting the meaning of ‘race’ in the Singapore context. 
 In keeping with the government ideology of multiracialism, a bilingual 
education policy of English and the “mother” tongue was introduced in all schools, 
whereby every student was required to learn English as the first language and his/her 
mother tongue (Chinese, Malay or Tamil) as the second language (Language and 
education policy is discussed in Chapter 7.3).  These four languages were also 
accorded uniform treatment and declared official languages with English designed to 
promote interaction and communication between the various ethnic groups as well as 
becoming the dominant language of education, administration and commerce.  
Similarly, all schools became integrated to admit students from all communities, with 
all lessons being conducted in English and the mother tongue taught in a language 
class within the school curriculum.  The government’s rationale for its language 
policy was based on social, political and economic concerns which justified the 
argument for an ‘Asian language’ as well as proficiency in English.  The argument is 
that the importance of the mother tongue inevitably emphasizes ethnic culture, 
language being equated with the ethnicity that it gives.  The implementation of second 
language education as a way to inculcate the young in school with proper “Asian” 
values would provide these young minds with the “cultural ballast” necessary to 
counteract Western cultural influences introduced through the use of English and 
brought on by the Republic’s modernization programme.89  Former President Wee 
Kim Wee voiced the PAP Government’s concerns on this subject when he opened the 
Seventh Parliament on 7 June 1990:  
This openness has … also exposed us to alien lifestyles and values.  Under this 
pressure, in less than a generation, attitudes and outlooks of Singaporeans, 
especially younger Singaporeans, have shifted.  Traditional Asian ideas of 
morality, duty and society, which have sustained and guided us in the past, are 
giving way to a more westernized, individualistic and self-centered outlook on 
                                        
89  On Singapore’s linguistic policies and the prevailing ideology of language, see Clammer, 
Singapore: Ideology, Society, Culture, 133-137. 
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life… the speed and extent of the changes in Singapore society is worrying.  
We cannot tell what dangers lie ahead, as we rapidly grow more westernized. 
 
5.7  Race, Ethnicity and the People in the Nation State 
 While it was the colonial regime that first introduced the concept of ‘race’ into 
the pluralistic society of Singapore, the nation state has for the purpose of 
administrative and political convenience continued this practice and made it a social 
and pervasive reality of everyday life.  As Nirmala Purushotam has described, people 
were classified by the colonial administration into ‘races’ by census reporting, a 
practice that has been in force since 1871, and continues to this day in post 
independent Singapore.90  Similarly the National Identity card that every resident in 
Singapore possesses classifies the individual by his/her ‘race’.  The identification of 
‘race’ is a crucial part of a citizen’s identity with a number of housing, educational, 
and employment consequences.  As Benjamin says, it has long been at the root of 
Singapore’s concept of ‘multiracialism’.91
In Singapore people are socially defined by their ‘race’ because of their 
physical characteristics to which social attributes are linked – in other words, ‘race’ in 
Singapore cannot be understood as being based on skin colour alone because it has 
been socially constructed first by the colonial administration then subsequently by the 
postcolonial state.  People are therefore conscious of the existence of ‘race’ and so 
organize their relationships with others on the basis of the ‘racial’ identity they 
attribute to others and to themselves.  If they believe the others belong to a group that 
is genetically different from theirs, then they tend to fashion relationships with this 
group differently, as is illustrated by relationships between the dominant ethnic group, 
that is, the Chinese and the minority Indians, Malays and others.  The point here is 
that people, rightly or wrongly, accept the biological aspect of other people as a 
reality and so act in accordance with their belief.  Such beliefs make ‘race’ subjective 
and real – as real as people want it to be.  No matter how offensive we may find ‘race’ 
and how unimpressed we are by scientific research disproving the biological aspect of 
race, race consciousness remains a powerful motivating force behind peoples’ 
thoughts and behaviour, leading to processes of inclusion and exclusion. 
                                        
 
90  Nirmala Purushotam, “Disciplining Difference: Race in Singapore”. 
 
91  Benjamin, “The Cultural Logic of Singapore’s ‘Multiracialism’ ”. 
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The nation state tends to emphasise cultural differences of different ethnic 
groups in Singapore to a point that distinguishes a particular group from the rest of the 
population.  Such a scenario can be observed not only from the responses of my 
informants, but also over the years from stirrings of people from all ethnic groups 
who feel some sense of deprivation.  The dominant Chinese group felt it in the years 
after independence when English was given importance to such a degree that this 
group became concerned that Chinese language and culture was being undermined by 
western influence - hence the introduction of Confucian ethics instruction in schools 
to emphasise the values of morality, the emphasis on the Speak Mandarin Campaign, 
and the introduction of other Chinese cultural manifestations.  Such an emphasis on 
‘Chineseness’ in the Republic in turn caused a certain amount of uneasiness on the 
part of the other communities, hence increased ethnic consciousness resulting in the 
state’s policies of ethnic management for all ethnic groups. 
Ethnicity in Singapore therefore appears as much a cultural and political 
phenomenon, ethnic groups reacting to particular conditions enforced by the state 
rather than a spontaneous stirring of people wanting to express themselves 
collectively.  In sum, it can be argued that ethnicity in the Singapore concept 
encapsulates the various types of responses of different communities to the state’s 
policies because of their respective subjective reactions to these policies.  Also some 
communities, notably the Malays and Indians, perceive that the ‘race’-conscious 
dominant community regards them as inferior and therefore organize themselves 
ethnically.  In the process, ethnic groups regard each other as a ‘race’, a notion that 
has been perpetuated as a social reality by the colonial regime and later by the nation 
state.  Being related to ‘race’, ethnicity is also connected to class, another factor 
contributing increasingly to the prospect of national consciousness and national 
identity becoming more elusive in Singapore society.         
 
5.8  Conclusion 
 After attaining independence the new nation wasted no time in promoting 
national identity, economic development and ‘racial’ harmony through a discourse of 
‘racial’ politics centered on the ideology of ‘race’.  By doing so it has appropriated a 
‘racialised’ colonial discourse that has been anchored to the central theme of 
multiracialism and with it a multicultural, multilingual and multireligious society, 
with the Chinese, Malays, Indians and other ethnic minorities enjoying autonomy and 
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equality of status in their culture, language and religion.  ‘Race’ has therefore been 
socially constructed by the state as an everyday reality in the social, cultural, 
economic and political life of Singaporeans.  State discourse therefore promotes 
national identity with ethnic identity as an essential ingredient.  In the minds of 
Singaporeans these intersecting discourses coexist at different levels. 
 The three discursively produced groups – ‘Chinese’, ‘Malay’ and ‘Indian’ – 
“have become the relevant administrative racial categories that are used to rationalize 
government policies”, says Siddique.92  These policies are a major factor in the 
continuation of ‘ethnicity’ as a socially constructed phenomenon in which the social, 
economic, cultural and political environment is closely intertwined at the level of 
everyday life.  The government policies, bound up with high levels of state 
intervention and control, include a series of vigorous ‘race’-based ‘social engineering’ 
initiatives to promote national identity and ensure ‘racial’ harmony, and consequently 
economic success in line with its declared theme of multiracialism, and have been 
hegemonically masterminded by the nation state since independence (see Chapters 6-
8).  They have been harnessed by the state to the political process of nation building 
and have been the pillars of Singapore’s new physical, urban, social, cultural, political 
and cultural landscapes.  The major social engineering instruments developed by the 
state include the education policy of bilingualism (English and the mother tongue), a 
high-rise public housing policy to supplant slum and squatter areas, family policies 
designed to stem both the birth rate and an ageing population, the institution of 
compulsory military service for defense and social cohesion purposes, as well as a 
self-help policy to assist the various ethnic communities.  The ideology of the nation 
state for equal treatment of the various ethnicities is also manifested through heritage 
conservation to showcase the ethnic component of the multicultural heritage of 
Singapore.  Ethnicity is offered as a tourist attraction, whereby ‘ethnic’ groups are 
seen to live happily together while preserving their separate cultural identities and 
practices.  This is the official version of a Singaporean identity founded on racial 
‘harmony’.  The policies have significantly impacted the various ethnic communities 
in Singapore, and their effects on the Indian community will be analysed on the basis 
of interviews with my respondents in the ensuing chapters.  Related to the nation 
state’s approach to ‘race’, a major consideration in the postcolonial Singapore context 
                                        
92  Siddique, “Singaporean Identity”. 
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that conspicuously has not been given much prominence by Singapore anthropologists 
and historians is the connection between state-controlled ethnicity and the ideology of 
socio-biology.  Clammer argues that the social construction of ethnic categories in 
Singapore, especially the flourishing of its Chinese manifestations, has its foundations 
in ideas about the genetic basis of ‘race’ that allows a certain discourse of ‘race’ to be 
promoted.93  This subject will also be explored in juxtaposition with ‘social 
engineering’ policies in the chapters to follow.   
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                        
 
93  Clammer, Race and State in Independent Singapore 1965-1990, 7. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
RACIAL POLITICS AND SOCIAL ENGINEERING – FAMILY, 
POPULATION AND ‘CHINESENESS’ POLICIES 
 
 “Singapore students rouse controversy by choosing Hitler as idol” – this 
breaking headline appeared conspicuously in Japan Today (July 1, 2005), a major 
Japanese newspaper. The news was also reported in the local media in Singapore and 
created quite a stir with the Israeli and German ambassadors intervening side by side 
with the Education Ministry.1  According to the above sources, a group of eight high 
school students in Singapore sparked a storm of controversy after they chose Nazi 
Germany leader Adolf Hitler as their idol during a recent school outing. The group 
chose ‘Adolf Hitler’ as their group name and idol during a leadership camp excursion 
to Pulau Ubin, a small island off Singapore. Besides adopting the name of Hitler, the 
group had also prepared a placard, flaunted a photo of the German leader, and even 
demonstrated the Nazi salute with shouts of ‘Heil Hitler!’ Two weeks before the camp 
the group had been told to choose a name of a great leader and the teacher in charge 
apparently raised no objections when informed of the students’ choice. The 
newspaper also reported that none in the group had seemed embarrassed or 
uncomfortable with being associated with Hitler. Responses like: “He led Germany 
and was very good, although he was evil” and “His name symbolizes strength and 
loyalty, as people were very loyal to him” marked their perceptions of him. The 
incident sparked a knee-jerk reaction from many in Singapore, including the Ministry 
of Education as well as the Israeli and German embassies. In a letter to The New 
Paper, one reader, Michael Keogh, commented:  
What annoyed me was how they treated Hitler with a couldn’t-care-less 
attitude. It was precisely that attitude that allowed Hitler to get into power. He 
talked about his programmes from the beginning but people just thought: 
‘He’s a strong man, he can be good for us’ and made him their leader.   
Expressing his anxiety, one teacher wrote in stating that students needed to be better 
guided: “History is about different perspectives from different authors, but the 
students have to choose a balanced view. If they do go astray and become too radical, 
                                        
1  The New Paper, 25 June 2005. 
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teachers have to step in,” he said.  While it was commonly felt by the Singapore 
public that this was an isolated incident involving essentially a small group of 
students who had acted in ignorance rather than with any intent to idolize Hitler, 
many were deeply concerned that such acts could have an effect on ethnic relations in 
Singapore. Voicing his concern, Education Minister Tharman Shanmugaratnam 
agreed that the students should have shown more sensitivity. “Hitler had committed 
major crimes against humanity, racial crimes – something which our students should 
be very sensitive about, particularly given how much emphasis we place on racial 
harmony”, he said.2    
 
6.1  Introduction 
 As I have argued in the previous chapter, the British introduced the ideology 
of ‘race’ and racial theory based on European ideas of biological inheritance/selection 
that resulted in an Orientalist discourse of superiority over the colonized.  This 
colonial discourse of dominance drew heavily on essentialized notions of difference 
between colonizer and colonized based on perceived biological differences. On 
attaining independence the new nation state continued to use ‘race’ as a structuring 
principle of society by introducing the ideology of ‘multiracialism’ and 
hegemonically promoting ethnicity as an acceptable everyday reality in the lives of 
Singaporeans, the goal being to develop a unified Singaporean national identity in 
which the separate distinctive ethnic, linguistic and cultural identities of the various 
communities were retained and reinforced. ‘Racial’ politics has dominated the urban 
political economy of Singapore as the state pursues national developmentalism 
through the ideology of multiracialism, which, it insists, is basic to Singapore’s 
survival, economic growth and stability.  As a result, Singaporeans have come to 
accept a racialized identity.  Politically constructed through a combination of 
autocratic paternalism and hegemonic control, this identity has since independence 
been made the basis of various housing, health, education, language, defence, self-
help, heritage conservation, population and family policies introduced by the state.  
Such initiatives were intended to ensure ‘racial’ harmony and economic success. They 
were the brainchild of a policy elite gathered around Lee Kuan Yew, Prime Minister 
from 1959 to 1990, under whose tutelage Singapore was transformed from a colony 
                                        
2  The New Paper, 29 June 2005. 
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into a metropolis boasting one of the highest standards of living in the world.3 His 
policies and programs have been the building blocks of Singapore’s new physical, 
social, cultural and political landscapes, and have had a significant impact upon the 
various communities, especially in reinforcing ‘racial’ thinking and ethnic identity.  In 
this chapter I will examine the policies relating to the family, the population and the 
‘Chineseness’ of Singapore and the responses of Singapore Indians to the ways these 
policies have impacted them.  Such responses illustrate how the Indians go about 
engaging and negotiating them in their everyday lives.  
 
6.2  The Rationale for Race-based Policies 
 An exploration of responses to these ‘race’-based policies will hardly be 
complete if consideration is not given to contextualizing their development and the 
rationale underlying their implementation.  In Chapter 5 I showed how during the 
colonial administration of Singapore the economic hierarchy of the three main 
population groups (namely, Chinese, Indians and Malays) was racialized.  The 
Chinese were characterized as more intelligent, industrious, disciplined and 
economically pragmatic than either Indians or Malays.  The latter suffered from 
negative stereotyping of their work ethic.  Such stereotypes have persisted to the 
present day.  They were, according to Michael Barr, a profound influence on the 
various social engineering policies and programmes implemented by former Prime 
Minister Lee Kuan Yew’s administration, in particular its population and family 
policies.4  Such policies have been related to, what Perry, Kong and Yeoh call, Lee’s 
“nature more than nurture” theory for a “high quality” population – a concern that 
several writers have also articulated.5  Tremewan, for instance, discusses Lee’s 
policies of “sorting” society “according to natural ability”, while Minchin, Tamney, 
Clammer, Trocki, and Chee and Chan are among others who have dealt specifically 
                                        
3  Lee Kuan Yew was Prime Minister from 1959 to 1990 when he handed over the reins to Goh Chok 
Tong in a smooth power transfer. 
 
4  Michael D Barr, “Lee Kuan Yew: Race, Culture and Genes,” Journal of Contemporary Asia 29, 2 
 (1999). Racial prejudices and economic hierarchy, it can be argued, feed on each other so that they are 
 interconnected and closely linked. Consequently, it cannot be disputed that racial prejudices have 
 contributed to perceptions of the economic abilities of the main ethnic communities, as much as the 
 economic hierarchy has contributed to such prejudices.    
 
5  Martin Perry, Lily Kong and Brenda Yeoh, Singapore: A Developmental City State (Singapore: John 
Wiley & Sons, 1997), 89. 
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with Lee’s attitudes linking ‘race’ and genes.6  Indeed, one cannot appreciate the 
racialized nature of Singaporeans’ perceptions without first understanding Lee Kuan 
Yew’s views on ‘race’.  
 Lee linked economic performance and intelligence to ‘race’ just as the British 
had done during the colonial period.7 He was persistent in his observation that the 
Chinese were a “race” with a “more intense and exacting civic culture” conducive to 
economic development and commercial ability.8  This was in sharp contrast to his 
view that the Malay and Indian cultures were “soft”, “benign”, “relaxed” and less 
demanding.9  Of the Malays, he remarked that they “had always withdrawn from 
competition and never really entered into the mainstream of economic activity”.10  In 
a 1965 interview on Australian television, he compared the Chinese and Malays thus:  
One is the product of a civilization which has gone through all its ups and 
downs, of floods and famine and pestilence, breeding a people with very 
intense culture, with a belief in high performance in sustained effort, in thrift 
and industry. And the other people, more fortunately endowed by nature, with 
warm sunshine and bananas and coconuts, and therefore not with the same 
need to thrive so hard. Now, these two societies really move at two different 
speeds.11
Moreover, Lee’s perceptions about the inherent genetic strengths and weaknesses of 
the different ‘races’ reaffirmed his belief in Chinese racial and cultural superiority 
which formed the fundamental basis of his worldview in which ‘race’ was an all-
pervasive feature of civilization. It is this attitude that is seen as having formed the 
                                        
6  Christopher Tremewan, The Political Economy of Social Control in Singapore (London and New 
York: St Martin’s Press, 1994), 102-104, 115; James Minchin, No Man is an Island (Sydney: Allen & 
Unwin, 1986; reprint, 1990); Joseph B Tamney, The Struggle over Singapore’s Soul: Western 
Modernization and Asian Culture (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1996), 102-103; John R 
Clammer, Race and State in Independent Singapore 1965-1990: The Cultural Politics of Pluralism in a 
Multiethnic Society (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 1998), 160-164; Carl A Trocki, Singapore: 
Wealth, Power and the Culture of Control (New York: Routledge, 2005), 155; H L Chee and C K 
Chan, Designer Genes, eds. Chee and Chan (Petaling Jaya: Insan, 1984). 
 
7  Ian Buruma, a Henry Luce Professor at Bard College in New York, writing in an article in Time 
magazine (2005), calls Lee Kuan Yew “one of the last proponents of social Darwinism”.  
 
8  Lee as quoted in Tamney, The Struggle over Singapore’s Soul, 102. 
 
9  Ibid., 101-102. 
 
10  Lee as quoted in Barr, “Lee Kuan Yew: Race, Culture and Genes,” 17. 
 
11  Ibid., 11. 
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basis of the various social engineering instruments of his administration, and which, 
as I will demonstrate later in this chapter, resulted in the emphasis on Chineseness in 
the Republic.  
 According to Barr, Lee Kuan Yew’s reading of the British historian Arnold 
Toynbee’s “Challenge and Response” fermented his views on environmental and 
biological determinism and eugenics, and Lee acknowledged Toynbee as enabling 
him to rationalize Chinese racial and cultural superiority.12  In fact, Barr claims that 
Lee began quoting Toynbee in Cabinet meetings as soon as the People’s Action Party 
(PAP) came into power in 1959.  Hence his comparison of the “more intense and 
exacting Sinic cultures of East Asia” with the “less demanding” values of the 
indigenous cultures of South and Southeast Asia which, he claimed, “accounts for the 
difference in industrial progress between Eastern and Southern Asia”.13  Barr, 
however, argues that in reading Toynbee, Lee developed a view of race on a narrower 
base of environmental determinism than that propounded by Toynbee.14   
 Another influential source for Lee was the Scandinavian social scientist 
Gunnar Myrdal who explains in his ‘Asian Drama’ why peoples in South and 
Southeast Asia – the “soft societies” – were subject to lower achievements.15  Lee’s 
belief in Chinese superiority was further enhanced by the Lamarckian16 theory of 
evolution and he came to the conclusion that intelligence was 80% genetic while only 
20% environmental.17  The ideas of theorists like Jensen, Darlington, Eysenck and 
Burt relating to the “genes and intelligence” link (though the legitimacy of some of 
their ideas, especially of Burt, have been questioned and discredited) were also used 
                                        
 
12  Arnold Toynbee, “Challenge and Response,” in The World and the West, (London: Oxford 
 University Press, 1953); Barr, “Lee Kuan Yew: Race, Culture and Genes,” 10. 
 
13  Lee’s commemorative lecture at Cambridge University quoted by Barr, “Lee Kuan Yew: Race, 
 Culture  and Genes,” 11. 
 
14  Barr, “Lee Kuan Yew: Race, Culture and Genes,” 13. 
 
15  Ibid., 11. 
 
16  Famous French naturalist and zoologist Jean Lamarck who developed a theory of evolution in     
which he postulated that acquired characteristics can be inherited by later generations. 
 
17  Lee Kuan Yew, “The Education of Women and Patterns of Procreation,” Bulletin (Singapore: 
Regional Institute of Higher Education and Development, August 1983); Clammer, Race and State in 
Independent Singapore, 162. 
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by the political leadership to justify government policies.18  By directly associating 
‘good’ glands or genes with ‘races’, Lee Kuan Yew expounded his view in a series of 
speeches in the 1960s, stating that people of “migrant stock” who come from harsher 
climates and who have inherited their ‘good glands’ from their parents pass them 
down through generations.19  This helps to explain his admiration for the Chinese of 
Southeast Asia who supposedly have genes that are hardier, tougher, and more 
enterprising and innovative than the genes of indigenous peoples of this region.  He 
captures the essence of this assertion with the following parable: 
Three women were brought to the Singapore General Hospital, each in the 
same condition and needing a blood transfusion.  The first, a Southeast Asian 
was given the transfusion but died a few hours later.  The second, a South 
Asian was also given a transfusion but died a few days later.  The third, an 
East Asian, was given a transfusion and survived.  That is the X factor in 
development.20  
Returning from a two-month tour of Australia and New Zealand in 1965, he extended 
his analogy to the tough migrant cultures of those countries and posited that Australia, 
New Zealand and Singapore had each produced societies with “a tremendous amount 
of enterprise” which he characterized as a “frontier spirit”.21  In this way he attempted 
to put the Chinese on par with Northern and Western Europeans.  
 His association of ‘race’ with genes is also demonstrated when he proudly 
proclaimed, with reference to the Chinese in Singapore, that very few such cities on 
the equator – the climate and the stupor, the heat and the humidity notwithstanding – 
have the cultural verve and dynamism of a migrant community which have made this 
                                        
18  Arthur R Jensen, Genetics and Education (London: Methuen, 1972); C D Darlington, The Evolution 
of Man and Society (London: Allen and Unwin, 1969); Hans Jurgen Eysenck, Race, Intelligence and 
Education (London: Temple Smith Ltd., 1971); Cyril Burt's most famous work on the genetics of 
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19  Barr, “Lee Kuan Yew: Race, Culture and Genes,” 13. 
 
20  Lee as quoted in Barr, 1. 
 
21  Lee’s speech at the Political Study Centre, Singapore, quoted in Barr, 14. 
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place throb with life and vitality.22  Hence his claim that the Malay ‘race’ was 
unenterprising and backward unlike the Chinese whose superior genes were 
responsible for the economic success of the Chinese and consequently that of 
Singapore.23  More and more Lee came to the conclusion that there was a link 
between the economic level of parents and the intelligence of children, leading Barr to 
conclude that Lee Kuan Yew was a ‘racist’, not only because he believed that “some 
races… were inherently superior to others” but also because he “integrated his racial 
views into his political agenda and created a regime which accentuate racial 
categorization”.24  According to Barr, Lee’s environmental determinism, Lamarckian 
view of evolution and cultural eugenics theory formulated by a host of theorists all 
combined to form the rationale for the eugenics programme for Singapore by 
“tinkering” with the cultures of the ethnic communities and thereby creating “a 
society which has a relatively low level of racial tension, despite having a high level 
of racial consciousness”.25  Lee’s ‘race’-based eugenics policies and the sinicization 
programme were directed to answering the challenges of Western cultural influence, 
degenerating genes and the search for talent to bolster Singapore’s economic 
performance.  These policies and programmes, enforced through coercion and 
dialogue, form the basis of most of the significant social engineering instruments that 
have governed the daily lives of Singaporeans since Singapore’s independence.26  
Citizens born after independence are a complete product of these policies and 
programmes and their responses and reactions are also articulated in this and 
subsequent chapters.  
                                        
 
22  Lee as quoted in Barr, 15. This is an interesting theory of vitalism that has long historic roots to 
 eugenics. 
 
23  James Minchin, No man is an Island. The public image of Malays is of a people lagging behind the  
 other ‘races’ in educational and economic achievement.  
 
24  Barr, “Lee Kuan Yew: Race, Culture and Genes,” 20-21. 
 
25  Ibid., 21. 
 
26  At this point it is pertinent to mention that the association of ‘race’ with socio-biology and scientific 
 racism in the Singapore context has conspicuously been absent in the works of Singapore’s 
 anthropologists, historians and social scientists. Though it is a practical reality in everyday Singapore, 
 the theme of ‘race’ itself is a hugely sensitive subject in the eyes of the state. Consequently public 
 utterances as well as academic and intellectual discourses on ‘race’ are frowned upon. Available 
 literature on this controversial theme is therefore mainly from foreign sources. 
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 Lee’s eugenics theory was also responsible for the ideology of meritocracy 
that was one of the tenets enshrined in the state’s founding themes. According to 
Tremewan, meritocracy institutionalized and “legitimated class hatred and racism” in 
Singapore because of the perceived connection between “intelligence, biological 
heredity and race or class”.27  Lee’s belief that intelligence was hereditary was 
reflected in his perception that the working class who were breeding most in 
Singapore, namely the Malays and Indians, possessed low levels of intelligence unlike 
the middle and upper Chinese classes.28  Hence his public references to working class 
Singaporeans as ‘digits’.29  In the rest of this chapter, I will explore the state’s policies 
and programmes relating to the family, the population and ‘Chineseness’, as well as 
their relationship to ‘race’.  At the same time we need to interrogate these 
programmes’ relationship with ‘racial’ identity, ‘ethnic’ identity and national identity 
by analyzing responses from my respondents.  
 
6.3  Family policies 
 
History in China is of dynasties that have risen and fallen, of the waxing and 
waning of society. And through all that turbulence, the family, the clan, has 
provided a kind of survival raft for the individual. Civilizations have 
collapsed, dynasties have been swept away by conquering hordes, but this life 
raft enables the civilization to carry on and get on to its next phase.              
 -  Lee Kuan Yew30
 This quote from a speech given by Lee in 1994 indicates the importance he 
placed on the family in Singaporean culture.  Romance and love in family harmony 
have also featured prominently in Chinese culture. His eugenics theories had their 
greatest impact on family and population policies which, since the time of 
independence, were implemented by “a mixture of publicity, exhortation and material 
                                        
 
27  Tremewan, The Political Economy of Social Control in Singapore, 102. 
 
28  Ibid., 115; Tables 9, 10, 11 and 13 show birth figures from Malays and Indians as compared to 
Chinese. 
 
29  T J S George, Lee Kuan Yew’s Singapore (Singapore: Eastern Universities Press, 1984), 132. 
 ‘Digits’ is a term Lee Kuan Yew used to describe the working classes and minority ‘races’ who failed 
 in the education system and therefore were considered to lack in natural ability. He felt that such people 
 might yet be improved through social engineering.  
 
30  “A Conversation with Lee Kuan Yew,” Foreign Affairs, (March/April 1994), 15. 
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incentives and disincentives” to control the country’s rate of population growth.31  It 
is in the eugenics programme that the techniques of the state’s hegemonic control and 
indoctrination reached their greatest heights. The mechanics of their implementation 
are first recounted here as a prelude to how they are linked to ‘race’ and ‘ethnicity’.  
 With falling death rates and continued high birth rates and immigration since 
the end of the Second World War, the Singapore nation state in the seventies saw 
rapid population growth as a threat to living standards, economic progress and 
political stability.  Various policies were initially introduced to reduce the birth rate 
including the setting up of a Eugenics Board as well as a Family Planning Board to 
authorize sterilizations.  Abortion and voluntary sterilization were legalized in 1970. 
Between 1969 and 1972, a set of policies known as "population disincentives" were 
instituted to raise the costs of bearing third, fourth, and subsequent children.  Civil 
servants only received paid two-month maternity leave for the first two children; 
maternity hospitals charged progressively higher maternity fees for each additional 
birth; and income tax deductions for more than three children were eliminated.  Large 
families received no extra consideration in public housing allotments, and top priority 
in the competition for enrolment into Primary I in the most desirable primary schools 
was given only to children whose parents had been sterilized before the age of forty 
with no enrolment priorities for third and higher-order children.  Voluntary 
sterilization was rewarded by seven days of paid sick leave and by priority in the 
allocation of such public benefits as housing, education, and the approval of work 
permits for foreigners wishing to marry Singaporeans and take up residence in 
Singapore.  The policies were accompanied by publicity campaigns urging parents to 
"Stop at Two" and “Girl or boy – two is enough”, arguing that large families 
threatened parents' present livelihood and future security: “small families have more 
to eat”.  The penalties weighed more heavily on the low income-earners, particularly 
the Malays, and were justified by the authorities as a means of encouraging the poor 
to concentrate their limited resources on adequately nurturing a few children who 
would be equipped to rise from poverty and become productive citizens.  
                                        
 
31  Saw Swee Hock, “Singapore: Population Control Policies” in Population Control for Zero Growth 
 in Singapore (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1989). 
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 As a result of these measures, fertility declined throughout the 1970s, reaching 
the replacement level of 1.006 in 1975, and thereafter declining below that level.32   
While the fertility levels of the Malays and Indians stabilized at about the replacement 
level, the fertility rate among the Chinese continued to decline to a level substantially 
below replacement. While 76% of the population was Chinese in 1985, only 69% of 
the babies born that year were Chinese.33  With fertility below replacement level, it 
was feared that the population would after some years begin to decline unless 
supplemented by immigration.  Interestingly, low levels of population growth were 
also accompanied by increasing affluence, education, women's participation in paid 
employment, and control of infectious diseases.  Table 3 below shows the rate of 
population growth over the years.  
Table 3 
Population and growth rate 
 
Year 
 
Total Population 
 
Growth Rate (Percent) 
 
Census 
1901 
1911 
1921 
1931 
1947 
1957 
1970 
1980 
1990 
2000 
 
 
 
227.6 
303.3 
418.4 
557.7 
938.1 
1,445.9 
2,074.5 
2,413.9 
3,047.1 
4,017.7 
 
 
n.a. 
2.9 
3.3 
2.9 
3.3 
4.4 
2.8 
1.5 
2.3 
2.8 
 
Source: Department of Statistics, Singapore. 
It is clear that government policies and publicity campaigns had combined with 
broader socioeconomic forces to promote later marriage and smaller families. 
Consequently, the government became alarmed by growing numbers of single 
                                        
32  Source: Department of Statistics, Singapore. 
 
33  Saw Swee Hock, Changes in the Fertility Policy of Singapore (Singapore: The Institute of Policy 
Studies, 1990).  
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women, a falling birth rate pursuant to a two-child family policy, and an ageing 
population, as the following tables show.34
Proportion of singles 
Table 4 
Proportion of female singles in age group 30-39 
 
Total 
  1980         1990 
 
Chinese 
  1980           1990 
 
Malays 
  1980          1990 
 
Indians 
  1980          1990 
 
Others 
  1980          1990 
 
  13.4          18.1 
 
  14.1        19.2 
 
  10.2       12.2 
 
   9.9       16.0 
 
  15.8       14.9 
 
Source: Department of Statistics, Singapore. 
 
Table 5 
Proportion of female singles in age group 35-44 
 
Total 
  1990         2000 
 
Chinese 
  1990           2000 
 
Malays 
  1990         2000 
 
Indians 
  1990         2000 
 
Others 
  1990         2000 
 
  13.3      14.4 
 
  14.1       16.0 
 
  9.0      8.5 
 
  11.0      9.0 
 
  11.0      9.0 
 
Source: Department of Statistics, Singapore. 
 
Overall the “singlehood” rate has been increasing further in the last two decades as 
the above tables show.  At the key age group of 25-44 years, one in five females was 
still unmarried according to the Singapore Department of Statistics. Singlehood was 
most prevalent among graduate females and has been associated with greater 
participation in education and employment and correspondingly the increasing trend 
towards later marriage. The Chinese had higher proportions of older, unmarried 
females than the Malays and Indians, reflecting the trend towards late marriages 
among the Chinese. The Malays had the lowest proportion of singles in any age 
group. The above tables also show trends among different age groups between the 
census of 1980, 1990 and 2000.   
Ageing population 
The population had grown older in 2000 (the last census). Between 1980 and 2000, 
the median age rose from 24 years in 1980 to 34 years in 2000 as shown in Table 6 
below. 
                                        
34  The state persisted with this policy long after the demographics had changed and later labour 
 shortages were to emerge resulting in new race-based approaches to immigration – see discussion on 
 population policy in this chapter (6.4).  
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Table 6 
Median Age (years) 
 
Total 
1980  1990  2000 
 
Chinese 
1980  1990  2000 
 
Malays 
1980  1990  2000 
 
Indians 
1980  1990  2000 
 
Others 
1980  1990  2000 
 
   24     29      34 
 
25     30     35 
 
21     26     29 
 
25     29     33 
 
28     30     33 
 
Source: Department of Statistics, Singapore. 
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Tables 7 and 8 below further indicate the ageing of the population between different 
age groups during the years 1980 to 2000. 
Table 7 
Persons aged 60 years and over (percent) 
 
Total 
 1980            1990 
 
Chinese 
  1980          1990 
 
Malays 
1980           1990 
 
Indians 
1980           1990 
 
Others 
 1980            1990 
 
 7.5        9.1 
  
 
  8.0       9.4 
 
4.8      7.2 
 
6.2      9.7 
 
 9.5        11.6 
Source: Department of Statistics, Singapore. 
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Table 8 
Persons aged 65 years and over (percent) 
 
Total 
1990          2000 
 
Chinese 
1990          2000 
 
Malays 
1990          2000 
 
Indians 
1990          2000 
 
Others 
1990          2000 
 
8.5   10.2 
 
8.8 10.4 
 
6.4 8.8 
 
7.9 11.2 
 
11.7 11.2 
 
Source: Department of Statistics, Singapore. 
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Fertility rate 
While Table 9 below shows the overall decline in fertility rates for the whole 
population, Tables 10 and 11 show that the Chinese had the lowest fertility, the 
Malays highest and the Indians in between. 
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Table 9 
Total fertility rates 
Age 
group 
(Years) 
 
1994 
 
1999 
 
2000 
(per  
 
2001 
thousand 
 
2002 
females) 
 
2003 
 
2004 
 
15-19 
20-24 
25-29 
30-34 
35-39 
40-44 
 
7.4 
46.9 
129.1 
109.1 
42.6 
6.7 
 
 
8.4 
37.2 
105.0 
97.5 
38.5 
6.4 
 
 
8.8 
42.2 
110.0 
107.7 
43.3 
7.6 
 
8.4 
35.7 
96.1 
94.6 
39.4 
6.8 
 
8.4 
34.6 
91.4 
95.9 
38.0 
5.8 
 
6.6 
32.3 
81.9 
88.3 
35.5 
6.0 
 
6.5 
32.1 
80.2 
88.3 
34.8 
6.2 
 
 
   
Per 
 
female 
   
Total 
Fertility 
rate 
 
 
 
1.71 
 
 
1.41 
 
 
1.60 
 
 
1.41 
 
 
1.37 
 
 
1.25 
 
 
1.24 
Source: Department of Statistics, Singapore. 
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Table 10 
Number of children born (per female) 
 
Total 
1980  1990  2000 
 
Chinese 
1980  1990  2000 
 
Malays 
1980  1990  2000 
 
Indians 
1980  1990  2000 
 
Others 
1980  1990  2000 
 
3.4     2.9     2.5 
 
 
3.4     2.8     2.5 
 
3.9     3.2     3.1 
 
3.4    2.7     2.4 
 
2.8     2.3     2.0 
Source: Department of Statistics, Singapore. 
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Table 11 
Crude birth rates by ethnic group 1970 – 2004 
 
Year 
 
Total 
 
Chinese 
 
Malays 
 
Indians 
 
Others 
 
1970 
1980 
1990 
2000 
2004 
 
 
 
22.1 
17.6 
18.2 
13.7 
10.1 
 
21.8 
16.6 
16.4 
12.6 
9.0 
 
 
23.5 
20.2 
25.8 
18.1 
13.6 
 
21.9 
19.8 
20.2 
14.2 
11.5 
 
26.5 
42.1 
38.2 
27.9 
23.0 
Note: Crude birth rate refers to the number of live births per thousand population. 
Source: Department of Statistics, Singapore. 
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Besides Others, Malays still registered the highest birth rate of 13.6 per 1000 residents 
followed by Indians of 11.5 per 1000 residents. Chinese registered the lowest rate of 
9.0 per 1000 residents. According to the Department of Statistics, in terms of the 
proportion of mothers below 25 years of age, Malays were the youngest (26.1%), 
followed by Indians (17.0%) and Chinese (7.0%). The average family size had also 
become smaller, the Chinese having the smallest family size in 2000. The decline in 
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family size has been associated with the trend towards delay in marriages as Table 12 
below shows.  
Table 12 
Average number of children born by ethnic group 
 
Age 
 
Chinese 
1980  1990  2000 
 
Malays 
1980  1990  2000 
 
 
Indians 
1980  1990  2000 
 
Others 
1980  1990  2000 
 
 
Total 
<30 
30-39 
40-40 
>50 
 
3.3     2.8     2.5 
2.9     0.9     0.6 
5.2     1.8     1.6 
8.9     2.6     2.1 
4.9     4.5     3.7 
  
 
3.8     3.2     3.1 
3.3     1.3     1.4 
6.8     2.4     2.4 
11.8    3.5     2.8 
5.7     5.9     4.9 
 
3.3     2.7     2.4 
3.0     1.1     1.0 
5.9     2.0     1.9 
9.3     2.9     2.2 
5.3     4.7     3.9 
 
2.2     2.3     2.0 
1.8     0.9     1.0 
3.9     1.6     1.6 
5.8     2.2     1.9 
3.4     3.7     3.0 
Source: Department of Statistics, Singapore. 
There was also a strong correlation between family size and educational level of the 
females. On average, university graduates in all age groups had the fewest children, 
largely due to late marriage among the graduates as Table 13 below shows. 
Table 13 
Average number of children born by highest qualification attained and age group of 
married females 
 
Age 
 
<Secondary 
1990     2000 
 
Secondary 
1990     2000 
 
 
 
>Secondary 
1990     2000 
 
 
University 
1990     2000 
 
Total 
Below 30 
30-39 
40-49 
50 & over 
 
3.4     3.3 
1.2     1.3 
2.1     2.1 
3.0     2.4 
4.8     4.2 
 
1.6     1.9 
0.9     0.9 
1.7     1.8 
2.1     2.1 
3.0     2.5 
 
1.5 1.5 
0.6 0.6 
1.5 1.5 
2.1 2.0 
2.8     2.3 
 
1.4 1.3 
0.4 0.4 
1.4 1.3 
2.0 1.9 
2.5 2.2 
 
Source: Department of Statistics, Singapore. 
On average, university graduates had the highest proportion (28%) with no children or 
only one child. In 2000 married graduate females had 1.3 children compared with 2.1 
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children for those with below secondary qualifications. Women without any 
qualification had the highest fertility and those with tertiary qualification the lowest. 
More females were also marrying later than before. The delay in marriage occurred 
for females at all levels of qualification and in all the main ethnic groups over the 
years as Table 14 below shows. 
Table 14 
Average age at first marriage by year of marriage (years) 
  
1960 
 
 
1961-70 
 
1971-80 
 
1981-90 
 
1991-2000 
 
Ethnic group 
Chinese 
Malays 
Indians  
Others 
 
Qualification 
<Secondary 
Secondary 
>Secondary 
University 
 
 
20.7 
17.7 
18.0 
21.1 
 
 
20.0 
22.0 
23.7 
24.5 
 
 
23.3 
19.9 
20.3 
23.2 
 
 
22.4 
23.2 
24.6 
25.3 
 
 
24.3 
21.7 
22.1 
23.8 
 
 
23.6 
23.8 
24.6 
25.2 
 
 
26.1 
23.5 
24.0 
25.7 
 
 
25.3 
25.3 
25.9 
26.3 
 
 
 
26.9 
24.8 
25.3 
27.0 
 
 
26.9 
26.3 
26.3 
26.9 
Source: Department of Statistics, Singapore. 
Age at first marriage is a key factor for fertility as women marrying in their teens have 
a longer reproductive life span than those marrying later. The trend towards marrying 
at an older age reflected the longer period spent in education, the gradual discarding 
of the traditional practice of early marriage, the increasing economic independence of 
females over the years as well as the rapid socio-economic development of Singapore.  
 It was clear that the population control programme instituted in the mid-sixties 
had succeeded beyond the state’s anticipation, so that a situation was created whereby 
the replacement rate especially for the Chinese population had by the late 1970s 
declined drastically.  Worse still was that the better-educated Chinese women were 
having fewer children, marrying later or not marrying at all. Male university graduates 
also compounded the problem by preferring less highly educated wives. Singapore 
was also experiencing the lowest birth rates since independence among all three major 
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ethnic groups. Typically exhibiting a concern with breeding and with Singapore’s 
better educated and wealthier Chinese majority which was neither replacing itself nor 
raising the quality of “racial” stock, Lee warned the nation in his 1983 National Day 
message that 
 If we continue to reproduce ourselves in this lopsided way, we will be unable 
to maintain our present standards. Levels of competence will decline. Our 
economy will falter; administration will suffer; and society will decline.   
He continued by saying:  
If you don’t include your women graduates in your breeding pool and leave 
them on the shelf, you would end up a more stupid society…. So what 
happens?  There will be less bright people to support dumb people in the next 
generation.  
 Later, in a 1990 speech, he spoke of it as a dilemma because it meant that “50% of 
graduate girls will either marry down, marry foreigners, or stay unhappy”.  The state 
contended that graduates in particular produced brighter and more intelligent babies 
and therefore were more likely to be capable of parenting given their scholastic merits 
– hence an overwhelming emphasis on academic qualifications in Singapore’s 
meritocracy drive.   
The government therefore acted by introducing new eugenics policies and, 
although these policies appeared non-racial, they were in fact racially targeted in 
favour of the Chinese.  Table 15 below shows graduate levels according to ethnicity, 
with the Chinese graduate population showing marked increases over the years when 
compared with Indian and Malay graduates.  The increases among the Chinese have 
meant a corresponding reduction in their female graduates giving birth, limiting the 
number of births, delaying them, or in the case of singles staying away from marriage 
altogether – a problem that Indians and Malays do not encounter.  Hence the 
‘eugenic’ state's dilemma. 
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Table 15 
Number of graduates by ethnicity (percent) 
  
1980 
 
1990 
 
2000 
 
Chinese 
Malays 
Indians 
Others 
 
1.5 
0.2 
1.4 
2.2 
 
4.6 
1.0 
3.1 
3.2 
 
5.9 
0.7 
2.6 
2.8 
 
Source: Department of Statistics, Singapore. 
 The Graduate Mothers Scheme was therefore implemented in January 1984, 
giving preferential school admission to children whose mothers were university 
graduates and additional income tax relief, while offering grants of S$10,000 to less 
educated, low-earning women below 30 years of age who agreed to be sterilized after 
the birth of their first or second child.35  Prof Saw Swee Hock explains, “what it 
means is that the policy encourages those who are less educated… to undergo 
sterilization”.36  In 1984 at the height of the Great Marriage Debate, the state also 
established a Social Development Unit (SDU) to act as matchmaker for unmarried 
university graduates, and slogans like “Make a little room for love” became regular 
catch-phrases.  The SDU provided opportunities for single graduates to interact and 
find their life partner through its socialization and match making programmes.37  
Ridiculed as a dating agency for the “Single, Desperate and Ugly”, the SDU matches 
graduate Singaporeans – for the most part Chinese – who have little time or simply do 
not know how to find a romantic partner.  The new unit even arranged love boat 
cruises to take such graduates on romantic trips up the Singapore River, coyly 
announcing: “We just provide the intro – the rest is up to you”.  Other measures 
included speed dating according to Chinese zodiac dates. Several television and SDU 
commercials also exhorted young university-educated males and females to get 
                                        
35  Reported in The Straits Times of 24 January 1984. 
 
36  Saw Swee Hock, “Changes in the Fertility Policy of Singapore”, 1990.  
 
37  The Government announced on 17 November 2006 that the SDU was being disbanded, leaving 
matchmaking activities to more glamourous private dating agencies and professional matchmakers. In 
announcing the move, the state acknowledged that it had been “unable to shake off its image as a state-
controlled dating agency”, as reported in The Straits Times of 18 November 2006. Singles, disliking the 
stigma attached to the SDU, also questioned the need for the government to get involved in something 
as private as dating.  
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married and procreate. One such commercial from the SDU featured a young graduate 
Chinese father proudly cradling his infant daughter. Flushing with pride, he says, 
“Now for the first time I realized what life was really about – not money, not status, 
but the future and here in my arms was the future and we were a family”. Another 
agency, the Social Development Service (SDS) catered to singles with no tertiary 
education.  Many of the policies, especially those affecting placement of children in 
the highly competitive Singapore schools, proved controversial and were generally 
unpopular because they were considered by the minority communities as elitist and as 
favouring the Chinese.  
 My Indian and Malay respondents almost unanimously point both to the 
importance of the subtle measures undertaken by the state to boost the Chinese 
population and the importance accorded to Chinese graduate women, both single and 
married.  To varying degrees they show their displeasure at what they perceive to be 
the state’s obsession with Chinese graduate women and their inability to produce 
sufficient babies to match the Indians and Malays.  They attribute this concern to 
insecurity and the fear that in the years to come Chinese dominance would be 
undermined by their diminishing numbers.  “I don’t understand why the Government 
is so paranoid about this subject!” questions Premavathy a nurse.  Agreeing Rambai, a 
44-year old mother of three says, “I think it’s most unfair for the Government to have 
given special treatment to the Chinese.  What about their call for multiracialism and 
equal rights and opportunities for all? This policy is most discriminatory”.  Another 
mother, 58-year old Radha, says she felt cheated as a non-graduate because she did 
not agree with the state’s socio-biological view that graduate women produced more 
intelligent children:  
I could not go to the university simply because I did not have the means to do 
so, yet the Government thinks I’m stupid and incapable of producing bright 
children. But I’ve three very bright children, one a doctor, another software 
engineer and the third an architect. 
Yet again another non-graduate Indian working mother says that her children were 
disadvantaged by not getting to the school of their choice, as opposed to her graduate 
neighbour’s children.  She was also deprived of the additional tax benefits that only 
graduate mothers receive from the state.  “The biggest blow was that I had to undergo 
sterilization because the Government felt that as a non-graduate I should not have 
more children”, says Pratibha.  
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 In 1985 the Graduate Mother’s Scheme was abandoned or modified on the 
grounds that it had not been effective at increasing the fertility of educated women 
and that the birth pattern was becoming ‘racially’ lopsided.  The state in 1986 
therefore decided to reverse its family planning program to reflect its identification of 
the low birth rate among the Chinese as one of the country's most serious problems. 
With the overall birth rate still falling, the old family-planning slogan of "Stop at 
Two" was replaced by "Have Three or More, if You Can Afford It" and new 
legislation introduced. A new package of incentives for large families entirely 
reversed the earlier incentives for small families. It included tax rebates for third 
children, subsidies for day-care, priority in school enrolment for children from large 
families, priority in assignment of large families to Housing and Development Board 
apartments, extended sick leave for civil servants to look after sick children and up to 
four years' unpaid maternity leave for civil servants. Pregnant women were offered 
increased counselling to discourage "abortions of convenience" or sterilization after 
the birth of one or two children. All these measures were targeted at the Chinese 
although officially it was proclaimed as applicable to everybody. Malays were not 
considered affected as they were perceived by the state as not having a problem with 
natural growth unlike the Chinese (see Tables 9-12). It should be noted that these 
incentives were aimed at graduates in the first instance, Chinese graduates in 
particular, given the varied rates of education levels according to ‘race’.  Despite 
these measures, the mid-1986 to mid-1987 total fertility rate reached a historic low of 
1.44 children per woman, far short of the replacement level of 2.1 demographers 
considered as necessary for population stability. The state reacted in October 1987 by 
urging Singaporeans not to "passively watch ourselves going extinct."  The low birth 
rates reflected late marriages (see Table 14), and the Social Development Unit 
extended its matchmaking activities to those holding Advanced level (A-level) 
secondary educational qualifications as well as to university graduates.  The 
government also announced a public relations campaign to promote the joys of 
marital bliss and parenthood.  In March 1989, the government announced a S$20,000 
tax rebate for fourth children born after January 1, 1988 and paid maternity leave for 
parents expecting their third child. The population policies demonstrated the state's 
assumption that its citizens were responsive to monetary incentives and to 
administrative allocation of the government's medical, educational, and housing 
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benefits. Changing living standards and social expectations have shown them to be 
otherwise (see Tables 4 and 5, 9-15). 
 As the birth rate continued to decline the government began to urge all citizens 
“to go forth and multiply”.38  A Ministry of Community Development and Sports 
survey of 1,481 respondents released in September 2002 pointed out the alarming fact 
that only half of the females (in their 30s) surveyed expressed their desire to get 
married compared to 87% for men in the same age group.  The state then launched a 
variety of new programmes over a period of years encouraging couples to have more 
children by offering increased tax, financial, educational, housing and other 
incentives. Dating guides and manuals as well as online dating websites and an annual 
“Romancing Singapore” campaign have now become common. The state is not alone 
in pushing parenthood. A Singapore doctor, Wei Siang Yu, known as Dr. Love, has 
produced a reality television show for the Asia-Pacific region in which couples 
compete to be the first to conceive. The Government also introduced a Baby Bonus 
Scheme (for babies of married couples) in April 2001 with benefits for the second and 
third child to encourage couples to have more children. The scheme was enhanced in 
August 2004 and extended to the first and fourth child. The benefits of the scheme are 
as shown in Table 16 below: 
Table 16 
Baby bonus scheme benefits 
 
Birth order 
 
Cash gift from  
Government 
 
Maximum matching 
Government 
contribution 
 
Total benefits 
 
First 
Second 
Third 
Fourth 
 
$3,000 
$3,000 
$6,000 
$6,000 
 
__ 
$6,000 
$12,000 
$12,000 
 
$3,000 
Up to $9,000 
Up to $18,000 
Up to $18,000 
 
 
 
                                        
38  From a 2000 National Day Rally Speech (on 20.8.2000) by Singapore’s ex-Prime Minister and now 
 Senior Minister, Goh Chok Tong. He also said,” We must try to arrest the problem… . Family adds 
 warmth and meaning to our lives. Friends are important, but a family is indispensable”.  
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Maternity leave for the mother has also been extended from 8 to 12 weeks with 
additional childcare benefits and a lower maid levy. 
   Despite all these measures, the fertility level has fallen below the rate needed 
for the natural replacement of the population, making Singapore increasingly 
dependent on foreign labour and raising the spectre of a ‘graying’ population and 
higher social welfare costs. A major reason for the decline in births, at least according 
to certain sociologists and doctors, is stress arising from the state ideology’s over-
emphasis on material success, and academic and work achievement. Singaporeans are 
supposedly so focused on these achievements that they now have less sex than people 
in other countries and therefore fewer babies, says Victor Goh, an obstetrician and 
fertility expert at National University Hospital, who conducted a study on sexual 
habits in 2002.  Goh calls this condition “lifestyle impotency.” People had “nothing 
wrong with the mechanics of sex but were just too stressed out in life” to mate, he 
said. Stress appears to be the byproduct of the government’s push to keep the 
economy growing, notes Chua Beng Huat, a sociology professor at the National 
University of Singapore.  “One of the most radical things you can do in Singapore is 
to be contented with your life,” he said.  “That means you won’t compete like hell for 
the next dollar [but] the ability of the government to maintain its competitive edge 
economically will collapse.”39 This second scenario the state will not accept. People 
have been conditioned to excel as they have bought into the work ethic almost as a 
national duty. As Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong, who relinquished office in 2004, 
has said: “Surveys continue to show that our young place financial and career goals 
ahead of family formation”.40
 As of 2004, Singapore’s birth rate has sunk to an all-time low of 1.24 babies 
per woman, according to the latest census figures from the Singapore Department of 
Statistics (see Table 9).  Raising it has become a national cause as significant as the 
fight against terrorism. If the birth rate continues to wane, officials warn, the 
workforce will shrink and productivity will suffer. There will be fewer people to 
support a growing elderly population and to sustain the military that protects the 460 
square-mile island sandwiched between Indonesia and Malaysia.  Goh Chok Tong had 
                                        
39  Chua Beng Huat, Communitarian Ideology and Democracy in Singapore (London and New York: 
Routledge, 1995).   
 
40  Policy statement issued in Parliament after a debate on pressing national issues ended on Friday, 5 
 April 2002.  
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this to say: “This decline in our marriage and procreation rates is clearly a national 
problem,” warning that a baby shortage could threaten Singapore’s economy and 
survival as a nation in the long term.41  In other words, if educated women do not 
reproduce, the quality of Singapore’s population would decline.42  “This is a matter of 
values, not of incentives,” new Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong says in his 2004 
National Day speech.  “We want people to have babies because you want them and 
you love them. It’s part of a happy family life”.  But not everybody agrees with what 
the government leaders claim.  Says a respondent Muniamma, a 55-year old hospital 
attendant, “By offering incentives to women who are university graduates – the 
government means Chinese – they are just trying to increase the number of ethnic 
Chinese”.  Yet because of work pressures, childcare has become a major issue and 
related to it is the problem of foreign maids, seen by the middle class as essential 
items for having both children and continuing to make money. Thus the severe 
regulations and conditions imposed by the state to discourage such maids whilst 
acknowledging the need for such labour (see Chapter 4.4).  
 Another family policy emanating from the declining birth rate among 
Singaporeans concerns the rights to citizenship: as from 15 May 2004, children born 
to Singapore women abroad are able to obtain Singapore citizenship by the mother’s 
descent.  Singaporean men residing abroad had already been permitted to pass on their 
citizenship to their children born overseas.  In a statement released by the Immigration 
and Checkpoints Authority (ICA), it was claimed that the law will become gender 
neutral to reflect the trend of increasing numbers of Singaporean men and women 
travelling overseas. Suffice to mention that a large number of Singaporean women 
living abroad include university graduates or the equivalent and are mainly ethnic 
Chinese, demonstrating once again that all these policies have a racial dimension. 
 
6.4  Population policy 
 Population trends in Singapore since the colonial period show that 
transnational immigration has always been a vital part of Singapore’s demographic 
history and is directly linked to its economic development.   By 1827 the Chinese 
                                        
 
41   Policy statement issued in Parliament after a debate on pressing national issues ended on Friday, 5 
 April 2002.  
 
42  Saw, Changes in the Fertility Policy of Singapore.  
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were already the major community in Singapore reaching 63% by 1881 and by 1914 
comprised more than 75% of the total population, a proportion that is carefully 
maintained and managed by the nation state today.43 Both the colonial and 
postcolonial governments have seen it desirable to keep this racial balance intact 
because of its presumed significance to the economy of Singapore.  ‘Unhappiness’ 
[read, economic failure] would result if significant changes were made to the racial 
make-up, according to then Deputy Prime Minister and now Prime Minister Lee 
Hsien Loong.44  Importantly the state relies on economic success for the maintenance 
of racial harmony in the multiracial, multicultural, multilingual and multireligious 
nation state.  Senior PAP leaders have all reiterated the importance of economic 
progress for the wellbeing of the nation.   Saying that ‘race’ was a human instinct that 
would not go away, Lee Kuan Yew emphasised in his 1989 National Day speech that 
altering the balance would mean economic problems.  Lee said: 
Let us just maintain the status quo.  And we have to maintain it or there will be 
a shift in the economy, both the economic performance and the political 
backdrop that makes that economy possible.   
Alluding to the perceived ‘superiority’ of the Chinese people and their ‘race’ – the 
result of his eugenics philosophy - he said: 
You look at the educational levels of the performers.  It has got to do with 
culture, nature and so many other factors.  But year after year, this is the end 
result… The formula has worked.  Keep it. 
 Population control policies since independence have been formulated to 
“achieve a population of a certain size and quality”, according to Tamney, with 
selective immigration (besides encouraging a higher birth rate) increasingly 
becoming, in the words of then National Development Minister S Dhanabalan, an 
“important tool to solve Singapore’s population problem”.45  This has been the main 
thrust of the state’s eugenics programme as spelt out by Prime Minister Lee in a 
Parliament Select Committee Report passed in 1969.  Referring to “…less 
                                        
  
43   Source: Department of Statistics, Singapore.   
  
44  The Straits Times, 3 Feb 1991.  
  
45  Tamney, The Struggle over Singapore’s Soul, 75; S Dhanabalan, Minister of National Development, 
in a speech on 19 August 1989 to celebrate National Day. 
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economically productive people reproducing themselves at rates higher than the rest,” 
he reiterated that this situation will “increase the total population of less productive 
people” whom he called “the irresponsible, the social delinquents”.  He therefore 
recommended that measures be taken to raise the “total quality” of the population by 
“correcting a trend which can leave our society with a large number of the physically, 
intellectually and culturally anaemic”.46  Referring to the quality of the population, he 
said at a National Day Rally Speech in 1986: 
I am often accused of interfering in the private lives of citizens.  Yet, if I did 
not, had I not done that, we wouldn’t be here today.  And I say without the 
slightest remorse… we would not have made economic progress if we had 
not intervened on very personal matters… .47
 To maintain the Chinese ratio and expand their “talent pool”48, the state has 
therefore been silently and covertly accelerating immigration of skilled people from 
‘traditional sources’, namely, Hong Kong/China/Taiwan to settle in Singapore on the 
grounds that it was necessary to keep Singapore’s “racial balance”.49  In 1989 
immigration rules were liberalized to absorb 25,000 Hong Kong skilled workers, the 
state emphasizing that such a move would not upset the existing racial proportions 
that would remain intact.  However controversy raged over the state’s decision, 
leading people especially the minority communities to question its motives.50  Was it 
a necessity born out of a need to take more immigrants or was it an attempt to 
maintain and institutionalize Chinese dominance?  The reality of the race theme was 
that many among the minorities saw themselves being disadvantaged by ethnic 
Chinese immigrants.  Lee Kuan Yew himself drew reference to a straw poll taken 
which showed that a clear majority of Chinese in Singapore agreed to the policy of 
taking in more of their own kind from Hong Kong, while a clear majority of Malays 
and Indians were unhappy with it.51  In the eyes of the minorities, the state’s top-
                                        
46   Abortion Bill, Third Reading, 29 December 1969, Select Committee Report, 321-3, as reported  in 
Tremewan, The Political Economy of Social Control in Singapore, 103. 
 
47  Reported in The Straits Times, 20 April 1987. 
  
48   Ibid., 15 August 1983. 
  
49  Ibid., 29 July 1989.  
 
50  Ibid., 21 August 1989. 
  
51   Ibid., 31 August 1989. 
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down      decision served to perpetuate the position of the Chinese as the dominant 
community in Singapore.  Conversely, the minorities saw themselves as minorities in 
perpetuity so long as the state’s policy was maintained.  Asks Raj Kumar, a 58-year 
old medical practitioner:  
If the Government believes in fair and equal treatment of the races under its 
policy of multiracialism, why impose quotas on the racial balance?  Is it 
because the Malays are seen to reproduce faster than the other communities?  
Why import talent only from China? Why not from India?  
While the minorities saw the quota policy as unfair and unethical, the state countered 
this concern by arguing that if the Chinese formed the dominant community it is not 
because of machinations but because of natural migration which saw them as a 
majority community ever since 1871 (when the first census was taken) and possibly 
even earlier – see Table 17 below), a status quo that the minorities had accepted as 
normal all along and hence one there was no reason to tinker with.   
Table 17 
Racial proportions of Singapore’s population (1871-2000) (percent) 
 
Race  
 
1871 
 
1911 
 
1947 
 
1957 
 
1970 
 
1980 
 
1990 
 
2000 
 
Chinese 
Malays 
Indians 
Others 
 
 
56.2 
26.9 
11.8 
5.1 
 
71.4 
15.0 
9.0 
4.6 
 
77.6 
12.3 
7.3 
2.8 
 
75.4 
13.6 
9.0 
2.0 
 
76.2 
15.0 
7.0 
1.8 
 
76.9 
14.6 
6.4 
2.1 
 
77.8 
14.0 
7.1 
1.1 
 
76.8 
13.9 
7.9 
1.4 
Source: Department of Statistics, Singapore. 
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 Justifying the policy of encouraging Hong Kong skilled workers into 
Singapore, then National Development Minister, S Dhanabalan felt that the Chinese 
dominant race was good for Singapore saying that making up “75% of the population 
they don’t feel threatened”, hence “they would be prepared to make more effort to 
meet the sensitivities of the minorities… they can accept talented Malays and 
Indians”.  The Indian minority had feared that a major inflow of qualified, skilled 
immigrants from Hong Kong would reduce their numbers in Singapore.  
Notwithstanding the Government’s assurance that their position in Singapore would 
not be eroded and that the existing racial composition would remain intact, many 
among them still feel insecure, their insecurity being compounded by the emigration 
of a disproportionately high number of well-educated Indians from Singapore.  Says 
an Indian employee in a private company, 45-year old Kumaran, “The Government 
only thinks of improving the Chinese race at the expense of minorities like us.  Even 
our Indian PAP MPs and Ministers agree with this policy – they are just ‘yes’ men”.   
Such a response is echoed by many other Indian respondents.   Being aware of the 
situation and to allay the fears of the Indian minority the Government therefore 
moved to attract talented overseas Indians to replace those who had emigrated and to 
strengthen the community.   In this way the state has reiterated its desire to maintain 
the racial balance.  One reason adduced by the state for Indian Singaporeans 
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emigrating was their mobility and strength in English, a factor generated by the 
success of the state’s bilingual policy and emphasis on English – social engineering 
policies that had been the pillar of its multiracial policy.  Notwithstanding the state’s 
stand on racial balance, many Indians still feel threatened by the state’s emphasis on 
Chineseness and on the Chinese population as the cornerstone for economic progress 
and social stability.  Twenty-eight year old construction foreman Murugaiyah 
laments, “Our jobs are being taken away by these Chinese immigrants, simply 
because they are Chinese, even though they don’t speak good English”.   Distribution 
of the population is certainly seen as an issue of ‘race’ in Singapore, though the 
government is aware that such sensitivities should not upset racial or religious 
sentiments and emotions.   
 Further, numerous undergraduate and postgraduate scholarships are offered to 
candidates from China in stark contrast to placements of students from India and other 
neighbouring countries.   In addition, companies recruiting technical and professional 
employees from China have their work and employment permits fast-tracked.  
Permanent Resident permits are also readily dangled in front of them and they come 
with most of the rights and duties accorded to citizens, with a further advantage over 
Singapore citizens in the fact that they are exempted from military service.  The 
official justification is that as Singapore is mainly culturally Chinese it is easier for 
Chinese nationals to adjust to local society and therefore become more productive.  
Another justification is that China is looked upon as the next economic superpower, 
and building relationships and networks with Chinese students and business 
entrepreneurs would create benefits to Singapore in the long run.   More telling is Lee 
Kuan Yew’s scientific reasoning in terms of “innate ethnic qualities” when comparing 
East Asians to Malays.52  In addition, he considers that,  
Climate and diet may have given East Asians a cultural edge over Southeast 
Asians in coping with modern economic development.  They may account in 
part for the intense, thrifty, and largely secular societies of China, Japan, 
Korea and Vietnam.53
 In line with this approach to population policies, the state is seen by my 
respondents to recruit short-term, low-skilled and darker-complexioned labourers 
                                        
52  The Mirror, 21 October 1968.  
 
53   Lee Kuan Yew, Lecture at Columbia University, New York, reported in Eastern Sun, 23 December 
 1968. 
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from countries like India, Bangladesh, Thailand, Sri Lanka and Philippines on a ‘use-
and-discard’ policy with several restrictive conditions attached (see Chapter 4.4).54   
Says Kurup, a 56-year old manager of an employment agency recruiting foreign 
workers into Singapore, “The Government mostly imports low-skilled labour from 
these countries.  Why such a wide disparity – why not predominantly from China 
where labour is equally cheap?”  The ‘easier-to-adjust’ response given by the state 
should apply just as much, the argument goes.  Some of my respondents also perceive 
that the state prefers to recruit brown and darker-complexioned workers because they 
are easily identifiable from the local majority Chinese and therefore greater 
surveillance can be exercised on their conduct in Singapore.  “They can be easily 
spotted and punished if they overstay” says Arokiasamy, a 43-year old labour 
consultant working for a private firm.   Similar arguments are put forward by other 
respondents, including Thayalan, a 39-year old stevedoring clerk in a shipping 
company, who sums it all up in the following words, “I think the government is 
discriminating between the races”, a view not disputed by many of my participants.   
 With ‘racial’ and ‘ethnic’ identity being an underlying factor in immigration 
policy dividing foreign workers coming to Singapore, the question of national identity 
and nation building based on the CMIO model of multiracialism and multiculturalism 
becomes more problematic because of the complexities of social interaction derived 
from ethnic categories prevailing in Singapore society.   The Chinese ‘race’, presented 
as ‘racially’ and culturally superior, is seen to be exclusionary of minority 
communities in Singapore and therefore as not appreciating the linguistic and cultural 
worlds of other ‘races’ or ethnicities.  With the politics of sameness and difference 
becoming more complex within each ‘race’, the task of forging a national identity 
based on the CMIO model of separate-but-equal ‘races’ becomes even more difficult.  
This difficulty is seen to multiply manifold when the plight of the Malays and Indians 
in Singapore is examined.  Government leaders building upon common stereotypical 
perceptions complicate the rhetoric of national identity by asserting that the Chinese 
                                        
 
54   Brenda S A Yeoh, S Huang and J Gonzales, “Migrant Female Domestic Workers: Debating the 
 Economic, Social and Political Impact in Singapore,” International Migration Review 33, 1 (1999): 
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have a business culture whereas the Malays and Indians, if they are to compete in the 
national economy, need to acquire one.55
 
6.5  ‘Chineseness’ of Singapore  
 With ethnic Chinese comprising about 77% of the population, one may be 
forgiven for categorizing the city-state as a Chinese nation – indeed prominent neo-
Confucian scholar Wei-ming Tu calls the island city “a sanitized version of Chinese 
society” and emphasizes its Chineseness.56  There is no single definition of the term 
‘Chineseness’.   However, it is normally referred to as the identity displayed by 
overseas Chinese who articulate identifiable cultural standards and the socio-cultural 
traits of being a Chinese, largely as a result of the re-emergence of China and the 
resurgence of Chinese pride worldwide.  In Singapore, as in China, ‘Chineseness’ is 
primarily defined as a matter of blood and descent combined with a sense of cultural 
pride emanating from the Chinese ‘yellow race’, which is often described as endowed 
with superior attributes in comparison to the ‘black race’ and the ‘brown race’.   As 
Dr Sun Yat-sen, the leading proponent of a Chinese nation-race said in his famous 
Three Principles of the People: 
The greatest force is common blood.   The Chinese belong to the yellow race 
because they come from the blood stock of the yellow race.  The blood of 
ancestors is transmitted by heredity down through the race, making blood 
kinship a powerful force.57   
A textbook used in primary schools in China in the beginning of the 1920s explained 
to its readers that: 
Mankind is divided into five races.  The yellow and white races are relatively 
strong and intelligent.  Because the other races are feeble and stupid, they are 
being exterminated by the white race.   Only the yellow race competes with 
the white race.  This is so-called evolution… .  Among the contemporary races 
                                        
55   Helen Kopnina, “Cultural Hybrids or Ethnic Fundamentalists? Discourses on Ethnicity in 
 Singaporean SMEs,” Asian Ethnicity, 5, 2 (June 2004): 249.   
 
56   Tu Wei Ming, Confucian Thought: Selfhood as Creative Transformation (Albany: State University 
 of New York Press, 1985). 
  
57  Sun Yat Sen, Sanminzhuyi (Three Principles of the People), (Shanghai: Shangwu Yinshuguan, 
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that could be called superior, there are only the yellow and the white races.  
China is [belongs to] the yellow race.58  
 While there has been no clear definition of the term ‘Chineseness’ in the 
Singapore context, it is generally used to refer to the condition of being ethnic 
Chinese in relation to other ethnic communities, namely Malay, Indian and Others.    
With the diverse backgrounds of the Chinese in Singapore, ‘Chineseness’ is actually a 
contested and heterogeneous notion.  However, since independence, the ruling 
political party, the People’s Action Party (PAP), has established itself as the dominant 
authority on ethnicity and Chineseness, contributing to how Singaporeans perceive 
Chineseness and what being Chinese means.  Consequently, the state has identified 
Mandarin as the symbolic mother tongue of the Chinese thus emphasizing Chinese 
ethnic culture and its linkage with language, in the same way as each of the other 
ethnic groups in the CMIO classification are given their own official language.  The 
racialised categories are further entrenched in Singapore society through cultural 
policies that hegemonically allow the state to specify cultural boundaries and 
intervene to ensure that these boundaries are maintained. In the process the state then 
not only claims political legitimacy through the management of ethnic relations but 
also institutes itself as the sole authority on ethnic identities and cultures. 
 Consequently the racial concept of ‘Chineseness’ is seen by Singaporeans as a 
crucial factor in shaping the social engineering policies of the PAP Government.  
Some of these policies, particularly those introduced post-1980s, are perceived to 
intensify the ‘Chineseness’ of the nation – what is normally referred to as 
‘sinicisation’.  Cultural policies cited consistently by academics and scholars include 
the state-sponsored annual Speak Mandarin campaign, the official promotion of 
Confucian ethics (later dropped from the school syllabus because it appeared to 
encourage excessive religious zealousness among Christians and Muslims), the 
attempt to institutionalize an ‘Asian Values’ policy based on Confucian ideals, the 
state’s eagerness to cultivate a bilingual and bicultural Chinese elite through the 
introduction of Special Assistance Plan (SAP) schools, eagerness to encourage 
immigrants from China and the worry that the Chinese were not reproducing 
themselves.  All of these are perceived by my informants to be ethnocentric and 
geared towards ensuring Chinese dominance arising from the socially engineered 
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‘racialisation’ of identities.  It is widely viewed by scholars that such cultural policies 
of ‘sinicisation’ or increased Chineseness pose a threat to ethnic harmony in 
Singapore and thus compromise the ideal of multiracialism by pandering to the 
interests of the ethnic Chinese, in so doing marginalizing other ethnic groups.  Yet 
critics also point out that the state had been careful to deemphasize Chineseness in the 
early post-independence period because of its feared impact on racial harmony and 
the necessity to promote the use of English as a neutral language.  Clammer, for 
instance, characterizes the development of Singapore from the 1980s as a “slow shift 
from genuine pluralism or multiracialism – the original ‘founding charter’ of post-
colonial Singapore society - towards distinctive Sinocentrism in language policy, 
political culture, promotion of high culture and citing of Singapore within the geo-
politics of the wider region”.59  This view is echoed by Lily Zubaidah Rahim who, in 
writing about the Malays in Singapore, posits that official policies encourage political 
and cultural dominance of the Chinese.   She says:  
The political marginality of the Malays has allowed the PAP leadership to 
strengthen its political base within the Chinese community and to promote the 
nation as a Chinese-dominated Confucian society.  The long-term political, 
social and geo-political ramifications of a Sinicised Singapore in a Malay 
region are alarming…”.60  
Vasil views the attempts to preserve Singapore’s ‘Asianness’ by reference to 
Confucian values as “insidious attempts at Sinicising Singapore”, though it is 
generally accepted by my respondents that Confucian values in a pragmatic sense do 
benefit others besides the Chinese.61  Another scholar Eugene Tan describes 
Singapore’s state policies as a “creeping Chineseness”.62   
 The concerns of the academics, scholars and historians are shared by the 
minorities who perceive that they have been marginalized by Chinese dominance in 
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Singapore, leading to a fear that Singapore would increasingly become a Chinese 
state.  Chandran, a 51-year old engineer, contends that although the state constantly 
asserts the need for national identity and celebrates diversity, it has done little to 
accommodate and balance differences between the Chinese cultural attributes and 
those of the other ethnic groups.   Rather he feels that policy statements and frequent 
pronouncements by the state only serve to accentuate cultural differences and create 
suspicion.   In his words, “We should deemphasize our cultural differences, instead of 
giving too much importance to the Chinese culture and language and less importance 
to our Indian and other minority groups in Singapore”.  His views are echoed by any 
number of my Indian respondents, all of whom believe that the Government was 
“playing with fire” by giving undue importance to one ‘racial’ group at the expense of 
the other.  They are consistent in their anxiety over a perceived ethnocentrism in state 
policies that could disturb racial harmony and result in other ethnic groups asserting 
their rights.  However, the political leadership has consistently gone on record to allay 
their fears reiterating the contention that such fears are misguided and that the races 
should accept and appreciate each others’ ethnic values.  A speech by Wong Kan 
Seng, then Foreign Minister, at a National Day celebration on 14 August 1998, is an 
example of the state’s view that the concerns of minority communities are 
unfounded.63  
 Chineseness – whether in language, culture, national or political affiliations or 
a combination of these elements – has, since independence, greatly impacted upon the 
state’s attitude towards race relations and national identity.   In various ways, the state 
has over the years negotiated with, suppressed or celebrated aspects of Chineseness as 
it sought to forge a nation and construct a cohesive Singaporean identity out of a 
colonial society of immigrant descendants.  As Gramsci has shown, in the Singapore 
context the ideology of nationalism has become a hegemonic imposition by the 
dominant Chinese class on the minority communities. 
 One of the critical factors that have strongly contributed to the Chineseness of 
Singapore has been the fact that the Chinese have comprised the dominant community 
since the first government census of 1871.   Their demographic dominance continues 
to this day, a result of deliberate state-managed planning of ethnicity.  The numerical 
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majority of the Chinese along with their dominance in trade, entrepreneurship and 
capital has thus given Singapore the unique character of an essentially Chinese city 
ever since colonial times.  A natural consequence was the attitude - particularly from 
the Chinese-educated masses – that Singapore belonged to them alone and therefore 
they could assert “themselves as the dominant majority”.64  The Malays with their 
emotions still aligned to the Malaysian political leadership during the merger period 
of 1963 to 1965 were suspected of harbouring anti-Chinese feelings.  Somewhat 
logically, according to Vasil, they feared that with independence Chinese chauvinism 
in Singapore would “be extremely difficult to curb and control” and “was likely to 
assert itself with greater vehemence”.65  This was the situation that led to widespread 
communal rioting when Singapore became a self-governing state in the newly formed 
Federation of Malaysia during the years 1963-1965.66  It was the mistrust and fear 
caused by the anti-Chinese attitudes of the Malaysian leaders towards their Singapore 
counterparts that led to considerable friction between a Malay-dominated Malaysian 
leadership and a Chinese-dominated Singapore leadership, leading to Singapore being 
dismissed from the Malaysian Federation and achieving full independence in 1965.  
Racial politics and ‘race’ relations have indelibly marked the political and social 
landscape of Singapore ever since.   
 Realizing regional sensitivities of “ethnicity’ and ‘race’, the first leaders of the 
new nation state decided to deemphasize the Chineseness of Singapore in an effort to 
appease Malays and maintain harmony between the various ‘races’.  English, along 
with Chinese (Mandarin), Malay and Tamil became official languages with English 
the language of administration and education while the Chinese (Mandarin), Malay 
and Tamil languages became second mother tongue languages in schools.  Sociologist 
Nirmala Purushotam argues that while the state promotes English as the official 
language of nation building, it also specifically identifies Mandarin as “the symbolic 
mother tongue of the Chinese in Singapore, thereby emphasizing Chinese ethnic 
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culture and unity”.67  By keeping Mandarin relevant, the state appeases the Chinese 
who feel a loss of culture because of the importance placed on English-medium 
education.   It also reduces internal differences engendered by various Chinese 
regional dialects by promoting Mandarin as the lingua franca of the Chinese.   Finally 
it contains Chineseness by subordinating it to the national and global imperatives of 
English.   
 In trying to deemphasize Chineseness in the early stages of independence, the 
PAP leaders antagonized the Chinese-educated masses who felt undermined by state 
policies creating an essentially English-speaking Singapore, but, in the late 1970s, 
there was a resurgence of Chineseness among a new generation of local born bi-
lingual Chinese who began to rediscover their cultural values that, in their opinion, 
had not been given sufficient importance since independence.  They realized that in a 
now socially stable and economically strong independent Singapore, it was an 
opportune time to give greater relevance to an ‘Asian Values’ discourse based on 
Chinese cultural values.  Some of the state’s social engineering policies proved 
unpopular among the minority communities, notably the Malays and to a lesser extent 
Indians, who felt that the state was reneging on its founding principle of multiracial 
democracy and eroding its commitment of deemphasizing the Chineseness of 
Singapore.  Sixty-seven-year old retired shipping company clerk Vamadevan is 
unhappy with the overemphasis given to the Chinese.   He says, “The Government 
talks about multiracialism and equality of the races but does not practise it.  Just 
because we are in the minority we are given less importance.  We are second-class 
citizens”.  Agreeing, a 54-year old female social worker Indrani says, “This is a 
Chinese country.  I think we Indians have no place here.  They [the Chinese] control 
everything”.  Almost the same response comes from Nonis, a 55-year old male 
Eurasian club manager: “This is their country….  They think they can impose their 
authority at will.  The trouble is we have no say because they are in the majority”.  I 
also sought the view of a Malay citizen, Harun a 69-year old retired government clerk 
who has this to say about the Chinese, “They forget that this country belongs to all of 
us Chinese, Indians, Malays and all.  The races have lived in relative harmony all 
these years, but now the Government appears to be rocking the boat”.   However, with 
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increasing economic prosperity in Singapore, the state has, under a new leadership 
within the ruling PAP Government, reassured the Malays and other ethnic groups of 
its adherence to multiracialism/multiculturalism by reducing economic disparities 
between the ethnic groups and opening new avenues for the various ‘ethnicities’ to 
enable them to better appreciate their own ethnic values.68  Many Indians however 
remain unconvinced that the state is doing enough for the minority communities.  
Their concerns are summed up in this response from a lawyer in private practice, 59-
year old Mohan Arunasalam:  
The Chinese by virtue of their numbers and political clout have greater access 
to state resources.  At the same time the Government places too much focus on 
Chinese cultural values as benefiting the nation and pays only lip service to 
the position of the Indians and Malays.    
 Restored Chineseness has reached new heights by the state confronting the 
fear of deculturation among the Chinese thus giving more emphasis to their language, 
culture and identity.  Government leaders feel that such measures were necessary to 
improve the overall quality of the population, maintain political stability, enhance 
economic prosperity and global competitiveness, strengthen family values and prevent 
skilled and educated Singaporeans moving out of Singapore.  Explaining the state’s 
changing stance with the Chinese in an interview with Raj Vasil in May 1991, Goh 
Chok Tong explains: 
In the last few years… the government has intervened actively – in the case of 
the Chinese, to get the Chinese to speak Mandarin, to celebrate their cultural 
month, and for government leaders to be seen as patrons for certain Chinese 
organizations.69   
But the Prime Minister did not agree with Dr Vasil who suggested that Chinese 
Singaporeans were asserting themselves, saying that they were, in fact, more aware of 
the need to accommodate differences between themselves and other ‘races’.  He 
clarifies this by saying, “Of course, when we do that for the Chinese, because of our 
commitment to multiculturalism we would do likewise for the Malays and the 
Indians”.  Apart from the aggressive public promotion of Mandarin pursuant to the 
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‘Speak Mandarin’ campaign, several programmes have been hegemonically 
introduced in the last two decades.  These include the extolling of Confucianist 
values, population and family policies, large-scale revival of hitherto banned 
economic, academic and tourist ties with China, vigorous encouragement of 
immigration from China, and the glorification of Chinese culture manifested in such 
forms as the Special Assistance Plan schools for gifted Chinese students, building of 
elaborate theme parks, and large budgets for Chinese TV serials.70  While open 
opposition to these measures has been muted, private criticism between individuals is 
prevalent.   Argues 54-year old teacher Ambika: 
Even my colleagues in school speak very often of rediscovering their roots.  
They have an emotional attachment to China to such an extent that they look 
forward to making visits to China during the school holidays.  Such a longing 
for China and things Chinese was not there 20 or 30 years ago and I attribute 
this change to the Government’s huge efforts to project Chinese cultural 
values.  I have also observed that even though non-Chinese like myself are 
present in the company, they continue to speak Mandarin among themselves.   
Her observations bear similarity to what Lal Singh, a 47-year old importer of 
electronics with close Chinese connections, says, “Whenever my Chinese business 
associates travel to China for business or work purposes, they look upon their trip 
with nostalgic longing because of love for their ethnic culture and values”.  Greater 
discontent is displayed by Indian housewife Susila who complains that Channel 8 of 
Singapore Television caters specifically to a Chinese audience with an exclusively 
Chinese perspective.  Yet another respondent, 21 year-old Balendran undergoing 
National Service thinks that the minority communities are being marginalized in 
many ways.   He cites the example of Singapore Airlines portraying only the Chinese 
ethnic group in their advertisements, though he fails to mention that the attire of the 
stewardesses strongly reflects Malay designs and fabric. 
 While Chineseness permeates every aspect of Chinese society in Singapore, it 
also affects relations with the minority communities.  Apart from long-standing 
historically induced negative stereotypes between the ethnic groups, its interethnic 
                                        
  
70  Hussin Mutalib, “Consider Things that may Hinder Multiracialism,” The Straits Times, 30 June 
1990, 32; Bertha Henson and Sumiko Tan, “Quest for a S’pore Identity,” The Straits Times, 15 June 
1990, 25. 
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relevances are also seen in social and cultural occurrences in spaces common to the 
various ethnicities in Singapore.  A Chinese roadside opera (called wayang) or funeral 
wake in the void deck of the HDB block or pavement prayers as in the burning of joss 
sticks and paper money on the grass verge of the HDB apartment block, for example, 
all convey different meanings for interethnic perceptions and attitudes.  How residents 
regard and negotiate these public Chinese functions reveals the complex means by 
which they resolve and accommodate cultural-religious differences.  I took the 
opportunity of speaking to both Indian and Malay residents in an HDB block at the 
bottom of which Chinese residents (also living in the block) were burning paper 
money and incense sticks to celebrate the Seventh Moon Festival (also called Hungry 
Ghosts Festival).71  While most of my respondents are careful to report that they had 
no choice but to tolerate and accept the noise, ash and public movement on the 
grounds as it was an important cultural event for the Chinese, some are not so 
charitable in their perceptions.  Says Mariamma, an Indian housewife:  
They make too much noise and we cannot sleep especially my little 
granddaughter who is not well.  The ash also flies into my flat and I don’t like 
it – it may be polluting and dangerous.  Stepping on burnt joss paper is a bad 
omen you know.  You may get sick after that.  Why are the Chinese allowed to 
do this in public whereas Indians like us have to remain quiet and accept 
whatever is going on? They [the Chinese] just want to dominate because they 
think everything belongs to them.  If we Indians were to conduct our 
ceremonies like them, will they keep quiet? 
Another Indian resident, Soosai a 47-year old teacher was quick to agree.  Salmah, a 
40-year old Malay nurse says: 
 HDB practices discrimination in the treatment of festivals between the 
various races.  When the Chinese burn their joss sticks and paper money, they 
litter the turf and burn it as well.  But they get away with it, but when the 
Malays accidentally burn the turf when they do their cooking in the void deck 
during a marriage ceremony, they are fined and their deposit forfeited.    
Chineseness, which takes as its central mission the promotion of Chinese 
culture and language among the Chinese ‘race’ will, in the eyes of the minorities, 
exclude these communities from acceptance into mainstream culture and the Chinese 
                                        
71   The Seventh Moon Festival or Hungry Ghosts Festival is held to appease ancestors, gods and 
 ghosts believed to be released from hell in the seventh lunar month of the Chinese calendar.   
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cultural world – a racist trend which, if not checked, could lead to harmful 
consequences for harmony between the various ethnic groups.  On the other hand, 
Chinese cultural values linked to the dominant ideology have been primarily 
responsible for Singapore’s economic success, political stability and peace, say both 
Lee Kuan Yew and his successor Goh Chok Tong in public speeches.72  State 
ideologies underlying the insistence on cultural and moral values are all based on 
supposed Chinese values, like thrift, hard work and obedience, say my respondents.   
This cultural bias on the part of the state has oriented most of the social engineering 
policies that have been implemented to date.  Especially since the 1980s, the state has 
sponsored and supported many programmes, as set out above, to enhance Chinese 
culture and fine-tune it to suit the themes of the dominant ideology.  
 
6.6  Asian Shared Values 
 These attributes of Chinese culture based mainly on Confucian values have 
since 1996 been formalised to create a set of core Shared Values (hitherto loosely 
called Asian Values) that have been framed as the national ideology.  In an address to 
mark the opening of the Seventh Parliament on 9 January 1989, then President Wee 
Kim Wee set out the problem as identified by the state, defining the national ideology 
on the issue thus: 
If we are not to lose our bearings, we should preserve the cultural heritage of 
each of our communities, and uphold certain common values which capture 
the essence of being a Singaporean.  These core values include placing society 
above self, resolving major issues through consensus instead of contention, 
and stressing racial and religious tolerance and harmony.  We need to enshrine 
these fundamental ideas in a National Ideology.  Such a formal statement will 
bond us together as Singaporeans, with our own distinct identity and destiny.  
We need to inculcate this National Ideology in all Singaporeans, especially the 
young.73  
                                        
  
72  Barbara Crossette, “Influences from West Worry Singapore Chief”, New York Times, 4 January, 
1987; Sunny Goh and Tan Ban Huat, “PM Goh on Values that Must Not Clash”, The Straits Times, 20 
December, 1990, 1. 
  
73  Shared Values (Government of Singapore, White Paper, 6 January, 1991), 1-2. Lee Kuan Yew’s      
idea of ‘cultural nationalism’ originated from his conviction that the implementation of a Western-
styled democracy was inapplicable to Asian societies because of cultural differences. Explaining the 
reasons for Lee’s stance, Brown says, “The state elites consider cultural nationalism to offer a stronger 
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So as to ensure acceptance by all, the state took pains to assure the population, 
especially the minority groups, that these Shared Values were not overly promoting 
Confucian ideas or ideas based on a perceived Chinese superior race or culture.  This 
was in response to appeals by minority leaders like Othman Haron Eusofe, a Malay 
MP, that the sensitivities of minority communities should be considered when 
formulating a national ideology so that they do not feel that they are being ‘forced’ 
into accepting the majority community’s values.74  A White Paper on Shared Values 
published on 6 January 1991 explains: 
We need to respect the great religions and cultures to which different groups 
of Singaporeans belong.  Each religion or culture encompasses many enduring 
values, but unfortunately we cannot use any single one of them as the basis for 
building a common Singaporean identity, without alienating the other 
groups.75
Suggesting that the groups should identify ‘a few key values … common to … the 
groups … and which draw on the essence of these heritages’, the Shared Values were 
finally formalised by Parliament and published in the following form: 
• Nation before community and society above self 
• Family as the basic unit of society  
• Community support and respect for the individual 
• Consensus not conflict 
• Racial and religious harmony 
 
6.7  Conclusion 
 It can be surmised from the eugenics policies and programmes of the state that 
commitment to Chinese values and culture as the foundation for economic growth and 
stability was and is the dominant ideology, at least from the late 1970s onwards.  
They were sidelined temporarily after independence in 1965 to guard against 
geopolitical tensions and sensitivities from the surrounding Muslim world and to 
                                                                                                               
base for political cohesion and societal loyalty than does political nationalism” (David Brown, 
Contemporary Nationalism: Civic, Ethnocultural and Multicultural Politics (London: Routledge, 2000) 
308. Prior to the 1988 General Elections the PAP Government had developed a series of unpopular 
policies and the ideology of ‘Asian Values’ and later ‘Shared Values’ is regarded by some of my 
respondents as a mechanism to counter negative reaction and gather support. 
  
74  Reported in The Straits Times.  
  
75  Shared Values (Government of Singapore, White Paper, 6 January, 1991), 3.  
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ensure that ‘racial’ harmony, economic development and political stability were not 
hampered.  Indeed the very survival of the fledgling nation state rested firmly on these 
objectives and to realize them the hegemonic and paternalistic state used the construct 
of ‘race’ ideology to create various forms of social engineering.  A ‘multiracial’ 
society in which ‘ethnicity’ became not only the basis for public policy but also an 
everyday reality in the lives of Singaporeans took shape.  Subsequently a resurgence 
of Chinese ethnicity resulted in new policies designed to further the cause of Chinese 
culture and identity.   This came at a time when the state realized the need for ethnic 
communities to celebrate their cultures in a multiracial democracy.  Population and 
family policies, immigration and advancement of Chinese cultural values explored in 
this chapter also demonstrate that they saw their genesis in theories of biological 
determinism and scientific racism which had inspired the first-generation PAP leaders 
of the nation state, in particular its former Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew.    
 One of the key questions that I have been exploring in this chapter is how  
such policies have impacted on the Indians in Singapore as they go about their daily 
existence.  My findings reveal an important fact that underpins their ethnic 
negotiation with national identity in Singapore.  Suffice to say, these policies reveal 
that Singapore Indians see themselves as sidelined from the national project by their 
perception that undue importance is given to Chinese racial, cultural, economic and 
political dominance at the expense of minority interests.  Consequently ethnic Indians 
search for answers to the vexing question of how to align themselves with national 
identity.  While the social policies discussed in this chapter reveal the direct impact of 
socio-biology theories, there are also several other policies and programmes instituted 
by the state that are equally race-based and affect all Singaporeans in their daily lives.  
Such policies which include housing, language and education, self-help, heritage 
conservation and compulsory National Service will be explored in the remaining 
chapters.76  Throughout this and the subsequent chapters the responses from my 
Indian interviewees and respondents reveal that there appears to be an inconsistency 
between the state’s ideological espousal of ‘multiracial’ harmony and the emphasis on 
‘racial’ differences in its policies.   Do these seeming opposites clash or reconcile?  
 
 
                                        
76  National Service policy issues concern mainly the Malays and not the Indians who are the focus of 
this thesis. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
RACIAL POLITICS AND SOCIAL ENGINEERING – HOUSING AND 
LANGUAGE/EDUCATION POLICIES 
 
 
 
Every Singaporean citizen must learn how to be a good citizen; how to 
be fit; how to be honest, effective, and deserving of belonging to a 
community with the highest social and living standards in Southeast 
Asia… the rugged product of a systematic programme for the 
inculcation of self-discipline. 
- Lee Kuan Yew1 
7.1  Introduction 
 I have shown in the last two chapters how a racialized political doctrine has 
continued to function as a mechanism of social control in the new nation state of 
Singapore after it obtained independence from the British in 1965.2  Pursuing 
hegemonic control, the Government implemented various policies of social 
engineering based on the ideology of ‘race’ to ‘put people in their proper places’.  I 
have also advanced the argument that theories of biological determinism and 
scientific racism were directly responsible for the imposition of specific immigration, 
population and family policies as well as the enhancement of Chinese values as the 
basis of economic growth and social stability.  These instruments of social control 
designed to create the ideal citizen envisioned by Lee Kuan Yew were supplemented 
by more ‘race’-based initiatives that included housing, language and education, self-
help, heritage conservation and National Service.3  In this chapter I will explore 
housing and language/education policies to interrogate their relationship with 
constructions of ‘race’ and ethnicity, and to analyse how such policies dictate the lives 
of Indians as they grapple with the state’s desire for national identity.  Both these 
                                        
1  Speech by Lee Kuan Yew, former Prime Minister and now Minister Mentor, at the National Day 
Rally, 1986. 
 
2  Full independence was attained after separation from the Malaysian Federation in 1965.  
 
3  While state policy relating to National Service professes to contribute to social cohesiveness and 
national integration, there are aspects of this policy that articulate a strong ‘racial’ dimension perceived 
to relate almost exclusively to the Malay ethnic community. As the ‘racial’ aspect of this policy does 
not generally affect the Indian community, I have refrained from examining this policy in my thesis.  
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policies have been fundamental to the state’s promotion of ‘racial’ integration and 
nation building, impacting on Indians as much as the other ethnic groups.  However as 
this thesis is substantially focused on Singapore Indians, it is their perceptions and 
worldviews that will take centre-stage.   
 
7.2  ‘Race’ and Public Housing 
The state has used public housing as a major instrument in bringing about 
racial integration. 
              - Minister for National Development S Dhanabalan4
 Public housing is one of the most critical and pivotal components of the social, 
cultural and economic changes undertaken by the state since independence to 
transform the diverse ethnic groups into a harmonious society.  With more than 90% 
of the population now living in public housing estates, public housing is treated as one 
of the most important aspects of social and economic development and political 
stability in Singapore.  There appears to be a paradox here because it can be argued 
that in countries with marginalized populations, public housing is not considered as 
contributing to economic development, whereas in the Singapore context it is an 
integral part of it.  Implemented through the Housing and Development Board (HDB), 
the state regards the policy as a striking symbol of physical nation building through 
multiracialism and ethnic interaction.  Hence several scholars have argued that public 
housing is a powerful social engineering tool instilling economic discipline and order 
in Singapore.5  
 The public housing programme initiated by the nation state is also part of the 
larger process of urban renewal designed to break up social patterns of living 
inherited from British rule.   During the colonial period, Singapore’s population had 
mostly lived in separate ethnic groupings with little interaction between them.  These 
communities maintained rigid social and physical boundaries compounded by 
stereotyping and an underlying sense of insecurity.  Town planning in colonial 
Singapore had, as I have explained in Part I, been highly influenced by the Raffles 
                                        
4  Speech by former Minister for National Development S Dhanabalan at a New Year gathering on 6 
January 1989, as reported in The Straits Times of 7 January 1989. 
 
5  M Castells, L Goh and R Y-W Kwok, The Shek Kip Mei Syndrome: Economic Development and 
Public Housing in Hong Kong and Singapore (London: Pion, 1990), 244-246; Christopher Tremewan, 
The Political Economy of Social Control in Singapore (London and New York: St Martin’s Press, 
1994). 
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Town Plan of 1822 that specified the physical separation of ‘races’ by “appropriating 
and marking out the quarters or departments of several classes of the native 
population”.6  This residential concentration was “reinforced by the desire of the 
newly landed immigrant to live in association with others of his own land”.7  While 
this rigid segregation of ethnic groups no longer exists in its colonial form, its legacy 
still abounds in the contemporary built landscape dominated by high-rise public 
housing.  Instead of physical separation of ethnic groups, what has taken its place is 
the deliberate state policy to enforce dispersal and diffusion of ethnic minorities 
within these groups and amongst the Chinese majority based on ‘racial’ 
categorizations and a state-orchestrated version of identity so as to create the “ideal 
citizen” of Singapore.    
  
7.2.1 Ethnic dispersal (1965-1989) 
 At the time of independence the various ethnic groups were concentrated in 
ethnically exclusive communities in the central areas of the town, mainly housed in 
two or three-storeyed shophouses in varying degrees of dilapidation and living in 
overcrowded, unsanitary and unhygienic conditions.  The authorities considered these 
dwellings to be “slums” that were “fast hampering the orderly growth of the city”.8 
Alan Choe, then head of the Urban Renewal Department, wrote that “in a land-scarce 
Singapore it is ironical that there should be a large piece of strategic and valuable land 
right in the centre of the city occupied by slums and constituting a hindrance to 
progress and growth”.9  The other reason for urban renewal was the socio-political 
necessity to redistribute the population into ‘racially’ mixed public housing estates in 
satellite towns in the outlying areas that were then characterized by kampungs or rural 
villages.  In the 1950s the central areas of the town had been the sites of racial riots 
between the Malays and the Chinese and of organized violent strikes by left-wing 
trade unions and student organizations. The resettlement and redistribution of the 
                                        
6  Raffles quoted in C B Buckley, An Anecdotal History of Old Times in Singapore 1819-1867 
(Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1902/1984), 81.  
 
7  H E Wilson, Social Engineering in Singapore: Educational Policies and Social Change 1819-1972 
(Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1978), 13. 
 
8  Alan F C Choe, “Urban Renewal” in Modern Singapore, eds. J B Ooi and H D Chiang (Singapore: 
University of Singapore, 1969), 163.  
 
9  Choe, “Urban Renewal” in Modern Singapore, 164.  
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population into the new satellite towns would disrupt the social base of the left-wing 
political organizations and redistribute the ethnically formed communities into the 
multi-racial housing estates.10  Such a move would also thwart any attempt by 
aggrieved minority members at any one location from posing a political challenge to 
the PAP-controlled government.  
  In order to remedy the situation of acute housing shortages which had led to a 
‘crisis of habitability’,11 the new state established the HDB in 1960 for the task of 
rapidly building low-cost high-rise flats, initially for Singapore’s low-income 
population.12  According to the HDB, the home-ownership scheme was “to encourage 
a property-owning democracy in Singapore, and to enable Singapore citizens in the 
lower middle income group to own their own homes”.13  As a result of the HDB’s 
massive public housing programme, ethnic concentrations of people in Malay 
kampungs and Chinese villages were dispersed and residents resettled in multi-ethnic 
housing estates consisting of high-rise apartment blocks.  Residents of different ethnic 
backgrounds and classes had now to live together in the same area for the first time.  
The state’s forced resettlement programme involved “the demolition of established 
[ethnic] settlements to make land available for the new housing estates”.14  This was 
achieved through mandatory land acquisition obtained through compensation based 
on values drastically below market rates.  The Land Acquisition Act of 1966, a ‘gift’ 
of colonial rule, empowered the state to acquire any land deemed necessary for 
national development at compensation rates determined by the state.15  Tremewan 
mentions that huge fires (as in Bukit Ho Swee) would break out occasionally, 
                                        
10  James Minchin, No Man is an Island (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1986); Tremewan, The Political 
Economy, 46; Chua Beng Huat, Communitarian Ideology and Democracy in Singapore (London and 
New York: Routledge, 1995), 113-115. 
 
11 J F Warren, RickshawCoolie: A People’s History of Singapore 1880-1940 (Singapore: Oxford 
University Press, 1986), 194.  
 
12  As mentioned previously, Singapore attained self-government from the British in 1959 before full 
independence in 1965. 
 
13  HDB, 1964 Annual Report quoted in M Castells, L Goh and R Y-W Kwok, The Shek Kip Mei 
Syndrome, 231.  
 
14  Chua Beng Huat and Eddie C Y Kuo, “The Making of a New Nation: Cultural Construction and 
National Identity in Singapore”. Paper presented at the ‘Cultural Policy and National Identity 
Workshop’ at East-West Center, Honolulu, Hawaii (June 1990), Department of Sociology, National 
University of Singapore, Working Paper No 104, (1991), 20. 
  
15  Chua Beng Huat, Communitarian Ideology and Democracy in Singapore, 130. 
 
 209
implying that such ‘fires of convenience’ were deliberately lit by the state’s coercive 
apparatus.16  As urban squatters and villages tended to be ethnically homogeneous, 
the demolition amounted to the “destruction” of ethnic communities and their 
attendant social practices.17  The subsequent dispersal was intensified by the first-
come first-served rule without regard to ethnic group membership in the allocation of 
public housing flats, a move that literally prevented members of the same ethnic 
groups from living together.18  According to Minchin this dispersal of the ethnic 
communities involved “breaking up …communities based on affinities of ‘race’, clan, 
religion, language and dialect or on generations of friendly contact and shared work, 
and transferring the fragments into compact areas that are easy to monitor and easy to 
isolate should the need arise”.19  The consequences, according to Chua and Kuo as 
well as other writers, were that colonial communities were deprived of specific social 
supports and networks (for example, extended family), forcing them to rebuild 
community with multiethnic strangers with whom they had apparently little in 
common.  However the state countered these criticisms by insisting that the 
integration of all ethnic groups would “increase inter-ethnic understanding and avoid 
potential race riots”.20
It can be argued that the fundamental rationale behind public housing in 
Singapore is based on the dynamics of first constructing a ‘racial’ categorization of 
the ethnic communities, then allocating flats according to this socially constructed 
model so that, in the words of Anthony King, “local environments could be modeled 
and controlled in accordance with an assumed ‘public good’”.21 Public housing 
estates were to become integrated, with a strict ethnic and social mix maintained 
through the HDB’s allocation policies that would bring “all the ‘races’ and social 
groups closer together while allowing each group to practice its own beliefs and 
                                        
16  Tremewan, The Political Economy of Social Control in Singapore, 47. 
 
17  Chua Beng Huat and Eddie C Y Kuo, “The Making of a New Nation”, 20. 
 
18  Ibid. 
 
19  James Minchin, No Man is an Island, 249. 
 
20  Chua Beng Huat and Eddie C Y Kuo, “The Making of a New Nation”, 20. 
 
21  Anthony King, Re-presenting the City: Ethnicity, Capital and Culture in the Twenty-first Century 
Metropolis (Houndmills, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996), 209-210. 
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customs”.22 In early 1989, then Housing Minister S Dhanabalan described in 
Parliament the problem as it had stood in 1960, the year when the Board had been set 
up:  
Various sections of our population at that time were gathered in different 
pockets distinguishable by their racial or dialect groups.  The Malays, for 
example, were concentrated in Geylang Serai, Eunos and a few other areas.  
The Indians were gathered in the Serangoon Road and Naval Base areas.  The 
Chinese were fragmented into dialect groups each with its own enclave… 
Each [ethnic] group was fiercely proud of its own identity and defended its 
narrow interests stoutly.  Each clung to its own clan or dialect community for 
security.  There was no social cohesion.  We were a divided society … The 
massive public housing effort gave us the opportunity to mix the population.  
We made sure that every HDB new town and estate had a balanced mix of 
racial groups.23
This ‘racial’ balance was the desired objective of the state and was attained by a 
balloting process whereby applicants of all ethnic groups could choose to live in the 
area of their choice.  Other than the bilingual education system designed to promote 
multiracialism and language skills (see Chapter 7.3), public housing became the main 
platform for the promotion of ‘racial’ mixing since a typical HDB block contained 
members of all ethnic groups, thereby preventing the formation of ethnic enclaves.  
The HDB thereby became the state’s cornerstone for economic development as well 
as its social engineering instrument par excellence to eliminate Singapore’s slums and 
racial enclaves, generate a sense of national loyalty, engineer a strong work ethic, 
improve its international image, and stimulate employment and economic activity.  
Several scholars have argued that, although the public housing programme has been 
highly successful in providing the population with affordable housing on a massive 
scale, it has also served as a form of social control.24  
                                        
22  Quoted in Ooi Giok Ling, Sharon Siddique and Soh Kay Cheng, The Management of Ethnic 
Relations in Public Housing Estates (Singapore: The Institute of Policy Studies, 1993), 11. 
 
23  Quoted in The Straits Times of 7 January 1989.  
 
24  Minchin, No Man is an Island; Tremewan, The Political Economy of Social Control in Singapore; 
David Brown, “Globalisation, Ethnicity and the Nation-State: The Case of Singapore,” Australian 
Journal of International Affairs, 52, 1 (1998): 35-46.  
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 Beyond merely providing shelter for the masses, the housing programme 
enabled the state to achieve its ideological goals, namely, the promotion of economic 
development, social integration, acceptable social values, economic discipline and the 
maintenance of political legitimacy and hegemonic dominance.  Consequently, 
employment and economic activity were stimulated through the massive building 
programme while binding people to sell their labour through a home-ownership 
policy which made them mortgagers who were then required to repay heavy housing 
loans through compulsory Central Provident Fund deductions from their income.  
Such a welfare policy was calculated to render owners ‘tenants of the state’ and has 
enabled the state to exercise tight bureaucratic and hegemonic control of its flat-
dwellers through a system of surveillance and monitoring procedures.25  According to 
Chih, drawing upon the work of Foucault, the largely standardized public housing 
environment can be seen as a Panopticon into which individuals and households are 
slotted, thereby facilitating their discipline and supervision”.26  This dependence on 
the state ultimately meant that owners were obliged to vote for the PAP-dominated 
government, as failure to do so would result in the state threatening to withdraw its 
provision of particular goods and services.  The PAP threat became a reality when in 
the run-up to the 1985 and subsequent General Elections it warned constituencies that 
voting for the opposition would mean that they could be deprived of upgrading 
facilities for their flats.  Chua is of the view that the state’s monopolistic intervention 
in the public housing market and the concomitant dependency of the citizens on the 
state means that the state “becomes more and more absolute” and that “[a]s this 
absolute dependency deepens, the citizens as public housing consumers become 
increasingly vulnerable and subject to social regulations tied to other social policies, 
beyond housing issues”.27  
 Despite state dispersal, it soon became clear that people continued to drift 
towards ‘racial’ enclaves, at least in terms of interacting privately on the basis of 
networks within their own ethnic groups.  Social surveys conducted by the HDB 
                                        
 
25  Chua Beng Huat, “Public Housing Residents as Clients of the State,” Housing Studies 15, 1 (Jan. 
2000): 45. 
 
26  Chih Hoong Sin, “Segregation and Marginalisation within Public Housing: The Disadvantaged in 
Bedok New Town, Singapore,” Housing Studies 17, 2 (2002): 269.  
 
27  Chua Beng Huat, “Public Housing Residents.” 
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found that residents’ social ties were still with relatives, friends, fellow-workers and 
others of the same ethnic group who often lived some distance away.  Residents also 
used sales, purchases and apartment exchanges to move closer to members of their 
own ethnic group.  It appears that given a free choice, individuals normally choose to 
congregate with others who they see as being of their own ethnic group.  The result 
was a tendency towards a regrouping of the ethnic communities that had been 
deliberately broken up by the state’s resettlement programme.  While the policy had 
been to encourage a general ethnic integration in HDB estates, it had allowed people a 
greater degree of choice of location.  Consequently by the late 1980s ethnic 
concentrations based on social and historical continuities had resulted in areas like 
Bedok, Eunos, Woodlands, Tampines, Ayer Rajah, Taman Jurong and Teban Gardens 
becoming predominantly Malay, Bukit Merah, Henderson, Tiong Bahru, Ang Mo Kio 
and Hougang being mainly Chinese, while Kampong Java and Yishun more populated 
by Indians (see chart below).28  
                                        
28  Extracted from Parliamentary Debates 1989 (columns 721-722).  
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7.2.2  Ethnic quotas (1 March 1989 to date) 
 The state saw this tendency towards ethnic clustering as contrary to its 
declared policy of multiracialism and ‘racial’ tolerance.  Voicing the concerns of the 
government, the Housing Minister remarked that a disturbing trend was the 
reemergence of “racial enclaves” with some HDB estates attracting people of a 
particular race.  He singled out Malay applicants as wanting to live in 
Bedok/Tampines, traditionally Malay strongholds, while Chinese prefer to move to 
estates like Ang Mo Kio/Hougang.  This “regrouping along racial lines”, to quote the 
Minister, was threatening to undermine “social and racial integration”, adding that a 
balanced “racial” and social mix would help avoid “racial and social tensions” and 
ensure “inter-racial” harmony among the “races”.  Stressing this, the Minister further 
added: 
 214
Mixing the various communities in proportions that approximate the general 
population has given us racial tolerance and harmony for more than 20 years.  
To allow the races to regroup now would be to go back to the pre-1965 period 
when there were racial enclaves and racial riots.29  
 Accordingly, on 1 March 1989 the state announced new measures to enforce 
ethnic quotas, again demonstrating the continued significance of ‘race’ and ethnicity 
in Singapore society.  The purpose of this ethnic quota policy in public housing was to 
achieve a ‘balanced racial mix’ by eradicating ethnic enclaves that were now showing 
signs of reemerging.  While the concern for a ‘balanced mix’ is arguably common 
rhetoric in many countries, in the case of Singapore the policy is in line with the 
state’s ‘putting in place’ philosophy (mentioned early in this chapter) that constitutes 
the basis of the various ‘race’-based instruments of social engineering.  The new 
quota policy set a maximum limit on the percentage of Chinese, Malays, Indians and 
Others allowed in each neighbourhood and housing block to correspond with the 
supposed racial mix of the country’s population as a whole: that is, 78% Chinese, 
14% Malay, and 7% Indians – the ‘race’ categories specified in the founding tenet of 
multiracialism.    
 Under this policy of a ‘balanced racial mix’, the quota for each of the 
officially recognized ethnic groups is monitored and maintained by imposing 
constraints on the flat owner’s freedom to sell his house so that the ethnic balance is 
maintained.  Residents (other than Chinese) should therefore resell their flat only to 
someone of their own ethnic group, particularly if the Chinese have reached their 
quota.30  In other words, owners can resell their flats in a block only to someone of 
their own ethnic group that is not already over-represented in the block.  Thus, for 
example, a Malay can sell only to his/her own racial group so that the national 
demographic balance is maintained in the block (see chart below). 
                                        
 
29  The Straits Times, 12 February 1989.  
 
30  One of the unintended consequences of HDB’s resale policy was that it also benefited the Chinese in 
another race-based dimension. Hong Kongers were granted permanent residence status in the run-up to 
the 1997 take-over by China based on the state’s policy of encouraging immigration from Hong Kong 
to maintain Singapore’s racial proportions. The result was that many Hong Kongers promptly bought 
HDB flats, waited for prices to rise, sold their flats for a handsome profit, gave up their PR and 
returned to Hong Kong with the profit. Also see Chapter 6.5 on Chineseness. 
 215
 
The Straits Times 17 February 1989 
 216
 This forced inter-ethnic mix extends to the entire housing estate to prevent the 
formation of ‘racial’ enclaves.  According to then Minister of National Development, 
Teh Cheang Wan, such an arrangement was necessary for the “long-term stability of 
the nation” and was “a small price to pay in order to ensure that we do build a 
cohesive, better integrated society in Singapore”.31  He further assured the public that 
it would be applied “fairly, across the board to all races” in keeping with the state’s 
multiracial objective and reiterated that the policy should be a microcosm of 
Singapore’s ethnic mix and integration.   
 Interaction between the various ethnic communities and with the state has 
been a vital aspect of multiethnic housing in Singapore ever since.  While there is 
general consensus from Singaporeans of all ethnicities that multiethnic living 
reinforces traditional family values and is good for social cohesion and the ultimate 
promotion of an overarching national identity, the personal responses of many of my 
minority ethnic informants, particularly Malays and Indians, indicate a general 
ambivalence towards the Chinese, the dominant ethnic majority.  This ambivalence is 
predominantly visible in social, cultural and religious matters that basically define and 
differentiate between the various ethnic groups.  Most of my non-Chinese informants 
reject the policy on the grounds that it discriminates and marginalizes them on 
account of their ethnicity.  They argue that the state shows partiality towards the 
Chinese majority at their expense, even though the government has assured the public 
that this was not so.  The government, they contend, was particularly worried that it 
was the minorities that had a tendency to form ethnic enclaves causing potential for 
racial friction.  As minority groups they say that they have an equal stake in the 
country with the Chinese who, because of their numerical majority, form the 
dominant group in every housing block.  Indeed, ironically the housing quota system 
made every estate an ethnic Chinese enclave. Their unanimous perception is that the 
policy goes against the grain of the state’s declared multiracial policy of cultural and 
family values as they cannot hope to buy flats near their relatives.  Their overall 
feeling is that the state is being extremely authoritarian and encroaching into their 
private lives and rights.  Public housing policies have therefore become a site for 
political contestation with the ethnic quota policy ranking as a key issue among the 
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minority Malay and Indian communities in “national issues most interested in”, as I 
will demonstrate in the ensuing paragraphs.32   
 Government leaders agree that the ethnic quota requirements have hampered 
the sale of HDB flats by minority groups.33 While the policy applies to all 
Singaporeans irrespective of ethnicity, home owners from minority ethnic groups say 
they are the hardest hit when the quotas are filled because they can then sell only to 
one of their own ‘race’.  They tend to lose out financially because of the limited 
market. This is their main point of contention about the state’s racial politics on 
housing policy.  Bishan, according to a Straits Times article of 17 October 2005, is an 
illustration of an area where most of the blocks have already reached the limit for 
Chinese owners.  Consequently a Malay or an Indian home owner there can sell his 
flat only to his own ethnic group, making the sale more difficult.  The problem, as my 
research shows, is particularly acute for these minority communities as often they find 
that, because of numerical limitations, they are not able to get ready buyers for their 
flats.  Only if the Chinese have not yet reached their allowed quota is it possible for 
the minorities to attempt to sell their flat to them.  But, on a practical basis, my 
interviewees complain, selling the flat to a Chinese is fraught with difficulty.  This is 
because the Chinese prefer to buy a flat from a fellow Chinese because of their 
attitude to feng shui (geomancy) and other cultural considerations.  While the Chinese 
sometimes reluctantly purchase a flat from an Indian resident, buying from a Malay is 
almost non-existent.  Indians and Malays therefore find that they are saddled with a 
property that they cannot readily sell in the open market.  This is because of their 
perception that ‘race’ and race consciousness have been factored into the housing 
market by the state, leading to a “buy and sell by race” policy.  They generally argue 
that the housing policy discriminates against the minority ethnic communities.  An 
Indian resident, 58 year-old Alagappan, residing in an HDB apartment in the Little 
India area is particularly incensed: “The Chinese refused to buy my flat because they 
said it smelt of bad curry… .  I think this is just an excuse… they are simply racist and 
anti-Indian… .  I had endless trouble selling my flat”.  Ibadullah, a 65 year-old retired 
Malay hawker, is convinced that the Chinese refuse to buy his flat because they think 
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it is possessed by evil spirits.  He protests: “They [the Chinese] think we are 
medicine-men weaving black magic on others… .  How can they be so mean?   They 
just cannot tolerate us [meaning Malays] because of our race and religion”.  These 
minorities frame their concerns on the basis of their perception that the state’s race-
based housing policy has been divisive and that the Chinese have used their ‘race’ and 
overwhelming numbers to dominate and stereotype the ethnic minorities.  Suresh 
Kumar is yet another Indian resident caught up in the ethnic quota bind.  He says: 
Seven years ago I bought my 3-room flat from my in-laws as they could not 
sell it because of the ethnic quota policy.  Now, seven years later, I face the 
same problem.  The ‘small price to pay’ argument by the Minister is way too 
big for me because I cannot upgrade to a bigger flat even as my family gets 
bigger.  I cannot sell it to a Chinese because they have already reached their 
quota in my block and neighbourhood.  Neither am I able to get anybody from 
my own racial group.  An Indian who did come forward was not prepared to 
pay the market price.  What am I to do? The HDB says officially that it would 
help in cases such as mine but I don’t see any help forthcoming although I 
have already told them of my problem. 
Such concerns are also compounded by the perception that Chinese dominance and 
the perception of Chineseness in all housing estates means that the image of ‘racial 
enclaves’ actually refers to the minorities and that the policy is really intended to 
prevent their concentration - hence the feeling of discrimination and being 
disadvantaged.  Malays, in particular being both indigenous yet remaining on the 
lowest rung of the socio-economic ladder (see Tables 18-22 in Chapter 8.2), 
particularly feel a sense of community fragmentation and discrimination because of 
the perceived Chinese fear of Malays and past animosity between these two 
communities resulting in racial riots on three previous occasions in Singapore’s post-
war history, the last in 1969.34  Rejecting the Government’s concern that ethnic 
enclaves lead to riots, one Malay respondent says, “Integration and national identity 
are not automatically achieved just by mixing the races.  It cannot be forced and it 
will come naturally over a period of time.”  Noting that the original intention to limit 
‘races’ to a prescribed ratio was to promote ‘racial’ tolerance and harmony in line 
with the state’s multiracial and multicultural policies, Kesavan, a 36-year old 
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motorcar mechanic contends that the policy has led to segregation and 
marginalization of the minority communities because it has a pro-Chinese basis.  He 
continues, “The policy ensures a majority of Chinese in every HDB estate, so that 
they can dominate society and the country.  This is not good for racial cohesiveness.”  
In agreement with this view is a 67-year old Indian resident Kasinathan who does not 
believe that racial integration can come about just by putting people of different 
ethnicities together.  To him there is no spirit of community in his neighbourhood.  He 
says, “When my Chinese neighbour comes back to his flat, he just slams the door shut 
and makes no effort to get to know his neighbours.  When I greet him he just nods and 
disappears into his flat”.   
 Even when people get along well with their neighbours, they develop no 
patterns of association as I discovered among some of my respondents.  Says one of 
them, housewife Rani 54: “The mainly Chinese neighbours in my block are merely 
casual in their friendship with me and my family.  They do not seek a deeper 
friendship.  Every now and then I invite them to my house during festivals but they 
prefer to meet and talk in the lifts or in the void deck.  May be they are so conscious 
of their race and mine that they feel uncomfortable in interacting closer”.  Besides the 
state’s primary objective of discouraging the formation of ethnic enclaves, the 
overriding philosophy of mixing the various ethnic groups in a localized setting is to 
foster closer interaction between members of these groups as a way to achieve greater 
ethnic integration for the purposes of nation building.  The state believes that the 
greater the frequency of interaction, the more they will integrate.  My survey shows 
that, with exceptions, people accept and tolerate their neighbours of other ethnicities 
though they do not expect to move any closer.   
 Another grouse of the minorities involves those who fall under the category of 
‘Others’.  The HDB’s policy of clustering ‘Indians and Others’ into one group means 
that both compete for “a now smaller piece of the pie” (as one of my respondents put 
it).  Such a scenario puts both the Indians and the ‘Other’ communities like the 
Eurasians into a distinct disadvantage.  The Eurasians, for example, forming a very 
small percentage of the population, have to compete with a considerably larger Indian 
base.  One of my Indian respondents also argues that the policy fails to recognize the 
tremendous ethnic and cultural differences that exist between these two communities.  
Prabhakaran, a 67 year-old Indian government retiree, says: “We are already a 
minority and yet we have to share with the Eurasians and other small communities 
 220
who are so different from us”.  This response is echoed by a Eurasian, Fonseka, a 54 
year-old technical draughtsman, who thinks that his community has almost no chance 
to buy a flat as Indians, by virtue of their numbers, have a greater chance to do so.  
Over all, the minority ethnic communities appear aggrieved with the state for not 
giving them the freedom to live where they wanted.  Being very family and 
community-oriented, they have always lived near their kith and kin as it gives them a 
sense of security and close interaction.  They also oppose the policy on the grounds 
that it contradicts the government’s frequent exhortations for family and community 
support, filial piety and maintenance of traditional culture and values.   
On a general basis, my Malay and Indian respondents give the impression that 
housing policy is one of several ‘social engineering’ areas in which they perceive 
excessive intervention, coercion, control and authoritarianism on the part of the PAP 
government in the public and private lives of citizens.  However, it must be 
acknowledged that despite their reservations on the racial quota policy many of my 
Malay and Indian informants welcome multiethnic living in HDB estates.  As 
reported by Purushotam, “people are not only adjusting to their new environment, but 
they prefer it to their former residential patterns”.35  Unlike the Chinese who appear to 
consider ‘race’ important in interethnic relationships, many Indians I interviewed 
believe that the more people interact with their neighbours the greater the interaction 
between the ethnic groups as a whole.  They admit to accepting the status quo as the 
only solution for closer ethnic interaction and the potential for national identity in a 
multiracial Singapore.  Most of them have already adjusted to and accept other ethnics 
as their immediate neighbours.  Managing and celebrating differences are, according 
to them, part of daily living. 
 Nevertheless research has shown that the issue of ‘constraint choice’ resulting 
from the ethnic quota policy has segregated and marginalized the Indian community, 
especially those from the lower-income group, more than the other ethnic groups.36  
Realizing that the policy affected Indians more than the Chinese, the National 
Development Minister had, as early as 1989 and again in 1997, agreed that the 
Government would review the policy to see whether there were other ways to achieve 
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ethnic integration without causing undue hardship to residents.37 Indian MP R 
Sinnakaruppan even suggested in Parliament on 25 July 1997 that the ethnic quota be 
applied only to areas such as Little India where there was a reasonably high demand 
for flats from Indians, and a combined quota with other ‘races’ elsewhere.  In 
speaking of the plight of Indians and others (meaning Eurasians and other minorities) 
in selling their HDB flats, the delicate matter of ‘race’ and ‘race’ relations was also 
strongly alluded to by other Indian backbenchers in Parliament, signifying the 
importance and sensitivity of ‘racial’ politics in a multiethnic society such as 
Singapore.38  A call for a review of the HDB’s ethnic quota policy has repeatedly 
been made both in Parliament and outside.  However, the state has said that it “does 
not intend to tinker” with the policy, thereby ignoring the discontent of the minority 
communities.39   
 
7.3  ‘Race’, Education and Language Policy 
 As with housing, the “main social control mechanism for putting people in 
their places physically”, education and language policies have had similar but even 
more far-reaching objectives.40  While public housing is confined those affected by 
the housing policy41, education and language policy applies to all Singaporeans and 
are the chief vehicles for instilling linguistic discipline among the multiethnic 
population – in the words of Wilson, education is a major instrument of “social 
engineering”.42   
 The colonial regime had ensured that their education policy kept the ‘races’ 
divided with English education being available to the privileged few who were 
employed as “clerks for Western commercial houses and the government”.43 The 
educational needs of the three major ethnic groups were left to their own resources 
with little interference or control from the British administration.  Four separate 
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educational streams, namely, English, Chinese, Malay, and Tamil existed under 
British colonial practice, promoting “ethnic exclusiveness” and “conflicting ethnic, 
social and political orientations” that supposedly had divisive effects on the 
population.44  A further division created by the British was the class gulf between the 
English-educated and Chinese-educated Chinese, a divide that was to create problems 
for the post-independent state as it sought to defuse the tensions between the two 
groups.   The situation that the British left behind on independence was therefore one 
in which language and ‘race’ had been manipulated by them for the purpose of 
achieving political and social control of the population as well as for keeping the 
‘races’ apart.  In this chapter I will demonstrate that this situation has been maintained 
in a modified fashion by the post-independent state to achieve similar hegemonic, 
political and social controls.  
Education has long been relied on by the nation state as a crucial tool of 
“national-building”.45 The schools are consciously used as “agencies of political 
socialization” creating among students “loyalty to the republic” and “appreciation of 
racial and religious tolerance”, in other words both a Singaporean national and a 
separate ethnic identification.46  More clearly than any other social engineering 
initiative in Singapore, the school system expresses Singapore’s approach to 
multiracialism and nation building, bringing together Singaporeans of all ethnic 
groups and classes, and affecting almost every family in significant and profound 
ways.  It is in the schools, more than in any other institution, that the abstract values 
of multiracialism and of Singaporean identity are given concrete form.  The symbolic 
daily flag raising and lowering ritual along with the reciting of the national pledge and 
the singing of the national anthem are all aimed at instilling loyalty and a sense of 
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national identity.47  These school activities emotionally reinforce the substance of 
political socialization contained in the state-designed school curriculum.  So effective 
are the schools in this respect that a critic of the PAP once described the Singapore 
education system as “the most important item in the programme of thought control”.48 
Most of the domestic political issues of the country, relations between ethnic groups, 
meritocracy, the future security of the nation, and the requirements for economic 
development are reflected in education policy.  Frequent fine-tuning of education and 
language policies has therefore taken place to reflect constant social change and a 
rapidly changing national and global economy.   
 One of the major decisions was to introduce bilingualism – meaning English 
and a mother tongue language - in schools in 1966, soon after independence.  
Instilling nationalistic values to citizens through educational and language instruction 
was the rationale for the formulation of the bilingual policy, the assumption being that 
a bilingual citizen would be able to communicate and interact not only with his or her 
own community, but also with members of other linguistic groups, thereby fostering 
tolerance, racial harmony, mutual respect and integration.  Chan and Evers set out the 
rationale for the bilingual policy: 
Each segment of Singapore’s population is too distinct and exhibits too strong 
a cultural tradition to warrant any hope that these traditions would merge into 
a single cultural and national identity.  The pragmatic solution was to create a 
double identity: a somewhat subdued cultural identity based on the respective 
local language and a national identity based on English.49
However an overwhelming response among my Indian respondents is that the mother 
tongue policy seemed to compartmentalize children by ‘race’.  “Today I see school 
children mixing only with children of the same race.  At recess time, in the school 
field, at gatherings, in the canteen, and when the children scramble to get home, we 
always see this happening.  This is not good for national integration”, says Roshini a 
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mother of three.  She reminisces that during her school days in Singapore she was not 
at all conscious of the ‘races’ of her friends in school.  She thinks that the state today 
was overly emphasizing the peoples’ ethnicities.   
 Bilingualism was also a means of gaining access to Western knowledge and 
technology without losing familiarity with the language of one’s ‘race’ and culture.50 
The state further justified the policy on the ground that English was a neutral language 
that would help to minimize cultural and language differences between the ethnic 
groups.  The state’s emphasis on industrialization and foreign investment made it 
imperative that English as the international language of business and commerce 
should be given prominence, hence its hegemony in multiracial Singapore.51  Under 
the bilingual policy therefore all students had to learn English as the main medium of 
instruction and the first language, and their respective culturally laden mother tongues 
as their second language.  The mother tongue was defined by the father’s ethnicity 
that was in turn defined by the state’s rigid racial categories, all these factors being 
considered fixed and not negotiable.  So while English became the dominant language 
of education, government, commerce and technology, as well as the language in 
which to express national identity, Chinese (Mandarin), Malay and Tamil became the 
official mother tongue second language in schools and the language in which to 
express ethnic identity.52  Consequently, while Chinese students were required to 
learn English and Mandarin, regardless of the language spoken in the home, Malays 
were required to learn English and Malay and Indians were required to learn English 
and Tamil, notwithstanding the Indian language spoken at home.  The reality is that 
while the second language is a requirement in schools, it is in many cases not the 
language spoken at home.  Chinese speak dialects (like Cantonese, Teochew, Hakka) 
rather than Mandarin, while many Indians speak their own regional languages unless 
they are Tamils.  English has therefore gained ascendancy over the vernacular 
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languages as the most important language spoken in public, a situation that has 
contributed to the erosion of the vernacular languages despite their being presented by 
the state as an essential component of ethnic identity.  To this problem, the Prime 
Minister has responded as follows: “If we use only English and allow our mother 
tongue to degenerate, we will in time, lose our values and cultural heritage”.53 Lee 
Kuan Yew emphasizes the importance of the bilingual policy thus:  
…if we abandon our bilingual policy, we must be prepared to pay the grievous 
price of becoming a people who have lost their cultural self-identity.  Once we 
lose this emotional and cultural ballast, we will cease to be a separate and 
distinct community, with pride in ourselves.  Instead we shall become pseudo-
Westernised, alienated from our Asian background.54
Lying at the core of ethnic management, bilingualism in education has been a constant 
theme since independence, although it has been interpreted differently at different 
stages of Singapore’s development.   
 To ensure that racial diversity led to ethnic interaction and cohesion, the state 
also established integrated schools, admitting students from all ethnic segments and 
according English a special status.  At the same time limits were set to the proportion 
of minority students permitted in schools.55  This was a radical departure from the 
colonial period when schools were largely segregated along different language 
streams and there was very little interaction between the various ethnic groups.  The 
rationale was that Singaporeans should “retain their cultural identification through 
education in their own language… and gain a common ground through the English 
language”, though in practice most students learn their ethnic group language in 
school only as a second language.56  
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 The principle of multiracialism and multiculturalism also assumes that each 
‘race’ has a distinct culture reinforced by and intimately connected to its own 
language.  This is one way ethnic groups constitute themselves, language being 
presented as the “verbalization of the shared beliefs, fraternal bonds, [and] communal 
historic ties… of a people”.57  In line with this principle, the new nation state after 
independence proclaimed four official languages – English, Chinese, Malay and 
Tamil for Singaporeans, one language each for the major local ‘races’.  These four 
languages are those recognized in Singapore’s education system.  The four languages 
are also freely used in Parliament, though English remains the working language of 
the bureaucratic machinery.  Each language medium was “assured of a respectable 
position in the national education system” and there was to be equality in government 
financial assistance.58  
 Racial categories therefore have determined language choices of children in 
schools under the bilingual policy.59 With the linkage of a language to a broadly 
defined racial category the prescribing of Mandarin as the second language for the 
Chinese has not only served to preserve Chinese dominance and unite the Chinese 
against the ethnic minorities, it has also proved divisive according to perceptions from 
the minority communities.  In contemporary Singapore ethnicity partially determines 
social mobility, hence the ability to speak English-Mandarin is more favoured than 
English-Malay or English-Tamil for employment or business opportunities as 
evidenced by my respondents in subsequent paragraphs.  This English-Mandarin 
equation is considered by the state as essential for national development, these 
languages being identified as the languages of commerce as well as for the 
cohesiveness of the majority community and thus necessary for national survival.  
Hence job advertisements in the print media often specify a preference for candidates 
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proficient in English and Mandarin.  By contrast the other official ethnic languages, 
Malay and Tamil, are relegated to the family setting or private gatherings.   
 The association between ‘race’ and language was further underlined with the 
‘Speak Mandarin’ campaign of the late 1970s, the most ambitious project of 
Singapore’s language planning and social engineering.  This measure to revive 
Chinese culture and Chineseness was the result of agitation by Chinese-educated 
groups, leading a Singapore educationist to comment that it was “a balancing move to 
reassure the Chinese community that their cohesiveness, cultural identity, and 
language claims still remained a primary concern of the government”.60 The 
dominance of English had also upset those who supported Chinese education.  Vasil 
argues that the introduction of Mandarin and subsequently the promotion of 
Confucianism by the PAP Government was to appease the Chinese-educated who felt 
alienated and threatened by the importance given to the English language.61  Several 
authors like Vasil and Chua point out that the publication of Ideology and National 
Competitiveness: An Analysis of Nine Countries by George Lodge and Ezra Vogel, 
which claimed that predominantly Confucianist societies were likely to be more 
competitive than the ‘individualistic’ nations of the West, was an influential study for 
the PAP leadership. 62
 The Chinese-educated had also perceived that the dominant status of the 
Chinese community was being undermined.  A new national socio-ethnic rationale 
therefore had to be developed to sustain social stability and ethnic harmony for the 
purposes of economic development based on a survivalist ideology.  In line with this 
need the Goh Education Report reiterated as follows:  
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One way to overcoming the dangers of deculturalisation is to teach children 
the historical origins of their culture.  Chinese pupils could be taught in the 
Chinese language in secondary schools early Chinese history…63  
 Lee Kuan Yew had all along believed in the superiority of Chinese culture and 
race and this belief strengthened his desire to create, what Barr calls, “a Sinocentric 
form of multiculturalism in Singapore”.64 In an address to his constituents at a 
Chinese New Year gathering in March 1978 he says, “Heaven forbid that we lose our 
own cultures … ”65  Further championing the cause of Chinese language and culture, 
Lee launched the Speak Mandarin Campaign on 7 September 1979 and in 1984 
reiterated the importance of the campaign.  Rather than speak their native dialects like 
Hokkien, Hakka and Cantonese, Chinese Singaporeans were exhorted to learn 
Mandarin as their mother tongue.  Until the late 1970s and early 80s dialects were 
commonly spoken among the Chinese in Singapore.  This situation was deemed 
undesirable by a state concerned that if dialects continued to be spoken, the ability of 
Chinese Singaporeans to learn the bilingual standard English and Mandarin would be 
affected.  The only way to remedy the situation was, in the view of the state, to 
eliminate dialects.  The Chinese also needed a language that would bind them together 
as a single community.  In this way the state has successfully promoted the use of 
Mandarin as a language to represent the Chinese and has thereby created a more 
homogeneous ethnolinguistic majority.66  According to the state, this language was 
associated as it was with ancient Chinese civilization and having a written script.  
This was the rationale behind the Speak Mandarin Campaign.  Promotion of 
Mandarin in Singapore has also the tacit objective of alignment with mainland China, 
given the socio-political, economic and strategic benefits accruing to Singapore.  The 
campaign has been one of the nation’s most notable public campaigns with constant 
state promotion and political speeches liberally and hegemonically laced with 
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metaphors to influence the public and promote the campaigns.67  Every year a whole 
month is dedicated to the promotion of this policy and data shows that over the years 
the use of dialects has shown a significant decrease with Mandarin becoming more 
widespread.  This necessity to promote Mandarin over dialects prompted Lee to say: 
“English will not be emotionally acceptable as our mother tongue”.68
 My conversations with people from the minority communities, namely, the 
Malays, Indians and Eurasians show that while they did not see the importance given 
to English as a threat to their identity and culture, the Chinese were distinctly 
concerned that their heritage and identity were in jeopardy.69  This concern is echoed 
in the words of then Prime Minister, Goh Chok Tong, who asked: “What will be the 
future of 75% of our people who are Chinese whom we find could be losing their 
bearing?”  He went on to say, in an interview with Raj Vasil in late 1992, that unlike 
the Malays and Indians, the Chinese were in danger of losing their values:   
This was because they are educated in English, they travel abroad, they study 
abroad, and the slightest hiccup over here, they think of emigration.  Their 
bond with the country is not there because the bond to the community is not 
there.  They become individual economic animals, looking for the greenest 
pasture in the world.  Now if that becomes a common phenomenon, where 
will Singapore be?70    
 Goh Chok Tong told Dr Vasil that the Speak Mandarin campaign was aimed 
at getting younger Singaporeans to go back to their roots because they were losing 
their culture.  From time to time other PAP leaders have also expressed the need to 
learn Mandarin.  Dr Hong Hai, MP, for example, extolled it as an “insurance against 
Western cultural colonization”.71  
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 Under the “Speak Mandarin’ campaign the use of Mandarin was widely 
enforced in public places, in government offices and the workplace, on TV and radio, 
in the naming of public places, in the use of bilingual instead of multilingual signs, in 
the building of Chinese theme parks, in the merging of two main Chinese-medium 
daily newspapers into a single state-controlled one, and especially in the setting up of 
the prestigious and elite Special Assistance Plan (SAP) schools in 1980 where gifted 
Chinese students could study Mandarin as a first language besides English.72  All 
these measures in the state management of ethnicity are seen by the minority 
communities as favouring the Chinese at the expense of the minorities and going 
against the grain of multiracialism by encouraging racial segregation and the 
“Sinicization of the entire Singapore society rather than of the Chinese only”.73  
Discussions of language, culture, ethnicity and race have raised significant and indeed 
fundamental issues as I discovered in interviews with many Singaporeans.  They 
raised particular issues about state policies and programmes, some of which are as 
follows: What about the pressures from a dominant Chinese ethnic population? Will 
strengthening the place of Chinese language and culture amongst Chinese-speaking 
Singaporeans sinicise the population? What of the 14% Malay and 7% of the Indian 
population who do not communicate in Chinese? Non-Chinese speaking Singaporeans 
argue that the state’s language-planning approach excludes all non-Chinese from the 
scheme of things addressed by the Speak Mandarin Campaign.  Would this lead to a 
dominant role and over the years a hegemonic role for the Chinese language? Has the 
status and role of English now been replaced in some areas by an English-Mandarin 
equation and in other contexts by Mandarin? What elements of Singaporean culture 
and tradition should then be selected that will be relevant to the minority Indians 
living in Singapore? What is the status of political representation for Indians in 
Singapore especially in the politicized Group Representation Constituencies (GRC) in 
racially integrated constituencies? Four Indian MPs were appointed by the ruling 
party in the 2001 General Elections but the Indian newspaper Tamil Murasu debated 
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whether their appointments were representative of the Tamil-speaking Indian 
community as they could speak fluent Mandarin but little or no Tamil.    
 The Speak Mandarin Campaign is the target of my respondents’ ire provoking 
a spate of responses in the Singapore media and in my interviews with them.  In 
particular the slogan “If you are Chinese, make a statement in Mandarin” was seen by 
some of the minorities and some English-educated as yet another sign that Singapore 
was becoming a Chinese state.  Though the state subsequently conceded that the 
campaign had been badly publicized and that the public perception that there was an 
attempt to get non-Chinese to speak Mandarin was unfounded, the damage had been 
done resulting in uneasiness and unhappiness among the minorities.  Says one 
interviewee Lal Bangah, a 47-year old lab assistant:  
My son entered NS [National Service] last year.  During his Basic Military 
Training and in his subsequent postings, he was mostly with English-educated 
Chinese Singaporean NS men with whom he had to interact.  Yet most of 
them spoke in Mandarin in his presence and even when engaged in general 
conversation.  Whenever he asked them to speak in English they would say, 
“Sorry but we are more comfortable talking in Mandarin.  Sometimes 
instructions and briefings are given in Mandarin too.  The situation was quite 
different when I was serving my own NS about 20 years ago.  I recall that one 
of its original objectives was to foster a sense of national integration and all of 
us spoke in English, the language common to all of us.  At the same time I was 
never conscious that I was from a minority community.  My teammates and I 
were from different racial groups but this fact simply did not register in our 
minds and we mixed freely as a result.  But nowadays I see 
compartmentalisation among the various ethnic groups because of the 
Government’s overemphasis on ethnic consciousness.  I strongly believe that 
unless Singaporeans today reach out to those of other races and make them 
feel comfortable in their presence, we will end up retreating into separate 
linguistic and racial enclaves.  And the kind of national identity that my 
contemporaries and I had will be less prevalent.  Certainly this is not the way 
to achieve national integration and identity.  One of the purposes of the 
bilingual education policy is that Singaporeans should be fluent in English and 
their mother tongue.  If Chinese Singaporeans feel more comfortable talking in 
Mandarin than in English in a mixed gathering, what about the employment 
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prospects of non-Chinese Singaporeans? I say this because I find a lot of jobs 
advertised nowadays in the newspapers calling for applicants “conversant in 
both English and Mandarin”, even though many of them are back-room 
positions requiring no knowledge of Mandarin. 
 Such a perception is prevalent among many of my participants who felt that 
the state’s emphasis on the Speak Mandarin Campaign had put the minority 
communities at a disadvantage in getting jobs as they did not know Mandarin.  
Stressing the need for more sensitivity, Lal Bangah continues, 
Use of the mother tongue is fine in mono-ethnic settings but in multi-ethnic 
Singapore, the use of the English medium would serve to unite us all.  In such 
a multiracial setting it is important that we must be sensitive to the interests 
and sentiments of other ethnic groups. 
 A similar grievance came from another Indian Kamala, a 22-year old female 
National University of Singapore student who had been given the duty of recording 
minutes of a university club’s committee meeting.  She says she felt hurt and was at a 
loss when her classmates started talking in Mandarin even though they were aware 
that she had to take down the minutes in English.    
  The following responses are examples that further typify the resentment the 
minorities have towards the emphasis given by the state to the Chinese language and 
culture.   
 Says Ganesan, a 40 year-old Tamil-speaking male Indian engineer, working in 
a construction company: 
 …this policy is so discriminatory… why is not Tamil given equal 
importance? Why can’t they [the Government] not have a ‘Speak Tamil’ or 
‘Speak Malay’ campaign also?” They do not practice equality when talking 
about our multiracial society. 
His grievance is echoed by lawyer 46 year-old Nathan who considers that policies 
deferred from the rights enshrined in the Singapore Constitution.  Quoting the legal 
freedom to learn languages, he asks, “Why must my child learn only Tamil and not 
say Chinese or Malay or Russian?” He is also upset that though Tamil was one of the 
official languages it was often absent in many official publications.   
Sasitharan, a 34-year old accountant: 
I tried to enroll my son for Primary 1 a few years ago but discovered that some 
top primary schools offer only Chinese as the mother tongue.  I’m against this 
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policy for two reasons.  Firstly, it creates Chinese elitism, and secondly it is 
not consistent with the Government’s policy of equal opportunities for all as 
minority races cannot consider these schools.  How do we expect to achieve 
racial integration if we have such policies? 
Vidya, a 50 year-old female Indian government clerk:  
Sometimes in the office my boss mutters some phrases and jokes in Mandarin 
during meetings and I, along with my Malay colleague, feel left out… This is 
not fair.  It is also rude and openly discriminates against minorities.   
Salleh Ibrahim, a 58 year-old male Malay stall owner:  
They [the Chinese] forget that we are the bumiputras (meaning natives), yet 
they want to impose their language and their Chineseness on Singaporeans just 
because they are the dominant community.   
Another Malay, 25-year old Idris, a government technical assistant: 
You know why Malays cannot take Chinese as a second language in schools? 
The Government wants everyone especially the Chinese to stay connected to 
their ethnic groups.  I see that this policy is mainly to protect and improve the 
position of the Chinese and not the other races.  They [the Government] make 
it look like a fair policy by encouraging Malays to take up Malay as their 
second language and Indians their language.  Individual wishes or parents’ 
wishes do not count.  Only race counts (underlined by me).  What about 
equality that they preach under multiracialism? 
Yet another Malay, Fatimah, a 47 year-old female telephonist:  
When I applied for the job of clerk in a company, they asked whether I could 
speak Mandarin, even though my job did not require attending to the public.  
Why this discrimination on account of race? Might as well abolish Malay and 
Tamil and have only Chinese taught as a second language in schools.  May be 
then we would have better chances of getting employment.  But may be not! 
Almost all my respondents imply that ‘race’ is still in the way of equal social 
interaction.  The fact that ‘race’ plays a pivotal role in the state’s language policy is 
underlined in this episode recounted by Jayabalan, a 26-year old accountancy 
graduate from the Nanyang Technological University:  
At a recent interview for the position of accountant in a public relations firm, I 
was asked whether I could speak Chinese.  I explained that I could not only 
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speak but also could write Mandarin and showed them my certificates.  Yet I 
was not chosen for the job.   
He contends that he was passed over because he belonged to a minority ‘race’.   
 My respondents are therefore unanimous in feeling threatened and sidelined 
from the national project by perceptions that knowledge of Mandarin was expected in 
order to be considered for employment and ethnic quotas.  They perceive that ethnic 
favouritism towards the Chinese and entrenched social advantages for the Chinese 
disadvantaged the minorities in Singapore.  They also expected more pressure from 
the dominant Chinese population and a hegemonic Chinese language and culture, as 
respondent Kumaran, a 62-year old retiree observes, “I don’t know where this is all 
leading to.  Why can’t the Government be more sensitive to our feelings and accord 
equality to all the races?”  They also argue that the state’s language policies exclude 
them from social advancement, even though the Government has attempted to allay 
their fears.  They see all these changes as going against the PAP Government’s 
overriding commitment to a multiracial Singapore.  Such an attitude is particularly 
prevalent among the economically depressed Malays who resent the strong reassertion 
of the Chineseness not only of the Chinese but of Singapore itself.  Malay and Tamil-
speaking communities raised particular issues with state planning decisions and 
questioned the roles of their own ethnicities in the multilingual framework.  Anxieties 
felt by the minority communities are also reflected by their MPs – for example, MP 
Othman Haron Eusofe says that there is an insecure feeling among minority groups 
that they had not been able to share in Singapore’s prosperity, especially in getting 
lucrative employment in the private sector.74  Responding to the unhappiness felt by 
minority communities the Prime Minister has warned employers not to discriminate 
against non-Chinese by setting Mandarin as a requirement even for jobs that did not 
need it, but my respondents are not convinced that employers, particularly Chinese 
companies, would comply.75   
 The issue of SAP schools was another topic drawing a barrage of criticism 
from respondents who regard this mode of emphasis on the Chinese language as 
racially motivated and therefore discriminatory.  As SAP schools provide Chinese as 
a first language equally with English and are only meant for bright Chinese students, 
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the minorities see it as a policy of training up an elitist bilingual Chinese class at the 
expense of the minorities by not giving similar opportunities for bright non-Chinese 
students.  For instance, medical practitioner Dr Sivasothi, 53, questions the motives 
behind the setting up of these schools.  He sees the state’s promotion of a Chinese-
speaking elite as challenging and even undermining the promotion of “racial 
tolerance”.  Besides he feels that the Government is using taxpayers’ money “to 
promote one elite segment of society and not the others [meaning minorities]”.  He 
asks, “Do they [the state] think that Indians and Malays are so stupid?” implying that 
prejudices and stereotypes about minorities dictate Government policy.  With SAP 
schools having better facilities and teachers than normal schools, many interviewees 
see these schools giving Chinese pupils an unfair advantage over pupils from other 
ethnic groups.  Objecting to the privileging of SAP schools only to Chinese students, 
one Indian parent suggests that such schools should be opened up to non-Chinese 
students also.  However government leaders have said that this was “totally 
unnecessary” and that “some [alternative] way must be found for all the bright 
students of all races to be in the same environment”.76  
 Many of my respondents also argue that the compulsory segregation of these 
SAP students by ‘race’ undermines the policy of multiracialism because these 
students do not interact with other ethnic groups.  Minorities are particularly vocal 
about how the SAP schools were harming inter-ethnic mixing.  Even a Government 
MP S Chandra Das was prompted to express his concern saying that he had received 
feedback that pupils were more “race-conscious” than in the past, more “keenly aware 
of their racial differences” and not mixing enough with pupils from other ethnic 
groups.  He observed that “we are unwittingly paying another price in terms of inter-
racial relations”.  He feared that with SAP schools nurturing future potential leaders, 
there could be “serious implications in the way Singapore is governed and run” in the 
future.  The MP also saw that ‘race’ was unexpectedly segregating pupils in schools 
according to the second language they took, observing that Indian pupils were 
discouraged by principals from joining certain schools because Tamil was not taught 
there during school hours.  Stressing that education should aim to foster national 
consciousness, racial harmony and multiracial values, he said, “Educational policies 
which tend to create racial divisiveness or result in ethnic groups being isolated from 
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each other should be discarded”.77  However senior Government leaders have 
repeatedly defended the SAP policy saying that it was a fallacy to argue that SAP 
students could not mix with other ‘races’.   
A minority member writing in the press had suggested that SAP schools 
should not have been conceived in the first place as such schools did not allow free 
mixing between the ‘races’.78  The state however responded to such arguments saying 
that abolishing SAP schools would not lead to better unity.  The Government 
spokesman rationalized his argument thus: “We never set out to have a homogenized 
society based on one race, one language, one culture and one religion” and that the 
Government “stood for a multiracial, multilingual, multicultural and multireligious 
Singapore”.   This perennial issue of whether SAP schools were cut off from other 
races saw more publicity as media comments from the minority communities argued 
against the operation of these schools on the ground that such schools were “racial 
cocoons”.79  A survey conducted by The Straits Times in February 2002 also 
concluded that SAP school students had “fewer friends of other races, compared to 
students in non-SAP schools”.     
 Further cultural initiatives that followed the ‘Speak Mandarin’ campaign and 
the introduction of the SAP schools, such as religious education in schools, the search 
for ‘Asian Values’ by extolling the virtues of Confucianism, the building of Chinese 
theme parks and the provision of big budgets for Chinese television serials are all seen 
by the ethnic Malay and Indian communities as veiled attempts to accord undue 
importance and an increased sense of superiority to the Chinese community and 
marginalize the minority communities on the strength of the ‘race’ card.  They view 
structural inequalities in the education system and a general social bias towards the 
Chinese as offering Chinese students an educational advantage over the minority 
communities and contributing to their disproportionate economic success.  These 
discourses of the state are widely perceived by several respondents as founded on 
Confucianism and its persistent equation with Asian Values, thus leaving little room 
for ethnic Malay or Indian discourses.  Recently proposals have been suggested to 
make the learning of Chinese in schools even easier, while giving opportunities to 
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those who want to make Chinese their main language instead of English.  Parents are 
to be given the choice not to force children to try to master two languages to equal 
ability.  The intense uneasiness caused by the furore of the Speak Mandarin Campaign 
and other state-directed initiatives to enhance Chinese language and culture has not 
only prompted defensive responses from the Chinese community but also elicited 
repeated assurances from the political leadership allaying the fears of the minority 
communities while also reminding the Chinese to be aware of the fragile multiracial 
fabric of Singapore society.80  The government also took pains to stress that, 
While the majority should be tolerant of and understand the sensibilities of the 
minority communities, there are times when the minorities must also 
understand the sensibilities of the majority… For the minorities to ask for the 
[Speak Mandarin] campaign to be withdrawn could prove troublesome 
because the Chinese could react in a way which could be harmful to the 
minority community… tolerance must be mutual… multiracialism must cover 
both sides.81
The Prime Minister further emphasized that the minority races should not try to 
impose their views on the Chinese and that they should not get upset over issues like 
the Speak Mandarin Campaign that was targeted only at Chinese Singaporeans.82
 The nation state furthermore emphasizes meritocracy in the education system.  
Yet as is the case in nearly all merit-based societies, forms of class disadvantage are 
reproduced through the schooling system.  Former Education Minister Tony Tan, for 
example, exposed the differences in educational achievement between the ethnic 
groups in the following words, “Malay and Indian children do not perform as well as 
Chinese children because they are relatively weaker in English and Mathematics”.  To 
support his statement, he produced statistics that showed striking differences in the 
rates of educational achievement over the years between these groups in major school 
examinations, particularly in English and Mathematics.  The gap he observed widened 
as they went up the “education ladder” and that “without success in school 
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examinations, one cannot hope to aspire to higher levels of vocations or job 
opportunities in a modern industrialized city like Singapore”.83  
This meant that the children of the wealthy Chinese and the English-educated 
succeeded in attaining top positions in commerce and employment (see Tables 18-22 
in Chapter 8.2).  This is because such children mainly came from affluent Chinese 
families who could afford to give their children the best educational opportunities.  In 
contrast, the lower classes and minority ‘races’ were considered by the state to lack 
ability, Lee Kuan Yew often referring to them as ‘digits’, a reference which had its 
genesis in Lee’s eugenics theories whereby intelligence is linked to ‘race’ and 
biological heredity (see Chapter 6.2).84  It was, according to Lee, the children of the 
elite on whom 
 we aim to identify the most intelligent members of society who can provide 
the direction, planning and control of [state] power in the people’s interest… It 
is on this group that we must expend our limited and slender resources in order 
that they will provide the yeast, that ferment, that catalyst in our society which 
alone will ensure that Singapore shall maintain… the social organization 
which enables us, with almost no natural resources, to provide the second 
highest standard of living in Asia… We do this by means of an educational 
system in which Singapore’s brightest students [are] groomed for future 
command… The ideal product is the student, the university graduate, who is 
strong, robust, rugged, with tremendous qualities of stamina, endurance and at 
the same time with great intellectual discipline and most important of all, 
humility and love of community.85  
In his last National Day speech as Prime Minister in 1990 before stepping down, Lee 
said that only the top 3% of Singapore was capable of political leadership, indirectly 
referring to the Chinese elite.86  Critiquing the supposed link between intelligence and 
examinations, 48-year old Kripalini, a dermatologist in private practice explains: 
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Your intelligence in Singapore is determined by genetics.  Whether you are 
genetically competent is decided by school examinations.  If you fail the 
exams you are genetically inferior and there is no hope for you.  Why, Bill 
Gates would be a dishwasher in Singapore!   
In expressing this view, he says that the government often used academic 
performances of the various ethnic groups to reinforce perceptions of the intelligence 
hierarchy of these groups, Chinese always being considered the most intelligent when 
compared with Indians and Malays.  “Singapore may be the only country in the world 
that is openly following the discredited ideology of eugenics”, he concludes.  Yet it 
could be convincingly argued that meritocracy in education is an issue of class more 
than race.  Meritocracy, by its very nature, finds it difficult to distinguish between the 
child of a menial worker and the child of a doctor because both are capable of 
excelling in their studies.  The only reason that the doctor’s child fares better is 
because the doctor-parent is able to give their child that extra push – by means of their 
own time, education and resources – which the labourer can ill-afford.  The 
difference, it could be argued, is not because of ‘race’.  Thus instead of perceiving the 
minority community as backward because of their ‘race’, it stands to reason that class 
is the overriding factor in meritocracy, though the Singapore nation state favours the 
Chinese against the minority communities on the strength of ‘race.’ 
 Thus the educational system in Singapore targets educational resources based 
on a ‘racial’ categorization of people by linking them to class and education.  For 
instance, the Graduate Mother Scheme linking education to reproduction patterns 
(described in Chapter 6.3) and the Gifted Education programme all aimed at 
reproducing the Chinese capitalist class while the less academically inclined (coming 
mainly from the Malay and Indian communities) were diverted to technical and 
vocational training to boost the lower rungs of the labour force.  Likewise the state’s 
emphasis on higher educational qualifications under the ideology of meritocracy 
dictated that foreign middle-class and affluent Chinese professionals and business 
people were, besides whites, accorded preferential treatment in being given 
employment passes to work in Singapore with a whole range of incentives for them to 
stay on in Singapore with their families, while work permits with severe restrictions 
were issued to less-educated working class production workers, construction labourers 
and domestic servants from Malaysia, Thailand, India, Indonesia, Bangladesh, 
Philippines and Sri Lanka (see Chapter 4.4).   The consequence of the principle of 
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meritocratic sorting is seen in the many surveys that show that income inequality 
actually widened between ethnic minorities and the Chinese in the economic sector, 
the latter having higher educational qualifications and occupying top positions in 
business and employment.87  
 As I have demonstrated above, several of my interviewees have reported that 
language and educational policies have served to unite the majority community more 
closely around the idea of ‘race’.  Apt are the words of respondent Pillay, a 54-year 
lawyer in private practice, who wonders about what is ahead for Singapore’s 
minorities,  
Government’s policies seem destined to project an ever-increasing Chinese 
monopoly and Chinese dominance in every aspect of our daily life and 
activities based on their preoccupation with race, with a concomitant reduction 
in Chinese commitment to multiracialism.  Minorities like mine will just have 
to tolerate and accept the system, otherwise there will be trouble, but the 
government must also empathise with our situation.   
 Minority anxieties resulted in Chinese chauvinism based on ‘race’ taking 
centre-stage during the public debate over the issue of whether MRT signs should be 
in English or Chinese, or both, or in all the four official languages.  Some of the 
Chinese-educated argued that as they formed the major ‘race’, the signs should be 
only in Chinese.  Such exchanges illustrate the fact that beneath the surface of 
multiracial peace lie ethnic and linguistic passions that feed on the ‘race’ card.  ‘Race’ 
and language also became a hot issue during the General Elections of 1997 resulting 
in minority groups (as well as Chinese-educated Singaporeans) urging the state to 
reassure the public that all ‘races’ and language groups would be treated fairly.  
Recognizing that ‘race’ and language, among other issues, remained sensitive and will 
remain so in Singapore, the Government advised them that there would be an “open, 
level playing field for all races”, with English as the dominant working language.88  
The state, while encouraging Chinese culture, language and traditions, frequently 
makes pronouncements to assure the minorities that “efforts would be made to help 
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all ethnic groups strengthen their own cultural and social fabric, while also binding 
them into one Singaporean identity”.89
 
7.4  Conclusion 
 The housing and language/education policies discussed in this chapter 
demonstrate the strong responses ethnic Singapore Indians exhibit as they feel the 
direct impact of these policies in their daily lives.  Though most Indians accept 
multiethnic living as part of the social reality of multiracial Singapore, they take 
umbrage with what they perceive to be excessive state intervention and control biased 
in favour of the majority Chinese in the enforcement of the ethnic quota, language and 
educational policies. Their responses suggest that the quota policy does not augur well 
for the promotion of national identity because it is categorized according to ‘race’.  
Likewise language/education policies draw sharp reactions from Indians who perceive 
that such policies are based on the ‘race’ factor that enables Chinese to assert their 
ethnic superiority over the minority communities thereby undermining the policy of 
multiracialism, meritocracy and the concomitant objective of national identity 
espoused by the state.  In the final chapter I will examine how the Indian community 
is again faced with the dilemma of ethnic identity clashing with national identity in 
the social engineering policies of self-help and heritage conservation. 
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CHAPTER 8 
RACIAL POLITICS AND SOCIAL ENGINEERING – SELF-HELP AND 
HERITAGE CONSERVATION 
 
8.1  Introduction 
 While chapters 6 and 7 have sought to demonstrate that the minority Indian 
(and Malay) communities saw many aspects of the state’s social engineering policies 
as divisive and not contributing to national integration, Chapter 8 further explores 
their fears, anxieties and tensions with regard to the government’s policies of self-help 
and heritage conservation.  The state has gone about engaging and negotiating these 
policies with the various communities, but the Indian minority is particularly 
concerned that such policies highlight ethnic differences and ethnic inequalities to the 
detriment of national identity.1  Their feelings and concerns find a voice in this 
chapter.   
 
8.2  ‘Race’ and Self-help 
The commitment to the principle of meritocracy hitherto discussed with 
respect to the language and education policy of the state applies equally to other 
aspects of state planning.  In particular it applies to the problem of economic 
inequalities between the Chinese and the minority ‘races’.  Robust economic growth 
and the growing affluence of the middle class during the decades following 
independence resulted in growing socio-economic disparities between the Chinese 
and the minority communities.  Tables 18-22 below show economic performance 
between the various ethnic groups and the widening gap between the Chinese and the 
Malays/Indians.  These tables show that the majority of Malays and Indians – 
especially the Malays – hold low-skilled jobs producing low incomes while having 
large families unlike the Chinese.   
 
 
 
 
                                        
1  The Malays are equally concerned in the context of their community, but their anxieties and tensions 
are sidestepped for the purposes of this thesis, although there is some discussion of their position in this 
chapter. 
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Table 18 
Monthly income from work and ethnic group 1980, 1990 and 2000 (percent) 
2000 
Monthly income 
from work ($) 
Total Chinese Malays Indians Others 
Total 
Below 500 
500-999 
1,000-1,499 
1,500-1,999 
2,000-2,999 
3,000 & over 
 
100.0 
3.5 
8.2 
14.9 
15.5 
23.6 
34.3 
100.0 
3.5 
7.9 
13.9 
14.6 
23.4 
36.7 
100.0 
4.1 
10.6 
21.5 
22.0 
26.3 
15.5 
100.0 
3.4 
8.6 
16.1 
16.1 
22.7 
33.1 
100.0 
2.3 
4.8 
11.7 
10.7 
18.6 
51.9 
1990 
Total 
Below 500 
500-999 
1,000-1,499 
1,500-1,999 
2,000-2,999 
3,000 & over 
Average $ 
 
100.0 
11.0 
37.1 
23.4 
11.3 
8.9 
8.3 
1,414 
100.0 
6.9 
36.8 
24.5 
12.4 
10.2 
9.2 
1,497 
100.0 
9.4 
47.8 
27.0 
9.4 
4.6 
1.8 
1,049 
100.0 
17.6 
38.9 
21.7 
9.5 
6.8 
5.5 
1,195 
 
 
100.0 
57.4 
16.1 
4.5 
3.0 
4.4 
14.6 
1,408 
1980 
 
Total 
Below 500 
500-999 
1,000-1,499 
1,500-1,999 
2,000-2,999 
3,000 & over 
Average $ 
 
 
100.0 
63.4 
24.2 
5.9 
2.5 
2.0 
2.0 
598 
 
100.0 
60.2 
26.6 
6.7 
2.9 
2.1 
1.5 
595 
 
100.0 
81.7 
15.7 
1.8 
0.5 
0.2 
0.1 
388 
 
100.0 
68.7 
20.2 
4.8 
2.1 
2.3 
1.9 
568 
 
100.0 
31.9 
12.7 
7.4 
5.8 
9.9 
32.3 
2,307 
Source: Department of Statistics, Singapore. 
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Table 19 
Occupational distribution by ethnic group (percent) 
 
Occupation  Chinese  Malays  Indians  Others  
  
1980   1990   2000 
 
1980    1990  2000 
 
1980    1990  2000 
 
1980   1990   2000 
 
Total 
 
100.0  100.0  100.0 
 
100.0  100.0  100.0 
 
100.0  100.0  100.0 
 
100.0  100.0  100.0 
Administrative & 
Managerial 
Professional, 
Technical & 
Related 
 
Clerical 
 
Sales & Services 
 
Production &  
Related 
 
Cleaners & 
Labourers 
 
Others  
 
5.1    11.0    15.9 
 
 
9.1    18.7    30.3 
 
16.2    14.8    13.5 
 
16.1    14.0    11.7 
 
 
38.7    26.5    18.6 
 
 
8.6    9.7    6.2  
 
6.2    5.3    3.8 
 
0.6    1.1    2.9 
 
 
4.8    10.6    20.4 
 
14.5    16.0    20.0 
 
6.0    15.4    16.2  
 
 
54.2    37.7    27.5 
 
 
17.3    16.2    10.7 
 
2.6    3.0    2.3    
 
3.7    7.1    12.5 
 
 
8.9    15.1    30.7 
 
13.9    15.0    15.4 
 
13.8    17.1    13.7 
 
 
36.0    24.1    15.4 
 
 
16.2    15.2    8.0 
 
7.5    6.4    4.3 
 
24.5    13.2    27.0 
 
 
25.9    27.5    36.4 
 
10.5    18.2    12.5 
 
4.7    15.9    12.2 
 
 
20.3    12.8    6.7 
 
 
9.4    6.5    3.0 
 
4.7    5.9    2.2 
Source: Department of Statistics, Singapore 
 
Table 20 
Economic performance by average monthly household income 
 1980 1990 2000 
 
Chinese 
Malays  
Indians  
 
1,213 
896 
1,133 
 
3,213 
2,246 
2,859 
 
5,219 
3,148 
4,556 
Source:  Department of Statistics, Singapore. 
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Table 21 
Highest qualification attained by ethnic group2
 
 
Highest qualification  
Attained 
 
 
 
Chinese 
 
1990     2000 
 
Malays 
 
1990     2000  
 
Indians 
 
1990     2000 
 
Others 
 
1990     2000  
 
Total 
 
No Qualification 
 
Primary 
 
Secondary 
 
Upper Secondary 
 
Polytechnic 
 
University 
 
 
100.0     100.0 
 
32.0     20.2 
 
25.6     21.9 
 
25.7 23.2 
 
7.6 15.0 
 
4.1 7.0 
 
5.1      12.6 
 
 
 
100.0     100.0 
 
30.5     20.0 
 
33.1     30.1 
 
30.0     32.1 
 
4.9      12.9 
 
0.9       2.9 
 
0.6       2.0 
 
100.0     100.0 
 
27.7     13.9 
 
31.4     24.5     
 
27.8     26.4 
 
7.7      15.6 
 
1.2       3.1 
 
4.1      16.5 
 
100.0 100.0 
 
15.5 7.5 
 
26.5 16.2 
 
33.9 25.2 
 
12.2 19.9 
 
2.2 3.8 
 
9.6      27.5 
Source: Department of Statistics, Singapore. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                        
2  In 2000, the Indians had the highest proportion of university graduates – 17 percent compared with 
13 percent for the Chinese and 2 percent for the Malays. The Indians also had the largest increase in 
proportion of university graduates between 1990 and 2000 compared with the Chinese and Malays. The 
jump in the proportion of Indian university graduates was partly due to the entry of Indian permanent 
residents possessing university qualifications in the last decade. Among the Indian permanent residents, 
51 percent were university graduates in 2000, up from a mere 9.0 percent in 1990. In contrast, the 
increase was smaller among the Chinese and Malay permanent residents.   
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Table 22 
University graduates by major field of study and ethnic group, 1990 and 20003
 
Major field of  
study  
 
 
 
Total  
 
1990     2000 
 
Chinese 
 
1990     2000  
 
Malays  
 
1990     2000 
 
Indians 
 
1990     2000  
 
Others 
 
1990     2000  
 
Total  
 
Arts & Social  
Sciences 
 
Mgt, Acct & 
Commerce 
 
Law 
 
Stats &  Computer 
Studies 
 
Natural & 
Physical Sciences 
 
Medical, Dental & 
Related Sciences 
 
Engineering 
 
Architecture, 
Building Science 
& Related Fields 
 
Other Fields 
 
100.0    100.0 
 
 
25.0     17.9 
 
 
24.4     30.8 
 
3.7       2.6 
 
 
4.7 7.7 
 
 
10.7 7.1 
 
 
6.1 4.4 
 
20.2 22.8 
 
 
 
3.6 2.9 
 
1.6       3.8 
 
 
 
 
100.0    100.0 
 
 
23.2     16.6 
 
 
25.7     32.5 
 
3.1       2.3 
 
 
5.0       8.0 
 
 
10.7      6.7 
 
 
6.0       4.3 
 
21.1     22.9 
 
 
 
3.8       3.1 
 
1.4       3.6 
 
100.0    100.0 
 
 
55.0     34.4 
 
 
11.9     22.0 
 
6.0       2.8 
 
 
2.0       6.8 
 
 
7.6       7.2 
 
 
2.4       4.9 
 
9.1      14.6 
 
 
 
3.5       2.7 
 
2.5       4.6 
 
100.0    100.0 
 
 
35.5 21.6 
 
 
13.3 21.9 
 
11.0 4.5 
 
 
2.3 6.7 
 
 
12.8 10.4 
 
 
8.2 4.5 
 
13.6 24.1 
 
 
 
1.1 1.2 
 
2.2       5.1 
 
100.0 100.0 
 
 
38.5 30.2 
 
 
17.6 21.1 
 
6.1 3.4 
 
 
1.9 5.5 
 
 
6.6 6.8 
 
 
6.6 4.9 
 
15.2 20.0 
 
 
 
3.4 2.9 
 
4.1       5.2 
Source: Department of Statistics, Singapore. 
 
The above statistics have been reinforced by data from several other sources.  
For example, according to a 2000 report prepared by the Association of Muslim 
Professionals (AMP) on Malay successes and shortcomings in the ten previous years, 
the Malay-Chinese-Indian income gap widened between 1990 and 1995, with the 
Malays lagging behind the other ethnic groups on both income and education fronts, 
and, as a result, unable to make a national impact in comparison with the others.  For 
example, the report comments, the percentage of Malay workers earning more than 
                                        
3  In terms of major field of study, the growth in the number of persons with university qualifications 
was centered on engineering and computer studies. These disciplines are concentrated mainly among 
the Chinese and spurred on by the strong demand for computer and engineering professionals from the 
rapidly expanding computer, electronics and more technologically-based manufacturing industries. 
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$2,000 per month rose from 6.4% to 22.4%.  But the percentage of Chinese and 
Indian workers in the same income group jumped from 19.4% to 42.8% and from 
12.3% to 35.7% respectively.  In education, the report notes that the percentage of 
Malay students going on to post-secondary institutions leapt from 35.9% in 1990 to 
76.7% in 1999, but many Malays, it says, are still weak in mathematics and science 
and do not make it to pre-university centres, polytechnics and institutes of technical 
education.  The AMP report also commented that only about 20% of Malays from 
Primary 1 had at least 5 O-level passes in 1996 compared to over 60% of Chinese 
students from the same batch.  The community also had a high number of unskilled 
workers who are not able to fill jobs in the nation’s new knowledge and technology-
driven economy, the report added.4  Table 22 shows that those who do make it to 
tertiary institutions end up doing the ‘soft’ disciplines like Arts and Social Sciences, 
unlike the Chinese (and to a lesser extent Indians) who excel in the sciences, 
engineering and computer studies. 
The question therefore arises whether these trends – that is, Chinese economic 
domination, Malays having large families, low-paying jobs and low incomes, and 
Indians also having low-paying jobs with low incomes – are related.  It has been 
shown that historical race-based discrimination at the workplace is a common concern 
voiced by the ethnic minorities.  Several of my Indian respondents appear aggrieved 
at the way they are treated in the workplace as well as in Chinese shops and other 
Chinese establishments.  “We are treated as inferiors”, says Poongothai, an accounts 
clerk in a private company employing many Chinese.  In a similar way, Muthu a 37-
year old salesman in an automobile company says, “I don’t see myself going up in 
promotions even though I’ve performed well.  Preference goes to my Chinese 
colleagues”.  Another Indian, 39-year old Lingam working in a government 
department agrees.  All in all my respondents are unanimous in claiming that they 
perceive a sort of  “internalized orientalism” on the part of their Chinese peers or 
superiors, because of a combination of perceptions of cultural superiority by the 
Chinese race and negative stereotypes of other ethnic groups.  Such an attitude also 
permeates business dealings that Indians have with Chinese.  “My thirty years of 
dealing with Chinese shows that sometimes they try to short-change me in various 
ways.  They try to take advantage of me because I belong to a minority race”, is the 
                                        
4  Reported in The Straits Times of 21 October 2000. 
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reply from Ranjit Singh, a 58-year old textile wholesaler.  Minority communities 
therefore perceive the state as reinforcing barriers of ‘race’ and class even in the 
workplace and as wanting to maintain Chinese racial, cultural, economic and political 
dominance in Singapore by a hegemonically and carefully orchestrated process of 
social engineering focused on advantaging the economic superiority of ethnic 
Chinese. 
Research by William Keng on ethnic income inequality in Singapore 
highlights his conclusion that more than educational differences between the various 
communities, the segregation of ethnic minorities in lower-paying jobs and 
occupations across all industries reflect Chinese domination in the economic and 
political spheres (see Tables 18 and 19).5  Similar concerns have been raised by other 
researchers on this under-researched topic of ethnic inequality issues in Singapore.6  
Although related to British colonial policy arising from historical migration patterns, 
this situation appears to have become entrenched in the economic policies of the 
postcolonial state thus perpetuating the separate cultural and economic identities of 
the main ethnic groups.  According to Keng’s study, occupational distribution 
between these ethnic groups also shows a pattern similar to that which existed in the 
colonial period.  The Chinese are well represented in the high-paying financial 
services and business activities compared to the Malays and Indians who are, with 
exceptions, disproportionately confined to the lower-paying unskilled and semi-
skilled sectors of the economy (see Tables 18 and 19).  The concentration of ethnic 
minorities in lower-paying occupations and industries was, the study concludes, 
because of institutional discrimination arising from ethnicity.  The study also points 
out that, despite the overall economic improvement of the three main ethnic groups 
during the last two decades, ethnic income inequalities had actually widened.7  
                                        
5  William Keng Mun Lee, “The Income Marginality of Ethnic Minorities: An Analysis of Ethnic 
Income Inequality in Singapore,” Asian Ethnicity 5, 1 (Feb 2004). 
 
6  Lily Zubaidah Rahim Ishak, The Singapore Dilemma: The Political and Educational Marginality of 
the Malay Community (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1998); J B Tamney, The Struggle over 
Singapore’s Soul: Western Modernization and Asian Culture (Berlin and New York: Walter de 
Gruyter, 1996), 98-103; John Clammer, Singapore: Ideology, Society, Culture (Singapore: Chopmen, 
1985) 118-129; Tania Li, Malays in Singapore: Culture, Economy and Ideology (Singapore: Oxford 
University Press, 1989) 99-121; Christopher Tremewan, The Political Economy of Social Control in 
Singapore (London and New York: St Martin’s Press, 1994).   
 
7  The latest General Household Survey conducted by the Department of Statistics and released on 28 
June 2006 also confirms that although average monthly household incomes rose between 2000 and 
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Tracing back the reasons for this state of affairs, one could argue that with the ‘racial’ 
division of labour since colonial days, the Chinese have dominated the economy and, 
after the British left, obtained a ‘stranglehold’ on the economy by erecting cultural 
barriers based on prevailing negative social and physical stereotypes to exclude 
Malays and Indians from higher-paying occupations in Singapore.8  In addition, since 
independence and the rebuilding of Singapore after separation from Malaysia, the 
state has relied primarily on the Chinese for support. They have been perceived as the 
bulwark of independent Singapore.  State economic policies that accentuate ethnic 
differences have been perceived by ethnic minorities to magnify the economic 
dominance of the country’s Chinese majority despite affirmative action policies for 
these communities.  In addition, as I have discussed in Chapter 4, migration policies 
of the state have been tied to labour policies based on ‘race’ and the multicultural 
policies of the state resulting from globalization. 
 While the Chinese forge ahead both in academic performance and material 
success, the Indians and particularly the Malays perceive that they are being 
increasingly excluded from the middle class.  There is the persistent belief among 
these two groups that the state is moving away from its declared principle of 
multiracial and multicultural equality of all ‘races’ by according disproportionate 
importance to the Chinese at the expense of the minority communities.  In an 
interview that Raj Vasil had with an important Malay leader of the governing PAP in 
December 1988, the leader summarises the unhappiness of the Malay community in 
the following words:  
To many Malays, the PAP government seems to be more interested in 
appeasing the Chinese in order to maintain their large electoral support than 
strictly upholding the principle of multiracialism that in 1965 had guaranteed 
an equality of rights and status to all the different communities.9
                                                                                                               
2005 across all ethnic groups, the income gap was widening. Reported in The Straits Times of 29 June 
2006. 
 
8  Michael Barr, “Lee Kuan Yew: Race, Culture and Genes,” Journal of Contemporary Asia 29, 2 
(1999); P Erik, “Prospect of Liberalization in Singapore,” Journal of Contemporary Asia 23, 3 (1993); 
Kuah Khun Eng, “Confucian Ideology and Social Engineering in Singapore,” Journal of Contemporary 
Asia 20, 3 (1990). 
 
9  Raj Vasil, Governing Singapore: Democracy and National Development (St Leonards, NSW, 
Australia: Allen & Unwin, 2000). 
 
 250
Social engineering measures of the late 1970s and 1980s like the promotion of 
Confucian values, the building of Chinese theme parks, the recruitment of Chinese 
immigrants from Hong Kong, the repeated calls for Chinese to produce more babies, 
the naming of roads, buildings and new townships in Chinese and general Chinese 
domination in Singapore, along with the policy of preventing ethnic concentrations 
(meaning Malay and Indian) in public housing estates had only served to create 
increasing resentment among the Malays and to a lesser extent Indians.  
Simultaneously they too began to assert their own identities as evidenced by appeals 
from minority leaders to the state’s leaders.  On their part, the Chinese had, since the 
late 1970s, also been unhappy despite their dominant position because they saw the 
emphasis on English and increasing adoption of Western lifestyles as a threat to their 
cultural values and identity.10
 The problem of racial disparity was therefore causing concern to the state that 
felt that if left unattended it would result in serious disharmony and unrest between 
the communities and consequently undermine political stability, economic growth and 
national identity.  The problem was most acute with the Malays who, according to 
numerous documented sources, were already feeling marginalized, discriminated 
against, and cut off from mainstream society not only because of their own anti-
Chinese sentiment but also because of racial slurs and prejudices held against them by 
the Chinese on account of their ‘race’ – the Malay ‘problem’ has been well 
documented by several historians and writers on Singapore.11  Racial slurs against 
Malays were also compounded in the educational system by the way in which the 
Education Ministry analysed examination results by ‘race’ and showed how the 
Chinese outperformed other ethnic groups, particularly the Malays (see Tables 21 & 
22).  The difference in performance was caused, according to the Education Minister, 
by “socio-economic factors, the importance placed on education by parents of various 
‘races’, the different make-ups and attitudes of the various racial groups”.12  Lee 
Kuan Yew himself attributes Malay students’ underachievement to lack of parental 
                                        
10  The unhappiness of the Chinese has been reflected in several letters to the Readers’ Forum page of 
The Straits Times and in appeals by Chinese organisations to the political leadership. 
 
11  Chinese negative perceptions of Malays have been discussed in previous chapters, especially 
Chapter 1. 
 
12  The Straits Times, 17 November 1990. 
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discipline.13  Malay government leaders also repeatedly contrast the Malays with the 
‘business culture’ inherent among the Chinese ‘psyche’ by reminding them that to be 
successful they must emulate the Chinese.14  All these perceptions of a cultural 
hierarchy by state leaders tend to justify “the myth of the lazy native” and thus 
reinforce ‘racial’ identities and ‘racial’ thinking – a prejudice that partly owes its 
origins to colonial attitudes and partly to Lee’s theory of the economic and cultural 
superiority of the Chinese resulting from their supposedly superior genes (see Chapter 
6.2). 15  
 Under the British, the Malays had enjoyed special rights, a historical creation 
based on British colonial policy that provided Malays with certain privileges on “the 
assumption that they alone were indigenous...and needed both political and economic 
protection.16  Although the constitution of the new nation state enshrined the principle 
of “equal citizenship rights for people of all races”17 in line with its ideology of 
multiracialism, there was some recognition of the disadvantaged position of the 
Malays18 as they were “historically marginal to Singapore’s political, economic and 
social life”19, the state being concerned that “harm will be done to the unity and 
integrity of the nation if one section (of the population) is lagging behind”.20  This 
issue of special rights became another factor in the Malays’ sense of alienation as they 
perceived that the Chinese were being favoured in various aspects of everyday life in 
Singapore.  For instance, Malay sensitivities were compounded by their exclusion 
                                        
 
13  The Straits Times, 25 August 1990, 13 October 1990. 
 
14  See Joseph Tamney, The Struggle over Singapore’s Soul, 99. 
 
15  James Minchin, No Man is an Island (1986; reprint, Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1990). 
 
16  Gordon P Means, Malaysian Politics (London: University of London Press, 1970), 177.  
 
17  Pang Cheng Lian, Singapore’s People’s Action Party: It’s History, Leadership, and Organization 
(Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1971), 2. 
 
18  The constitutional guarantee provided that the government shall “protect, safeguard, support, foster 
and promote (Malay) political, educational, religious, economic, social, and cultural interests and the 
Malay language,” but did not extend the guarantee to public or private employment or in admission to 
institutes of higher learning – Ahmad Mattar, “The Singapore Malays: Their Education and Role in 
National Development” in People’s Action Party 1954-1979 (Singapore: Central Executive Committee, 
People’s Action Party, 1979), 82.  
 
19 Russell Betts, Multiracialism, Meritocracy, and the Malays in Singapore, Ph.D. diss., (Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology, 1975), 34. 
 
20  Lee Kuan Yew, cited in Alex Josey, Lee Kuan Yew (Singapore: Donald Moore Press, Ltd., 1968), 
308.   
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from sensitive positions in the armed forces of Singapore because of historical 
perceptions by the state that they owed their loyalties more to Malaysia than to 
Singapore.  Government leaders have themselves voiced their concerns in this matter, 
as in former Prime Minister Lee’s speech in 1999 that background checks would be 
carried out on Malay Singapore Armed Forces officers who had family ties in 
Malaysia, before they were put in command of machine-gun units.21  
 The position of the Malays has therefore always been a source of worry for the 
state after the political separation from Muslim Malaysia, the race riots that occurred 
in the 1960s and its unhappiness as reflected in the poor support by the Malays for the 
PAP in successive elections.  It was not until the late 1970s that the PAP leadership 
under Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong realized that concerted and positive action had 
to be taken to improve the position of the Malays to ensure political and social 
stability in the nation state (and their support for the party).  It therefore decided that 
commitment to the principle of meritocracy by an attitudinal change on the part of the 
Malay community was necessary.  Secondly, the state decided that the community 
needed to help itself to improve the educational performance and technical skills of its 
disadvantaged members and expected that this would contribute to their socio-
economic improvement.  MENDAKI (the Council on Education for Malay/Muslim 
children) was therefore first set up in 1981 under Government sponsorship as a 
response by the Malay-Muslim PAP Members of Parliament to the worsening 
educational standards of the Malays, especially in English, Mathematics and Science, 
as evidenced in the 1980 census.  Malay leaders themselves agreed that just about 
everything – from their philosophy of life to the home environment – worked against 
the community and gave the other communities in Singapore an edge over them.  
Several Malay school principals interviewed admitted that a host of inhibiting factors 
deterred their Malay students from competing with their Chinese and Indian friends in 
school.22  Problems like the low educational background of Malay parents, lack of 
suitable reading materials at home, emphasis by Malays on religion and the spoken 
Malay language, as well as lack of aspiration for progress all supposedly combined to 
produce a philosophy of life that contented Malays.  Hence their poor grasp of 
English that in turn was responsible for poor performances in mathematics and 
                                        
 
21  Reported in The Straits Times of 12 October 1999. 
 
22  Ibid., 29 May 1982. 
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science.  In the words of Ahmad Mattar, then Acting Minister of Community Affairs 
and Chairman of MENDAKI, the objective of MENDAKI was to “improve the level 
of educational achievement by Malay/Muslim students, and to increase the number 
and percentage of higher-educated Malays/Muslims.23  Said Prime Minister Lee, 
when opening the MENDAKI Congress on Education on 28 May 1982:  
The problem is of concern to all Singaporeans and not just to Malay 
Singaporeans.  It is in the interests of all to have Malay Singaporeans better 
educated and better qualified and to increase their contribution to Singapore’s 
development. 
In alluding to their poor educational performances, Lee once again referred to his 
eugenics philosophy pointing out two factors – nature being the natural intelligence of 
the child, and nurture being the training in education.  Talking about the attitudes of 
parents he made reference to the importance performance in examinations had on 
Chinese culture.  The Indians too, he said, were keenly aware of the importance of 
studies and examinations as the road to success.24
 Thus began the idea of self-help groups, initially for the Malay community 
and, following its success, for the Eurasian, Indian and Chinese ethnic groups as well 
– it could be argued that this need for mutual support mechanisms by ethnic groups 
has been a carry-over from Raffles’ strategy of ethnic segregation.  Before 
introducing this form of ethnic-based welfare the state spelt out its position and 
rationale on social security and self-help, the main philosophy behind this system 
being that members of an ethnic group best know the problems their group is facing 
and how to solve these problems most effectively.  Wong Kan Seng, Foreign 
Minister, for example, says that one reason for the state setting up racial self-help 
groups was that ethnic diversity had to be accepted and managed by Singaporeans 
themselves so that it became a source of strength for the country25 – what Brown, 
referring to the various self-help groups, calls a ‘corporatist’ management of 
ethnicity.26  Replying to concerns from Singaporeans that community-based 
                                        
 
23  Speech by Ahmad Mattar at the opening of the Congress of MENDAKI on 28 May 1982. 
 
24  Reported in The Straits Times of 29 May 1982. 
 
25  Ibid., 15 August 1998. 
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programmes would divide society along ethnic lines, the state countered this argument 
by saying that it would administer any programme in a ‘race-neutral’ manner.  Hence 
the “various ethnic groups would have to help members of their community who fell 
behind as the Government could not help one group at the expense of the others”, says 
S Chandra Das, Member of Parliament in a message addressed to the Indian 
community.27  In using the ‘race’-based approach to solve social problems of the 
various ethnic communities, the Prime Minister then warned community leaders that 
two operating principles should always be observed and upheld.  Firstly, they must 
reaffirm their commitment to multiracialism, and secondly they should not use “ethnic 
or religious appeal to boost one community at the expense of another, or to play off 
one group against another, in promoting each community’s programme”.28  
Responding to renewed public calls that community self-help groups would be 
potentially divisive and that one national body to help the underclass from the various 
communities would be the solution, the state addressed these concerns by saying that 
if there was one national body the Chinese as the strongest group would dominate by 
“being most influential in making decisions affecting all races, being the most 
powerful in fund-raising, and having first claim on resources”.29  
In analysing the need for self-help groups, the state also reiterated the 
importance of the family in Singaporean culture, stressing that the family should show 
care and compassion for its own members.  “Singaporeans are materialistic but they 
are committed first and foremost to the material well-being of family members, and 
there are good reasons for that.  Most of us are the descendants of economic migrants 
from China”.30  These were the words of Lee Kuan Yew, drawing on biological 
essentialism once again.   The state stressed the importance of the community looking 
after the interests of its members.  Its stand on this issue is echoed in the following 
press editorial:  
                                                                                                               
26 David Brown, “The Politics of Reconstructing National Identity: A Corporatist Approach,” 
Australian Journal of Political Science 32, 2 (1997), 255-269.  
 
27  Reported in The Straits Times of 6 November 1991.  
 
28  Address by Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong to the Sikh community at the Central Sikh Temple on 
21 November 1991.  
 
29  The Straits Times, 22 November 1992. 
 
30  “A Conversation with Lee Kuan Yew,” Foreign Affairs, March/April 1994, 115. 
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Until such a time when history has made Singapore a nation of one people, no 
amount of rational analysis can defeat the biological instinct to care, when 
pressed to prioritise, for one’s own [ethnic] community first”.31  
In perceiving the need for a ‘levelling up’ policy, Lee warned:  
If we are to remain a socially mobile society, with no class distinctions or 
class hatreds, those who have risen up through meritocracy must take an active 
interest in the welfare and well-being of the less fortunate.  Not to do so is to 
risk a gradual stratification of Singapore society.  Then, the less successful 
will begin to resent those who are successful but do not bother about them.32
Saying that “we are all prisoners of our instincts” and that “the first instinct is to 
identify with somebody who looks like him”, Lee’s dictum is echoed by the 
newspaper’s editorial on 1 September 1992 as follows: “Put simply, one’s charity 
extends from the family to the social grouping and then to society at large in a 
prioritized fashion”.33  In other words, these quotes can be interpreted to refer to 
peoples’ supposed primary identification with their own ‘race’.  Hence the 
justification for separate self-help organizations for the Chinese, Malays, Indians and 
Eurasians, typifying state policies that harmonized with official ‘racial’ categories.     
 Consequently, with the encouragement of the state, MENDAKI was set up and 
the state agreed to provide administrative and financial support for the Malay cause.  
MENDAKI programmes offer educational tuition to students to improve their 
performance.  Other programmes offer counseling to help Malays deal with drug 
problems, the high divorce rate and economic progress.  A donation of $1 per month 
is deducted from the wages of Malay/Muslim workers while the state matches it with 
an amount equal to the total of the community donations.  The successful experience 
of MENDAKI inevitably led to pressure from the other ethnic groups, even from the 
Chinese, for similar help.  For instance, a reader of The Straits Times E H Ong, in a 
letter to the newspaper published on 2 July 1988, expressed his misgivings of aid 
being extended to only one ethnic group.  He mentioned the need to avoid 
“aggravating one race” and “hurting the others”.  Such appeals enabled the state to 
encourage similar community and ethnic based self-help organizations for the 
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Eurasian, Indian and Chinese communities to address their cultural, educational and 
social deficiencies, the state thereby hegemonically shifting responsibility for the 
upliftment of each ethnic group to the groups themselves.  In 1989 the Eurasian 
Association was formed and in 1991 the Singapore Indian Development Association 
(SINDA) was set up by the state at the urging of the Indian community.  In the 
following year the Chinese community set up the Chinese Development Assistance 
Council (CDAC) on a platform similar to that of MENDAKI.  The CDAC was 
formed for the purpose of helping “poorer Chinese escape the underachievement trap 
through self-help programmes such as extra classes and worker training”.34  Each 
community launched a slew of programmes to improve poor school grades, provide 
worker training and help strengthen family and ethnic ties. 
 As previous chapters have shown, the British had left the various ethnic 
groups to their own resources.  Community and clan associations had therefore 
provided opportunities for social interaction, found jobs and resolved conflicts for its 
members.  The nation state, it can be argued, has similarly distanced itself from the 
role of providing social security and support on the grounds that humans need moral 
support from members of their own community.  Says Goh Chok Tong addressing the 
Indian community at a SINDA function: “The reality is that many Singaporeans 
remain more comfortable turning to members of their own community for help.  They 
feel less inhibited sharing their problems with someone from the same community, 
culture and religion”.35  Though the state saw a communitarian welfare strategy as 
helping to bind the nation through mutual self-help, the media subsequently reported 
that the Prime Minister’s comments at the SINDA function had “stirred Singaporeans 
to think about race again”.36  One of its readers, V Sivaprasad, an Indian, has 
confessed to a ‘nagging fear’ that ‘race’-based self-help groups went against the logic 
of a multiracial reality espoused by the nation state’s founders.  Another reader argued 
that such self-help groups did not help in integration as they only served to emphasise 
“racial distinctiveness” and “highlight and perpetuate differences”.37  There was yet 
another view that self-help groups caused the emergence of a ‘racial’ consciousness 
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“better off left behind”, but another school of thought posited that this was a “good 
thing” as it enabled ‘race’ issues to be aired in the open, though discussions about 
‘race’ were still frowned upon in ‘race’-sensitive Singapore.  The irony of self-help 
groups is that in the postcolonial nation the well-off Chinese are able to command 
more robust financial resources than others by virtue of their overwhelming 
demographic majority and with greater active support from the state are able to utilise 
opportunities to widen the already existing economic disparities with the Malay and 
Indian communities and hence worsen the problem of ‘racial’ and class cleavages.38  
 Minority groups insist that state policies that create and manage ethnicity 
politicize ethnic differences and inequalities.  As in the other social engineering 
instruments discussed so far, ‘race’ has been used as a primary social identification in 
community-based self-help policies and this has led to the perception among the 
minority ethnic groups that identifying and targeting them to improve their socio-
economic position promotes the notion that the Chinese are a class apart and superior 
to them, a notion that strengthens and reinforces Chinese dominance and negative 
racist attitudes towards minority groups.  My interviews reveal that many Indians do 
not share the state’s ‘race’-based approach in helping the communities uplift 
themselves.  Jayakumar, an Indian lawyer in private practice says: 
When MENDAKI was set up, it was done with the best of intentions.  
However, it has led quickly to a clear division of Singaporeans into three 
distinct racial groups looking selfishly and inwardly into their own ethnic 
problems, thus heightening their ethnic consciousness and identity.  Is the 
Government not going back on multiracialism and nation building? Why is 
there so much emphasis now on ethnic identity and race instead of multiracial 
cohesion?  
The Prime Minister responding to public concerns about self-help groups felt, 
however, that the fear of heightened ‘racial’ consciousness resulting from the 
formation of the self-help groups was “exaggerated” and that these groups were not 
divisive, a view not shared by several of my Indian respondents who feel that ethnic 
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self-help groups only sharpen the sense of ethnic difference while perpetuating the 
notion that meaningful help could only come from one’s own kind.39    
Says an informant, 51-year old Indian town planner Narayanan, in summing 
up the responses of the interviewees: 
The irony is that we are preaching racial harmony in a multiracial nation, yet 
why do the various communities’ self-help groups run separate tuition classes 
on the same subjects? This cannot be good for a multiracial society’s well 
being.  Why cannot the five self-help groups offer the classes to all races 
under one roof in the same way as students of different races learn together in 
the normal school system? Is the Government sincere in wanting to promote 
multiracial harmony when the different races are asked to go their separate 
ways like in colonial days?  
In 2001 Abdullah Tarmugi, Minister for Community Development and Sports 
warned that the leadership of the self-help groups “must avoid turning these 
organizations into exclusive enclaves catering to only parochial interests”.40  The 
Prime Minister then called for a “partnership” approach through joint programmes to 
reduce friction and suspicion among the different races and “to prevent us from 
swinging unwittingly to an undesirable scenario where more and more social services 
and programmes are organized along ethnic lines”.41  While efforts have since been 
made by the self-help groups to offer help to members outside their community, 
minorities feel that these efforts are merely cosmetic.  Even when self-help groups try 
to offer help to outsiders there is a potential backlash as sometimes people do not 
accept that members of one ‘race’ can help those of another.  A case in point occurred 
when two members of an Indian self-help project, Hariprasad Childcare Centre, 
looked after a 6-year old Chinese girl in a hospital ward where she was recuperating 
from an operation.  A relative of the girl, also Chinese, was befuddled to see that 
Chinese people had not come to attend to her.  Curious visitors asked the Indians, 
“You mean you also look after Chinese children?”  This ‘racially’-tinged question, as 
the reporter of this episode says, is something she comes across often during the 
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course of her work as a community project worker, leading one to ask, “Is this the 
impact of ‘race’-based policy changes when Singaporeans are encouraged to go in 
search of their own roots and look after their own kind? Why the social exclusion?”  
 Says another respondent, 39-year old Indian housewife Agnes Pakiam with 
two children receiving mathematics and science tuition from SINDA, “I always take 
my two children to these classes but never see students from other races there”.  
Another Indian parent by the name Manivannan at the tuition centre observes, “The 
Chinese don’t want their children to mix with us.  May be they think they are 
superior”. 
In an article examining ethnic differences among the elderly in Singapore, 
William Lee voices the concern that such a privatization of social security policy is 
“an attempt at ethnic revitalisation”, a policy which, in his view, is perceived by the 
minority groups as favouring the Chinese.  While, on the one hand, the state expects 
the minority groups to be self-reliant, on the other hand it is seen as actively 
supporting Chinese culture through various public campaigns, such as the Speak 
Mandarin campaign, while other cultures are left to fend for themselves or even 
undermined, according to Lee.  He comes to the conclusion that privatization of social 
security will only serve to “further disintegrate social cohesion by deepening the 
divisions among the ethnic groups, and between those who have and those who have 
not”, a result which “forces individuals to identify with their ethnic groups”.  He 
attributes this state of affairs to the leaders’ “narrow interpretation” that Singapore 
owed its success to “Chinese cultural influence”, a view which reflects the origin and 
significance of the state’s racial perspectives.42
8.3 ‘Race’ and Heritage Conservation 
We should be a nation that is uniquely multiracial and Asian, with each 
community proud of its traditional culture and heritage.   
– former Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong.43  
 
                                        
42  William Keng Mun Lee, “Ethnicity and Ageing in Singapore,” Asian Ethnicity 2, 2 (September 
2001): 176. 
 
43  Goh Chok Tong, “Our National Ethic” in Speeches: A Bimonthly Selection of Ministerial Speeches 
12, 5 (Ministry of Communications and Information, Singapore, 1988), 15. 
 260
 In 1989 Lee Hsien Loong, then Minister for Trade and Industry & Second 
Minister for Defence (and now Prime Minister), notes that Singaporeans should not 
“abandon our roots ... They anchor us, and will help us grow”.44  This ‘search for 
roots’, as a constitutive part of modernity, has become increasingly manifested in 
Singapore from the late 1970s as the state realized the need for a renewed emphasis 
on history to enable Singaporeans to understand nation building.  While there were 
obvious commercial reasons for this trend, beginning with the widespread economic 
recession in the mid-1980s and the consequent need to showcase Singapore’s 
multicultural heritage for valuable tourist dollars, there was a greater need to celebrate 
ethnic heritages by pursuing Asian cultural values, languages and traditions and to 
remind young Singaporeans that building a sense of history in the face of an 
‘onslaught of Western liberal values’ was “the substance of social and psychological 
defence” for nation building purposes.45   This sense of history has been manifested in 
several public policies enforced through massive state intervention and centralized 
coordination, organized as well through ‘racial’ thinking.  Dividing the population 
along ‘racial’ lines, separate TV and radio programmes cater for the different ethnic 
groups, and cultural festivals like Chinese New Year for the Chinese, Hari Raya 
Puasa and Haji for the Malays and Deepavali (festival of lights) for the Indians as 
well as ethnic dance forms are celebrated separately.   
 Celebration of the traditions of the multicultural heritage of the ethnic 
communities has been extended to another significant ‘race’-based policy – that of 
heritage conservation introduced by the state in the 1980s.  Colonial planning often 
took the form of what Rabinow calls ‘techno-cosmopolitanism’ or the technical 
formalization of indigenous architectural forms in new building projects that gesture 
to the colonized as did the French in Morocco, the Dutch in Jakarta and the British in 
Singapore.  The Singapore nation state also realized that heritage conservation was 
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important as it provided a sense of “identity, security and continuity”.  It was worried 
that globalization and relentless economic development in the country could erode 
traditions and culture and erase the legacies of the past.46  The Urban Renewal 
Authority’s (URA) conservation concept manuals acknowledge the significance of 
preserving heritage in the following words:  
In handling historic fabric, it is absolutely essential that mistakes are avoided 
because once destroyed, our fragile architectural heritage is as good as lost, 
never to be recovered again.  A conscientiously conserved environment can 
and must be achieved if we are to be able to attract visitors, expand business 
scope and sophistication and above all, transmit our heritage to the future 
generations.47
This rationale for conservation of ethnic enclaves is the state’s interpretation of the 
‘racial’ DNA of Singapore based on the virtues of meritocracy, economic 
development and competition.  This is manifested in the selection of conservation 
sites by the URA – interestingly it is usually the colonial residential areas in the urban 
built environment that are earmarked for conservation and preservation, like 
Chinatown, Little India and Kampong Glam.  So, ‘politically correct’ tourist images 
of Singapore capture the essence of multiculturalism, ‘racial’ harmony and national 
identity as propagated by the state by offering a view of Asian traditions set against a 
backdrop of a modernizing Singapore.  In other words, ethnicity is offered as a tourist 
attraction – what Joel Kahn calls ‘culturalization’ - whereby ethnic groups are seen to 
live happily together in the nation while preserving their separate cultural identities 
and practices.48  This is the official version of a Singaporean identity founded on 
‘racial’ harmony, ethnicity being ‘commodified’ by the state and packaged to the 
outside world and to its own subjects through happy images of its ethnic citizens.  
Such images are in line with the state’s obsessive ‘programme of image management’ 
in the words of Laurence Leong, although as I will demonstrate in this chapter, my 
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respondents say that such images are manipulated by the state to mask the racial 
politics that prevails in the Little India area.49  
 At the same time tourist images have been selectively exploited and 
manipulated by the state to justify its hegemonic imposition of social, political, 
cultural and economic control over civil society, so that through tourism, “a political 
climate favourable to the PAP may be created, ensuring that any challenge to its 
supremacy is unlikely to succeed”.50  Following Dovey, urban planning as in heritage 
conservation lends itself to practices of coercion and seduction in Singapore, thus 
legitimizing authority and control over its citizens.51  Hence the more striking visual 
and colourful aspects of ethnicity are promoted.  Chinatown is made more attractive 
by its “sights, sounds and smells”, while Little India is touted for its “cacophony of 
colours, sounds and scents”, and the Malay enclave is celebrated for being the only 
living kampung in Singapore.52  A curious and interesting point that can be argued 
here is that heritage conservation areas in Singapore have been showcased by the state 
to project multiracial and multicultural harmony in direct contrast to the 1893 Chicago 
World Fair (and similar fairs) of different ‘living’ villages that were deliberately 
designed to present racial hierarchy.   
 These powerful tourist images reinforce political ideologies that the state 
wishes to communicate about its management of ethnic identities.  History has shown 
that political regimes make especially powerful symbolic use of the physical 
environment in such a way that power and identity are embedded in it.  In this 
context, heritage conservation has been manipulated to serve political aspirations, 
what Clifford Geertz has specifically termed the “cultural balance of power”.53  
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Consequently, heritage conservation in Singapore, as Powell argues, has become a 
powerful ideological tool of state social control, defining and articulating the state’s 
diverse cultures – Chinese, Malay, Indian – in the promotion of the multiracial, 
multicultural project of nation building and the construction of national identity.54  As 
George Yeo, former Minister for Information and the Arts, says, setting up of heritage 
centres “can be a source of national strength”.55  Singapore’s model of multiracialism 
and multiculturalism is therefore showcased to both Singaporeans and tourists as 
successfully accommodating differences.  This includes “equal representation of the 
races in the urban landscapes”.56  Hence Chinatown (representing the Chinese), Little 
India (representing the Indians), and Kampung Glam (representing the Malays) 
project the physical landscape of the country’s ethnic diversity.  These areas have 
been ethnicised and historicised to legitimize the notion of a country with social 
harmony and a sense of national identity, and that Singapore is a unique place 
“(w)here so many ethnic groups have come together to make it one of the world’s 
greatest melting pots of all races”.57  In this way the state uses heritage construction to 
promote a version of identity that supports and helps legitimize its rule by 
highlighting contradictions between the various ethnic groups in a manner that 
reinforces state power and control.  With emphasis on the CMIO model, differences 
between the four main ethnic communities residing in Singapore are brought out for 
the pleasure of the tourists – internal and external – who are encouraged to enjoy 
ethnic festivals, food, shopping, places of worship, architectural and other traditions 
by touring ethnic enclaves like Chinatown, Kampong Glam and Little India.  Tourism 
is therefore linked to the re-presentation of ethnicity as “strongly bounded, 
homogeneous cultural identities, firmly associated with a particular homeland and 
rooted in strong kinship ties”.58  Ethnic tourism then is directly associated with 
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socially constructed and officially approved racial distinctions.  Through tourism, 
ethnicity has been socially engineered to foster “ethnic consciousness as a resource 
for nation-building and political development, while at the same time guarding against 
the emergence of competitive ethnocentrism”.59 Ethnic heritage sites and various 
manifestations of cultural forms (for example, ethnic festivals and special events) of 
the CMIO ethnic communities are therefore marketed by the state as a “celebration of 
diversity” in Singapore with an overarching national identity based on 
multiculturalism and multiracialism.60   
 Heritage sites in Singapore exhibit a symbolism by the way they are produced 
and interpreted by the state, so that by portraying the particular characteristics and 
stereotypes of the ethnic groups that are associated with the enclaves, colonial 
representations are revived, appropriated and rearticulated to invent a ‘new’ 
postcolonial identity that seeks to articulate the relationship between ethnic identity 
and national identity.  At the same time the heritage sites recognise and reinforce the 
political culture of the present without neglecting the importance of the colonial 
power, although such sites clearly undermine the attempt of the modern nation state to 
present itself as postcolonial.  This is because the nation state has no alternative sites 
of multiracialism to present intermingling and therefore there seems to be no attempt 
to assert the distance that has been travelled since colonial rule.   
   Realizing that a historical sense of time and place emanates from preserving 
pockets of the town which retain an old world charm, the state therefore decided to 
retain some edifices of the colonial heritage.  Accordingly in 1988, apart from various 
redevelopment strategies designed to satisfy tourist demands for “the Oriental 
mystique and charm best symbolized in old buildings, traditional activities and 
bustling road activities”, three historic ethnic enclaves, namely Chinatown, Little 
India and Kampong Glam were designated to represent Chinese, Indian and Malay 
traditional cultures.61  The state decided to conserve these areas as “they represent the 
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mixture of races and nationalities that make up Singapore”.62  There was also a 
growing concern to preserve Asian cultural values that came with these ‘races’ and 
nationalities by conserving the historic districts for the promotion of, “a sense of 
continuity and identification with the past”.63  As Kevin Lynch argues, “A city 
without old buildings is one without an apparent past and resembles... a man suffering 
from a loss of memory”.64  The state hopes to make Singaporeans take pride in their 
cultural heritage and traditions, thereby establishing a sense of local cultural identity 
and a sense of rootedness among the ethnic communities which would in turn foster 
national identity to present and future generations.  As mentioned earlier, economic 
factors were also responsible for the state’s focus on heritage conservation as a means 
of boosting tourist arrivals and revenue to Singapore following a sharp recession in 
the Singapore economy during the mid-eighties.  
 As discussed in Chapter 3, the three historically ethnic areas had been 
allocated by Sir Stamford Raffles for the different groups in his 1822 Town Plan of 
Singapore.65  In 1988 concept plans for all three areas were drawn up by the Urban 
Renewal Authority so that the conservation of buildings, structures, trades and 
activities could “provide the sign-posts from the past to the present and which [are] 
critical to the psyche of a nation”.66  In the same year conservation manuals and 
guidelines for these districts were published.  The Little India conservation manual of 
1988, for example, justifies the conservation of this district thus: 
At one time, many of the plain and humble shophouses built during the early 
phases of Little India’s history were not considered significant in their own 
right.  However, they are now valued historically for reflecting the 
circumstances of that particular period in time when building technology and 
                                        
 
62  The Straits Times, “Historical Sites Represent Mix of Races and Nationalities Here – Areas to be 
Preserved,” 27 December 1986. It is to be noted of course that these areas do not necessarily represent 
a complete mix of the various ethnic groups, because each area has a particular ethnic group as the 
dominant community.  
 
63  P Keys, “Conservation as an Integral Part of Urban Renewal,” Planews 8, 1 (1981): 44.  
 
64  Kevin Lynch, What Time is This Place? (Cambridge, Massachusetts & London: MIT Press, 1972), 
23. 
 
65  Town Plan of Singapore, published in J Crawfurd, Journal of an Embassy to the Courts of Siam and 
Cochin-China etc (London: Henry Colburn, 1828), 529. 
 
66  The Committee on Heritage Report, Singapore 1988, 27-29. 
 266
funds, as well as the migrant mentality of their builders, produced the simple 
and adaptable structures that they are.67  
This late recognition of the need to preserve Singapore’s colonial heritage and history 
has prevented the demolition of ancient buildings by the post-independence leadership 
in Singapore and prompted large-scale restoration work, especially in the last decade 
and a half. 
 In brief, the historically constructed narrative of heritage conservation both 
serves as a tool for nation building and social stability, while simultaneously reducing 
heritage to a commodity by transforming historical ethnic enclaves into tourist 
attractions in order to generate revenue for the state.  Heritage is thus shown to have 
political as well as socio-cultural and economic dimensions.  Thus the term ‘Little 
India’, as the Serangoon Road area is widely known today, was coined by the state 
with the designation of the Indian settlement as a heritage zone in 1981, conferred 
conservation status in 1989, declared as ‘a historic district’ in 1995, and labelled as an 
‘ethnic quarter’ in 1999 combined with the state’s tourism drive, all of which plugged 
‘Little India’ into the globalization strategies of the state.  The URA and Singapore 
Tourism Board (STB), the state agencies which coined these terms and labels, saw the 
potential of the area as a “window into the world of Indian cultural, artistic, religious 
and culinary achievements and activities…” for tourists as well as for Singaporeans.  
To the state, Little India was a ‘front space’ catering to the tourists’ gaze and the 
heritage needs of Singaporeans.  Realizing its heritage value, these agencies saw the 
Little India area as offering locals as well as tourists Indian lifestyles and traditional 
activities of the past and the present.  Thus Little India is constructed in the image of 
‘Indianness’ and as an ‘Indian’ space that is the ‘emotional and commercial centre of 
the local Indian community’ offering the community a sense of ethnic-cultural 
identity and belonging.68  The official discourse claims that by the process of 
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designating Little India as representative ethnic space the Indian component of the 
multicultural heritage in Singapore is reinforced, and consequently a sense of national 
identity forged.  
 To this end tourist packages are presented by the Singapore Tourism Board in 
the form of guided walking and trishaw tours (Plate 12) of the ‘authentic’ Indian 
enclave (Map 3). For instance a typical tour to Little India features Hindu temples Sri 
Veeramakaliamman Temple (Plate 13) and Sri Srinivasa Perumal Temple (Plate 14), 
Indian spice shops (Plate 15), and Indian-owned shopping centres like Mustafa Centre 
(Plate 16) as ‘must-see’ travel spots in Little India.   The tourist value accorded to 
Little India by the state is seen in the many sights, sounds and smells of Little India 
and is glorified for the benefit of tourists in travel magazines, brochures and other 
travel literature.   
 The ‘sensescape’ of the conserved quarter now overwhelms: an elderly 
saffron-clad Indian woman, with fiercely cropped hair, few teeth and a no-nonsense 
attitude, squats by the five-foot path.  She squawks my name at a green-feathered, 
red-beaked psychic parrot called Mani, which grabs a card from a pack spread of 
cards with its beak and hops back into the cage.  The woman picks a slip of paper 
corresponding with the number on the card.  It is in two pieces, torn through years of 
use.   She pushes the two halves together.  “All your wishes will come through.  A 
new relationship will bring great happiness”.  There’s more, but I’m shooed away, 
clients are queuing up.  What did I expect for $2?  Around her the men-folk, 
housewives and video-totting tourists compete for space and place (Plates 7 and 8).  
Nearby a man in a white dhoti (loose loin cloth tied around the waist) sits cross-
legged on a raised wooden platform, plaiting a garland of jasmine flowers (Plate 17).  
The fragrance wafts.  Next door a vegetarian restaurant serves its customers.  The 
waiter heaps dosai (pancake made of rice flour) and coconut chutney on lines of 
plates, and glasses of lassi (sweet yoghurt) wash down the food (Plates 18 and 19).  
Upstairs, portions of rice are heaped on to a banana leaf along with curried vegetables, 
spicy gravies, pickles and pappadam (fried rice cracker).  People eat with their 
fingers, cups of rasam (pepper spiced soup), thairu (curd) and payasam (sweet 
pudding) (Plate 20).   
The beating of drums, the clashing of cymbals and the chiming of bells hang 
in the air outside Sri Veeramakaliamman Temple, where dozens of sculptures of the 
Goddess Kali adorn the walls (Plate 13). Inside the temple, saris breeze side by side 
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with salwar-kameez, the women devotees paying obeisance to the gods.  The waft of 
bathi (incense) floats from the temple and nearby shops.  Indian music with a 
hypnotic regularity blares in the street.  A glitter in the goldsmith shops, marriage 
necklaces, gold bangles, earrings (Plates 21 and 22).   
 One of Singapore’s main tourist attractions, Little India is located very near 
the city, the quarter stretching from Rochor Canal Road on the west to Kitchener 
Road and Birch Roads in the east and Race Course Road in the north and Jalan Besar 
in the south (Map 2).   Forming an irregular rectangular area, its main thoroughfare 
and epicentre is Serangoon Road, running through its middle.  Serangoon Road, about 
800 meters long, is lined with Indian shops and restaurants on both sides.  Serangoon 
Road is in turn intersected by a multitude of side roads like Buffalo, Kerbau, Cuff, 
Norris, Veerasamy, Hastings and Hindoo Roads as well as others like Dunlop Street, 
Clive Street, Mayo Street, Dalhousie Lane, Roberts Lane and Campbell Lane – all 
reminiscent of past British rule in Singapore and India.  You can buy anything Indian 
here, just like in any bazaar street in India – the choicest silk sarees, elaborate Indian 
gold jewellery, aromatic incense sticks, religious artifacts, Indian curios, handicrafts, 
trinkets and utensils, the latest music hits in Hindi or Tamil, freshly ground spices and 
posters depicting popular Indian film stars (Plate 15).  
Interestingly, such products are often selective and based on the state’s 
ethnicised interpretations of what constitutes Little India.  It can therefore be argued 
that the historical district has been manipulated by the state to sidestep the 
contestations and conflicts that take place between what T C Chang calls “insider” 
and “outsider” groups – “different groups of people with differing degrees of 
attachment to Little India”.69  In such an environment, according to him, “global 
forces of tourism, commercialism and... urban change” clash with the “assertions of 
Indian identities and cultural heritage.”70  Conflicting meanings and interpretations 
take place between tourists and locals, Indian and Chinese communities, and between 
the state’s planners and users.  My respondents complain (see Chapter 4) that these 
partial representations of Little India often appear to conceal the racial politics that 
presents everyday reality between these groups in the life of Little India.  They 
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eclipse, for example, the vibrant communal interactions between different groups of 
people (for example, different ethnic groups and foreign workers) in Little India, as it 
assumes that only Indians live here, when in actuality my observation shows that 
about 50% of the foreign workers are Bangladeshis.  Tourist brochures prepared by 
the STB ignore the presence of the unskilled foreign Indian worker as part of the 
Little India scene because by implication the physical sight of the Indian worker – 
whose dark-skinned appearance is perceived to contaminate the frontness of Little 
India which the state promotes - subverts the state’s perception of what it considers as 
politically correct for the ethnicisation of Little India.71  Racial stereotypes are 
identified here by my respondents as contributing to the state’s programme of ethnic 
management – see discussion of foreign workers in Chapter 4.4.    
 The majority of my Indian respondents consider that heritage conservation 
along ‘race’ and ethnic lines inevitably exacerbates ethnic consciousness and ethnic 
identity at the expense of national identity.  Indian residents and traders in the Little 
India district, already feeling the impact of increased Chinese encroachment in the 
commercial life of Little India and a corresponding decline in traditional Indian-
owned retail activities and services, perceive that the rich Indian cultural identity is 
being appropriated by the Chinese.  Arguing that the state’s agencies (that is, URA 
and STB) have adopted a high-handed top-down racial approach to conservation, 
Murugesan, a 63-year old Indian trader of textile goods says that neither he nor other 
traders in the area were consulted in the conservation plans.  He ventured to volunteer 
his ideas but these were ignored.  He continues: “Like me, other shop owners, 
residents and workers have identified ourselves with the place and given it meanings 
and feelings, yet we are not consulted”.  To him “conservation is simply to attract 
more tourists to Singapore.  The Government is more interested in its commercial 
viability than its heritage value”.  He suspects that conservation is a way the state 
manages and manipulates ethnicity by allowing more Chinese to occupy the area.  
The original Indian owners of some of the Little India shops received poor 
compensation moneys when the state decided to proceed with 
conservation/renovation of these shops.  Once refurbished, these buildings were 
priced beyond the reach of the original owners or other interested Indians.  “Only the 
Chinese can afford to buy or rent the conserved shophouses and this literally drove the 
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and the heritage needs of Singaporeans.  
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Indians out of their traditional livelihood and physical space” remarks Murugesan.  
This is the predominant sentiment among my respondents most of whom say that 
conservation of the Little India area benefits the Chinese and the tourists more than 
the Indians, while the URA’s response is that the best way to ensure that a heritage 
building is safeguarded for future generations is to put it to an economically viable 
use.72  The Head of Conservation at the URA maintains: “If a building can be put to 
good use, and it is successful, there is more scope for keeping it”.73  Traders, workers 
and shopkeepers I spoke to are up in arms with URA’s “irresponsible” and 
“unsympathetic” attitude towards the Indians.  Indian spice goods shopkeeper 
Dayalan summarizes the responses of the others: “How can we afford to pay the high 
rentals demanded by the conserved shophouses?  The Chinese grab them as they have 
the means”.  The consequence is that many traditional Indian trades and activities 
located in Little India for decades have been displaced by new modern western-style 
shops and plazas owned by Chinese and dealing in trades and activities far from 
traditional to the Indian community and which do not, furthermore, provide the 
symbolism and authentic ambience that was the preserve of the old tradition-laid 
shophouses.  Dayalan’s view is shared by many other interviewees who feel that 
shops selling franchised Western goods threaten the Indian identity of the place.  Such 
a feeling is exacerbated as these new shops are now owned and managed by non-
Indians, mainly Chinese, who being able to afford the high rentals, conduct their 
activities in what the Indian traders regard as “un-Indian” ways.  Several respondents 
interviewed say that they prefer to shop at the older Indian outlets (especially those 
selling vegetables, spices, flowers and saris) than at the newer Chinese-owned shops 
selling ‘modern’ rather than traditional Indian goods.  Such a scenario was also 
reported in the press which commented that there was concern that conserved shops 
of Little India were not drawing in customers because they were “flocking to older 
shops in more run down parts of Serangoon Road”.74  Some respondents perceive that 
conservation smacks of discrimination against the Indians by benefiting the Chinese 
more.  “We are a minority in Singapore and therefore Little India is important to us.  
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Why can’t the Government understand this?” asks the owner of a shop selling saris.  
Most local Indian respondents agree that the historical and emotional ties which 
Indians attach to the place give the area a greater importance as a “recognized Indian 
community space” as well as a “focal point for community interaction” than its 
economic viability as a tourist centre.  75   The Indians, now more than ever conscious 
of their identity and ethnicity, resent the increasing occupation of the shops and 
activities by Chinese which they perceive as imposing a measure of Chineseness into 
the traditionally Indian area.   
 My survey shows that only about 30% of the shops in Little India are under 
direct Indian ownership, and these shops do not form part of URA’s conservation 
programme.  Many of the old ones owned by prominent Indian business families were 
sold to others once the state started demolishing shophouses and building high-rise 
HDB flats in the area.  Many interviewees are of the opinion that the state should 
honour its promise to safeguard the Indian heritage of the place by firstly limiting the 
proliferation of non-traditional shops in Little India, and secondly reducing the rentals 
of the conserved shophouses thereby enabling Indians to conduct ethnic-based 
products and services and therefore retain the character and identity of Little India.  
Says 72-year old Govindaraju, a long-time owner of a provision store selling Indian 
spices, condiments, prayer items, handicrafts and religious artifacts, “We value the 
Indianness and Indian way of life in this area and therefore take pride in the area 
because it has an Indian character.  Once you allow other races [meaning the Chinese] 
to occupy this place, Little India will be erased and a part of me is gone...”, implying 
that the Chinese are increasingly challenging Indian claims to the place.  Such 
responses bear out the fact that a sense of rootedness that the state purports to 
emphasise to its multiethnic population is connected to ethnic consciousness of the 
place which in turn affects ‘race’ relations.  Clearly Indian resentment against the 
increased Chinese presence seems to be a feature of the latter’s spatial occupation of 
the area, confirming the view of many interviewees that such tensions between these 
communities will not augur well for national solidarity.  “We cannot hope for people 
to live happily side by side as Singaporeans in a multiracial society if we have such 
problems”, is the attitude adopted by Nathan, a Tamil teacher residing in the Little 
India area.  Other long-term Little India residents also feel that having lived and 
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worked there for many decades, only they can really appreciate the Indian character 
and atmosphere of the place.  Some interviewees are, for example, indignant that the 
traditionally named Tekka market was renamed (in 1981) without their knowledge – 
with a “mere stroke of the pen” according to one of my informants - to the Mandarin 
name of Zhu Jiao Centre, a move they saw as imposing a ‘race’ texture to the area on 
account of the Chineseness of the name.  The old name of Tekka, though of Chinese 
Hokkien dialect, was something the Indians had come to accept as contributing to the 
Indian character of Little India.  “This was the name by which the old wet market was 
affectionately known even by the Chinese who themselves did not accept the new 
name”, says Cheran, who owns a video shop in Kerbau Road adjacent to the market.  
The renaming issue was, they say, brought up to the state but no satisfactory answer 
resulted.  Responding to renewed appeals from residents and shopkeepers, the state 
finally reverted to the current name of Tekka Centre. They had also objected to the 
demolition of the old Tekka market that was first built in 1915 and later rebuilt and 
renamed Zhu Jiao.  The respondents appear to suggest that the state has imposed 
hegemonic meanings and deconstructed the vernacular identity of the place.     
   Respondents attribute this state of affairs to the state’s emphasis on ethnicity 
as well as to the ‘Chineseness’ of Singapore.  “It only makes us Indians even more 
conscious that we have to safeguard and value our identity, all the more as 
Government has been encouraging the races not to forget their cultural values”, 
emphasizes Dinakaran, a foreman residing in an HDB apartment at Yishun, a distance 
away from Little India.  Many shop owners, tenants and residents of the area as well 
as visiting outsiders and tourists, when interviewed, are unanimous in saying that 
while conservation could help preserve the rich architectural heritage of Singapore’s 
past, the flip side was that the very charm, distinctiveness and Indian exotica the URA 
wanted to preserve might disappear.  Such a perception is reinforced by Dr Kevin 
Tan, president of the Singapore Heritage Society, who says that places with old world 
charm should evolve on their own: “If you want the flavour of the place to stay, leave 
it alone”.76  This is similar to the perception of Indian academics Siddique and 
Purushotam who write that “designating the area for preservation might be all that 
would be necessary for the survival of the area...  rehabilitation would follow as a 
natural process” and conclude that “living places... should be left to regenerate 
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themselves”.77   Karuppiah, a resident of Little India for over five decades has this to 
say, “The shops are there but where are the original shopkeepers?  We Indians are so 
used to frequenting the Indian goldsmith shops but now most of these shops are 
owned and run by Chinese”.  Echoing this view, the proprietor of one of the many 
vegetarian restaurants in Little India remarks:  
The only way Little India can continue to function as an Indian community 
locale is for the Government to provide ways to enable Singapore Indians to 
continue traditional cultural activities in the area so that the sense of identity 
and past heritage is sustained and valued. 
Indians living and working outside Little India were also sought for their views on the 
state’s heritage conservation policy.  They too visit the area frequently for purchases 
of Indian necessities, like spices, groceries, traditional Indian clothes, music CDs and 
videos, gold ornaments, prayer items and other Indian paraphernalia, as well as Indian 
traditional meals and snacks, or purely for socializing.  Like the residents of the area, 
most of them, particularly those living in Singapore as citizens and permanent 
residents, agree that conservation has a ‘racial’ dimension, firstly because the shops 
and spaces taken over by Chinese merchants brought an increased Chinese presence 
to the area, secondly because the identity and social ambience of the ‘Indianness’ of 
the place was being gradually erased, and thirdly, as a consequence, Indian ethnic 
pride, consciousness and identity was reasserting themselves among the Indians.  
Non-Indians visiting Little India however evaluate the conservation project mainly for 
its functional aspect.  To them the area looks cleaner and more orderly, and therefore 
the project has been successful.  They also seldom frequent the spice shops and others 
selling traditional Indian items.   
 Indian respondents also dwell on the importance given to ‘race’ by the state.  
According to them, state hegemony has dictated the demarcation of boundaries of the 
conserved Little India area, as in the widening of the boundaries to include parts of 
Jalan Besar that were originally not part of the Indian enclave (Map 2).78  Thus, 
following Jess and Massey, boundaries have become the “expressions of the power 
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structures of society”.79  These parts of Jalan Besar have always been occupied by 
Chinese shophouses-owners operating hardware, electrical and car tyre businesses 
that were seldom patronized by Indians.  By so reworking the boundaries, many 
interviewees feel that the Indian area has once again been encroached upon by 
Chinese space, thereby inhibiting the ‘Indianness’ of the place both in character and in 
numbers of residents.  Furthermore Indians tell me that they never shop in the 
extended area of Jalan Besar because they do not consider this area to be part of Little 
India and in any case traditional Indian items are not to be found there.  
 Residents of Little India also highlight how intimate social networks and 
bonding between the various communities of the place have disappeared after long-
time residents of the demolished shophouses were scattered into HDB apartments far 
away from Little India.  Says Palanivelu, a former aged resident of a shophouse in 
Little India now living in one of the HDB apartment blocks in the area: 
Before the HDB flats, we had only shophouses and all the races mingled 
together freely, visiting one another often in a communal atmosphere.  It did 
not matter whether you were Chinese, Malay or Indian.  No one took notice of 
that.  We were like one big family helping one another with our needs.  
However everything is different now.  Now I’m living in a flat and my 
Chinese neighbours won’t even respond when I smile at them or greet them.  I 
think they are so conscious of their ‘race’ nowadays because the Government 
has made it so.   
Clearly, he implies here that encouragement of ethnic consciousness by the political 
leadership has led to the disappearance of neighbourliness and friendliness that used 
to be a feature of living in the area before the HDB flats appeared and before many of 
the residential shophouses were demolished.  Such responses appear to demonstrate 
that “state-vaunted claims about the benefits of conservation (and tourism) accruing to 
the nation pale into insignificance when set against... the dislocation of community 
life.”80  
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 Responses from my interviewees further demonstrate that ethnic identity 
clashes with national identity in the conservation of the Little India heritage project.  
While a few take the view that highlighting ethnic diversity was not divisive and in 
fact promoted a multiracial, multicultural society, many express concern that 
conservation of ethnic areas, including Little India, serves to accentuate differences 
between the various ethnic communities and limit the state’s attempts to promote 
national identity and nation building.  From Sakthivel, a 41-year old Indian artisan 
residing in an HDB block in the Little India area comes this answer: “Such efforts by 
the Government give us more reason to reassert our identity and race as Indians.  If 
the various races were to adopt similar attitudes, how can we hope to integrate as a 
nation?” Chang agrees that such resistance by merchants and residents to the state’s 
approach to heritage conservation has resulted in the “reassertion of Indian identity 
and community . . . even as Little India is being themed and tamed.”81       
 Another issue of heritage conservation popular with respondents is the 
question of authenticity, an ambiguous and contested concept because of the migrant 
and postcolonial nature of Singapore society. The state is concerned that preservation 
of the nation’s ethnic cultural heritage should promote an awareness of the historical 
past for the present and future generations to forge a national identity, but long-term 
Little India residents and shopkeepers who seem to value authenticity see 
conservation as artificial and as becoming ‘museumized’.82  Consequently they 
perceive a threat to the Indian ethnic identity of the place, and therefore the cultural 
heritage of the nation.  The conserved shophouses are seen by respondents to look too 
structured and sterile, merely conserving the architectural outlook of the building and 
not the traditional activities that are so crucial in preserving ethnic heritage.  As one of 
my respondents, 53-year old Pallavan, a goldsmith living and working in Little India 
remarks, “Architectural restoration merely fulfils the superficiality of cultural 
preservation because it has been re-manufactured, leading to a loss of shared culture 
and history”.  Continuing he says, “The displacement of long established shophouse 
residents and traditional activities are characteristics crucial for the identity of the 
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place which in turn contributes to its authenticity.  The ineffectiveness of the Little 
India Arcade located across Serangoon Road directly opposite Tekka Centre, is a case 
in point.  The Arcade was set up as part of the Little India Conservation project to 
retain the existing activities (for example, the five-foot way trading and small 
activities) that were part of the historical and cultural heritage of Serangoon Road.83  
However, as my informants tell me, most of the businesses have left the arcade 
because of the high rents and the “dull” business.  The whole place, they say, looks 
“dingy, dark, gloomy, shoddy and lifeless”, because of which it is poorly patronised.  
Lack of ambience, authenticity and publicity are also to blame though the building is 
strategically situated in the heart of Serangoon Road. Spatial representations have 
therefore assumed new social meanings in the struggle between modernization and 
preservation in the Little India area.   
 URA contends that “conservation should not entail the fossilization of 
traditional trades and lifestyles that existed before conservation” for there is a need to 
adapt with the present context to ensure the relevance and significance of these 
conserved areas to the society now.84  But this perspective is not shared by the 
interviewees, one of whom, 45-year old graphic artist Kumarapathy sums up the 
general opinion when he says: 
 Merely conserving the shophouse façade to make it look authentic and not 
having the traditional activities that take place within them will not help 
people understand their cultural roots.  In this scenario, it is difficult to expect 
people to appreciate the cultural values and traditions of the various races as a 
way to better inter-ethnic relations and national cohesiveness.  Conservation of 
historic districts should make Singaporeans aware of their cultural heritage 
and a sense of who they are so that these conserved landscapes can become 
successful symbols of national heritage and identity. 
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Kumarapathy’s argument resonates with the view of Kevin Lynch that “to the extent 
that change is inevitable, we should at least make sure that it is a humane 
process...”.85  
8.4  Conclusion 
 The self-help and heritage conservation policies of the state, like the other 
social engineering policies described in earlier chapters, generate intense reactions 
from the minority communities.  The main thrust of these reactions revolves around 
the perceived importance the state accords to Chinese economic and cultural 
dominance at the expense of minority interests, thereby resulting in disparities 
between the various communities.  Like the British colonial regime, the Singapore 
nation state is perceived by many minority Singaporeans to have abdicated 
responsibility for providing social security and support to the various communities, 
leaving these communities to their own self-help resources.  The ironic consequence, 
the minorities feel, is that it is the Chinese community that is best able to capitalize on 
the situation with the help of the state and to accelerate its own economic advantage 
over the Indians and Malays, further widening the problem of ‘racial’ and class 
differences.  Such differences are made more pronounced by historical perceptions of 
negative stereotyping and discrimination against these minorities.   
 As far as heritage conservation is concerned, the state is perceived to have the 
upper hand in defining heritage and what, how and where to conserve.  Respondents 
argue that the state seems to place more value on the “aesthetic and historical 
significance of place” and not on the “community value of place” as the lived 
experiences of the people occupying the place are not appreciated.86  The Indian 
minority feels that increased Chinese encroachment into traditional Indian space in 
Little India impacts adversely on the heritage value and authenticity of the place to the 
detriment of Indian ethnic identity and pride.  All in all, the consensus among my 
respondents to both self-help and conservation policies, as in the other policies 
described in this thesis, is that the state is veering away from its declared objectives of 
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multiracialism and a common national identity, and that ‘race’ is looming as a 
significant factor in its machinations. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
“We, the citizens of Singapore, 
Pledge ourselves as one united people, 
Regardless of race, language or religion 
To build a democratic society, 
Based on justice and equality, 
So as to achieve happiness, prosperity and progress for our nation.” 
 
 This is the solemn national pledge of allegiance that school children recite 
everyday at school assemblies throughout Singapore along with singing the national 
anthem.  For centuries, states have relied upon various methods of manipulation to 
create what Benedict Anderson calls “a sense of imagined community”.1  In 
Singapore, classifying citizens by ‘race’ is the orientation that has shaped the nation’s 
‘imagined community’ since colonial times.2  It is on the basis of ‘race’ that national 
and ethnic identity have been defined and managed by the state.  Hence the racial 
socio-political construction of national identity and ethnic identity could be 
considered “discursive” and controversial as Chua has argued.3  Through the state’s 
hegemonic control ‘race’ is manifested in the various social engineering policies 
described in this thesis.  These strategies for integration are all powerful practices of 
nation building as they reinforce the construction of a Singaporean national identity, 
but ‘racial’ politics as conducted through these policies have also become a site - 
whether acknowledged by the state or not – of conflict between ethnic and national 
identity, although the state emphasizes that loyalty to the nation should override 
ethnic identification.  Nevertheless one fundamental question asked repeatedly by the 
state and its citizens is whether ethnic consciousness is bringing the country together 
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or pulling it apart.  A number of my respondents, particularly Tamils from the lower 
social and economic levels, perceive and experience that ‘racial’ politics is proving 
divisive and is not contributing to a cohesive national identity or a fair distribution of 
social goods. Both of these are felt to be undermined by the resurgence of ethnic 
consciousness fostered by the state. 
 As I have discussed in Part I of this thesis, people in Singapore came from 
different parts of the world and their ethnicity was “embedded in a cultural orientation 
to a ‘homeland’ that was not Singapore”, a temporary place of sojourn where they had 
no intention of settling permanently.  In the words of Chua, Singapore was an 
“absence”.4  As a result, a plural society emerged during the colonial period in which 
people “mix but do not combine.  Each group holds by its own religion, its own 
culture and language, its own ideas and ways.  As individuals they meet, but only in 
the market-place, in buying and selling”.5
 Based on essentialist notions of ‘race’ that were translated into a politics of 
what Taylor calls “ascriptive ethnicity”, the colonial administration assigned 
segregated economic, social and residential spaces to the various ethnic communities 
for the purpose of economic development and modernity.6  This was achieved by 
means of the Raffles Town Plan.  The specific roles allocated to the various ethnic 
groups were justified on ideological and essentialist grounds in keeping with Social 
Darwinist assumptions of hierarchies among racial groups, which were considered to 
possess inherently different behavioral characteristics or features.  With the benefit of 
such assumptions, the colonial administration viewed the Chinese as enterprising, 
hardworking and as having a shrewd business sense, Malays as poor, lazy, backward, 
rural and devoid of business abilities, and Indians as docile, obedient and more suited 
to working on the plantations and on government construction projects.  The 
consequence was that stereotypes, misconceptions, prejudices, generalizations about 
race, irrational fears, racial labels, ethnocentrism and discrimination took hold not 
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only between the colonial administration and the ethnic groups but more importantly 
between the groups themselves.  Such essentialist assumptions served to separate 
communities by highlighting superficial and sometimes artificial differences between 
them while downplaying their common strengths and interests.  These attitudes have 
not only been accepted in popular discourse but have also been inculcated in the 
mindset of people and the state in Singapore ever since.  Such notions, I have argued 
in this thesis, have been reinvented by the independent state in the name of ‘national 
survival’, and used for the promotion of national identity based on economic 
development, social stability and ‘racial’ harmony.7  They have formed the basis of 
various ‘race’-based social engineering policies (described in Chapters 6-8) with 
‘multiracialism’ - the ideology that accords equal status to the cultures and ‘racial’ 
identities of the various communities in Singapore - multiculturalism, 
multilingualism, multireligiosity and meritocracy underpinning their implementation 
by an interventionist, authoritarian and paternalistic state.  According to Lai Ah Eng, 
an ideology of pragmatism has enabled the state to integrate “an economic ideology 
of meritocracy, efficiency and excellence [with] a political ideology of Singapore-
style democracy and politics based on consensus rather than conflict and [with] a 
cultural ideology of CMIO multiracialism”, all based on the localized concept of 
‘race’.8
 One consequence of these policies has been that social and economic 
inequalities among the various ethnic groups have become a lived reality for these 
groups with every area of daily life permeated with the tincture of ethnicity and 
‘racial’ politics.  Additionally, differences in the socio-economic development of the 
different ethnic groups pose problems to a nation state that pursues a policy of 
meritocracy and national consciousness in the population while exhorting the people 
to value their ethnic identities.  Though the state maintains that rapid economic 
progress is the result of the policy of meritocracy, empirical evidence shows that such 
a policy has benefited the Chinese majority more than the Malay and Indian minority 
                                        
 
7  The precarious notion of Singapore being a ‘little red dot’ continues to obsess the political leadership. 
 
8  Lai Ah Eng, Meanings of Multiethnicity: A Case-study of Ethnicity and Ethnic Relations in 
Singapore (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1995), 178-179. 
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communities.9  Various surveys attest to the widening social and economic gap 
between the Chinese and the minorities resulting from the policies of the state.  The 
responses of my Indian interviewees suggest that ‘race’ has been factored into the 
state’s planning and practice with adverse repercussions for the minority 
communities.  Their responses also have the effect of shedding light on to the larger 
question of the role of national and ethnic identity in the Republic as a whole.  While 
the various policies have provided a solid foundation to enable its citizens to identify 
with the nation and take pride in themselves, the collision of their ethnic and national 
identities tends to undermine this relationship and hinder the process of integration.  
How did this come about? 
            In the early years after independence the non-Chinese, particularly the Indians, 
were on the whole greatly impressed with the PAP’s nation-building programme. 
Most of them had no doubts about the genuineness of their rulers’commitment to a 
multi-cultural, multi-religious and multi-lingual Singapore nation.  As Chineseness 
had then been deemphasised they were convinced that Lee Kuan Yew and his co-
rulers would never succumb to the demands of Chinese chauvinists.  However a 
dramatic change in this regard began with the advent of the decade of the 1980s when 
Lee’s political leadership began to steer towards the Sinicisation of Singapore, a trend 
that today causes concern and anxiety among the Indians (mainly Tamils) and 
Malays10.  With old party stalwarts belonging to the first generation leadership 
receding into the background, governance and nation-building increasingly began to 
be driven by Lee’s attitudes of Chinese racial and cultural superiority – a result of his 
eugenics theories that have formed the basis of most of the significant social 
engineering instuments that impact the lives of Singaporeans.  Such attitudes paved 
the way for increasing PAP hegemony and authoritarian rule based on Chinese 
dominance.  
 Family policies for instance are, in the perception of my respondents, 
weighted heavily in favour of the Chinese majority.  Their fertility had declined with 
a corresponding fall in birth rates in the years after independence.  Inspired by 
selective breeding theories brought on by the perceived superiority of Chinese culture 
                                        
9  Political leaders in Singapore repeatedly voice the rhetoric of meritocracy in their speeches.  A 
speech by former Minister for National Development, S Dhanabalan on 19 August 1989, quoted in The 
Straits Times of 20 August 1989, to mark National Day celebrations is but an example.  
  
10 Chapters 6-8 provide reactions from my respondents to the various social engineering policies 
hegemonically enforced by the state in the last three decades or so. 
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over other Asian cultures, the state had introduced an array of measures to boost the 
Chinese population, both in ‘qualitative’ and quantitative terms.  My respondents 
express their discontentment, viewing such measures as disadvantaging them socially 
and economically.  By extension, selective population and labour policies based on a 
class and ‘race’ structure were introduced to maintain an arbitrary ‘racial balance’ 
and, in the eyes of my respondents, to ensure that the Chinese maintained their 
dominance.  The effect of such policies is that the Indian and other minorities feel 
threatened and marginalized.  They also fear that there is an overemphasis on 
Chineseness in various spheres of state governance and influence, resulting in 
discrimination and prejudice in the workplace thereby widening the economic gap 
between the various ethnic communities.  Such perceptions are reinforced by 
language and education policies and the undue importance given to the Chinese 
language over other community languages.  The Indian and other minorities perceive 
these ‘race’-based policies as providing the Chinese with numerous social and 
economic advantages that these minorities feel deprived of.  Housing policies are no 
different, with the ethnic quota policy in particular regarded as discriminatory in the 
way it restricts the freedom of the minorities to sell their flat.  The privatization of 
social security by the state through self-help policies is also considered by my Indian 
(and Malay) respondents as retarding the process of social cohesion by deepening the 
divisions between ethnic groups, particularly between those who are economically 
well placed and those who are not.  Heritage conservation in Little India is likewise 
viewed by my Indian respondents as working against their social and economic 
improvement.  In particular, their cultural identity and traditional activities are, they 
feel, disrupted by Chinese intrusion into Indian space and the Indian way of life.  My 
respondents ask why the state persists with such policies of inequality that force 
ethnic groups to strengthen ethnic solidarity with their own group rather than with the 
national ethos.  They further question the state’s motives and argue that the political 
leadership places an overemphasis on Chinese culture and Chinese dominance to the 
detriment of minority interests and achievement of national identity. They are also 
unhappy with the leadership’s attitude that the political culture of Indians is 
considered disruptive and therefore not congenial to the maintenance of a stable 
political order in Singapore.11
                                        
11 As for the indigenous Malays Lee Kuan Yew argues that their political culture is almost entirely 
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 Social and economic inequalities have in turn, according to my interviewees, 
been further reinforced by stereotyping and discrimination.  Following Heisler’s point 
that stereotyping and discrimination by politically dominant elites against minority 
ethnic group members on the basis of their ethnic group membership is commonplace 
in multiethnic societies, the Indians and to an ever greater extent the Malays in 
Singapore have fallen victim to stereotyping because they have been economically 
less successful than the majority Chinese.12  As I have demonstrated in my thesis, 
there is a widening economic gap between the Chinese and these minorities.13  The 
themes of socio-economic inequality and stereotyping run through the whole gamut of 
my informants’ responses to the state’s social engineering policies that maintain the 
basis for ‘racial’ politics in Singapore.  These themes – the result of an oversimplified 
generalization of perceptions enhanced by cultural or racial stereotypes attributed to a 
particular group – have been the subject of deep historical divisions between the 
majority Chinese and the Indian, Malay and other minorities, divisions which began 
in the colonial era and which continue to affect contemporary politics and social 
relations.  They underlie the resentment amongst the minority groups against Chinese 
ethnocentrism because of the Chinese claim to economic and cultural superiority.   
Jumari Naiyan of the Association of Muslim Professionals asks: 
Does the development of a Chinese-proficient elite who by inference could 
one day become the decision-makers in our society, also not suggest the 
possibility that certain biases could emerge further down the road?  The 
Malays are content to get on with their lives – so long as there is no overt 
trend of Chinese chauvinism taking root in Singapore.14  
 With socio-economic achievements and educational abilities between the main ethnic 
communities having a tendency to be seen in ‘racial’ terms as my thesis proves, the 
perceived prejudices of the majority community are strengthened while exacerbating 
the sensitivities of the minorities.  Such attributes are made worse when the political 
                                                                                                               
derived from their Islamic faith and that they cannot be trusted to act as fully loyal citizens of a multi-
racial, multi-cultural, multi-lingual and multi-religious Singapore. For instance they are denied equal 
rights to sensitive positions in the Singapore armed forces. 
 
12  Martin O Heisler, “Ethnic Conflict in the World Today,” The Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science, 433 (Sep. 1977): 3.   
 
13  This economic gap has prevailed since colonial times and Tables 15 and 18-22 show the extent of 
this gap in the last three decades. 
 
14  The Straits Times, 28 September 1997. 
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leadership continues to adopt a rhetoric stressing that there is no “quick fix” to getting 
rid of racial stereotypes.15  Former Prime Minister and now Senior Minister Goh 
Chok Tong is content to dismiss “irrational fears” among the “races”,16 while David 
Lim, MP, acknowledges peoples’ deep prejudices by admitting, “We are raised to be 
racial bigots”.17   
 Notwithstanding prejudices arising from perceived cultural differences, state 
leaders frequently exhort Singaporeans not to allow their different ethnic orientations 
to get in the way of ‘racial harmony’, the pursuit of ‘racial integration’ and a common 
national identity.  The importance of multiracial harmony has been repeatedly 
emphasised by the political leadership through the years.  Lee Kuan Yew himself, for 
example, describes it as “the most important single pre-condition for our continued 
success” and interrogates the various metaphors that could be used to depict this 
condition.18  The melting pot, salad bowl, buffet and pot luck metaphors were all 
tossed about with my respondents to gauge their idea of how multiracial harmony 
could best be achieved.  Their unanimous response has been that the pot luck best 
symbolizes the preferred image of multiracialism in Singapore.  When asked for the 
reasons for their choice of the pot luck over the other images, most of them say that 
the pot luck meal means, to quote the words of Straits Times correspondent Koh Buck 
Song, “Every person at the meal is an active participant, having worked to produce a 
dish he cares about.  He is more open to the culinary delights of others. The common 
meal depicts society in which all come together”.19  The journalist argues that the 
“melting pot and the salad bowl both carried a sense of helplessness, as if there was 
nothing you could do to change things once you climbed inside the cauldron”, 
whereas “if everyone was responsible for a dish, there would be deeper loyalty and 
commitment to the shared meal (or nation)”, thereby giving power to each individual 
                                        
 
15  Speech by Mah Bow Tan, former Minister for National Development, as reported in The Straits 
Times of 21 October 2002. 
 
16  Speech by former Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong, as reported in The Straits Times of 31 January 
2002. 
 
17  Speech by David Lim, former National Youth Council Chairman and now Member of Parliament, as 
reported in The Straits Times of 31 January 1999. 
 
18  The Straits Times, 8 March 1997. The imagery of food to discuss multiculturalism and 
multiracialism seems very appropriate in food-loving Singapore.  
 
19  The Straits Times, 8 March 1997.  
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and community.20  My respondents reject the melting pot image because of the 
perception of a loss of individual identity in the assimilation process, while they say 
that in a buffet diners are passive consumers with little personal involvement or 
commitment – a situation they relate to contemporary Singapore society.  The salad 
bowl is again not preferred because in this image minority communities are 
encouraged to retain their cultures that, like a salad, mix to some extent but do not 
merge.  Saying that while there has been some interaction among the ‘races’ over the 
years but little real understanding, they suggest that it is in the pot luck that there is 
greater sharing, participation, power, self-esteem, pride, confidence and enjoyment of 
one another’s dishes representing the different Malay, Chinese, Indian and Eurasian 
cultures that come together towards integration in a multicultural Singapore society.  
   Despite the state’s insistence of the priority of multiracial harmony over ethnic 
loyalties, ethnic boundaries – the result of political, historical, economic and social 
policies initiated by the colonial administration and continued by the nation state – 
persist to structure social relations.  While the British were content to leave the 
fragmented ethnic communities to their own resources based on their infamous 
‘divide and rule’ policy, the leaders of the nation state have pursued an ideology of 
integration and ‘multiracialism’ through various nation-building strategies and 
policies that have encouraged the simultaneous institutionalization of both national 
and ethnic identification on ‘racial’ terms as the state’s recipe for the success of the 
nation building project.21  The constant producing of ‘racial’ categories in public life 
through the national identity card system, schools, the census, cultural entertainment, 
official forms, records and statistics, and in various other aspects of social policy has 
resulted in people seeing themselves as “ethnically defined” – as Benjamin has noted: 
“Multiracialism puts Chinese people under pressure to become more Chinese, Indians 
more Indian, and Malays more Malay, in their behaviour”.22  My respondents report 
that this highlighting of ethnic differences only serves to strengthen the psychological 
divide between the dominant Chinese and the minority groups, thereby causing 
                                        
 
20  The Straits Times, 8 August 1994, 8 March 1997. 
 
21 By national identification, I refer to a citizen’s generally positive identification with national 
symbols, while ethnic identification refers to his self-identification as a member of a particular ethnic 
group. 
 
22  Geoffrey Benjamin, “The Cultural Logic of Singapore’s ‘Multiracialism’ ” in Singapore: Society in 
Transition, ed. Riaz Hassan (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1976), 121, 124. 
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unease and reinforcing traditional stereotypes.  The nation state of Singapore, noted 
for its pragmatic policies, on the other hand maintains that there is no point pretending 
that Singaporeans are all alike and that differences do not exist between Chinese, 
Malay and Indian Singaporeans.  In fact state leaders repeatedly, in terms reminiscent 
of Durkheim, contend that it is the differences between these groups – ‘race’ being the 
dominant marker of the difference - that provide the basis for understanding, tolerance 
and acceptance among them.  Yet my respondents feel that these ‘racial’ differences 
are also used to justify inequality, as well as to naturalize Chinese domination.  Plate 
23 below typifies the state’s approach of constructing a national identity through the 
appreciation and celebration of difference. 
 
Plate 23 
 
National Day Poster 
 Ironically, the state views ethnicity as a tool of identity formation that helps in 
the long-term process of integration through a generalized Singaporean national 
identity.  With the benefit of the state-controlled media, official discourse attempts to 
manage the ideals of national integration and a Singaporean identity with celebration 
of ethnic diversity and its cultural manifestations, especially of Chinese culture.  In 
this respect the leadership takes every opportunity to praise ethnic and cultural 
diversity as an essential ingredient of a unique Singaporean identity.  Says former 
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Foreign Minister and now Minister for Home Affairs and Deputy Prime Minister 
Wong Kan Seng, “Acknowledging that there are distinct ethnic identities does not 
mean that we cannot have a national identity as well.  They are not alternatives ... This 
is what makes Singapore unique.  We must preserve it and we will”.23  In spite of 
such periodic assurances of ethnic and national unity, many events over the last 
decade have evoked racist responses in the local newspapers.  September 11th, the 
Bali bombing of October 2002, and the American-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 all 
elicited racist responses from mainly Chinese elements towards Malay Singaporeans.  
Such articles were given wide publicity.  On the other hand, the SARS epidemic that 
originated in some parts of rural China and Hong Kong was largely underplayed in 
the media.  It can therefore be seen that discourses and practices on ethnicity and 
nationality coexist at different levels.   
 As my fieldwork shows, the intense ambiguity of ‘race’ in Singapore means 
there is a perception among many members of the minority Indian ethnic community 
(as in the other ethnic Malay and Eurasian minority communities) that ‘racial 
integration’, a term so often used by the nation’s political leaders, has in the recent 
past given way to apartheid-type measures that do not augur well for a common 
national identity that will therefore always remain elusive to Singaporeans.   In their 
view the state has ‘strayed’ from its declared goals of multiracialism and 
multiculturalism once emphasized as critical for the achievement of national identity 
and development.  In the eyes of the state, the national self is supposed to dominate 
the ethnic self, but in practice my predominantly Indian interviewees say and act 
knowing that this is artificial and forced at best.  Indeed they appear to feel that the 
state’s emphasis on multiracialism and support of ethnic identities exerts pressure on 
Indians to become more Indian just as the other ethnic communities feel obliged to 
value their own identities.  They reason that "top down" bureaucratic and ideological 
management of cultural and social pluralism is not conducive for inter-ethnic 
interaction and integration, because social engineering policies enforce over-rigid and 
stereotyped distinctions between groups.  They also feel that this impacts upon and 
disadvantages the minorities in particular, given the numerical and political 
dominance of the Chinese.  The Indian ethnic minority feels a sense of alienation and 
manipulation at the economic and cultural importance given by the state to the 
                                        
23  The Straits Times, 15 August 1999. 
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Chinese on the strength of their supposed genetic superiority that is manifested in 
eugenics programmes promoted hegemonically by the political leadership.  Although 
the state insists that its strict laws, policies and controls have made the nation one of 
the safest places in the world, that they contribute to social integration and ‘racial’ 
cohesion in line with the ideology of multiracialism, and ensure the competitiveness 
and growth of the national economy, my interviewees suggest that they are actually 
proving discriminatory.  Here it is pertinent to point out that the Indian “problem” of 
poverty, low incomes and low educational attainments is largely a Tamil problem that 
manifests itself in feelings of discrimination by the state and by the Chinese 
majority.24     
 One could of course argue that the state creates and manages ethnic and 
national identity as part of its legitimizing project because, as the platonic guardian 
over and above civil society, it has the duty to assiduously manage all aspects of 
everyday life in the name of social harmony.  Besides, managing ethnic groups is top 
on the state’s list of priorities; as Milne and Mauzy have described: “The Chinese are 
a majority in Singapore, but a minority in the region; the Malays are a minority in 
Singapore but a strong majority in the immediate region”.25  Given the claimed 
‘racial’/cultural differences of the various ethnic groups, it could equally be argued 
that such governance is inspired by the discourse of biological essentialism and 
hegemony which bind its social engineering policies together.  Hence there are family 
policies that, for example, encourage the naturally ‘highly competitive’ and ‘money-
driven’ Chinese to increase their numbers while curbing the procreating ‘instincts’ of 
the minorities, especially the Malays.   
 The subject of ‘racial’ politics as manifested in the various social engineering 
policies described in this thesis demonstrates the reality of how ethnic identity 
intersects and collides with national identity.  ‘Racial’ politics is best seen by my 
substantially Indian minority respondents in these instruments of the state.  As a 
consequence ‘race’ relations between the various ethnic groups have been affected 
leading to a rise in ‘racial’ polarization in a society “more conscious of racism than 
                                        
24 Expatriate and other educated local Indians show no special keenness to offer any real help to the 
Tamils. 
 
25  Robert S Milne and Diane K Mauzy, Singapore Politics under the People’s Action Party (London: 
Routledge, 2002). 
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sexism”.26  Various surveys conducted over the years also attest to this state of affairs.  
By way of illustration, a survey commissioned by the Ministry of Community 
Development and Sports in 2001 showed that while virtually all of the 1481 
respondents who participated indicated that they felt proud to be Singaporean (97%) 
they also felt a strong sense of identity with their own ‘racial’ and religious groups.  A 
Straits Times’ study conducted in mid-2002 revealed that of the three main ‘races’, 
the minorities were more sociable than the Chinese.  The latter were characterized by 
their “indifference” because they saw “no immediate need to reach out to others” as 
they were already comfortable, assured as the majority community and were prepared 
to mix with other ‘races’ only when it was “necessary”.  The study also showed that 
many people still clung to fixed notions and stereotypes of others.  Some interviewees 
felt that “racial harmony” was, at best, a “superficial notion” and cited Racial 
Harmony Day as evidence to point out that the “forced getting-along contributes to 
the notion that we can achieve harmony by simply turning up for these events, 
without making an effort to mingle outside of them”.27  Other respondents felt that 
though well intentioned, Racial Harmony Day did more harm than good to the cause 
of multiracialism in Singapore.  Yolande Chin and Norman Vasu writing for The 
Straits Times argued that marking the race riots that erupted in Singapore in 1964 
during the Prophet Muhammad birthday procession via the Racial Harmony Day 
could have unintended repercussions.  They cited “awareness about inter-racial 
‘realities’ in a negative fashion,” which could force people to see the “issue of race as 
a fault line” they may not have seen before.  In the aftermath of 11 September 2001 
and the pressing need to celebrate and respect ethnic diversity in Singapore, the 
association between terrorism and “unstable” race relations, they felt, could have been 
“unwittingly reinforced” giving rise to potential dangers of Singaporeans viewing 
each other through “racial lenses” because of a sense of insecurity.28  
 A survey conducted in 2002 by the Institute of Policy Studies concludes that 
the Chinese feel less comfortable, compared to Indians and Malays, when they are put 
in a room full of people who are not of the same ‘race’ as the Chinese.  On this 
subject of interethnic mixing, the study found that while seven out of ten Malays and 
                                        
26  The Straits Times, 26 November 1993. 
 
27  The Straits Times, 9 August 2002. 
 
28  Ibid., 29 June 2006. 
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Indians invited people of different ethnic backgrounds to celebrate special occasions 
like birthdays and weddings with them, only one in two Chinese actually did so.  Such 
a scenario, the report points out, has been prevalent since a 1990 survey conducted by 
the Institute.  Again, the study concluded that the Chinese were less supportive of 
national policies (like ethnic quotas and self-help groups) to promote “racial 
harmony” and interethnic mixing.29  A further demonstration of current realities is 
revealed in an Institute of Policy Studies survey conducted in 2003 which revealed 
that while the Chinese majority showed only a 78% support for the concept of a 
multiracial society in Singapore, Malays and Indians were more supportive (88% and 
83% respectively).  Surveys show that school children tend to mix with friends from 
within the same ethnic group.30 Such findings are also reflected among university 
students.  For instance, a survey (conducted by the National University of Singapore 
Political Association in 2004) of 748 NUS students (mostly Chinese) showed that 
they were more comfortable identifying with their ‘race’ than with their nationality.  
This survey also revealed that the current racial quotas in public housing policies had 
not encouraged much “racial” interaction.  Only 7.4% of respondents communicated 
with their neighbours of different ethnicities on a daily basis, while 44.3% almost 
never talked to such neighbours, reinforcing conclusions reached in previous 
ethnographic surveys.31 The survey also demonstrated that 60.3% of the Chinese 
respondents supported the racial quota policy, while only 50% of the Malays, 36.6% 
of the Indians and 35.7% of ‘Others’ did.  Elderly interviewees are all unanimous in 
saying that in the 1960s and 1970s there was greater mixing and interaction between 
the ‘races’ because of the state’s emphasis on ‘racial’ similarities rather than 
differences as well as its emphasis on national identity rather than ethnicity, according 
to another Straits Times report.32 Kessler, a 50-year-old transport operator, for 
                                        
29  Reported by Ooi Giok Ling in an article entitled “Allowing for Ethnic Diversity boosts National 
Identity” in The Straits Times of 18 June 2002. She however argues that the strong support for ethnic 
identity at the expense of a national culture does not diminish the likelihood of developing a “strong, or 
even stronger, national identity”, and that there is evidence showing a greater commitment to the 
reconciliation of ethnicity with national identity. The majority of Singaporeans, for example, regard 
themselves more as citizens than the ‘race’ they belong to. Such a conclusion however is not in full 
agreement with my Indian respondents.  
 
30  Today, 12 August 2003. 
 
31  Lai Ah Eng, Meanings of Multiethnicity. 
 
32  The Straits Times, 17 January 2004. 
 
 292
example, speaks of the 1960s and 1970s as being the “best years – we were told we 
must have a Singaporean identity, not a Chinese, Malay, Indian or Eurasian identity”.  
Continuing he says, “But the races began drifting apart in the late 1970s, when I think 
we started accentuating the differences between the races.  I feel sad that this has 
happened”.   
 In an interview with Raj Vasil, a senior Government leader revealed that “not 
many people think of ethnic integration in Singapore”.33  Some government leaders 
agree that state policies imposed hegemonically and with a “paternalistic discipline 
akin to colonial paternalism” are hurting rather than building cohesiveness.34  Inderjit 
Singh, Member of Parliament, for example, reiterates that policies and legislation 
alone cannot bring about “racial and religious harmony”.35  Another Member of 
Parliament Dr Lau Teik Soon points out that the state, instead of allowing for the 
separate development of the different cultures, should be emphasizing integration of 
the cultures.  “To put it bluntly, we cannot be a predominantly Chinese state” he 
says.36  While the leadership frequently calls for more interaction between 
Singaporeans of “different races,” there is the widespread acknowledgement among 
the political elite as well as my respondents that interaction and attitudes must go 
beyond the social superficialities of daily contact between the peoples.   
 The national identity card system - the way Singaporeans are officially 
classified by ‘race’ - for example, has been the subject of much debate among the 
Singaporean public.  A person’s ethnic identification is specified on identity cards 
under the title ‘race’.  While inadequate in reflecting the ethnic diversity in Singapore, 
it is also accepted that it reinforces ethnic loyalties and creates tension between the 
peoples.  A large number of my respondents therefore consider that the word ‘race’ 
should be deleted from the identity card.  They also feel that it has lost its relevance in 
the highly cosmopolitan nature of globalised Singapore.  To a proposal from an Indian 
woman at a forum on race relations that ‘race’ should be excluded from the identity 
card because people should not be judged on the basis of it, a Chinese woman 
                                        
33  Raj Vasil, Asianising Singapore: The PAP’s Management of Ethnicity (Singapore: Heinemann Asia, 
1995), 102. 
 
34  C J W-L Wee, “Mediating ‘Progress’: the National Narrative of Economic Development and 
Liberalism in Singapore,” Communal/Plural, 9, 2 (2001): 225.   
 
35  The Straits Times, 12 October 1999. 
 
36  Ibid., 14 June 1990. 
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retorted, “Even if you take it out, people can still tell if you’re Malay, Chinese or 
Indian.  Why not just be proud of your race, of who you are?”37  Such utterances lend 
weight to the perception of the non-Chinese that race remains more important as an 
ethnic identifier to the Chinese – a perception that was upheld in an Institute of Policy 
Studies survey conducted in 2002.38  While it could be argued, as Straits Times 
journalist Asad Latif has done, that “classifying citizens by race is an aspect of an 
official policy that simultaneously protects the various ethnic groups in Singapore by 
recognizing their uniqueness and guaranteeing their right to exist”, the consensus 
among my respondents is that there is a need to go beyond ‘race’ in defining the 
Singapore identity and achieving national integration.39  Several of my respondents 
agree with Latif’s comment that one way this could be achieved is by replacing the 
multiracial model with a multicultural one, the argument being that unlike “race 
which sets communities apart from one another, culture transcends ethnicity” and 
promotes greater cohesiveness.  In a similar vein, other members of the public argue 
that the solution would be to “abandon the rigid official ethnic categories of Chinese, 
Malay, Indian and Others to allow an unhindered pluralism to emerge”.  Such a 
solution they feel would provide a “cross-cultural connector to transcend the races”.40    
These responses find more common ground in the words of Dr Kevin Tan of the 
National University of Singapore:  
The state’s construction of multiculturalism, which is naturally designed to 
suit its own political agenda, will never coincide with the community’s idea of 
culture.  Multiculturalism cannot be constructed artificially.  It must be 
allowed to evolve and be recognized as a state of mind.41
 ‘Race’ as a primary principle of social organisation in Singapore is also 
criticised by many of my respondents because it has been made the subject of far-
reaching and vitally significant social engineering policies exercised through 
ideological tools of coercion, control and consent.  They contend that such policies 
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enforced through hegemony have not really fostered integration between the various 
communities; rather they have given rise to increasing ethnic loyalties at the expense 
of national identity, an argument that pervades this thesis.42   
 ‘Race’ is hegemonic in Singapore because it has been socially and politically 
constructed by the postcolonial state and historically grounded from colonial rule.  As 
a result of massive intervention and control race has been hegemonically imposed by 
the state.  A situation has therefore arisen whereby unequal opportunities have 
resulted mainly because of the state’s perception of the superiority of the dominant 
community.   The principle of multiracialism espoused by the nation state provides for 
equality of all Singaporeans irrespective of race, language or religion, yet the state’s 
construction of ‘race’ has made such an equality difficult to achieve in the perception 
of many of my respondents.  It is obvious therefore that though the postcolonial state 
resorts to hegemonic and ideological forms of power these are not achieved easily.  
This is because responses from my Indian and Malay informants indicate resistance 
from such minority groups.  Such resistance is manifested by feelings of unhappiness 
and anxiety among them.  This is an inevitable consequence as many theorists have 
pointed out – see pg. 21-22.  Of course the majority Chinese have no problems with 
the state’s conception of forms of power because they have benefited from the 
government’s policies substantially more than the minorities have.  
 There is also a general feeling among my respondents that “staged” ethnic 
Malay, Chinese and Indian performances at schools’ cultural festivals and at national 
functions do not ‘make’ a culturally sensitive Singaporean.  A nationalism based on 
an imposed subscription to such staged symbols is, according to them, banal and 
perfunctory at best, unresponsive and divisive at worst.  Celebrating diversity this way 
could do more harm than good, they say.  One of my respondents, Kalaimani, an 
horticultural assistant, made this observation: 
When the unique cultural practices of each ethnic community are emphasised, 
the focus is too much on our differences, rather than what different ethnic 
groups have in common.  This adds to the distance between the dominant 
community and the others, and also accentuates racial stereotyping.  
Academics Chin and Vasu argue that cultural performances by ethnic groups do not 
“accurately reflect the natural setting in which the races interact on a daily basis” and 
                                        
42  The thesis demonstrates that hegemony was also practised by the colonial administration with the 
main objective of implementing the colonial project.   
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that they can “accentuate stereotypes of each race and discipline individuals in the 
same way” that the CMIO compartmentalization constantly does.  Consequently, 
commentators perceive that skin colour becomes the stereotypical gaze of the people 
while ironically they are frequently exhorted to “look beyond that”.43  What was 
required, my respondents feel, was closer interaction and integration between the 
ethnic groups by learning to appreciate each other’s lifestyles, religious practices and 
customs.  For example, a Straits Times straw poll44 as well as other publications show 
that few Singaporeans know the reasons for the customs of other ethnic groups as in 
the following situations: Why Indian women wear pottu (dot on the forehead), why 
Indians traditionally greet each other by bringing both palms together known either as 
vanakkam or namaste (greetings), why Muslims cannot keep dogs as pets, why 
Muslims fast during Ramadan (fasting month), why wine is served at some Eurasian 
funerals, why giving a clock to a Chinese person should be avoided, why Chinese 
hang mirrors outside their doors, why Buddhists avoid eating meat on the first and 
fifteenth days of the lunar month or why Sikh men keep long hair.   
 The concept of a cohesive and distinctive national identity is still fluid and 
paradoxical in post-independent Singapore with ‘racial’ communities owing primary 
loyalty to their cultural ethnicity rather than to the idea of a Singapore nation.  Thus 
what it means to be Singaporean still remains an important cultural and national 
dilemma.  This is so despite high levels of ethnic and national identification.  The 
resurgence of state-directed and state-managed ethnic consciousness will always pose 
a dilemma in the government’s efforts to forge a national identity based primarily on 
economic grounds.  State leaders frequently ask whether the Chinese, Malays, Indians 
and Eurasians should separately and actively promote whatever it is that identifies 
them as a distinct community, or whether they should de-emphasise their 
Chineseness, Malayness, Indianness and so on, and work together instead to stress 
their similarities and forge a Singaporean identity.  There is, in brief, an ongoing 
problem of constituting the integration of the nation, and of finding a way to come to 
terms with its past and create reconciliation across historically produced ethnic and 
class divides.  The dynamics of conflicting ethnic, cultural and national identities will 
always prevail in Singapore, manifesting itself in anxieties pertaining to 
                                        
43  The Straits Times, 29 June 2006. 
 
44  Reported in The Straits Times of 5 June 1989. 
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hegemonically constructed state policies on language, culture and religion; ethnic 
relations in various domains; ethnic-based organisations and activities; ethno-religious 
relations and issues; the negotiation of commonalities and differences; conflict 
management and geo-political influences.   
 Finally, how do these anxieties impact on the Indian community’s stake in 
Singapore as it strives to integrate into local society?  The concerns of its members 
exemplify the impact of social engineering policies on the intersection of Indian 
ethnic identity and national identification leading to the processes of de-ethnicisation 
and re-ethnicisation amongst them.  The de-ethnicisation process has demonstrated, as 
my interviews show, that many young and “contented” third generation Singaporean 
Indians have “survived” and succeeded because they seem to have come to terms with 
the realities of living in Singapore with the dominant community.  I observe that some 
of them, for example, have adopted Chinese characteristics, values and even speech 
mannerisms.  On the other hand, several Singaporean Indians - mainly Tamils - 
interviewed are pushed to embracing a deepening sense of re-ethnicisation, partly 
because many of them have concerns of negative stereotyping and ‘racial’ prejudice 
by the Chinese majority and the perception that the Chinese majority does not 
sufficiently appreciate their sensitivities and sentiments.  Issues like Chinese 
carelessly talking in their own language in the midst of non-Chinese, not offering jobs 
to Indians even though the latter feel they are well qualified for the position, the 
public housing ethnic quota policy, encroaching into Indian space in the Little India 
area, and a general sense of a Chinese chauvinistic dominance that is perceived to 
prevent them from participating actively in the mainstream of national life have been 
frequently highlighted by my research.  Their articulation of ethnic identity is also 
given a new dimension by the increasing presence of professional and non-skilled 
labour from India and elsewhere resulting from transnational migration.  The state on 
its part takes pains to frequently assure the Indian and other minorities that their 
interests will not be jeopardized and that the minorities should also understand and 
appreciate the concerns and anxieties of the majority community.   In this context it 
would be remiss and indeed irresponsible of me not to acknowledge the fact that there 
were also several Indians from various levels of life I interviewed who say that neither 
do they feel marginalised, threatened or alienated by the state’s social engineering 
policies nor by the perceived dominance of the Chinese.  They also do not encounter 
any problem reconciling their ethnic and national loyalties in line with the state’s 
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ideology.  Living as a minority community inevitably meant having to negotiate their 
everyday lives with other ethnic communities but given the pragmatic governance of 
the political leadership they say they are comfortable with the existing identity politics 
in Singapore.  Such Indians comprising mainly professional expatriate workers from 
India as well as educated local Malayalees and other affluent Indians are 
predominantly from the upper strata of Singapore society and enjoy a better standard 
of living than their Tamil counterparts.  They do not lag behind the Chinese all that 
much in terms of economic power and wealth.  On the whole they find few real 
impediments in running profitable businesses or securing top salary-earning positions 
in business and industry.  As a result, unlike the Tamils and the Malays, they are 
neither overly concerned about perceived discrimination against the non-Chinese nor 
with the increasing domination of the Chinese in Singapore’s economy, governance 
and culture.  This is also the stance adopted by some Indians enjoying lesser 
economic rewards.  The majority of such Indians feel they have “arrived”, having 
emerged from the debilitating slum conditions of the colonial period and since then 
acquiring “unexpected” material benefits like new government housing and all the 
trappings of modern consumerism.  Wong Kan Seng, former Foreign Minister and 
currently Deputy Prime Minister/Minister for Home Affairs and other senior political 
leaders have also frequently advised minorities that Singapore’s national identity will 
continue to be a multiracial and multicultural one with equal opportunities for all.45  
However, it is an inevitable fact of identity politics that cultural minorities in 
Singapore, as in other multicultural societies, will always seek to preserve and define 
their own identities in the intersection of nationalist and multiculturalist discourses.   
 While there does exist a strong sense of national consciousness and integration 
especially among younger Singaporeans as my interviews suggest, it can be argued 
that such bonds are giving way to increasing feelings of ethnic affiliation.  A number 
of my respondents are unanimous in suggesting that such a bias towards ethnic 
identity is stronger if only because it is, they say, equated with certain values most of 
which are materialistic in nature.  The culture of consumerism along with the 
compulsive pursuit of money and possessions brought on by rapid modernisation, vast 
improvements in education and living standards, strong family values, law and order, 
safety and security, peace and stability, cleanliness and good political governance has 
                                        
45  Reported in The Straits Times of 15 August 1993. 
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created what many cynically consider as the most important social engineering project 
in contemporary Singapore.  In practical terms this mode of culture is amusingly 
termed the 6 Cs, being cash, condominium, car, career, country club and credit card.  
These 6 Cs are perceived to be a way of life that measures success by what can be 
achieved in financial terms. Such an insatiable obsession for material wealth has fused 
national dreams with personal aspirations – hence scholar Ooi Giok Ling’s finding 
that it is “not surprising that Singaporeans describe their sense of belonging and 
rootedness in practical and material terms”.46  Such a consumerist pattern of 
behaviour whereby people are perceived to become more self-centred and oriented 
towards projecting their own self-image, personal needs and material aspirations 
arguably means the weakening of the bonds of social care or commitment to a more 
equal distribution of life chances. In an article entitled “Singapore Place or Nation”, 
Professor Linda Lim blames the state’s economic priority and other policies “for 
engendering apathetic and passive Singaporeans with little affiliation for their country 
beyond its economic value”.47  Similarly another reader, writing to The Straits Times 
on 24 June 2006, asks why the primacy of economics and materialism has placed our 
courtesy and manners “on the back burner” – he was referring to a recent Readers’ 
Digest international survey that placed Singapore a low 30 out of 35 cities. 
 Singapore Indians find themselves taking root in Singapore society and 
identifying with the overall national objective of integration along with fellow 
Singaporeans of increasingly complex ethnicities and identities.  Among the new 
generation of Singapore Indians, national identification appears strong even as 
youngsters identify with a global diasporic Indian culture. In this process, my research 
shows, they seek to strike a balance between preserving ethnic diversity and being 
“stoutly Singaporean” as George Yeo, former Minister for Information and the Arts 
and currently Minister for Foreign Affairs, advised in a speech to SINDA.48  It is clear 
that most agree with the principle of integration through an overriding national 
identity (even if understood in state terms as a racially multi-stranded beast). Yet this 
                                        
46  Ooi Giok Ling, “Allowing for Ethnic Diversity boosts National Identity”. A quick glance at the 
Readers’ Forum Page in the local newspapers will confirm that most readers are obsessed with issues 
affecting their finances or cutting down expenditure but seldom on issues dealing with national identity 
or racial cohesiveness.   
 
47  The Straits Times, 19 June 2006. 
 
48  Reported in The Straits Times of 15 August 1993. 
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identity is agreed to partly because it is understood as a protection against the ethnic 
domination of the majority Chinese.  All of this shows, in sum, that the racialization 
of the world created by the British and appropriated by the independent Singapore 
state both enables and disables social relationships in Singapore.  But the experiences 
of my informants show that many are seeking to transcend the official categories of 
race too, not necessarily to deracinate themselves but to make a different range of 
‘racial’ practices possible.    
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Appendix A - Random press cuttings and reports (see Chapter 5.1) 
Appendix A is a sample collection of random press cuttings and reports that are self-
explanatory. The words ‘race’ and ‘ethnic’ are often fudged and used synonymously 
in the Singapore context.  The fudging between these words is sometimes taken to 
extremes when used together – as in “ethnic races” – to form a sentence.  The samples 
also show that political leaders, the public, academics as well as the media all use the 
word ‘race’ to refer to the ethnic groups. 
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